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THE JOURNAL

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PHILOLOGY.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS.

1. PROPERTIUS IV (V). 8. 1,

Disce quid Esquilias hac nocte fugarit aquosas.

The epithet *aquosas* as applied to the Esquiline hill by Propertius has not been rightly interpreted by commentators. They suppose that the hill was so called from its springs and marshy ground, and refer to Varro's statement (L. L. v. § 49) that its name was derived from the *æsculeta* which grew upon it, as proving that marshy ground occupied at least a part of the slopes. Another explanation given by commentators has been that *aquosas* is a translation of the Homeric epithets πολυπίδαξ or πιδήεσσα applied to Mount Ida in Il. VIII. 47, XI. 183, as it is in Hor. Od. III. 20. 15 "aquosa raptus ab Ida." But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. Varro's derivation of 'Esquiliæ' from the *æsculeta* which grew there seems improbable, and Mommsen R. H. Bk. I. ch. 4, and Corssen Lat. Spr. Vol. II. p. 1023 are probably correct in taking the true derivation to be from *excolinæ* "the suburban district," as *inquilinus* from *incolo* and *sescenti* from *sexcenti*. Nor does it seem likely that Propertius would have used the Homeric epithet merely as a poetical ornament, with-

out any special significance. As he lived himself upon the Esquiline (Prop. Carm. IV. 23, 24), he must have intended to express some feature of the hill which would be at once recognized by every Roman resident.

Nor is it difficult for the archæologist to see what this feature of the hill was. He will at once recollect that almost all the aqueducts of Rome entered the city on the Esquiline hill near the Porta Maggiore and the Porta S. Lorenzo, where considerable remains of the *specus* of several of the more ancient and important aqueducts still remain, the Marcian, Tepulan and Julian, with the records of their restoration by Augustus inscribed upon them. Agrippa and Augustus during the life of Propertius renovated and distributed the water of these and other aqueducts. We find Pliny, N. H. XXXVI. § 121, stating that Agrippa when ædile constructed several hundreds of cisterns and *aquæ castella,* and fifty great public jets of water.

Strabo also, v. 3. 8, says that nearly every house had *σίφωνες καὶ κροῦνοι ἄφθονοι,* and that rivers of water ran through the city. The passages in Horace, Ovid, Martial and Juvenal which describe the abundance of water dripping and bursting from the cisterns and pipes are well known. (Hor. Ep. I. 10. 20 'aqua tendit rumpere plumbum.' Ovid. Met. IV. 122. Mart. III. 47; IX. 19. Juv. III. 11.)

This escape of water from the pipes and *specus* and fountains on the Esquiline is probably referred to by Martial (Ep. V. 22. 6), where he speaks of the stones on the ascent from the Subura to the Esquiline as "Nunquam sicco sordida saxa gradu," a passage which is often wrongly understood as referring generally to mud in the streets. So also in Ep. IV. 18. 2 Martial, speaking of the arch of the Aqua Virgo over the Via Flaminia, says "Et madet assiduo lubricus imbre lapis."

The *puticuli* on the Esquiline mentioned by Festus, p. 216 ed. Müller, and referred to by Hertzberg in his commentary, were, as Festus says, pits for the deposit of the bodies of criminals executed on the Esquiline, and have no bearing on the epithet *aquosas,* but were named from the putrid filth they contained.

Propertius refers to the improvements introduced by Agrippa when ædile in the distribution of the water which came by the Julian and Marcian aqueducts to the Esquiline, when he speaks (in the line Carm. III. 2. 12 "Non operosa rigat Marcius antra liquor") of the pipes by which the water was conveyed to private houses. Frontinus de aq. 9, in reference to the same act of Agrippa, says that Agrippa "Compluribus salientibus aquis instruxit urbem." The greatest portion of the water supplied by the aqueducts to Rome must therefore have passed over and through the Esquiline hill. No doubt many of Agrippa's fountains and *castella* were constructed there, and many pipes passed from the main channels in all directions to the houses and gardens of Mæcenas and other wealthy courtiers who occupied the Esquiline after the ground had been cleared and made as Horace calls it *saluber*. (Sat. I. 8. 14 "Esquiliis habitare salubribus.") The warm swimming bath which Dion Cassius, LV. 7, mentions as one of the public improvements introduced by Mæcenas was probably in his grounds on the Esquiline.

2. Propertius IV (V). 4. 14,

Bellicus ex illo fonte bibebat equus.

Commentators and archæologists have been misled in their statements as to the probable position of this *fons* by their not having recognized the fact that the so-called Carcer Mamertinus was at a very early period a tank or well-house which probably supplied water to the district between the Capitoline and Quirinal hills. In this poem in connection with the story of Tarpeia, Propertius has evidently called up in his imagination the state of the ground occupied by the two contending troops of Romans and Sabines. The Sabine warriors under Tatius he represents as having descended from the Quirinal hill and posted themselves at the foot of the slope of the Roman Arx on the Capitoline. Here the poet imagines that there was a clump of trees watered by a spring which rose on the side of the Capitoline and flowed down towards the site of the Forum Romanum. He marks out the spot by the words in line 13, "ubi nunc est curia septa." The Curia, it is nearly

certain, stood on the slope below the site now occupied by the church of S. Giuseppe dei Falegnami and the ancient well-house called the Mamertine Prison, and this is exactly the position which the Sabines, descending from the Quirinal and posting themselves in the Forum valley, would occupy between the two hills.

Mommsen, in his admirable discussion of the topography of the north end of the Forum, mentions this passage of Propertius and suggests that the *lacus servilius* is the *fons* referred to (Ann. dell' Inst. XVI. 302). But the *lacus servilius* was on the side of the Capitoline nearest to the Palatine, and therefore on the opposite side to that from which Tatius was imagined by Propertius to have approached the Forum. Propertius must have had the Curia as restored by Augustus in his mind, and this was certainly near the Comitium and at the north-west corner of the Forum.

The lower chamber of the building now called the Carcer is constructed in a conical shape by the gradual projection of the stones forming the sides. This mode of building is of a very early date, and is found in the Regulini Galassi tomb at Cære in Etruria, and in well-houses at Tusculum and at Fiesole and Cortona. See Dennis, Etruria, Vol. II. pp. 46, 128, 451, and Gell, Topography of Rome, p. 432, where representations of the tomb and the well-house are given. The well at Tusculum shews most clearly what the nature of this Roman watering-place originally was. We have there the truncated conical dome where the spring water collects, and near it are some troughs supplied from it with water which were evidently washing troughs, or troughs from which horses might be watered. Propertius had a horse's watering trough of this kind in his imagination when he wrote the line "Bellicus ex illo fonte bibebat equus." In the legend, as it was known to Propertius, Tarpeia drew the water for her water-jug at the fountain-head, whence it ran down the slope to the troughs in the Forum where the horses could drink.

The building as it now stands was not consecrated as St Peter's prison before the 9th century (Hemans, Monuments of Rome, p. 110), and the name *Tullianum* was possibly derived

from the ancient structure having been a well-house. Festus gives an interpretation of the word *Tullius* as meaning a stream of water. (Festus, p. 353 ed. Müller.) He quotes from the Ajax of Ennius an instance of the use of the word *tullii* corresponding to the σύριγγες "arteries" of Soph. Aj. 1412 and the αὐλὸς παχύς, "gush of blood" of Hom. Od. XXII. 18.

Corssen Lat. Spr. II. p. 171 connects the name Tullius with the root *tol tul*, which would seem to point to the meaning "a place for drawing water." *Tiburtes tullias* occurs in Plin. N. H. XVII. 16. 26, where *tullias* probably refers to the well-known cascades of the Anio at Tibur.

3. Martial VIII. 75. 2,

A tecta Flaminiaque recens.

This passage has been wrongly explained by commentators as referring to the *tecta via* outside the Porta Capena. Their mistake arises from ignorance of the fact (well known to Roman archæologists) that there were two *tectæ viæ* at Rome, as is rightly stated in Forcellini's Lexicon s. v. *recta via.* These *tectæ viæ* were no doubt similar to the Porticoes at Bologna which lead from the Porta Saragozza to the Madonna di S. Luca, and from the Porta Maggiore to the church of Gli Scalzi. One of them was placed between the Porta Capena and the temple of Mars outside the walls, and was intended to secure a convenient passage for the votaries who went to dedicate their armour at the temple after a successful engagement or a happy escape. This custom is referred to in Propertius IV (V). 3. 71, "Armaque cum tulero Portæ votiva Capenæ subscribam salvo grata puella viro."

A grand procession of the Order of Knights (transvectio equitum, Liv. IX. 46; Ov. Fast. VI. 191) was conducted on the Ides of Quintilis every year from this temple of Mars to the Capitol to give thanks for the aid of the Dioscuri at the battle of Regillus, and other religious ceremonies were carried on just outside the Porta Capena, as for instance those connected with the Lapis Manalis. Thus a considerable traffic similar to that which passes through the Porta Saragozza at

Bologna, passed along the road between the gate and temple, and was sheltered by a *via tecta.*

The other path which was sheltered by a portico was on the Campus Martius near the Flaminian road between the old Porta Ratumena and the later Porta Flaminia, now the Porta del Popolo. This latter is the *via tecta* to which Martial refers in VIII. 75. 2, as quoted above, where he connects it with the Flaminian road. A further description of it as the Via Fornicata ad Campum is given in Liv. XXII. 36. 8, shewing that it was a vaulted archway. The Roman house of Martial's friend Julius Martialis seems to have been near this *via tecta,* for his villa was on the Monte Mario to which the approach from the Flaminian road would be much nearer than from the Porta Capena. See Mart. III. 5. 5, "hunc quæres primæ in limine tectæ," and Mart. IV. 64. 1, "Juli jugera pauca Martialis Longo Janiculi jugo recumbunt"; and 23, "Cum sit tam prope Milvius." Seneca, Apol. 13. 1, speaks of this *via tecta* as near the altar of Dis, where Claudius descended *ad inferos.* Claudius was buried in the Mausoleum of Augustus, which was near the southern end of this *via tecta.*

Gallienus (Hist. Aug. Gallien. 18) seems to have designed a grand extension of this *via tecta* to the Milvian bridge.

4. Martial IV. 18. 1,

Qua vicina pluit Vipsanis porta columnis.

A mistake has been made in the interpretation of this line by commentators from their ignorance of the position of the Roman aqueducts. Schrevelius in his variorum edition of Martial's epigrams, followed by Paley and Stone, identifies the *porta* here mentioned with the Porta Capena, because the Porta Capena is in several passages of the Roman poets called *madida* from the Aqua Marcia which passed over it.

But the *porta* here spoken of was 'vicina Vipsanis columnis,' and the 'Porticus Vipsania' was probably a portion or a continuation of the Porticus Polæ built by Pola, Agrippa's sister (Dion Cass. LV. 8), and perhaps connected with the Porticus Europæ (Mart. II. 14. 3). This colonnade was in sight

of Martial's house on the Quirinal (Mart. Ep. I. 108. 3), and we may infer from the name Vipsania that it was a part of the buildings of Agrippa near his Thermæ on the Campus Martius. Thus the water which dripped from the *porta* must have been that of the Aqua Virgo, from which Agrippa supplied his baths.

And it appears that the Aqua Virgo was carried over the arch of Claudius discovered in 1650, which crossed the Via Lata, now the Corso, near the Palazzo Sciarra, and was built in memory of Claudius' expedition to Britain in A.D. 43. Another archway was also discovered at the same time by which the Aqua Virgo was carried over a street parallel to the Via Lata but nearer to the Pantheon. One of these two archways is plainly alluded to by Martial, and thus the position of the Porticus Vipsania is approximately determined. The extent of this Porticus is shewn by the fact mentioned by Tacitus (Hist. I. 31) and Plutarch (Galba 25) that troops could be quartered in it.

(*To be continued.*)

R. BURN.

ON CERTAIN ENGINEERING DIFFICULTIES IN THUCYDIDES' ACCOUNT OF THE ESCAPE FROM PLATÆA. Bk. III. 20—4.

A CAREFUL consideration of the account given of this event by Thucydides, aided by modern research, will, I think, tend to throw considerable doubts over his accuracy, in this respect at least, as an historian. I am not aware that such doubts have been raised in any history of Greece, with the exception of that by Sir George Cox[1]. He has put forward, at some length, in an appendix, the views I propose to bring more fully before the reader; and in doing so, he has acknowledged his obligations to me as the author of the doubt. The question is, I think, both interesting and important; for the character of a great historian is impugned, if not for truthfulness, at least for accuracy.

In the year B.C. 429, two years after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Peloponnesians, led by King Archidamus, marched against Platæa. This was done at the desire and the instance of the Thebans, who were the implacable enemies of the Platæans. As the Platæans, advised by Athens, had rejected the offer of remaining neutral, their city was at once invested by the Lacedæmonian army. And here follows, in Thucydides II. 75—8, a most interesting and circumstantial account of the siege, which it is necessary to my purpose to epitomise.

The first operation was to barricade the city all round with trees cut from the spot, to prevent any further egress of the citizens, *τοῦ μηδένα ἔτι ἐξιέναι.* The next was, to carry a mound on an inclined plane to the level of the top of the wall. This mound was raised only against a portion of the city wall, the object being simply to effect an entry. For the construction of it, wooden piles and fascines, stones and earth, were used; and when the besieged made mines under or holes

[1] Hist. of Greece, Vol. II. App. K. pp. 603—6.

through the bottom of their own wall, and carried off the loose soil from the mound into the city, so as to cause a continual subsidence of the enemy's earth-work, the Peloponnesians had recourse to reed-baskets filled with clay. As the mound rose in height, the Platæans kept adding to the height of their own walls by a hoarding or frame of timber filled in with brick. For seventy days and nights the whole Lacedæmonian army worked continuously by relays, *κατ' ἀναπαύλας*. The Platæans, fearing they should not hold out, left off raising the wall in this part, and worked at a crescent-shaped inner wall, commencing from the lower or unheightened wall on either side, and curving inwards into the city, in order that, if their great or outer wall were taken, *εἰ τὸ μέγα τεῖχος ἁλίσκοιτο*, the secondary or crescent-shaped wall might still hold out for a time. The Peloponnesians now raise engines on their mound to batter down the Platæan timber frame or *upper* wall. This device seems to have been a battering-ram, a contrivance well known to the Assyrians in much earlier times. Mr Layard, in his 'Nineveh,' p. 217 of the smaller edition, describes a bas-relief in which the besieged are endeavouring to catch the ram by letting down a chain from the wall. In p. 255 of the same work, he says, "the battering ram was rolled up to the walls on an inclined plane constructed of earth, stones, and trees, which appears to have been sometimes paved with bricks or squared stones to facilitate the ascent of the engine." He adds, "this mode of besieging is frequently alluded to in Scripture."

According to Thucydides, the Platæans adopted very similar measures to prevent the ram making a breach. They let fall heavy beams suspended by chains, and knocked off the heads of the rams as they were going to strike. The Lacedæmonian army next tried fire, hoping, says the historian, that if a wind arose they could set ablaze the city, which was of no great size, *οὖσαν οὐ μεγάλην*, II. 77. They wished, he says, to induce the city to surrender without the expense and delay of a long siege,—to frighten the Platæans in fact, by a strong measure which should leave them little hope of mercy if they persisted in holding out. To this end, they piled up the spaces between the wall and the crescent-shaped barricade with faggots, which

they threw in from their own mound, and even for some little way over or beyond the crescent, and into the interior of the city. Then, setting fire to the heap with brimstone and tar, they made, says the historian, such a bonfire as had never been seen up to that time, unless perhaps in the accidental burning of a wood. But he adds, with a slight touch of the marvellous[1], "it is said that a thunderstorm with heavy rain descended at the time and put out the fire."

The siege at length was turned into a blockade. Archidamus appears to have retired with part of his army; for the historian says, a considerable part, *μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοπέδου*, was left, and that these, the remnant of the force, proceeded to wall round the city, assigning the work in different parts to different cities or bodies of troops, *περιετείχιζον τὴν πόλιν κύκλῳ, διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις τὸ χωρίον.*

This wall, he tells us, had a double ditch or moat, both inside and out, from which they had dug the bricks to make the wall: *τάφρος δὲ ἐντός τε ἦν καὶ ἔξωθεν, ἐξ ἧς ἐπλινθεύσαντο.* The whole of this work was finished, he adds, *πᾶν ἐξείργαστο*, at the rising of Arcturus, that is, at the autumnal equinox. Now, as the expedition had commenced in spring (*τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους*, chap. 71), and seventy days had been spent in the fruitless working at the mound, we are met at once by this startling statement,—that in less than three months an investing double wall of brick, with a double moat, was raised all round the city, and even built of materials, *πλίνθοι*, that had to be dug and made (either burnt or sun-dried) on the spot!

Now, though the historian does say that the city was not large, *οὐ μεγάλη*, we know certainly that it was by no means small. For there were 400 fighting men left in it, besides eighty Athenians, and 110 women to make the bread for the besieged (II. 78). All the rest of the women, with the children, the old men, and the unserviceable population, *ἀχρεῖον πλῆθος*, meaning probably the slaves, had been sent by the Platæans for safety to Athens. According to the usual average of fighting men to a whole population, there could not have been less than 10,000 inhabitants. At the battle of Marathon, some 60 years

[1] Compare the story in Herod. I. 87.

before, we read of a contingent of 1000 Platæans; at the battle of Platæa the ὁπλῖται numbered 600. Now, let us consider if any engineer, civil or military, could by any possibility perform such a feat in three months as to surround and inclose so large a town with a wall and a deep double moat! With the number of hands engaged, it is manifestly and certainly *quite impossible.* Such a feat can only be compared to the stories about devil's dykes and mounds miraculously raised in a single night. Least of all were the slow and inert Lacedæmonians likely to execute so stupendous a work in so brief a time.

We happen to know, from existing remains, the extent of the city wall of Platæa. Colonel Leake tells us, in his Travels in Northern Greece[1], that it is 2½ miles round. Of course, the investing wall with its double moats must have been much larger, whatever may have been the circuit of the ancient city.

But what puts an end to the question of possibility is the minute account given of this very wall in the 20th and 21st chapter of the Third Book, where it is to be observed that it is in three separate places distinctly called the "wall of the enemy," and "the wall of the Peloponnesians." It was actually a *double* wall, with an interval of 16 feet between. It was so high that it had to be scaled by ladders; it had battlements, and at intervals of every ten battlements, διὰ δέκα ἐπαλξέων, there were wide and large towers, spanning right across to the very outside of each wall, and therefore about as large as ordinary church towers! He calls them πύργοι μεγάλοι καὶ ἰσοπλατεῖς τῷ τείχει. There was an arch or entrance in the middle of each, and they were roofed above, ἄνωθεν στεγανοί. The intervening space, he says, was used as a series of guard-rooms, τοῖς φύλαξιν οἰκήματα ᾠκοδόμητο. Who these φύλακες were, we know from II. 78; they consisted half of Bœotians, that is, Thebans, and half of Lacedæmonians, though even the μέρος τι, or part of the army that is said to have made the wall, had retired, ἀνεχώρησαν, and been disbanded.

But still further; the whole of this wall, say, two miles in circuit, was plaistered internally with rough-cast—in itself a most gigantic task to perform! How could an invading enemy

[1] Vol. II. chap. 16.

possibly do this, standing on scaffolds or ladders, without opposition; and above all, *where did all the plaister come from?* Thucydides says, that in order to calculate the height of the walls by the courses of brick internally, the Platæans who intended to escape counted the bricks in a part ἥ ἔτυχε πρὸς σφᾶς οὐκ ἐξαλειλιμμένον τὸ τεῖχος αὐτῶν (that is, τὸ τεῖχος τῶν πολεμίων),—words which Dr Arnold incorrectly renders "thoroughly white-washed." He should have translated, "in a part where the plaistering had not been completed."

Thus then we have some 500 fighting men cooped up in a double wall of some two miles in circumference, and guarded by a handful of troops who had their lodging in the double wall! This alone is quite incredible; for if an army had come from Athens to aid the party within, these φύλακες would have been in a very unsafe position between the Athenians without and the Platæans within, and must have surrendered very shortly if only by a failure of supplies.

The question now arises, is the whole story about this wall a fiction, or is it the result of an extraordinary and almost incredible blunder on the part of Thucydides in confounding the ancient city walls with a new wall built on purpose to prevent the escape of the besieged?

Although there are very great difficulties in either supposition, I shall endeavour to show that the latter is the case. The evidence of modern travellers will go some way in determining this. But first it may be remarked, that we happen to possess an ancient stone sculpture, or drawing as it might be called, found by Sir Charles Fellowes at Pinara in Lycia, and of a date certainly not less ancient than the siege of Platæa, with battlements and towers on the walls precisely as described by Thucydides. Secondly, walls such as those here spoken of as the siege-works of the enemy existed commonly till quite late in the middle ages. If I remember aright, the city of Nuremberg still retains its old walls, said to be crowned with 365 towers. I say "crowned," bearing in mind the passage in the Œdipus at Colonus of Sophocles[1], who speaks of πύργοι μὲν οἳ πόλιν

[1] Ver. 15. The MSS. indeed give στέγουσιν, but it seems probable that στέφουσιν is the true reading.

στέφουσιν, in speaking of the wall then surrounding Athens, traces of which, with towers, still remain.

The most complete account of the old walls of Platæa is given in Dodwell's Classical Tour through Greece, Vol. I. p. 277—80. The ruins, he says, of the city stand on a low oblong rock, the narrow extremities of which face north and south, the longer sides closely corresponding with the still existing remains. Being enormously strong (even without being double), they might have afforded, in the flanking towers, a safe position for the warders or φύλακες of the beleaguered city. They were supported too by 300 reserves, who are said (III. 22, 7) to have been posted outside the outer moat to bring immediate aid, if necessary, οἷς ἐτέτακτο παραβοηθεῖν εἴ τι δέοι.

That Thucydides did not know the locality, and fancied that the city wall was encircled by another double wall, is further shown by his using ἐξελθόντες in chap. 22. He there says distinctly that the Platæans who remained in the city *went out* and made an attack on the Peloponnesian wall on the opposite side to that on which their friends were escaping. This must mean that they went out of their own city walls and attacked the Peloponnesian wall of circumvallation. Moreover, he fancied that the Spartan force was encamped somewhere between the city wall and their own double lines; a force over and above the φύλακες and the 300 reserves. For he says that when an alarm had been raised by the falling of a tile, in the escape, the besieging army rushed to the wall, ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος. Nor do I think it possible to understand these words in any other way.

Viewed under any aspect, the matter is full of difficulties. It is possible that all the walls now remaining may be later than the siege of Platæa; for Thucydides says the Thebans "destroyed the whole city to the level from the foundations," καθελόντες αὐτὴν ἐς ἔδαφος πᾶσαν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων, III. 68, but he does not specify the walls. The city is said to have been rebuilt after the peace of Antalcidas in 387, and again destroyed by the Thebans in 374. Again it was restored under the Macedonian supremacy, and lastly its walls were rebuilt by Justinian.

Thus great doubt is thrown on the identification of any of the present remains with those existing in the time of Thucydides. If those walls have wholly disappeared and been replaced by others, his account may be substantially true, *provided* we understand it of the city walls and not of the circumvallation, which, I think I have clearly shown, must be given up as false in fact, because involving an impossibility.

It is likely that this old city wall was the same, as regards circuit and foundations, with those walls that now exist, and which Dodwell attributes to the Macedonian era. The old foundations he speaks of may be those left by the Thebans when they razed the town to the ground; and the towers now standing may have been rebuilt after the fashion of the old ones.

With regard to the brick dug out of the moats, of which Thucydides says the walls were built, if there is clay on the spot, it may be said that sun-dried bricks could have been made with straw or stubble, like those which are used about Cambridge made out of the chalk marl, and called "batts." If there is no clay, then of course the whole story of the bricks is a fabrication. It would be very interesting to have this matter settled by a geological examination of the site, which is said to be on a rock.

My impression is, that Thucydides was so far led away by the habit of the λογογράφοι to compose amusing or sensational stories—abundance of which we find interposed in the graver historical narratives of Herodotus—that he here indulged his hearers with a very exciting story of a hair-breadth escape, and was really more intent on making the story a good one (in which he has certainly succeeded) than in a careful investigation of the truth. It is not to be denied that in his preface (I. 21) he denounces the λογογράφοι who compose stories merely to please, ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, but then this preface was written last, and it may express the feelings of the more matured historian, although some approach to the romantic and the marvellous had been attempted in the earlier writing of his history.

There may have been a desire too to insert an exciting and

amusing episode to counteract the dullness for which he himself apologizes in I. 22, where he expresses a fear that some may think the non-mythical nature of his history somewhat uninteresting, *ἐς ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθώδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται.*

It will no doubt be objected that Thucydides, writing so nearly at the time of the event, and a native of Athens, could not have been so misinformed about so important a town so near and so friendly to Athens. But Platæa had been utterly destroyed by the Thebans about B.C. 425; and if Thucydides wrote or published his history twenty years later, when the town was in utter ruin, such misconceptions are by no means so improbable as they may appear.

That certain prisoners of war did escape and get safely to Athens, no one will deny. But we may be pretty sure their version of the story would not be derogatory to their own bravery and cleverness.

There is really no difficulty in supposing that the Spartans had taken possession of the city wall and cooped up the inhabitants within it till they should surrender themselves through starvation. The motive for this is evident, viz. because in the event of a peace they would not be compelled to restore any city that had given itself up, but only those captured by force. This is distinctly stated in III. 52: "the Lacedæmonian general, aware of the weak state to which the Platæans had been reduced by the famine, was unwilling to take them by assault, orders to spare them having been sent from head quarters, in order that, in the event of a truce, and a restoration on both sides of the places taken in the war, Platæa might not be ceded to Athens, as having voluntarily come over."

The double character of the wall, described as spanned by towers, may be a mistake resulting from some kind of mound or barricade raised round the city wall on the outside, and the wonderful story of the deep moat and the frozen water very likely arose from that of the ditch out of which the mound had been dug. But if there ever were moats, there must still be vestiges of some of them.

F. A. PALEY.

ON THE FIRST SEVEN VERSES OF THE ANTIGONE.

I SEEM to myself to have found a probable solution of the great difficulties which beset this passage.

I suppose vs. 2—3 to have stood thus originally;

> ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν
> οὐκ ἔσθ' ὁποῖον οὐχὶ νῷν ζώσαιν τελεῖ;

By way of comment, ἔτι was written above ζώσαιν, this being the more usual formula, as we have ἔτι ζῶσαν γαμεῖς in v. 750, ἔτι ζῶν Ajax 990, and ἔτι ζῶσαν φλόγα in Bacch. 6. But when the gloss had crept into the text and so made a verse of seven feet, οὐκ ἔσθ' was omitted, and the present reading, which is nonsense, and cannot be translated, was the result. In other words, the actors had to choose between rejecting οὐκ ἔσθ', or ἔτι.

For many years I have held the opinion, that the three next verses are an interpolation, and that for three good reasons; (1) The seven verses of Antigone should correspond numerically to the seven of Ismene. (2) The words ὁποῖον οὐ—κακῶν are a mere repetition from the preceding sentence. (3) The double negative, ὁποῖον οὐ—οὐκ ὄπωπα, if defensible in itself, seems due to the same kind of pedantry which intended οὔτ' ἄτης ἄτερ in v. 4 to stand for οὔτε οὐκ ἄτερ ἄτης, i.e. οὔτε ξὺν ἄτῃ. None of the proposed corrections of this verse seem to me in the least probable. It is radically bad, together with the other two lines. The negative οὐ repeated seven times in three verses can hardly be attributed to Sophocles, who could so easily and naturally have used ἠσθόμην for οὐκ ὄπωπα, 'of which I am not fully aware.'

But *why* were these verses interpolated? I fancy I can now give a plausible reason. It was to represent in another way the *οὐκ ἔστι* which had been wrongfully excluded from v. 3, and was taken into protection by one school of actors. This is now developed into *οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν κακῶν ὁποῖον οὐκ ὄπωπα.* It is evident, not to say certain, that *if* the poet intended in v. 3 the syntax I have suggested, *ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν κακῶν ὁποῖον Ζεὺς οὐ τελεῖ,* he *could* not have immediately added, *οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν κακῶν ὁποῖον οὐκ ὄπωπα.*

As a matter of Greek grammar, it seems to me *necessary* that *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὁποῖον* should have commenced v. 3.

If my reasoning is right, what a curious "muddle" has been caused by the interpolation of the little word *ἔτι*[1]!

[1] In Oed. Tyr. 1401 there is a doubt between *ἆρά μου μέμνησθ' ὅτι οἷ' ἔργα δράσας*, and *μέμνησθ' ἔτι.* Remarkable examples of a redundant negative occur Oed. Tyr. 328, El. 626, Trach. 158, Phil. 416—8. (I am aware, of course, of the interpretation suggested by Professor Kennedy on Oed. Tyr. 328, where I still prefer my correction *τἄμ' ὡς ἂν εἴπῃς.*)

F. A. PALEY.

ON SOME FRAGMENTS OF THE NEW COMEDY, AND SOME PASSAGES OF AESCHYLUS, THEOGNIS. ALCAEUS AND IBYCUS.

The following notes on the 4th volume of Meineke's *Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum*, containing the fragments of the New Comedy, may, I hope, be not without interest, if not for themselves, as illustrating Catullus. I shall begin with exhibiting some parallelisms of expression or idea. Such resemblances are especially likely to be found in Menander, the one subject running through all whose dramas like a common breath, was love (Plut. περὶ Ἔρωτος ap. Stob. Flor. 63. 34).

Cat. LXXVI. 13, 14

Difficile est longum subito deponere amorem,
Difficile est.

Menand. Καρχηδόνιοι fr. III. M.

ἔργον ἐκ μακροῦ χρόνου
ἄνοιαν ἡμέρᾳ μεταστῆσαι μιᾷ.

Menand. Inc. CXCIII.

ἔργον ἐστί, Φανία,
μακρὰν συνήθειαν βραχεῖ λῦσαι χρόνῳ.

The repetition *Difficile est, Difficile est* is a natural one and has its counterpart in a fragm. of Apollodorus of Carystus Inc. v. M.

χαλεπὸν τύχη 'στι πρᾶγμα, χαλεπόν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ
αὐτὴν φέρειν κατὰ τρόπον, ὥσπερ φορτίον.

The combination of past, present, and future in the recurring formula *quot aut fuerunt Aut sunt aut aliis erunt in annis* is found several times in the New Comedy.

Menand. Inc. XII. M.

φθόνος
Φθισικὸν πεποίηκε καὶ ποιήσει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Philem. Inc. II. M.

ὃν οὐδὲ εἷς λέληθεν οὐδὲ ἓν ποιῶν
οὐδ' ἂν ποιήσων οὐδὲ πεποιηκὼς πάλαι,

to which may be added from Euripides Troad. 467

πτωμάτων γὰρ ἄξια
πάσχω τε καὶ πέπονθα κἄτι πείσομαι.

With Cat. XXII. fin. compare Menand. Inc. LXXXV.

οὐδεὶς ἐφ' αὑτοῦ τὰ κακὰ συνορᾷ, Πάμφιλε,
σαφῶς, ἑτέρου δ' ἀσχημονοῦντος ὄψεται.

With Cat. VIII. 3 *Fulsere quondam candidi tibi soles,* compare Zenob. VI. 13 *Μένανδρος δέ φησιν ἐν Λευκαδίᾳ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἡμέραν λευκὴν καλεῖσθαι.*

Menand. Inc. VII.

Μὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ἄνδρες, εἰκόν' οὐκ ἔχω
εὑρεῖν ὁμοίαν τῷ γεγονότι πράγματι,
ζητῶν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν τί ταχέως ἀπολλύει.
στρόβιλος; ἐν ὅσῳ συστρέφεται, προσέρχεται,
προέλαβεν, ἐξέῤῥιψεν, αἰὼν γίγνεται.

The word *ἐξέῤῥιψεν* has a strange look, and can hardly, I think, be genuine. I believe the real word is *ἐξέῤῥηξεν* which is used intransitively of a subterranean wind bursting forth by Aristotle Meteorol. II. 8, p. 366. 31 of the Berlin ed. *Ἤδη γὰρ σεισμὸς ἐν τόποις τισί γινόμενος οὐ πρότερον ἔληξε, πρὶν ἐκρήξας εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς τόπον φανερῶς ὥσπερ ἐκνεφίας ἐξῆλθεν ὁ κινήσας ἄνεμος.*

Menand. Inc. VIII. M.

Γαμεῖ γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδὲ εἷς εἰ μὴ δέκ' ἢ
ἕνδεκα γυναῖκας· δώδεκ' ἢ πλείους τινές.
Ἂν τέτταρας δ' ἢ πέντε γεγαμηκὼς τύχῃ
†καταστροφήτις, ἀνυμέναιος ἄθλιος
ἄνυμφος οὗτος ἐπικαλεῖτ' ἐν τοῖς ἐκεῖ.

Meineke reads after Tyrwhitt *τύχῃ καταστροφῆς τις*· apparently in the sense of 'dies.' Mr Lancelot Shadwell, in his 'Commentary on the Gospels of Matthew and of Mark' 1861, conjectures *κᾰ̔τα στραφῇ τις* 'which alters only half a letter, and exactly agrees with the context. The poet had just before said

γαμεῖ γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδὲ εἷς εἰ μὴ δέκ' ἢ
ἕνδεκα γυναῖκας, δώδεκ' ἢ πλείους τινές.

He then adds, But if any one shall take four or five wives, *and stop there*, they call him a miserable old bachelor' (pp. 58, 59).

Menand. Inc. xv. M.

Plut. ap. Stob. Flor. 63. 34 *τῶν Μενάνδρου δραμάτων ὁμαλῶς ἁπάντων ἓν συνεκτικόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἔρως, οἷον πνεῦμα κοινὸν διαπεφυκώς. ὃν οὖν (? ὡς ἂν οὖν) μάλιστα θιασώτην τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ὀργιαστὴν τὸν ἄνδρα συμπεριλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὴν ζήτησιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ λελάληκε περὶ τοῦ πάθους φιλοσοφώτερον. ἄξιον γὰρ εἶναι θαύματος φησὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐρῶντας, †ὥσπερ ἔστιν, ἅμα λαλεῖ†. εἶτα ἀπορεῖ καὶ ζητεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*

τίνι δεδούλωταί ποτε;
ὄψει; φλύαρος· τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς πάντες ἂν
ἤρων· κρίσιν γὰρ τὸ βλέπειν ἴσην ἔχει.
ἀλλ' ἡδονή τις τοὺς ἐρῶντας ἐπάγεται
συνουσίας; πῶς οὖν ἕτερος ταύτην ἔχων
οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἀπῆλθε καταγελῶν,
ἕτερος ἀπόλωλε; καιρός ἐστιν ἡ νόσος
ψυχῆς· ὁ πληγεὶς δ' †εἴσω δὴ τιτρώσκεται.

'Multorum coniecturis uexatum est' says Cobet of this passage Nov. Lect. p. 82; if therefore I err in my attempt, it is in good company. And first it seems pretty clear that the words *ἄξιον γὰρ θαύματος* are part of the quotation, and on this hypothesis they have been variously altered, not very happily so far as they are known to me. I would read

ἄξιον γὰρ θαύματος
τὸ τῶν ἐρώντων, οἷς πάρεστιν, ἄμποιεῖ.

'Strange enough is what happens to men in love, all that he (Love) produces in those that are under his spell.' The change of nominative to Ἔρως is easily intelligible, and if anywhere, in Menander.

For εἴσω δὴ which Bentley altered to εἰσβολῇ, Wyttenbach to εἰς ὃ δεῖ, Hermann to εἰς ὁδί, a marginal annotator of the Bodleian copy of Bentley's edition of the fragments has written εἰς ὅλην, i.e. I presume, ψυχήν. This would make excellent sense if we interpret καιρός a mortal blow: 'the disorder (love) is a mortal blow to the soul, the stricken victim is wounded in every fibre of it.'

Menand. Inc. XXX. M.

καὶ τοῦτο θύων οὐδεπώποτ' εὐξάμην
ἐγὼ τὸ σῶζον τὴν ἐμὴν οἰκίαν
ἀλλὰ παρέλιπον οἰκετῶν εἶναι στάσιν
ἐνδὸν παρ' αὑτῷ πρᾶγμα χρησιμώτατον.

The paraphrase of this passage given in the Venetian Schol. A. on Il. XXI. 389 οὐδέποτε θύων εὐξάμην ἄλλως σώζεσθαι τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ στάσιν οἰκετῶν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῇ as well as the excerpt from Plutarch Cat. Mai. 21 quoted by Meineke ἀεὶ δέ τινα στάσιν ἔχειν τοὺς δούλους ἐμηχανᾶτο καὶ διαφορὰν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὑπονοῶν τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ δεδοικὼς make it probable that we should read τὸ σῶζον τὴν ἐμὴν ἂν οἰκίαν, Ἀλλ' ἢ παρέλιπον· 'numquam id uoui quod domum meam seruaturum esset, nisi ut relinquerem etiam (without reserving) ut inter seruos fieret dissensio.'

Menand. Inc. LXXIX. M.

τοὺς τὸν ἴδιον δαπανῶντας ἀλογίστως βίον
τὸ καλῶς ἀκούειν ταχὺ ποιεῖ πᾶσιν κακῶς.

For πᾶσιν Bentley conj. πεινῆν, Meineke πάλιν or πάσχειν. Is not πράσσειν a simpler emendation?

Apollodorus Ἐπιδικαζόμενος II. M.

From the words of Terence on which this corrupt passage is quoted by Donatus it seems probable that ΝΑΛΚΕΙΣ or Ἀναλκεις represents ἐν λέσχῃ.

Anaxippus Ἐγκαλυπτόμενος I. M.

τὸν ὄρθρον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ὄψει βιβλία
ἔχοντα καὶ ζητοῦντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην.
οὐδὲν †χονδρεύουσι διαφέρω τ' Ἀσπενδίου.

I explain this of the *Aspendian salt* with the white and withered look of which the studious and bookish cook is compared. Plin. XXXI. 73 *Sal siccatur in lacu Tarentino aestiuis solibus...item in Sicilia in lacu qui Cocanicus uocatur et alio iuxta Gelam. horum extremitates tantum inarescunt, sicut in Phrygia Cappadocia Aspendi, ubi largius coquitur et usque ad medium.* I would read then *οὐδέν τι χόνδρου διαφέρω τ' Ἀσπενδίου.*

Poseidippus Ἀναβλέπων I. M.

ὁ δὲ τὴν γλῶτταν εἰς ἀσχήμονας
ἐπιθυμίας †ἔνιά τε τῶν ἡδυσμάτων
κάθαλος, κάτοξος, χναυστικὸς, προσκαυστικός.

For ἔνιά τε I would suggest ἐπίαλλε or ἐφίαλλε. Od. IX. 288 Ἀλλ' ὅ γ' ἀναίξας ἑτάροις ἐπὶ χεῖρας ἴαλλεν.

Aesch. Supp. 615.

τοίανδ' ἔπειθε ῥῆσιν ἀμφ' ἡμῶν λέγων
ἄναξ Πελασγῶν, ἱκεσίου Ζηνὸς κότον
μέγαν προφωνῶν μήποτ' εἰσόπιν χρόνου
πόλιν παχῦναι, ξενικὸν ἀστικόν θ' ἅμα
λέγων διπλοῦν μίασμα πρὸ πόλεως φανὲν
ἀμηχάνου βόσκημα πημονῆς πέλειν.

Conington, quoted by Paley, who translates 'warning them that the great wrath of Zeus would never hereafter enrich the city,' thought the idea was of a disease draining the body politic, exhausting its powers of support, *and preventing it from thriving or becoming fat.* This has always seemed to me the exact reverse of the poet's meaning. The citizens are warned against allowing the wrath of Zeus Hikesios, incurred by neglect of the suppliant Danaides, at some future time *to make the city wax gross* and *increase the unwholesome humours* in the body politic. The same metaphor underlies the words ὄλβος ἄγαν παχυνθεὶς

'prosperity swoln to an unhealthy bigness.' And this is surely the natural meaning of *προφωνῶν μήποτ'*, 'warning them that the anger of Zeus *should not* make the city grow fat,' i.e. against allowing it to do so.

857. *ἄγειος ἐγὼ βαθυχαῖος βαθρ έι ας βαθρ έι ας γέρον.*

So Med. I cannot help believing after all that has been written about *ἄγειος* that it is simply 'Αργεῖος: cf. 274 'Αργεῖαι *γένος* 'Εξευχόμεσθα, and the king's incredulity 277 *Ἄπιστα μυθεῖσθ', ὦ ξέναι, κλύειν ἐμοὶ, Ὅπως τόδ' ὑμῖν ἐστιν* 'Αργεῖον *γένος*, and especially 322 where the Chorus having proved their ancient connexion with Argos conclude with saying *εἰδὼς δ' ἀμὸν ἀρχαῖον γένος Πράσσοις ἂν ὡς* 'Αργεῖον *ἀνστήσῃς στόλον.*

Suppl. 875.

ὀι ὀῖ ὀῖ ὀῖ ὀῖ λ-υμ-ασισ ὑπρ ο γασυ λασκεῖ
περι χαμπτὰ βρυάζεις ὁ 'σ ἐρ ω τᾶς.

I think this mysterious passage contains two Egyptian allusions (1) to *Isis*, who is invoked to witness the wrong of the Suppliants (2) to the *crocodile*, called in Egyptian *χάμψα* (Herod. II. 69). We may suppose a number of Egyptians by this time to have gathered round, perhaps wearing the national ear- and ankle-rings, and gesticulating violently: it would be natural to the Suppliants bred in Egypt and remembering the similar adornment of the sacred crocodiles to compare them with their pursuers: hence I would read

οἲ οἲ οἲ οἲ οἲ,
λύμας, Ἶσι. πρὸ γᾶς ὑλάσκοι.
περὶ, χάμψα, βρυάζεις,
ὅσ' ἐρωτᾷς.

'Alas for the outrage, o Isis. I would he might howl beyond the limits of the land. Unmeasured is thy wantonness, thou crocodile, that thou askest so many questions.' With *περὶ βρυάζεις* we might perhaps compare Nicander's *περιβρυὴς* twice used in the sense of over-luxuriant. *ὅσ'* for *ὅς* as in *Ὀλβία, ὅσσα ἴσατι· πανολβία, ὡς γλυκυφωνεῖ* seems so natural that I marvel it should not have been suggested before.

Suppl. 987.

καὶ μήτ' ἀέλπτως δορικανεῖ μόρῳ θανὼν
λάθοιμι, χώρᾳ δ' ἄχθος ἀείζων πέλοι.

Weil and Wecklein rightly object to this, the former reading μήτ' ἐξ ἀέλπτων, the latter (Studien p. 88) supposing a verse lost after 988. May not the right reading be καὶ μὴ 'π' ἀέλπτοις 'and that I might not for some unlooked for reason be slain, and the land thus incur a burden of undying guilt.' The unlooked for reason would be some sudden surprise, such as might easily occur to a stranger.

Suppl. 996 sqq.

ὑμᾶς δ' ἐπαινῶ μὴ καταισχύνειν ἐμὲ,
ὥραν ἐχούσας τήνδ' ἐπίστρεπτον βροτοῖς.
τέρειν' ὀπώρα δ' εὐφύλακτος οὐδαμῶς.
θῆρες δὲ κηραίνουσι καὶ βροτοὶ, τί μήν;
καὶ κνώδαλα πτεροῦντα καὶ πεδοστιβῆ.
καρπώματα στάζοντα κηρύσσει Κύπρις
†κάλω ρ ακω λύουσαν θωσμέν ειν ην ἐρῶ.

It seems probable that the obelized line contained some particular application of the remark just made. 'I warn you to keep your virginity jealously guarded. Fruits just ripe are a desirable thing, and attract the attack of beasts and men. Venus gives notice when the grape is over-juicy, and who has not seen the fox watching the vine?'

I suggest then

κἀλωπέκ' ὠρευούσαν {ἀνθόσμην / οἰνάνθην} ἐρῶ.

The objection to the former of the two bracketed words is that it is not *known* to exist. But that it may have existed as the original word from which the well-known ἀνθοσμίας (οἶνος) took its origin, is I think likely, because both Suidas and the Schol. Arist. Plut. 807 say ἀνθοσμίας was formed ἀπὸ τόπου Ἀνθοσμίου ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ εἴδους ἀμπέλου. It is difficult to believe that the *vine* was called ἀνθοσμίας. As in the case of καπνίας, the vine would be likely to have a different form.

Schol. Vesp. 151 *κάπνη εἶδος ἀμπέλου ξηρότατον καὶ δριμύτατον οἶνον ποιούσης, ὁμοίως καπνῷ ποιοῦντα δάκρυα. τινὲς δὲ καπνίαν οἶνον ἐν Βενεβέντῳ τῆς Ἰταλίας γίνεσθαί φασι, καὶ καπνία ἡ ἄμπελος.* As then the vine seems to have been called *κάπνη καπνία* as well as *κάπνιος κάπνεος κάπνεως*, but not *καπνίας*, so it might be expected the vine would be called *ἀνθόσμη ἀνθόσμεως* or by some other similar form, but not *ἀνθοσμίας*. The fox is frequently mentioned as prowling about and injuring vines, Theoc. I. 457 *ἀμφὶ δέ νιν δύ' ἀλώπεκες, ἃ μὲν ἀν' ὄρχως Φοιτῇ σινομένα τὰν τρώξιμον*, Nicand. Al. 185 *Πιοτέρην ὅτε βότρυν ἐσίνατο κηκὰς ἀλώπηξ*. Babr. I. 11 *Ἀλωπέκ' ἐχθρῶν ἀμπέλων τε καὶ κήπων*. With *ἐρῶ* 'I will tell of,' introducing an object of comparison, cf. Ag. 896 *Λέγοιμ' ἂν ἄνδρα τόνδε τῶν σταθμῶν κύνα, Σωτῆρα ναὸς πρότονον κ.τ.λ.* and 838 *Εἰδὼς λέγοιμ' ἂν, εὖ γὰρ ἐξεπίσταμαι, Ὁμιλίας κάτοπτρον, εἴδωλον σκιᾶς, Δοκοῦντας εἶναι κάρτα πρευμενεῖς ἐμοί*. The language seems closely to resemble Chaeremon fr. 12 Nauck, *Πολλὴν ὀπώραν Κύπριδος εἰσορᾷν παρὴν Ἄκραισι περκάζουσαν οἰνάνθαις χρόνου*.

Suppl. 350.

λυκοδίωκτον ὡς δάμαλιν ἂμ πέτραις
ἀλιβάτοις, ἵν' ἀλκᾷ πίσυνος μέμυκε
φράζουσα βοτῆρι μόχθους.

Antigonus Hist. Mirab. 29 Keller *τὰς δ' ἐλάφους λέγει τίκτειν παρὰ τὰς ὁδούς, φευγούσας τὰ θηρία. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοὺς λύκους ἐνθάδε· ἄγειν δὲ καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐπὶ τῶν σταθμῶν, ἐθιζούσας οὗ δεῖ ἀποφεύγειν· εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο πέτραν ἀπορρῶγα, μίαν ἔχουσαν ὁδόν*. This description would apply exactly if we might interpret *δάμαλιν* not of a young heifer, but a young doe, following Hesych. *δάμαλις. μόσχος καὶ κατὰ πάντος νέου.*

Suppl. 795, 6.

ἀπρός-
δεικτος οἰόφρων κρεμὰς
γυπιὰς πέτρα.

Antig. Hist. Mirab. 42 *Γυπὸς δὲ λέγεται ὑπό τινων ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑόρακε νεοττὸν οὐδὲ νεοττείαν· διὸ καὶ Ἡρόδωρον τὸν*

Βρύσωνος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πατέρα ἀπό τινος αὐτοὺς ἑτέρας φάναι γῆς εἶναι μετεώρου. τίκτειν δ' οὖν ἐν ἀπροσβάτοις πέτραις.

Sept. c. Th. 576.

καὶ τὸν σὸν αὖθις προσμόραν ἀδελφεὸν
ἐξυπτιάζων ὄνομα, Πολυνείκους βίαν,
δίς τ' ἐν τελευτῇ τοὔνομ' ἐνδατούμενος
καλεῖ.

πρὸς μόραν Med. πρόσμορον most other MSS.

It does not seem to me at all certain that the reading of 576 is specially corrupt. Hermann indeed says '*ἀδελφεὸς* alienum est a trimetris tragicorum.' But surely forms like *ὀλοίατο* twenty lines above (552) in a similar iambic passage, the recurrence of *ἀδελφεῶν* in a lyric passage 974, to say nothing of the generally epic character of the play, are sufficient to determine the form as Aeschylean, even if we had not the further plea that as a gloss *ἀδελφόν*, not *ἀδελφεόν*, might have been expected. Hermann quotes two scholia which to me are very suggestive, *τὸν πρὸς τὸν σὸν θάνατον ἀδελφόν*, and *τὸν οὐκ ἐπὶ φιλίᾳ ὄντα σοι*. On this view I would read

καὶ τὸν σὸν αὖθις πρὸς μόρον δ' ἀδελφεόν

'he calls on him, that is your brother, but brother as the doom of death assigns,' *τὸν ἀδελφεὸν μέν, πρὸς μόρον δέ*. Polynices and Eteocles are brothers, but brothers in their doom, and in the fatality which, fulfilling the curse of their father Oedipus, sentences them to quarrel, as brothers, for the possession of their father's throne, and finally die by each other's hand. The whole of the conclusion of the play is a commentary on this remark, cf. especially 930 *οἱ δ' ὧδ' ἐτελεύ- Τασαν ὑπ' ἀλλαλοφόνοις χερσὶν ὁμοσπόροισιν*. 932 *ὁμόσποροι δῆτα καὶ πανώλεθροι*. 811 *Οὕτως ἀδελφαῖς χερσὶν ἠναίρονθ' ἅγαν. Οὕτως ὁ δαίμων κοινὸς ἦν ἀμφοῖν ἅμα*. The Δ would easily fall out before A.

Sept. c. Theb. 705.

νῦν ὅτε, σοὶ παρέσταμεν· ἐπεὶ δαίμων
λήματος ἀντρ οπαῖα χρόνι αμεταλλακτὸς
ἴσωσ ἂν ἕλθοι θα...λω τέρωι
π-νεύματι· νῦν δ' ἔτι ζεῖ.

So Med. ap. Merkel. The metre in 705 requires an alternation of dactyls with cretics, as is proved by their regular recurrence not only in the corresponding strophe 698—700, but in the previous strophe and antistrophe 686—688, 692—694. Hence *δαίμων* would seem to be wrong, though the passages quoted by Paley prove that it would be quite Aeschylean as regards mere expression. Accepting *θελεμωτέρῳ* from Conington, I would read the rest of the passage thus

νῦν ὅτε σοι παρέστακεν· ἐπεὶ δόμων
λήματος ἂν τροπαία χρονία μεταλ-
λακτὸς ἴσως ἂν ἔλθοι θελεμωτέρῳ
πνεύματι· νῦν δ' ἔτι ζεῖ.

and with *δόμων λήματος τροπαία* 'a changed wind in the spirit of the house' I would compare Cho. 1065 *ὅδε τοι μελάθροις τοῖς βασιλείοις Τρίτος αὖ χειμὼν Πνεύσας γονίας ἐτελέσθη.*

On the interesting fragments newly published by Weil from a papyrus of M. Firmin-Didot, the following suggestions have already appeared in the *Academy* of May 1, 1880.

Fr. III. 7.

Perhaps

καὶ τρεῖς ἀγῶνας, τρεῖς γυναικείους πόνους.

Fr. IV. 7.

ΛΕΠΤΗΓΑΡΕΛΠΙCΙΗΔΗΘΕΠΙΞΥΡΗΜΕΝΗΙ.

Weil reads *λεπτὴ γὰρ ἐλπὶς ἡδ' ἐπὶ ξυροῦ πέλει*, Blass *ἡδ' ἐπὶ ξυροῦ μένει.* I cannot but think that we have here a survival of a lost word *ἐπιξυρεῖν*, and would read *ἐπεξυρημένη* 'close-shaven,' i.e. a hope reduced to very narrow compass.

Fr. V. 5.

ΠΑΝΤΗΚΤΟΤΟΚΑΛΟΝ ΤΟΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΤΟCΕΜΝΟΝ.

Weil *παρέκειτο τὸ καλὸν, τἀγαθόν, τὸ σεμνὸν* [*ὄν*]. Blass *ἤλλακτο.* Perhaps *παρῆκτο* 'was perverted.'

Theognis 125 Bergk.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
πρὶν πειρηθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου.

οὐδέ κεν εἰκάσσαις ὥσπερ ποτ' ἐς ὥριον ἐλθών.
πολλάκι γὰρ γνώμην ἐξαπατῶσ' ἰδέαι.

A great variety of conjectures have been expended on ἐς ὥριον, as if it must be wrong. I venture to suggest that it is either a different spelling of or a mistake for ἐς αὔριον. The meaning is: you must test a friend *before* you admit him to your confidence, not after doing so. You must not guess at his character as if you were to come *the day after* and find you were mistaken in him. Sen. Epist. 3. 2 *Tu uero omnia cum amico delibera, sed de ipso prius. Post amicitiam credendum est, ante amicitiam iudicandum. Isti uero praepostero officia permiscent, qui contra praecepta Theophrasti, cum amauerunt, iudicant, et non amant, cum iudicauerunt.* Ethic. Eudem. VII. 2 οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος, ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θέογνις Οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης— ὑποζυγίου, οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος. And a little lower οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄνευ πείρας οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ.

Theognis 1066, 7 Bergk.

τούτων οὐδέν τοι ἄλλ' ἔπι τερπνότερον
ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξί.

Perhaps τούτων οὐ θνητοῖς.

Theogn. 1257.

ὦ παῖ, κινδύνοισι πολυπλάγκτοισιν ὁμοῖος
ὀργήν, ἄλλοτε τοῖς, ἄλλοτε τοῖσι φιλεῖν.

Perhaps κιλλούροισι 'wag-tails,' or as it seems also to have been written κιλλύροισι. Hesych. κίλλυρος σισοπυγίς. Theognis elsewhere makes this bird an emblem of instability. 303 Οὐ δεῖ κιγκλίζειν ἀγαθὸν βίον, ἀλλ' ἀτρεμίζειν.

Alcaeus fr. 86 Bergk.

For Αἰ γάρ κ' ἄλλοθεν ἔλθῃ δὲ φοικήνοθεν ἔμμεναι the most probable emendation seems to be, retaining Seidler's ὁ δέ φη,

Αἰ γάρ κ' ἄλλοθεν ἔλθῃς, ὁ δέ φη κήνοθεν ἔμμεναι

'if you have come from some other place, then he says he is from *that*.' An excellent description of a not uncommon character.

In the next fragm. though the restitution of the whole line is uncertain, it can hardly be doubted that *αβας προσποσιν* is a mistake for *ἄβας πρόποσιν*.

Ibycus fr. 2 Bergk.

Ἠ μὰν τρομέω νιν (Love) *ἐπερχόμενον,*
ὥστε φερέζυγος ἵππος ἀεθλοφόρος ποτὶ γήραϊ †ἀέκων
σὺν ὄχεσφι θοοῖς ἐς ἄμιλλαν ἔβα.

I think *ἀέκων* is a corruption of *σωκῶν* 'vigorous' when old age is approaching.

Ibycus fr. 29 Bergk.

Ἔριδος ποτὶ μάργον ἔχων στόμα
ἀντία δῆριν †ἐνίοις κορύσσοι.

Bergk reads *ἐμοί*. The variants are *ἔνιοι, νενοοι*. Hence I suspect a less common word, perhaps *ἐνεὶς*, as in Bacch. 851 *ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν*.

Bentley in his Epistola ad Ioannem Millium, p. 320, ed. Dyce, correcting the Hesiodic verses quoted by the Scholiast on Soph. Trach. 266 *Τοὺς δὲ μέθ' ὁπλοτάτην τέκετο ξανθὴν Ἰόλειαν Ἀντιόχη κρείουσα, παλαιὸν γένος Αὐβολίδαο* suggested from Hyg. fab. 14 *Clytius et Iphitus Euryti et Antiopes, Pylonis filiae, filii* that the right reading was *Πύλωνος Ναυβολίδαο*. That Bentley was right in his reference seems to me certain: but is not *Πυλάονος Αὐβολίδαο* a more probable version of it? Bentley indeed denies the existence of such a form as Aubolus or Aubolides: but instances are common enough of such dropping of an initial letter, e.g. Omamertes Mamertes (Tzetz. ad Lyc. 938), Brimo Obrimo, Briareos Obriareos (Bachmann on Lyc. 698), Candulus Andulus (Lobeck Aglaoph., p. 1305). To my ear *Πύλωνος* has a sound unlike the style of epic verse.

R. ELLIS.

THE HOMERIC TRIAL-SCENE.

Κεῖτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα
τῷ δόμεν, ὃς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴπῃ.

Mr Laurence, in a paper entitled "Judges and Litigants," published in the Journal of Philology, Vol. VIII. No. 15 (1879), resting on the great authority of Mr Shilleto, renewed the fight over this sorely contested passage, and attacked the interpretation given to it by Sir H. Maine and other eminent scholars. Sir Henry Maine has given an excellent exposition of the passage on the analogy of the ancient Roman *Legis actio sacramenti*, and in reference to the lines in dispute he says:—"The point of detail, however, which stamps the picture as the counterpart of the archaic Roman practice is the reward designed for the judges." Against this, Mr Laurence urges three points. He (1) first objects to translating *δίκην εἰπεῖν* as "to pronounce judgment," at the same time admitting that "*δίκη* in Homer is a very complex word used in many different ways." Few modern scholars will regard it as a valid objection to such an interpretation of an Homeric phrase that no parallel for such usage can be adduced from *Attic* Greek. (2) He objects that "if Sir Henry Maine and Mr Gladstone are right there must have been not one trial but two. The merits of the suit had first to be adjudged and then the merits of the respective judgments." Mr Laurence goes on to say:—"We do not learn whether the judges were to be rewarded in proportion to their knowledge of precedent, the skill which they displayed in mastering and grouping the facts of the case, or the elegance of the Greek in which their decisions were respectively pronounced." This is simply quibbling. To expect the rude judicial methods

of a primitive people to accord with our present notions of Law, which are the slow growth of ages, is indeed unreasonable. If an English judge at the present day was to adopt the method pursued by Solomon in his famous decision, public opinion would scarcely view his procedure with that unmixed satisfaction with which his subjects hailed the method employed by the wise King. (3) Like all those commentators who have held that the two talents of gold represent the ποινὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου, Mr Laurence points triumphantly to the largeness of the sum. On the other hand, Sir H. Maine, evidently feeling a certain difficulty in making the sum harmonize with his own admirable exposition, is forced to resort to the unsatisfactory explanation that "the largeness of the Homeric sum compared with the ordinary *sacramentum* indicates the difference between fluctuating usage and usage consolidated into law" (Anc. Law, 375).

The difficulty has arisen from the commentators all estimating the Homeric talent by the standard of historic times, without ever enquiring as to whether there was an Homeric standard or not. And yet such a standard can most certainly be found from the Homeric poems themselves.

First, in a well-known passage, Il. Ψ. 262—270, we find that when Achilleus offered prizes for the chariot race, two talents of gold stand only *fourth* in a list of five prizes. The first prize consisted of a γυνὴ ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυῖα, and a τρίπους ὠτώεις. Now, though the lady was not merely skilled in fair works, but was also supplemented by the τρίπους ὠτώεις, we cannot suppose the first prize to have been of startling value, especially if we find that in the list of gifts offered to Achilleus by Agamemnon, I. 122—130, 264—272, *seven* ladies, all of them ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυῖαι, and furthermore surpassing in beauty the tribes of womankind, are mentioned quite casually, and when we see from X. 164 that ἢ τρίπος ἠὲ γυνή was the ordinary prize in chariot races. If two talents of gold were so inferior in value to a slave woman, surely they would be a very insufficient "eric" for the life of a man of some importance, such as we are justified in considering the ἀνὴρ ἀποφθίμενος to have been. The third prize offered by Achilleus was a λέβης. This same

vessel is denominated *παμφανόωντα λέβητα* in l. 613 of this same book, which are the words applied in *τ.* 386 to the laver in which the nurse, Eurykleia, is washing the feet of the supposed old vagrant, when she discovers that he is her long-lost master. Now, a vessel employed for such mean purposes cannot have a high intrinsic value. Again, we find (*θ.* 393) in the list of presents to be contributed for Odysseus by the twelve *ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες* of the Phaiakes that a talent of gold stands last, for Alkinoos says,

> *τῶν οἱ φᾶρος ἕκαστος ἐϋπλυνὲς ἠδὲ χιτῶνα*
> *καὶ χρυσοῖο τάλαντον ἐνείκατε τιμήεντος.*

Furthermore, at *δ.* 129 we read of Polybos, King of Egyptian Thebes,

> *ὃς Μενελάῳ δῶκε δύ' ἀργυρέας ἀσαμίνθους*
> *δοιοὺς δὲ τρίποδας, δέκα δὲ χρυσοῖο τάλαντα.*

Here again we have ten talents of gold standing last in the enumeration. We shall be probably justified in making a similar inference from the position of the words *χρύσου * * * δέκα πάντα τάλαντα* in the description of the valuables, which Priam brought forth from his treasure-chamber for the ransom of the body of Hektôr (Ω. 232). For though the lines at *ω.* 273 seem to contradict this view at first sight, where seven talents of gold are mentioned before several leading items of the list in Ω. 232, the moment our attention is drawn to the epithet *εὐεργής*, all difficulty disappears (*χρυσοῦ μέν οἱ δῶκ' εὐεργέος ἑπτὰ τάλαντα*, cf. *ι.* 202). *Wrought* gold was excessively valuable at a time when skilled artificers were not to be found in Hellas, and when all works of art were imported from Sidon or Egypt.

From an examination of the above passages, I think it will be seen that the *τάλαντον* of the Homeric poems is by no means a large sum. (Mr Laurence is uncertain whether the Homeric talent is a weight or a coin. It cannot surely be the latter. There is no trace of coined money in Homer, and it was only at a very late date comparatively that the Greeks coined gold.) We must be careful not to regard it in the light of the Attic or Euboic, Aeginetan, or Babylonian talent, which seem to have been confined to silver (cf. Herod. VII. 28, Xen. Hell.

3. 5. 1), whereas the Homeric talent is confined altogether to gold. This alone is quite sufficient to overthrow Dr Schliemann's theory, that in certain oblong pieces of *silver* found at Hissarlik we have specimens of the Homeric talent (Troy and its Remains, 328). Rather are we to regard the small talent called the Sicilian or *gold* talent, used for weighing gold by the Greeks of Magna Graecia, which was equal to six Attic drachms, as the true representative of the Homeric τάλαντον.

If this be so, the sum of two talents would be too small as composition for a homicide, but would very fairly represent the sacramentum, and thus the only weighty objection to Sir H. Maine's interpretation of the passage will be removed.

WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.

NOTE ON XENOPHON, DE VECT. iv. 14.

[Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, April 15th, 1880.]

Πάλαι μὲν γὰρ δήπου οἷς μεμέληκεν ἀκηκόαμεν ὅτι Νικίας ποτὲ ὁ Νικηράτου ἐκτήσατο ἐν τοῖς ἀργυρείοις χιλίους ἀνθρώπους, οὓς ἐκεῖνος Σωσίᾳ τῷ Θρᾳκὶ ἐξεμίσθωσεν, ἐφ' ᾧ ὀβολὸν μὲν ἀτελῆ ἑκάστου τῆς ἡμέρας ἀποδιδόναι, τὸν δ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσους ἀεὶ παρεῖχεν.

THE conditions on which slaves were let out to work in the mines are generally said to have been that the lessee was bound to pay an obol a day for each slave and to restore them to the owner the same in number[1].

This profit would have been extraordinarily great, even allowing for the high interest usual among the Greeks; for on Boeckh's calculation, reckoning 350 days and taking the average

[1] Cf. Boeckh, Staatsh. d. Ath.[2] i. p. 103: 'Wenn Bergwerksclaven, an Pächter vermietet, ihrem Herrn täglich einen Obolos einbringen,...rührt dieser Ertrag keineswegs allein von den Sclaven, sondern zugleich von den damit verpachteten Bergwerken her' and Ueber d. Laur. Silberbergw. in Attica (Kleine Schriften, v. p. 47 foll.): 'Diese reichen Männer hatten ihre Sclaven an Unternehmer verpachtet, unter der Bedingung, dass der Pächter ausser der Beköstigung der Sclaven von jedem Kopfe täglich einen Obolos ohne allen Abzug erlege und die Anzahl stets vollständig erhalte und zurückliefere'; and Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb im griech. Altert. p. 205;—Prof. Mahaffy, Rambles and Studies in Greece, p. 130: 'Nicias let out 1000 slaves to Sosias, at an obol a day each—the lessee being bound to restore them to him the same in number'; and Wallon, Hist. de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité, p. 202: 'Ainsi les esclaves loués aux exploitants de Laurium produisaient net 1 obole par jour à leurs maîtres ou 360 oboles par an; et encore les entrepreneurs supportaient-ils les chances des maladies accidentelles ou de la fuite, puisqu'ils devaient, à l'expiration du contrat, les rendre tout aussi nombreux qu'ils les avaient reçus.'

price of a mining slave at 140 drachmae, the return would be above 40 per cent.; and yet there would have been no risk for the owner, since the lessee had to restore the full number of slaves which he had received. For this reason Boeckh suggests that the obolus a day for each slave included also *payment for the use of the mines in which they worked.*

This involves a gratuitous alteration of the text, all the MSS having παρεῖχεν, and secondly this solution of the difficulty does not appear tenable for the following reasons: (*a*) we learn from Andoc. de myster. § 38[1], that Diocleides had *one* slave working in the mines; is it conceivable that a mine and *one* slave to work it, could be let out to a lessee?

(*b*) Xenophon in proposing that the state might, in imitation of private individuals, procure public slaves and let them out on hire to work in the mines, does not so much as hint that the lessees would at the same time become entitled to work such mines as were not yet in private hands.—I think therefore that we must give up the notion that the high pay of an obolos a day for each slave included payment for the working of the mines.

From Xenophon we can derive what I consider the more probable explanation for this high return. He distinctly says that such public slaves were to be let out on the same conditions as those of private individuals (§ 19), and then proceeds to prove that the speculation is safe (§ 21): 'when the slaves are marked with the public mark and when a penalty is fixed for selling and exporting such slaves, how can any one steal them?' Does not this imply that the state, in its capacity as slave-owner, would have to bear the loss, if the slaves were stolen? otherwise, why should it take such precautions, if the lessee had to restore the slaves the same in number? I cannot suppose that the public mark was merely intended to prevent inferior slaves being restored to the state at the end of the contract, as

[1] ἔφη γὰρ εἶναι μὲν ἀνδραποδόν οἱ ἐπὶ Λαυρίῳ, δεῖν δὲ κομίσασθαι ἀποφοράν. Meier und Schömann, Att. Proc. p. 533, have: es ist durch keine Stelle belegt, ... dass ἀποφορά je die Miethe bezeichnet habe, die jemand für an ihn vermiethete Sclaven dem Eigenthümer zu zahlen hatte; Andocides evidently uses ἀποφορά in this sense.

Prof. Mahaffy seems to think was probable in such cases, when he says (Primer p. 40): 'the contractor was also obliged to restore them the same *in number*, no regard being had of the individual slave'; the Athenians were too shrewd business men to allow themselves to be cheated in that way. I should therefore suggest as a more probable explanation for the high profit on capital invested in mining slaves, that the lessee paid an obol a day for each slave for his work, and that it was *the owner who ran all risk for the life and safe keeping of the slaves:* this is confirmed by the fact that Nicias paid no less than a talent for an overseer in the mines (Xen. Mem. ii. 5, 2; cf. Plut. Nic. 4)[1].

The rate of profit on the purchase money was naturally high; for the value of a slave decreased with his getting old, not to speak of the danger of his dying comparatively early as a result of his exposure to the atmosphere of the mines (which was notoriously noxious (Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 12), in spite of air-shafts (*ψυχαγώγια*)), and of the still greater danger of his running away, for which reason some had to work in chains (Plut. Nic. et Crass. init.), a danger to which Xenophon alludes (§ 25) by a reference to the time of the occupation of Deceleia by the Lacedaemonians, when as is stated by Thucydides 20000 slaves deserted to the enemy.

The meaning of the above passage seems therefore to be, that Nicias received 1000 obols a day for slaves let out to work in the mines, and that by fresh purchases he kept up this number, either to enable Sosias to carry on mining operations on a large scale by supplying him regularly for the time of the contract with the same number of workers, or that he might himself retain a regular source of income.

[1] Perhaps also by the fact that Athenaeus (vi. p. 272 D) quotes the above passage only as far as *ἐφ' ᾧ ὀβολὸν ἑκάστου* (*ἕκαστον* the text) *τελεῖν τῆς ἡμέρας*, and that in Hyp. pro Lycophr. col. ii. supposing he speaks of mining slaves, no mention is made of a stipulation to restore the slaves the same in number.

NOTE ON PLATO, APOL. SOCR., p. 26, D, E.

Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν etc.

All editors, as far as I know, recognise in these words of Socrates an allusion to exhibitions at the theatre, at a drachma admission, of plays whose authors had borrowed the notions of Anaxagoras. But besides the wording, which appears to me scarcely to admit of such an interpretation, there remains the objection that a drachma was not the price of admission to the theatre. Boeckh (Staatsh. i. p. 68) expresses a different opinion regarding the meaning of this passage; according to him, in the *ὀρχήστρα* of the theatre, when no performances were going on, there were book-stalls, where the writings of Anax. might be had for a drachma at the most, an explanation adopted by Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb im gr. Altert. p. 572. This seems to me the correct interpretation of the above passage as far as the fact goes that *trade in books* is meant, but I submit to you a passage from Photius which gives in my opinion a much more satisfactory explanation of the spot, where the trade was carried on; he says s. v. *ὀρχήστρα*: *ὁ. πρῶτον ἐκλήθη ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ* and to the same locality points Nicophon (Mein. fr. com. ii. 2, p. 852) who mentions the *βιβλιοπῶλαι* amongst the motley crowd of sellers of figs, leather, spoons, sieves, etc. etc., whom we can only expect to find in the market place. Eupolis (M. ii. 1, p. 550) speaks of a place *οὗ τὰ βιβλία ὤνια*; this also is best understood as referring to the market place, and Boeckh does so, only since he has once established the book trade in the *ὀρχήστρα* of the theatre, he takes *βιβλία* here to mean not 'written books' but 'paper.' Without entering more into detail, by the aid of Photius' explanation of *ὀρχήστρα* and of these and other well-known passages from the Old Comedy

writers (such as *βιβλιαγράφον δὲ παρὰ Κρατίνῳ ἐν Χείρωσιν* M. ii. 1, p. 159) the fact seems to be established that there was *at* the time of Socrates' trial and *before* that time (Cratinus †423) a trade in books carried on in the market place at Athens; nay from Xen. Anab. vii. 5, 14 we may even conclude that an export trade had sprung up[1].

[1] In the reading aloud of the bookseller, by whose side Zeno of Citium sits down (Diog. Laert. vii. 2), Mr Grote (Plat. i. p. 147) sees 'a feeble foreshadowing of the advertisements and reviews of the present day'. But from Lucian adv. ind. 2 *καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκεις ἔνια πάνυ ἐπιτρέχων φθάνοντος τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ στόμα* it would appear that it was the custom of the Greeks to read aloud, cf. *ἀναγιγνώσκειν* in this sense in the Acts (8, 30), etc.

H. HAGER.

NOTES ON GENDER, ESPECIALLY IN INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES.

It is curious that, among the many subjects which philology offers to the speculative mind, gender has been generally avoided, or, if not avoided, has been treated in an inadequate or contemptuous manner. In English books especially, except Harris's *Hermes*[1], which was published in 1751, long before the era of the science of language, I can find but few remarks, and those of little or no value, on the history of gender. Adam Smith, Lord Monboddo, Dr Beattie and the late Prof. Key have alluded to it, but have confined themselves to enlarging, without improving, upon Harris. Prof. Sayce, in recent works, has devoted some pages to the subject and advocated a view which will be discussed hereafter; but other writers make no more than a passing mention of Harris's theory. In Germany, indeed, there is a considerable literature on the topic, but the collectors of facts have not, so far as I know, classified them with a view to theorising, and the theorists have not cared to study the whole collection of facts. The truth seems to be that the explanation of gender-distinctions belongs to a department of philology, the 'Bedeutungslehre' or Sematology or science of meanings, which, as a whole, is as yet non-existent; and thus, while the thorough investigation of gender has been neglected as being only a fragmentary contribution to a work still undesigned, a plausible and ancient explanation (such as the sexual theory adopted by Harris) of the more striking facts is considered sufficient for present purposes. Furthermore, the

[1] Chap. iv. pp. 44 sqq. (3rd Ed.).

dynamic changes by which the genders of words ought to be distinguished, are not regular enough or indicated with sufficient clearness to immediately arrest attention and invite inquiry. Thus, in Latin and Greek, the distinctions of genders are marked very imperfectly or not at all in the consonantal declensions, and in the vowel declensions by a method which is imperfect, uncertain and not primaeval[1]. Because, moreover, in the Indo-European family of languages each tongue has a system, for the most part peculiar, of assigning genders and marks of gender, the investigation of the history of gender distinctions has been considered to belong to the special philology of each separate language, and while the students of such separate languages are unable to find within the limits of their subject an explanation of the confusion, with respect to genders, therein existing, the whole inquiry has been shelved as idle and unfruitful. Even those writers who have ventured to approach the difficulty, have carefully warned their readers against their own conclusions. "As all such speculations," says Harris at the end of his chapter on gender, "are at best but conjectures, they should therefore be received with candour rather than scrutinised with rigour." Prof. Key[2] in a similar manner apologises for having touched on the topic at all. The writer of the article "Grammar" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica says, "Such speculations are wholly fanciful and the principles upon which they proceed are overturned by an appeal to the facts:" and Schoe-

[1] See Schleicher, Compendium, pp. 502, 503. In the vowel declensions gender, which should properly be marked in the stem, is, at least to all appearance, indicated by a modification of the inflexional suffixes. Similarly the plural, which also ought to be distinguished in the stem, is marked by a new set of inflexions. In verbs, on the other hand, unnecessary variations are introduced into the personal endings. If differences of quality and quantity and the like were marked always by the same alterations in the stem and differences of relation always by the same inflexions, the grammar of Indo-European languages would be more logically consistent and far easier to learn. Suppose, for instance, in Latin a stem-suffix *-ana* to indicate the feminine, and a stem suffix *as* to indicate the plural, then we might have *e.g.* masc. sing. *equus*, fem. sing. *equanus*; masc. plur. *equasus*, fem. pl. *equanasus*, all declined alike with one set of inflexions, instead of four. The Turk himself is far less "unspeakable" than the Aryan.

[2] Orig. and Develop. of Language, pp. 365—379.

mann[1] recommends to the student of gender "the shrewd saying of an old commentator on Aristotle, *οὐ δεῖ πλέον ἐπιζητεῖν παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἢ ὅσον ἐπιδέχεται ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σαφήνεια.*" It is possible, indeed, that the advice of these critics may, after all, be justified, but I submit, with deference, that *ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σαφήνεια* has not yet been properly elucidated. I propose, therefore, in this paper to sketch briefly but efficiently enough for the present purpose the nature and distribution of gender-distinctions in the languages of the world, and to state, in a very condensed form, a theory, suggested by these observations, of the history of such distinctions in the Indo-European languages. It may well be that the various grammars, upon which of course I have mainly relied, have occasionally mis-stated rules or stated them broadly without mentioning exceptions which would disprove my inferences, but I do not think that any or all of these and other similar slips can have occurred often enough to seriously damage the plausibility of my main conclusion. That this is indeed in part plausible, I may perhaps be permitted to infer from the fact that much of it is not new and has already been favourably entertained (for reasons not altogether the same as mine) by such men as Heyse[2], Madvig[3], Schleicher[4] and Kühner[5].

Before entering upon an inquiry into the linguistic distribution of gender-distinctions, with a view to discovering the origin and history of the phenomenon, it will be necessary to adopt some definition of gender, if not really, at least *prima facie* correct. The difficulty, which occurs in some sciences[6], of framing a provisional definition which does not beg the very question of debate, need not here create any embarrassment, for gender is itself a cause and may be well enough defined by its effects. The gender of a noun[7] is, in fact, first known by its environ-

[1] Redetheile, p. 72.

[2] System der Sprachwissenschaft, p. 418.

[3] Kleinere Schriften, No. 1.

[4] Compendium Vergl. Gram. ante cit.

[5] Greek Grammar, vol. I. p. 284.

[6] See, for instance, Cairnes, Logical Method of Polit. Economy, pp. 134, 135; Mill, Unsettled Questions of Polit. Econ. Essay v., and Logic II. 225.

[7] It is assumed here that gender is an attribute of nouns, and is distinguished, in other parts of speech, only more clearly to mark their relation to the prominent nouns. Prof.

ment, by the adjective or pronoun or, in some languages, by the verb by which it is accompanied, and all nouns of a certain gender have, *prima facie*, this characteristic alone in common, that they are invariably accompanied by the same distinct forms of these and other parts of speech. It is true that this result is merely accidental and that gender-distinctions might well be indicated in nouns alone, without affecting other parts of speech; but few languages, if any, seem to have adopted the latter expedient only, and it may therefore be generally said that in those tongues wherein separate classes of nouns are not necessarily followed by separate forms of the adjective, pronoun or verb (such separate forms not being distinctive merely of number, case or person) distinctions of gender do not exist: and the contrary, where such separate forms are found. Proceeding then upon this principle of discrimination, we find broadly that Radical languages[1] and languages of uncivilised peoples generally (with some remarkable exceptions to be hereafter mentioned more in detail) admit no distinctions of gender. Agglutinative languages[2] also (with one exception) are genderless, save that an incipient gender-distinction sometimes appears in the interrogative pronoun; the Incorporative, for the most part, distinguish animate things from inanimate; and finally, of the Inflexional, the Semitic family has two genders, called masculine and feminine, and the Aryan three, the masculine, feminine

Sayce, however, is of a contrary opinion. According to his theory, founded on Bleek's, certain pronouns were selected and associated (through habit, euphony or affinity of sense or sound) to certain classes of nouns, and where the pronouns differed, the nouns were considered to differ in gender. "Whereas gender started from transferring the differences between the pronouns to the substantives connected with them, we now transfer the inherited differences of substantives to their representative pronouns" (Comp. Philol. pp. 254, 257). He seems to think that this appropriation of pronouns was haphazard chiefly, whereas I believe the evidence shews that it was, originally at least, systematic, and depended on the meanings of the nouns. His argument seems to me to shew only that gender was formally indicated in pronouns earlier than in nouns, and this is doubtless true of many languages.

[1] Morrison, Chinese Grammar, pp. 66, 67.

[2] Caldwell, Dravid. Lang. of S. India, p. 171; Gabelentz, Gram. Mandchoue, p. 36 sqq.; Kellgren, Finnische Sprache, p. 75; Castren, Burjätische Spr. p. 7, § 32; Kasem-Beg, Türkisch-Tatar. Spr. p. 27.

and neuter. The foregoing statement is, however, available for little without further particulars, and I therefore add here such details as seem to me of special importance[1].

In those languages which admit no distinctions of gender, the sexes are distinguished either by separate names or by compound words of which one element is common and the other means 'male' or 'female.' (E.g. Chinese *jin* = homo: *nan jin* = vir: *niu jin* = femina.)[2] Occasionally, in the latter case, the common word is used alone for the male sex and the compound employed only for the female: (e.g. Setshuâna *khomo* = bull, *khomogari* = cow:) or in the compound forms the distinctive parts are clipt, as in Bullom, where *pokan* 'male' and *lakan* 'female' are often shortened in composition to *pok*, *po*, *lak*, *la*[3]. All these processes, it will be seen, actually survive or have their analogues in the higher languages. Many of these genderless tongues, again, draw, in some way or other, a distinction between persons and things[4] which approaches to a distinction of genders. This appears generally, but not always, in the interrogative pronoun, which has two forms, answering to our 'who' and 'what'. Thus, in Bullom (Africa), the pairs are

[1] In the following remarks, statements not otherwise authenticated are derived from Pott's article "Geschlecht," a splendid repertory of facts, in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædia, vol. LXII. Bindseil's Abhandlungen über Allg. Vergl. Sprachl., No. 2, is also full of information, and contains in particular (p. 527) a more precise statement of gender distribution.

[2] In Thibetan, curiously, *pho* 'male' and *wo* 'female' are added also to pronouns.

[3] So also in the *Mandingo* (Macbrair's Grammar, § 14) and *Yoruba* languages (Crowther's Vocab. p. 5) of Africa.

[4] I have already called this "an incipient gender-distinction." I mean that the distinction drawn is really between things, and not yet stereotyped into one between mere words. In Latin, on the other hand, such a word as *Somnium*, even when representing a divinity (e.g. Ov. M. 11. 588), would be followed by a neuter relative. At what stage a gender-distinction becomes complete is very difficult to determine. I have taken it, for practical purposes, to be so when a *large* class of nouns, representing *not exactly* a certain class of things, has appropriated to it special forms of the other parts of speech. In such a case, I should guess that the speakers had learnt to use words (like money) without immediately realising what the words represent. A good example of the incipient distinction is seen in Herero, where *ombepo* (Kafir *umoya*) is of the personal class, *when it means* '*spirit*,' but when 'wind,' of the impersonal (Bleek, post cit. p. 45).

nghä, ngho: in Annamese *ai, nào* (though the latter is used sometimes of persons also): in Mandschu *we, ai:* in Magyar *ki, mi:* in Samoyed *sele, ma:* in Turkish *kîm* or *kîn, neh.* The Dyaks of Borneo draw the same distinction in the pronoun of the third person, using *iä* of persons, *tä* of things. In Zulu, words which begin with *um* (in Cuan *mo*, in Herero *omu*[1]) have a different plural when they are names of persons from that which they have when names of things[2]. The distinction is carried furthest in Ashantee[3], which, indeed, may be said to have two genders. In this language the names of persons and the pronouns which refer to them begin with *o* (e.g. *oba* 'boy'), while, of things, the names begin with *a*, the pronouns with *e*. The class of persons, however, is not very strictly defined: for instance, *opodo* 'pot', *oprai* 'broom', *osekan* 'knife', and other similar words have the personal '*o*', while *agya* 'father', *abofra* 'child', and others are impersonal. On this point more will be said farther on. Both in Africa and Asia remarkable exceptions to the general rule of low linguistic developement appear. Thus, in Africa, the Hottentots distinguish masculine, feminine and common genders, have a definite and indefinite form of each, and singular, dual and plural numbers (e.g. *koib, kois, koii* are *vir, mulier, homo* respectively): and the same gender-distinctions are added to the verb, as *ǵambi, ǵamsi, ǵami*, virum, mulierem, hominem interficere[4]. In Namaqua also, according to Pott[5], who quotes a vocabulary published at Barmen in 1854, the same rules prevail (e.g. *aub*, vir: *aus*, mulier: *aui*, homo), and gender is distinguished even in the personal pronouns (e.g. masc. *make*, fem. *mare*, com. *mada*, 'nos')[6]. In Asia, the excep-

[1] See Bleek, De Nominum Generibus Ling. Afric. Austr. pp. 15 and 13.

[2] Grout, Journal of American Orient. Soc. I. 403. A less important but similar distinction appears in Kechua (S. America) and Malay: where different words for 'male' and 'female' are used of persons from those used of animals. See Tschudi, Kechua-Sprache, I. § 114; Crawfurd, Malay Gram. p. 10.

[3] Also, according to Krapf (Outlines of Kisuaheli Lang. pp. 28—33) in Kisuaheli and other African languages.

[4] Bleek, op. ante cit. pp. 40 and 46.

[5] In Ersch and Gruber, LXII. 410 a.

[6] The masculine and feminine genders are not, in either of these languages, confined to names of animals. It is curious that in Namaqua *soris* 'sun' is feminine, while *khâb* 'moon' is masculine, as are *hurib* 'sea' and *huub* 'earth.' See Bleek, Comp. Gram. of S. Afr. Langg. pp. 112 and 120.

tion is furnished by the Dravidian languages of Southern India, which shew, with respect to gender, a very remarkable developement. In Tamil nouns are divided into 'high-caste' and 'low-caste' or 'casteless'; in Telugu, into 'mahât' and 'amahât' or 'majors' and 'minors'. The first class includes only the names of rational beings, and in this class masculine and feminine genders are distinguished. All words in the second class are neuter. "This distinction" says Caldwell[1] "appears to have arisen at a late date", for in older Tamil and in poetry we find many words neuter, which, later, and in prose, are masculine (e.g. *Dêvu* 'God' (from Sanskrit) is neuter in old and masc. in modern Tamil): and according to the same authority, the suffixes which distinguish the masculine and feminine are only mutilated pronouns. Of the Incorporative languages, many have no distinctions of gender, and all discriminate the sexes by the primitive methods before-mentioned. In most, however, of the tongues of North[2] and Central[3] and in some of South America[4] a distinction, more or less clear, is drawn between the names of animate and those of inanimate things. In many cases the two classes of nouns are distinguished, as in Zulu, only by separate forms of the plural; but more generally, it would seem, the gender of nouns is reflected in the verbs, which, when transitive, vary with the object, when intransitive, with the subject[5]. According to Gallatin, some languages of Central America further divide the animates into rational and irrational, but more particulars on this subject are wanting. It appears plainly here as in Ashantee, that the linguistic distinction between animates and inanimates seldom accords strictly with the natural, and that the classes differ in different languages. Thus the Lenni-Lenape or Delaware Indians assign to the animate gender everything that lives and grows except

[1] Dravidian Lang. of S. India, p. 171.

[2] Du Ponceau, Mémoire sur le Système Gram. des langues de quelques nations Ind ennes de l'Amerique.

[3] Gallatin, Trans. Amer. Ethnol. Soc. I. p. 12.

[4] Tschudi, Kechua-Sprache, I. § 114 sqq.

[5] E.g. *wúnnehayoo* = he loses an animate object; *wúnnetow* = he loses an inanimate. Howse's Grammar of Cree Language, p. 41. Bindseil quotes (p. 527) from some American language *nolhalla* ('habeo') *nolhatton; newa* ('video') *nemen*, as similar pairs of animate and inanimate verbal forms.

annual plants and a few special exceptions (e.g. *namessall* 'fish'): and the Kechuas add, to the same class, the names of rivers, the sea, the sky and the stars, while they treat as inanimate all living things, such as *little* plants and animals, which do not obtrude their vitality on the public eye. According to Schoolcraft, also[1], the name of any inanimate, when personified, is transferred to the animate gender.

It remains to speak only of the Inflexional languages. Of these, the Semitic family (including here the doubtful Koptic[2], Galla and Berber) distinguish two genders, the masculine and feminine[3]. To the latter class belong, generally, the following groups, viz.: names of women, female animals, countries, towns, double members of the body and tools, abstractions and collectives. Hebrew, at least, uses the feminine adjective where Indo-European languages would have the neuter (e.g. "a tongue speaking *great things*." Psalm XII. 4). The names of male animals belong to the masculine gender, but other words seem to be distributed between the two genders in a manner of which no grammar yet published suggests a rationale. To the two genders of the Semitic family, the Indo-European languages add a third, the neuter, and confusion now becomes worse confounded. The signs of gender and the groups of 'congeneral' words differ totally sometimes in the most nearly-related tongues, and words of closely-allied meaning in the same language often disagree in gender. Except in names of male and female animals, few glimpses of uniformity appear. The names of 'child' 'egg' and fruits, and also diminutives, are almost exclusively neuter in all the languages of the family: 'earth' is feminine: 'wind' and the names of winds are masculine, and abstractions seem to be generally feminine. One example, on the other hand, will shew the extraordinary diversity of genders in a simple group. The names of *trees* are in Greek, Latin (in

[1] Quoted by Pott, E. and G. LXII. p. 420.

[2] Dillmann, Æthiopische Gram. § 126, and Bleek, op. ante cit.

[3] Gesenius (ed. Rödiger, trans. Davies), pp. 289—292; Forbes, Arabic Grammar, pp. 41—43 (almost translating the chapter in Sacy's Grammaire); Wright, Arabic Grammar, vol. I. §§ 289—297; Caspari, Arabic Gram. pp. 120—125; Longfield, Introd. to Chaldee, § 32, p. 40; Phillips, Syriac Gram. § 16, pp. 38—40; Sayce, Assyrian Grammar, p. 114.

spite here of analogies of form which would tend to make them masculine), Lithuanian and German, mostly feminine. But, in all these languages, there are many exceptions to this rule, and that not merely in the names of wild trees, e.g. *ἐρινέος*, *oleaster*, where the reason of the distinction may be guessed. Thus, Greek *δένδρον*, Gothic *triu*, Slav. *drevo* are all neuter, while Germ. *baum* is masculine. In Greek the following are masculine: *φιλλός*, *λωτός*, *φοῖνιξ*, *κιττός*, *μύῤῥινος*, *κέρασος* and a few more. In Latin except *ficus* (which is also feminine) the anomalies occur mostly in the names of plants, as *acanthus*, *carduus*, etc., all masculine. In Old High German *ahorn*, *asc* and *ëlm* were all masculine (as was Old Norse *þollr* pine-tree), and many names of plants. In Slavonic languages many trees are masculine, but in Sanskrit, according to Benfey, nearly all trees are masculine and shrubs feminine, while the two dialects of Keltic shew this extraordinary difference, that in Gaelic trees are masculine, in Kymric feminine[1]. Similarly, sun, moon and stars, mountains, rivers, towns and countries, collective names and abstractions, though seldom neuter, are divided in inextricable confusion between the other genders. A further peculiarity of these languages is that in modern times they shew a strong tendency to discard one or more of their ancient genders. Thus Persian[2] has lost them altogether. Bengali[3], English and Danish[4] preserve the masculine and feminine only for male and female animals and persons, and assign all other nouns to the neuter. Lithuanian[5] has lost its neuter, as Keltic[6] had long before, and one Spanish pronoun (*ello*) is the sole relic of the same gender in the Romance languages[7].

The foregoing statement will perhaps suffice to apprise the reader at least of the nature of the facts with which a theory of

[1] Pott on 'Metaphern' in Kuhn's Zeitschr. vol. II. Similarly metals are in Greek masculine, in Latin neuter.

[2] Chodzko, Persian Grammar.

[3] Forbes, Bengali Gram. pp. 18, 19.

[4] Grimm, Deutsche Gram. III. pp. 545, 546.

[5] Grimm, ubi sup. p. 548; Schleicher, Litau. Spr. p. 170.

[6] Zeuss, Gram. Kelt. p. 228.

[7] The neuter, in the other Romance tongues merged in the masculine, has become feminine in Wallachian only. See Alexi, Gram. Daco-Romana, p. 35. So also, in Lithuanian, the old neuter adj., used substantively, is now represented in common parlance by the feminine. Schleicher ante cit. p. 258.

the history of gender-distinctions must deal. To profess to divine, with certainty, the order out of which this monstrous disorder grew, would be an absurd pretence. Nevertheless, time has left a few traces of what might have been, and the method of comparison may still suggest what ought to have been. Conjecture, with these two aids, must be left to do the rest.

It will have been observed that in all languages, except the Inflexional, the division (if any) of genders in nouns agrees pretty closely with a 'dichotomy' of things, reasonable enough to satisfy even Plato's Eleatic stranger, the exceptions not being so numerous or of such a kind as that either inveterate use or some common characteristic of the barbarous mind may not fairly be admitted to account for them. A presumption is thus raised that the genders of inflexional languages are also the reflexion of a distinction in things analogous to that between animates and inanimates, or rational and irrational creatures. Nor has this presumption been disputed, so far as I can find, by any philologer until quite recent times, and then only by Dr Bleek and Prof. Sayce. Of these writers, the former, impressed by the fact that in the languages of the Congo-Caffrarian group and in Koptic the noun-affixes are or seem to be mutilated pronouns, suggests a theory that noun-affixes have, in all languages, come to be used as pronouns and that this accidental circumstance has given rise to a supposed distinction of genders. Prof. Sayce is of the same opinion except that he would reverse the process and say (see supra, p. 2, note) that pronouns came accidentally to be used as noun-affixes[1]. It is a

[1] I think the following examples (the first of which is suggested by Dr Bleek himself) will not misrepresent these two theories. According to Bleek, such suffixes as *-dom, -ric, -ism* of *kingdom, bishopric, idealism* would come to be used as pronouns, and where these nouns had preceded, we might refer to them as 'dom of England,' 'ric of Durham,' 'ism of Plato.' Prof. Sayce may be better illustrated by another set of examples. Thus, in a given primitive language, say, there are pronouns 'he,' 'she,' 'it,' and others all *prima facie* equally applicable in reference to any noun. Habit, however, has made it correct to say 'he' of male bears, oaks, tables, cups, spoons, and a thousand other things; 'she' of female bears, elms, chairs, saucers, forks, &c.; 'it' of insects, vines, &c. In process of time these pronouns were actually appended to the nouns, and so we get words con-

plain corollary from this theory that there may be as many genders of nouns as there are distinctive noun-affixes, and Dr Bleek actually assigns *sixteen* (and in one case *eighteen*) genders to the languages of the Congo-Caffrarian group[1], these genders being in fact forms of nouns compounded with and followed by distinct pronouns. It must be admitted that distinctions of gender clearly could have arisen by the methods here suggested, but such a theory is no less clearly inapplicable to the Indo-European languages, in which pronominal elements are very doubtful in noun-suffixes and have certainly nothing to do with the commonest methods of distinguishing gender. In the Semitic family, where the theory has more plausibility, it is to be observed, in the first place, that a very large proportion of feminines have not the distinctive pronominal element, and, secondly, though here the nouns included under each gender are on the whole strangely heterogeneous, yet under each there occur so many well-defined groups of similar meaning that it becomes incredible that the gender was only accidentally ascribed. *A fortiori* is this incredible of American and other languages which distinguish such well-marked groups only as animates and inanimates. Lastly, on examining Dr Bleek's sixteen or eighteen so-called genders, we find that seven of them are forms of the singular and seven of the plural. Thus, all nouns of any given gender out of these fourteen have at any rate this in common, that they are of the same number, and number is obviously, as much as sex or life, predicable, not originally of words, but of the things which words stand for. It might therefore be as properly said of these South African languages that they have two genders (or classes), a singular and plural, each distinguished in seven different ways: it would then be

structed like *he-bears* (or *bear-he*), *he-oak*, *he-table*, &c.; *she-bear*, *she-elm*, *she-chair*, &c.; *it-insect*, *it-vine*, &c.; but these groups have really nothing in common except that they are compounded with and are followed by the same pronoun respectively. Those languages which have two or three genders only have them merely by reason of the fact that they had originally only two or three noun-affixes (acc. to Bleek), or pronouns (acc. to Sayce). See Bleek, Comp. Gram. of South African Langg. Pt. II. p. 104, and Sayce, Comp. Phil., ante cit.

[1] This comprises all the languages of South Africa except the Hottentot.

seen that the basis of the distinction is even here rational, though the marks of gender (i.e. of number) might have been accidentally distributed[1]. We must then, it would seem, in default of a better hypothesis, fall back upon the theory, so favoured by analogy and so long sanctioned by belief, that genders in inflexional languages also are due to a primitive classification of things. What was the basis of this classification, is now the question. Clearly it was not number (as in S. Africa) for that is otherwise provided for: neither was it the presence or absence of life (as in America), or of reason (as in Tamil), for the divisions of gender, even where there are but two, do not coincide at all nearly with these distinctions. Some other principle of division is therefore plainly required, and the almost universal opinion of all ages, since grammars were first devised, has declared that differences of gender in inflexional languages were intended originally to mark differences of sex, real or imaginary, in the things or ideas of which nouns are the names. This belief rests apparently on the following grounds. The gender of nouns is, as it has already been stated, primarily indicated by the adjectives, pronouns or verbs which accompany them. Now we can easily conceive, with Bleek, that of these parts of speech there should be as many forms as there are of nouns, that in fact there should be as many genders as there are distinctive noun-suffixes. Yet in reality the number of genders in any language is at most three. It is a striking coincidence that the number of possible sex-distinctions is also three, viz. male, female and no sex. Moreover, the number of cases in which

[1] The remainder of Bleek's genders have nothing to do with number. The fifteenth belongs to the infinitive mood and a few nouns signifying place. The 16th, 17th, and 18th, which may be called peculiar to the Otyihererǒ language, are very rare even in ha-, and belong also only to nouns signifying places. These four might, therefore, very well be called the 'locative' gender. Observe also that of the first fourteen forms, two, a singular and a plural, are devoted to the names of men, animals and personified things; two more, also sing. and plur., to the names of rivers and trees. Another, a sing., implies very great size, while its corresponding plural is the gender of collectives (esp. of liquid substances). See Bleek, De Nom. Gener., ante cit. pp. 16 and 17, and *Id.*, Comp. Gram. of South African Langg. Pt. II. pp. 104, 123, 253 sqq. These facts do not seem easily reconcileable with Bleek's theory of accidental origin of gender-marks.

the name of an animal of a certain sex receives an exceptional gender are so small that, given a sex-name, its gender is almost certainly predicable. The difficulty of accounting for the attribution of sex to sexless things is not, by any means, insuperable; and lastly, the evidence of antiquity, i.e. of the writers who lived nearest to the time when genders were significant distinctions, is entirely in favour of the sexual theory. Thus the Sanskrit grammarians speak of 'masculine' and 'feminine' genders, and the third they call 'kliva' or 'napunsaka', 'castrated'. The German 'geschlecht' positively means 'sex'[1]. Our own word 'gender' is the lineal descendant of Priscian's 'genus', which he thus defines: 'Genera dicuntur propria quae generare possunt, quae sunt masculinum et femininum.' Servius had previously given a similar definition. In Greek γένος, used by Plato as distinctly equivalent to 'sex'[2], was first applied to language, according to Aristotle, by Protagoras, but there is some doubt whether the latter really meant 'sex' by the term, as Aristotle, on the other hand, certainly did.

Evidence, so many-sided as this, in favour of the sexual theory is not easily to be overcome. Some philologers, however, perplexed by the innumerable anomalies in the division of genders upon the sexual principle, have proposed new bases of distinction. One of these, which has received much favour, was suggested by W. Mohr[3], who, after premising that language must indicate the quantity, quality and relativity of each thing or idea, declares gender to represent a distinction of quality, in respect of activity, passivity and a mixture of these two. Thus, the names of all active things are or should be of the first, so-called masculine gender; those of passive things are of the

[1] This fact has led Grimm (Deutsche Gram. III. 317), who is followed by most German philologers, into the mistake of distinguishing 'natural' from 'grammatical' gender (called by Bilderdijk 'eigen geslacht' and 'geslacht uit toepassing,' *i.e.* by application. Niederlandsche Spraakl.). Sex is natural, but gender is, of course, always grammatical.

[2] Sympos. 189 d; Art. Rhet. III. 5, Poet. 21. Varro and Quintilian perhaps did not use 'genus' as meaning 'sex,' for they speak of 'genera' of verbs. For more information see Schmidt, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Gram. § 269 sqq.

[3] Dialektik der Sprache, Pt. III. chap. I. §§ 54—56.

second or feminine, while those things which, like tools, are at once active and passive, are assigned to the third or neuter gender[1]. Criticism upon such a theory can hardly be very vigorous, but it seems worth observing, in the first place, that the relative activity and passivity of male and female animals is shewn only in the sexual function, so that, in their names at least, sex must after all be considered the basis of the distinction of genders. Further, in the case of many things other than animals, it is far easier to conceive them as of a certain sex than of the corresponding activity or passivity. Thus abstractions are in the Aryan languages generally of the feminine (Mohr's passive) gender, yet surely the virtues and vices, for instance, were generally, in primitive times, imagined as active powers existing beyond us and interfering in our daily lives to prompt us to good or evil, to bless and to scourge. The sexual theory, pointing to Themis, Eris, the Muses and other similar names, suggests that these abstractions were personified as females and hence their names were assigned to the feminine gender[2]. To put it shortly, Mohr's theory is a less safe and satisfactory explanation than the sexual, because sex is of a much wider connotation than any other single attribute, such as activity or passivity. To get over this difficulty, Bindseil[3] very much enlarges the list of qualities upon which gender will depend. According to his view, the first gender will comprise the names of those things which are, by comparison, "great, strong, swift, active, stirring, creative"; the second the names of those which are "small, weak, passive, receptive, productive;" and the

[1] Mohr's theory seems to have been suggested by a remark of Grimm, who says (Deutsche Gram. III. p. 311), "The distinction of genders lies as deep in the nature of nouns and their forms as that between the active, passive, and middle in verbs. Both divisions may be compared in more than one respect: the active appears, like the masculine, as the strongest and oldest form; the passive, like the feminine, as a form derived from the first: the middle, like the neuter, as a blending or combination of active and passive, male and female, forms." This hint, however, is not carried further by Grimm himself.

[2] Bleek, on the other hand, as might be expected, is of opinion that genders influence mythology rather than mythology genders. See his Reynard the Fox in S. Africa, p. XXI., and Origin of Lang. p. 23.

[3] Allg. Vergl. Sprachl. ante cit. pp. 496, 497.

third those which are "impassive, lifeless, undeveloped[1]." It would naturally be expected, if this theory be true, that the names of all huge and ferocious animals at least would be of the first gender, and those of small and timid creatures of the second; yet this is not the case, and again we seem to be thrown back on sex alone as the basis of gender in one very large and important group of nouns. Finally, a happy compromise is adopted by Madvig[2], who, arguing from the fact that the neuter sign, a final *-m* or *-ν* in Latin and Greek, is also the accusative sign in other genders, sees in the neuter the passive gender and confines the sexual theory to the masculine and feminine, which together form the active gender. An explanation differing, on the whole, in little but names from Madvig's, will be proposed in this paper, with the further advantage, that it will not press the sexual theory into accounting for all masculine and feminine words, and that it, at the same time, removes the difficulty which prevented Bindseil from admitting the sexual theory at all. He was unable, he says, to account for the apparently late origin of the neuter and the apparent "retrogression" of so many languages which have abandoned the sexual distinction for that between animates and inanimates. It will be suggested that neither of these appearances corresponds with fact. The remark should here be added that probably none of the theorists just reviewed would deny that some words may come by their gender simply by the accidental analogy of their form[3]: but since such cases would only arise at a somewhat late date in the history of language, they may well be neglected in a general discussion of the origin of gender-distinctions.

[1] This classification, again, is taken from Grimm's division of the words to which grammatical, not natural, gender belongs (Deutsche Gram. III. 359): but while Grimm admits that sex is after all the ground of these distinctions, Bindseil stoutly maintains that sex has nothing to do with them.

[2] Kleinere Schriften, No. I. (Geschlecht).

[3] Thus *abenteuer* in Germ. is neut. from *adventura* fem.; *geste* in French is fem. from Lat. *gesta*, neut. plur.; *diu märe* in Thuringian is fem. from old *diumaere* neut. plur. Grimm, Kleinere Schriften, I. 85. On the other hand, meaning sometimes determines gender in spite of form and custom, e.g. *tretelgia* Goth. is fem. when meaning 'axe,' but, when 'carpenter,' is masc. So *nullus potestas*, *den Potestat* in old charters, like modern Italian *podesta*.

The statements hitherto made and the theories cited, with regard to genders in inflexional languages, apply to those languages only in the highest stage of their development. This fact, however, is almost always forgotten by the theorists, who generally take it that the differences of sex or other qualities are the only original ground of distinction of words, the common primitive principle of division which those nations, who acknowledge less than three genders, have abandoned. Now Indo-European languages at least, appear to have had a very long history at which we can only guess, and it is likely that, in this remote past, the distinctions of gender were not such as we find them at a later date, and again that the earlier usage did not wholly disappear on the introduction of the modern. The inquiry into development, which has disturbed so many symmetrical *a priori* theories, may perhaps be advantageously applied to the study of genders, though unfortunately, from the nature of the case, the evidence to be procured can be only fragmentary and, for the most part, disputable.

In the first place, as, on the one hand, we find in South-east Asia radical languages slowly becoming agglutinative, and agglutinative elsewhere (e.g. in Hungary) becoming inflexional, so, on the other, the more we examine the structure of words in the Indo-European languages, the more irresistible becomes the conviction that these have been at one time agglutinative and still earlier radical. This conclusion, based upon the analogy here mentioned and upon the successful analyses of many inflexions of verbs and of the genitive case[1], seems to be admitted by all philologers. But the radical languages now known admit, as we saw, no distinctions of gender, and it is an obvious question whether the Indo-European languages did so at the time when they may be supposed to have been radical. Analogy, at any rate, would shew that they did not, nor is internal evidence wanting to support the same inference. The nature of that evidence may be best learnt from a short extract from Schleicher, who says, "Gender is marked by no vocal element in nearly all cases of consonantal stems and stems in diphthongs and in *i* and

[1] Garnett, Philolog. Essays.

u. In stems in *a*, we find the feminine, in nearly all cases, an increase of this *a* to *ā*,...so that here most cases of the feminine are distinguished from the masculine and neuter. But the circumstance that the increase of the *a*-ending is not wholly foreign to the masculine and neuter shews that it is not wholly devoted to the feminine and that we cannot properly speak of feminine stems in *ā*. Moreover, in some languages the forms of the *a* stem with increased ending are used as masculine, e.g. Lat. *advena*, Gr. πολιτής: Slav. *vladyka* 'master', old Lith. *geradéja* 'benefactor' etc.: and *a* stems not increased do duty as feminines, e.g. Gr. ὁδός: Lat. *nurus*, *domus*, etc.: so that this distinction is not universal and its original application to the distinction of gender is very doubtful." The other means of marking gender, enumerated by the same philologer, are also almost all certainly not primeval, and his conclusion is that "es ist deutlich war zu nemen, dass in einer älteren sprachepoche der indogermanischen ursprache das genus one bezeichnung war und erst im laufe der zeit durch secundäre hilfsmittel die genera am nomen gesondert wurden[1]." It is worth observing, also, upon the same subject, that, as in radical and other undeveloped languages the sexes are distinguished by wholly distinct words (even in compounds the words for 'male' and 'female' are invariably quite different) so also in Indo-European languages the names of the sexes in human beings (e.g. *father*, *mother*, *brother*, *sister*, *son*, *daughter*) and in the animals probably most familiar to a primitive people (e.g. *bull*, *cow*, *dog*, *bitch*, *taurus*, *vacca*, *verres*, *sus*, etc.) are generally derived from different roots, or are represented by one common term differentiated only by the context or by the addition of the adjective 'male' or 'female' (e.g. *femina bos*, Varro, R. R. II. 1, 17, etc.). The second question which now arises is, When the Indo-European languages first assumed the practice of distinguishing genders, upon what principle was the distinction made? Did they at once proceed to discriminate the sexes, or was there an intermediate stage? The ordinary view appears to be that they first distinguished masculines from all other words which together belonged to the

[1] Vergl. Grammatik, p. 501. Comp. also Pott in Ersch and Gruber, ante cit. (pub. 1853).

second gender, and that this latter was ultimately again divided, new forms being assigned to the neuter. This theory, however, though it derives some colour from the practice of the Semitic tongues, is not supported by analogy in others or by the internal evidence of the Indo-European themselves. On the other hand there seems to be a fairly strong case, considering the nature of the subject, for the argument that the languages of our family at an early time distinguished animate from inanimate gender. Analogy here is to be looked for not only in the agglutinative tongues, but also in the incorporative, for the nations who speak the languages of these groups are, upon the whole, at much the same stage of mental development. We have already seen that in incorporative languages a distinction between animate and inanimate genders is almost universal, and that in the agglutinative, as also in the tongues, not definitively classed, of many of the higher savages, the same distinction or something like it is generally incipient and occasionally complete. It seems unlikely that the ancestors of the Aryan race, whose minds doubtless progressed, by the same paths as those of other peoples, from brutal ignorance to civilization, should have disregarded, as too obvious, a general classification which others have deemed so striking and so necessary to reproduce in speech. And here also internal evidence is forthcoming to support analogy. The distinction of only two forms, animate and inanimate, in the interrogative pronoun, which, as we saw, was the first inkling of gender in the agglutinative languages, is retained in nearly all the descendants of the Aryan stock; e.g. Gr. *τίς, τι*: Lat. *quis, quid*[1]: Ger. *wer, was:* Polish *kto, co* (so *nikt* 'nobody,' *nic* 'nothing'): Persian *keh, tscheh:* so also in Albanian and Keltic[2]. Yet Sanskrit has a feminine *ka* (masc. *kas*), so that the usage of the other languages would seem to be a survival from a very ancient time. Nor has some express recognition of this fundamental distinction ever wholly died out. Thus in Slavonic languages of the present day, masculine nouns representing animates have an accusative in *-a* which is not given to masculine names of

[1] Roby, Latin Gram. § 380, "Quis illaec est mulier?" Plaut. Epidic. iv. 1. 6, &c.

[2] Bindseil, p. 513.

inanimates[1]. In Lithuanian, masculine names in *ů* of animates have a special form of the vocative wanting to other masculines. In Persian, diminutives of animates are formed with *-ek* (as *kenîzek* 'puellula') while those of inanimates are formed with *-tsheh* (as *mah-tsheh* 'lunula'). In Old High German, neuters which stood for living things formed a special plural in *-iren*, etc. But the great sign of one common early usage in this respect is this, that the oldest and only universal distinction of gender-forms lies between the neuter on the one side and the masculine and feminine combined on the other. In the nominative and accusative singular the neuter has the bare stem or the objective ending *-m* (in pronouns a special ending *-d*) as against *-s* of the other genders, and in the plural again the neuter has final *a* where the others have *ās*. In one case, only, are the masculine and neuter together against the feminine, viz. in the feminine genitive sing. of the *a*-declension we find *-s* against the *-sya* of the others, but this variation may be explained by the fact of the late origin of the feminine, to be hereafter considered. In all other cases, where the masculine and neuter are distinguished from the feminine (e.g. Lat. abl. *novo* against *nova*) the difference is not primeval (e.g. in the last example both forms were originally *novāt*) and its ultimate appearance may be similarly explained by the late origin of the feminine[2]. Finally, whereas three common genders are conceivable, viz. a masc.-fem., masc.-neut., and fem.-neut., only one, the masculine-feminine, is found. This evidence, already reasonably strong, will be further enforced by facts which it is convenient to reserve for our last inquiry, namely, that into the general development of the forms by which genders are indicated. For the same occasion also, may be suitably kept a more detailed suggestion of the mode in which the animate gender was ultimately divided. It will be sufficient here to say that there seems little ground for doubting that this final division was based upon distinctions of sex in the things heretofore considered merely as animate, though probably not all such things were further conceived as endowed with sex.

[1] Grimm, Vorrede xxxix to Wuk's Serbische Grammatik.

[2] Schleicher, Vergl. Gram. pp. 502, 503.

One more question, as it has been already hinted, remains to be answered before a theoretical history of genders can be considered complete. Of existing forms, appropriated to the several genders, which are the oldest? When the primitive Aryan language first admitted distinctions of gender, were new vocal elements introduced to mark the classes, or were the old forms kept for one class and new provided for the other or others? And, in the latter case, to which class were the earlier forms assigned? Upon this point, philologers seem, for some reason or other, to be entirely agreed. From Bernhardi down to Prof. Sayce[1], all concur in the opinion that the masculine gender is the oldest, the neuter latest. The grounds of this belief appear to be, first, that in oblique cases the inflexions of the neuter are the same as and therefore probably adopted from those of the masculine, and, secondly, that Semitic languages have no neuter. Now, unless the neuter be a very late invention indeed, its inflexions in oblique cases are originally not only the same as the masculine but (except in one case, the genitive sing. of the *a*-declension) the same as the feminine; and that it is not a late invention, its universality sufficiently declares. When, moreover, it is sufficiently considered that there are good grounds for believing these inflexional suffixes to be mere adaptations of pronominal roots of definite meaning, it will be seen that it is impossible to give the priority, in respect of their use, to one gender rather than another. The argument, in fact, is only saved from being circular by the introduction of the analogy of Semitic speech. It would be lawful, perhaps, here to protest against an inference derived from languages whose early history is, in so many important respects, totally incomparable with that of the Indo-European family, but it seems possible also to aver that the real analogy may be different from that suggested. The genders of Semitic languages do not seem to have been very carefully treated, as yet, by any writer, but, in such information as can be gleaned at least from Hebrew

[1] Bernhardi, Sprachlehre, pt. I. pp. 141 sqq.; Grimm, Deutsche Gram. III. 318; Bindseil, Allgem. Verg. Sprachl. p. 496; Pott in Ersch and Gruber, LXII. 405 b; Whitney, Language and Study of Language, p. 274; Tylor, Primitive Culture, I. 273; Sayce, Assyrian Grammar, p. 119.

grammars, I can find nothing to disprove and some facts to favour a theory that these tongues also, like the Aryan, had at one time no genders; then divided animates from inanimates, and finally, very imperfectly, distinguished feminines from masculines, without, however, inventing any new forms indicative of this final division. Thus Gesenius[1] states that "the distinction of the feminine sex is often avoided by early writers, Hebrew as well as Arabic;" and Kalisch, that "as the great number of *communia* proves, usage may in many cases have long fluctuated. * * * * Certain it is that both genders were not so strictly distinguished by separate forms as in later epochs of the language, but, throughout the books of the Old Testament, we find traces of a gradual and struggling development in that direction....In a very considerable number of instances, the masculine of the pronouns, suffixes and verbs is, in the 2nd and 3rd persons, used instead of the feminine, and they occur in such variety and number that it is scarcely possible to consider them as anomalies or inaccuracies of expression." Similarly, the words *mother*, *concubine*, *ewe*, *she-ass* and others, names of countries, of parts of the body, of tools and utensils, of light, fire and other powers of nature are all construed as feminine, though generally *not feminine in form:* while the feminine form is actually preferred only for lifeless things, abstract ideas, collectives and adjectives used substantively. Much the same rules seem to obtain also in Chaldee[2], and in Assyrian many feminines have no distinctive termination[3]. Generalizations like these, unanimously adopted by the most eminent professors, seem to me to afford considerable *prima facie* evidence for a theory of genders similar to that already suggested for the Indo-European tongues[4]. The peculiarity in

[1] Hebrew Grammar, ed. Roediger, trans. Davies, pp. 239—242; Kalisch, Heb. Gram. II. 107 sqq.; Nordheimer, Heb. Gram. vol. I. pp. 216—218; Wright, Arabic Grammar, vol. I. §§ 289—297.

[2] Longfield, Introd. to Chaldee, § 32, p. 40.

[3] Sayce, Assyrian Gram. p. 119.

[4] B. Stade (Lehrbuch der Heb. Gramm. § 312 a) distinctly says, "The use of the feminine to form abstracts is explained by the substitution of the opposition of males to females for that of persons to things, *which latter opposition seems to have preceded, in Semitic languages, the differentiation of the two sexes.*"

this case would, of course, be that when the animates were divided according to sex, the feminines received, by way of distinction, not a new form but that already appropriated to inanimates, so that the result is rather to distinguish masculines alone from feminines and inanimates combined,—a practice not without analogies in other phases of Semitic civilization. To return, however, to the Indo-European languages: it is clear that if, in fact, the masculine and feminine represent the old animate gender and the neuter the old inanimate, the neuter must be older than one of the other two genders. But the masculine is clearly older than the feminine, so that the question of absolute priority lies between the masculine and neuter. Now we are accustomed to hear it argued that of two languages or two words that is the older which is the simpler in construction, i.e. which is the less abundant in functional suffixes. But the main distinction between the neuter and masculine is that the former is deficient in about a third of the chief suffixes which belong to the latter[1]. The nominative, accusative and vocative of neuters have but one form, which in the plural is much shorter than the masculine; and, in these cases, neuters singular of the consonantal declension are but a bare stem while masculines have extra suffixes, *s* or its equivalent in the nominative and *m* in the accusative. It is argued, however, that the final *m* of neuters in the vowel-declension is borrowed from the masculine accusative, while the short neuters in the consonantal declension are abbreviations of the masculine form. As to the former supposition, surely it is equally tenable that the masculine accusative *m* is the neuter form, chosen for this reason, that an animate thing, when conceived as passive, is to all present intents inanimate: and as to the latter, is it conceivable that a whole nation should consciously and systematically reject a customary suffix in order to mark a new distinction in things? It is an almost invariable rule that new associations of words are marked by new suffixes or internal modification, and it seems to me unscientific to assume an exception where another

[1] The argument of the text may be reinforced by the analogy of the dual number, which, admittedly a useless survival from a very remote antiquity, shews the same paucity of forms as the neuter gender.

explanation is possible. It is observable also that in Latin, which has preserved so many primeval usages, undeclined nouns are always neuter, and undeclined adjectives (e.g. *nequam, frugi, tot*) are always neuter in form. Let us recall here also the statement of Caldwell, already cited (supra, p. 45), regarding Tamil, that "in older Tamil and poetry we find many words neuter which later and in prose are masculine, and the suffixes which distinguish the masculine, feminine and common genders are only mutilated pronouns." Internal evidence and analogy are thus strongly in favour of the priority of neuter forms to masculine, and it is besides *a priori* improbable that the Aryan people, at quite a late date, unanimously invented a new gender which not so long afterwards many of them began to discard. With regard to the other two genders, it will be sufficient to say that the masculine is everywhere admitted to be older than the feminine. In the vowel-declension, where alone the two are differentiated, the feminine form with lengthened vowel is clearly later than the masculine, which also is always used in words of common gender[1]. The reader who desires more information on this topic is referred to Grimm's Deutsche Grammatik, III. pp. 313—315.

The theory of the history of gender in Indo-European languages, which I have here tried to sketch[2], is briefly as follows. These languages had at the earliest time no gender-distinctions but afterwards divided nouns into names of animates and those of inanimates, keeping the old forms for the latter but adding

[1] Thus *parens*, in old Latin, is masculine even when it distinctly means *mater*. Festus, s. v. *masculine*, Müll. 151.

[2] My theory may be concisely shewn by a diagram, thus:

No gender

animate (new, later masc., forms) — *inanimate* (old forms, later neuter, retained)

masc. (old anim. forms) — *feminine* (new forms or a few old anim. forms adapted)

For Semitic languages, the history of the classes would be the same, but of the forms different. Inanimates, not animates, received a new form, suffix *-t*. On the differentiation of feminines, no old material was available, nor did any new suffix suggest itself except the neuter *-t*. Hence the identity of neuter and feminine forms.

new suffixes to the former. Still later, the animate class was divided into masculine and feminine, and with this change the old forms of the animate gender were assigned to the masculine, while new characteristics were invented for, or possibly old material was specially appropriated to, the feminine[1].

It may be said that this theory, even if it be plausible, affords no explanation of the existing confusion in the distribution of genders; but it is submitted that each new change in the division of words would be somewhat imperfectly carried out and would leave a considerable margin of anomalies. In the first place, when the distinction between animates and inanimates arose, not all living things would be assigned to the animate class, and the exceptions will now be found as anomalous neuters. Thus, in Ashantee, as we saw, 'father', 'slave', 'child', 'maiden' and other expressly personal names and collectives of animates, as 'family', 'company', 'party' (though these latter may possibly be plurals), belong to the impersonal class. Similarly, in Aryan languages, we find *πᾶυ, pecus, das Weib, das Rind, das Schaf* and other German collectives, diminutives and names of children and fruits all neuter. Sometimes, doubtless, inveterate usage of a familiar word would retain the inanimate form for an animate name, and sometimes (as in the case of *τέκνον* etc.) animates would be deliberately assigned to the inanimate class because of their peculiar relation, as products, to other animates. On the other hand, very many words, properly belonging to the inanimates, would be assigned to the animate gender. The agent in this case would be a habit of vague personification, such as that of which Mr Tylor speaks in the following passage. "Certain high savage races," says he, "distinctly hold, and a large proportion of other savage and barbarian races make a more or less close approach

[1] For instance, many names of females in common use, but not many males, happened to have a long vowel in the stem, or to be formed with a suffix *-na* or *-ana* (e.g. Sk. *patnî*, Gr. *δέσποινα*, Lat. *regina*, Pol. *bogini* (goddess), Ger. *göttin*, Eng. *vixen*), and these forms would become, as a rule, but not without exceptions, distinctive of the feminine. In the Semitic languages, on the other hand, the animates had no special characteristic, and consequently, on the specialisation of the feminine, there was no old material to adapt.

to, a theory of separable and surviving souls belonging to stocks and stones, boats, food, clothes, ornaments, which to us are not merely soulless but lifeless[1]." A long and striking array of examples is given by this writer, but need not here be cited, for our business is only with the effect of this habit of personification on language. In Ashantee, 'broom', 'knife', 'pot' and other names of inanimates are assigned to the animate. Among the North American Indians names of trees, the calumet, the tomahawk, arrow, kettle, piece of wampum and other objects of familiar use are all habitually animate, and, according to Schoolcraft, already quoted, any other inanimate may, by personification, change its gender[2]. It is difficult, of course, to find, at the present day, equally certain examples in Aryan languages, but the habit of mind now in question was certainly common to our forefathers, witness only the ancient practice of trying for manslaughter a rooftree or other lifeless thing which had accidentally killed a passer-by: and that the habit of mind affected the language is rendered in the highest degree probable from the fact that from the earliest times we find inanimate objects receiving proper names. Thus we read of the ship Argo, of Thor's hammer Miölnir, of Arthur's Excalibur, Sigurd's Gram, Rustum's Brand, the Cid's Tizona, etc. These analogies will suffice to shew what influence personification could exercise in swelling the numbers of the animate class. All words of this gender were, according to my theory, ultimately assigned either to the masculine or the feminine, and in this redistribution old and new influences would combine to produce an infinite and confusing variety. The names of things, which contained no suggestion of sex, or (as in words of common gender) where sex was not material, would retain their old forms and associations and thus be masculine[3]: words in common use, properly feminine, would, especially in the consonantal declensions, not be transferred to their new gender: other words, properly either

[1] Primitive Culture, I. 477 sqq.

[2] See Tylor, Prim. Culture, I. 285—303.

[3] Similarly, in Greek, women, speaking of themselves in the plural, with a quasi-sexless editorial 'we,' use the masculine.

masculine or sexless, would be assigned to the feminine because they resembled, in form, a certain group of words which, by virtue of their meaning, were now classed as feminine: by these and many other similar obstacles a systematic classification would be prevented. In selecting words for the feminine gender, the merest fragment of a sexual characteristic would suffice, whether such characteristic were original or only added by association. Thus the Dyaks of Borneo say of a heavy downpour "*ujatn arai sa*" "a *he*-rain this": in Bullom the thumbs and great toes are called the male fingers, the others female: a Chilian calls soft wool *domo-cal.* i.e. female wool. In the French navy, it is said[1], masculine names were given to line-of-battle ships (as Le Vengeur), feminine to frigates (as La Belle Poule). The affection of a sailor for his ship leads him to speak of it as 'she', as does every mechanic of his engine. So, according to Cobbett[2], a Hampshire labourer refers to his plough with 'she', but to all other tools with 'he'. The distinction made by the Englishman between 'male' and 'female' screws, is in other languages indicated by a difference of gender. Thus in German we have *haft* and *heftel, haken* and *schlinge, ohse* and *öhre.* These last, according to Grimm[3], used to be distinguished as *mannli* and *weibli* simply, like the Italian *maschio* and *femmina,* Arabic *zend* and *zendet.* Similarly, in Greek, we find μύλος distinguished in gender from μύλη. Could there be a more remote suggestion of sex than that by which certain rimes and caesurae have been, even in modern times, styled 'feminine'? Yet sexual characteristics, no stronger than those here suggested, would in primitive times have sufficed to determine a word to the masculine or feminine gender, even as, in modern German, the manly qualities *muth* and *hochmuth* are distinguished from the womanly *demuth* and *wehmuth.* It would appear, also, as a further cause of confusion, that the separation of the feminine, though begun earlier, was not completed till after the scattering of the Aryan race: for except the lengthened stem-vowel and the suffix *-ana* no marks of the feminine can be

[1] Key, Language, Its Origin, etc., chap. on gender.

[2] English Grammar, Letter v.

[3] Deutsche Gram. III. 359.

considered common to all Indo-European languages. The *ic* of Lat. *victrix*, the *-ya* of Gr. *φέρουσα* (*φερουτ*-ya), are peculiar to those languages, as are other forms to other languages. Lastly, when more civilised habits of observation had displaced the older tendency to personify, new words, created to represent new things or ideas, would receive a gender suggested not by their meaning but their form: compounds (e.g. with *heit*, *keit* in German) would be assigned to the gender of their last component; words with vowel-ending (preferred in Latin and Greek) would be classed as feminine. At the same time, phonetic changes and the irksomeness of remembering distinctions no longer significant would lead to endless mistakes, many of which would become stereotyped (as in the case of *frons* and *crux*, and many more which were masculine in Old Latin[1]), or even to rearrangements of genders, regardless of form[2]. Other similar sources of confusion, needless to enumerate or discuss, will doubtless occur to the reader.

In the foregoing remarks I have endeavoured merely to suggest a history of the Indo-European genders which will, without violence, account both for their existence and for the few regularities and multitudinous discrepancies of their distribution. The proofs which have been proposed, though not absolutely cogent, yet seem to me more than strong enough to support a hypothesis which can never be very hardly worked. For unfortunately genders, as we know them, are generally those of only one dialect, fixed at quite a late date by the introduction of writing and the growth of a literature. The want of record and the difficulty of conceiving the mental

[1] Festus, s. v. *masculino*, 151 Müll. ante cit.

[2] Thus, according to Grimm, modern German shows a tendency to make all names of towns neuter, notwithstanding that they may be compounded with terms properly of other genders, *e.g.* Bam-berg (*m*), Magde-burg (*f*), Lands-hut (*m*), Elber-feld (*n*), Neu-hof (*m*), &c. are all neuters. Deutsche Gram. III. 426. The loss of genders, like that of inflexions in modern languages, is clearly due to the inability of foreigners, adopting a new language, to remember meaningless distinctions, even where similar ones existed in their native tongue.

attitude of a long-distant age will prevent the possibility of explaining, with any show of certainty, the gender of a particular word. The same obstacles lie in the way of any practical application of a theory as to the origin of language, but the science of philology manifestly requires the aid of such tributary speculations[1].

[1] The substance of this article was written as long ago as 1876. While it was printing, Mr Brandreth read a paper on Gender before the Philolog. Soc. in London. I am told that his views on the probable growth of gender-distinctions agree with mine. I may here observe also that, in the article on Grammar in the last edition of the Encyc. Brit., Prof. Sayce expressly adopts the sexual theory of gender.

JAMES GOW.

ΑΤΑΚΤΑ.

1. Aristoteles *Poet.* 1, 1447ª 8 (Vahlen):—*περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστόν τι ἔχει κτέ.*

The reading *ἕκαστόν τι* has been introduced by Vahlen (instead of the common reading *ἕκαστον*) under a misapprehension, namely that the Paris MS. 1741 has *ἕκαστοτι*. The MS. has *ἕκαστον*, written thus, *ἕκαστο*N.

2. Aristot. *Poet.* 3, 1448ª 30:—*διὸ καὶ ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τε τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς κωμωδίας οἱ Δωριεῖς· τῆς μὲν γὰρ κωμῳδίας οἱ Μεγαρεῖς ..... καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔνιοι τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ.*

The grounds on which the Dorians claimed the invention of Comedy are stated at some length by Aristotle, whereas their claim to the invention of Tragedy is merely recorded as a fact in a clause of some half-dozen words, as though it were too far-fetched to deserve consideration. If we insert a δ' after *καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας* so as to make the clause mean 'and *even* Tragedy is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians,' we shall improve the sense as well as the construction of the passage.

3. Aristot. *Poet.* 8, 1451ª 16 :—*μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται ἐὰν περὶ ἕνα ᾖ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίνει ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕν· οὕτως δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις.*

The *ἑνί*, which has supplanted the old reading *γένει*, is found in a late (Wolfenbüttel) MS.; but, if I am not mistaken,

it has on its side much better authority than this, namely that of the Arabic version of the Poetics. Until we have Prof. Sachau's long-promised edition, the Arabic version is a sealed book to us; in the interim however we may as a pis-aller turn to the mediaeval Latin version, which is a translation of the commentary of Averroes. Now the Latin corresponding to the above passage runs thus:—

Uni etenim rei multa accidunt, et similiter reperiuntur in una et eadem re actiones multae (f. 5 rect. ed. Ven. 1481).

The Arabic text, therefore, which is older than the oldest Greek MS. and is based on a still older Syriac version, would seem to presuppose *ἐνί* rather than *γένει*. As for *ἐνίων*, I think it should be bracketed, as due to a marginal *ἐνί* (intended as a correction of *γένει*) which has found its way into the text in the wrong place. It is not recognized in the Latin version, and there is no similar limitation in the next clause (*ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις*) which is in other respects the counterpart of the clause with which we are dealing.

4. Callimachus *Hymn.* 5 (Lav. Pall.). 45:—

σάμερον ὑδροφόροι μὲν βάπτετε, σάμερον Ἄργος
πίνετ' ἀπὸ κρανᾶν, μὴ δ' ἀπὸ τῶ ποταμῶ.

This is the reading in Schneider's edition; but I cannot think that his note on the passage (I. p. 340) clears up the difficulty in the words *Ἄργος πίνετ'*. If we are not prepared to take *πίνετ'* as = *πίνεται*, or to regard *Ἄργος* as a vocative = ye Argives, or to write (as Meineke suggests) *πίετ'* or *πίνει*, there is still another possibility, *viz.* to read *πίσετ'*. *πίσετε* will of course govern *Ἄργος*; and as the future is practically equivalent to an imperative (see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 25. 1. 5 *b*), Meineke's doubts as to the *μὴ* that follows will thus fall to the ground. The *μὲν* after *ὑδροφόροι* is Schneider's unnecessary correction of the MS. reading, *μὴ*.

5. Clemens Alex. *Paed.* 3. 12, p. 307 Potter:—*καὶ οἰκέταις μὲν χρηστέον ὡς ἑαυτοῖς· ἄνθρωποι γάρ εἰσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς· ὁ γὰρ θεὸς πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις ἐστίν, ἂν σκοπῇς, ἴσος.*

As the context literally swarms with quotations I suspect that Clemens has here worked into his text the words of some dramatic poet, perhaps Euripides. The addition of a syllable or two gives us the following result:—

ὁ γὰρ θεός <τοι> πᾶσι τοῖς <τ'> ἐλευθέροις
καὶ τοῖσι δούλοις ἐστίν, ἂν σκοπῇς, ἴσος.

6. Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 4. 8, p. 589:—*ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Θεόδοτος ὁ πυθαγόρειος ἐποίησεν καὶ Παῦλος ὁ Λακύδου γνώριμος, ὥς φησι Τιμόθεος ὁ περγαμηνὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀνδρείας.*

Clemens is enumerating the philosophers (Zeno, Anaxarchus, etc.) famous for their fortitude under torture; and we learn from this passage that their heroism was the subject of a special work by a certain Timotheus of Pergamum. Who then is the Paulus mentioned? As Lacydes resigned in B.C. 215, I do not see how one of his disciples can have had such a name, and am inclined to suspect that the right name was Φαῦλος or Φάυλλος. The mistake may be as old as Clemens himself, since Theodoret who copies him has the same reading. As far as I know, this Paulus or Phayllus is not mentioned elsewhere: judging from the dates one may perhaps suppose the story of his sufferings to have been told in some way or other as an episode in the history of the tyrant Nabis.

7. Clemens Alex. *Strom.* 7. 11, p. 871:—*τάχα δ' οὗτοι καὶ τοὺς θαυματοποιοὺς ἀνδρείους φήσουσιν εἰς τὰς μαχαίρας κυβιστῶντας ἐξ ἐμπειρίας τινὸς κακοτεχνοῦντας ἐπὶ λυπρῷ τῷ μισθῷ.*

Read *ἐπὶ λυπρῷ τῳ μισθῷ*: comp. Diog. Laert. 10. 3: *γράμματα διδάσκειν λυπροῦ τινος μισθαρίου.*

8. Galenus *περὶ διαφορᾶς σφυγμῶν* 2. 10, t. 8 p. 631 Kühn:—*οὔτε γεννηθεὶς Ἀθήνησιν οὔτε τραφείς, ἀλλὰ χθὲς καὶ πρώτως ἥκων ἐκ Κιλικίας.*

For *πρώτως* read *πρῴην.*

9. Galenus *περὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων* 4, t. 14 p. 595:—*μία μέν* [scil. *ἀμφιβολία*], *ἣν κοινὴν ὀνομάζουσι τοῦ*

τε εἰρημένου καὶ τοῦ διαιρετοῦ, οἷα ἐστὶν ἡ αὐλητρὶς παῖς οὖσα· κοινὴ γὰρ αὕτη τοῦ τε αὐλητρὶς ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου.

This occurs in an enumeration of the eight species of amphiboly recognized by the Stoics. ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ was a favourite instance of one kind of ambiguity, the question being whether in a formula like this, ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ *πεσοῦσα δημοσία ἔστω*, it was to be read as one word or as two—'utrum aula quae ter ceciderit an tibicina si ceciderit debeat publicari,' as Quintilian says (Instit. 7. 9. 4; comp. Diog. Laert. 7. 62). The parallel statement in Theon (Progymn. 4, Rhett. Gr. t. 2, p. 81 Spengel) is as follows:—*ἀσαφῆ δὲ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν ποιεῖ καὶ ἡ λεγομένη ἀμφιβολία πρὸς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου τε καὶ διῃρημένου, ὡς ἐν τῷ* ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ *πεσοῦσα δημοσία ἔστω· ἓν μὲν γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ ὑφ' ἓν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, αὐλητρὶς ἔστω πεσοῦσα δημοσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ διῃρημένον, αὐλὴ τρὶς πεσοῦσα ἔστω δημοσία.* By the aid of this parallel it is easy to restore the words of Galen to something like their original form:—*μία μέν, ἣν <παρὰ τὴν> κοινὴν ὀνομάζουσι τοῦ τε διῃρημένου καὶ τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου, οἷα ἐστὶν ἡ* ΑΥΛΗΤΡΙΣ *πεσοῦσα· κοινὴ γὰρ αὕτη τοῦ τε αὐλητρὶς ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ διῃρημένου.*

10. Galenus (pseudo-Galenus) *εἰ ζῷον τὸ κατὰ γαστρός* 5, t. 19 p. 176:—*φησὶ δὲ Δημόκριτος ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐξεσεῖσθαι καὶ κύνα ἐκ κυνός.*

The astonishing word *ἐξεσεῖσθαι* is a blunder which has survived from the editio princeps. As Democritus said *ἐξέσσυται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου* (Stob. fl. 6. 57), it is pretty obvious that what Galen wrote was *ἐξεσσύσθαι*. A similar correction has still to be made in Clemens Alex. *Paed.* 2. 10, p. 227 Potter:—*ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐκφύεταί τε καὶ ἀποσπᾶται*—where *ἐκφύεται* is surely a scribe's mistake for *ἐκσεύεται*. B. ten Brink (Philol. 8, p. 415) thought *ἐκφύεται* due to a slip of memory on the part of Clemens himself.

11. Galenus *Defin. medic.* 487, t. 19 p. 462:—*ἐνθουσιασμός ἐστι καθάπερ ἐξίστανταί τινες ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποθυμιωμένων ἐν*

τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὁρῶντες ἢ τυμπάνων ἢ αὐλῶν ἢ συμβόλων ἀκούσαντες.

This definition may be made complete by the aid of what precedes it in the text, but even then it requires some slight correction. Read:—ἐνθουσιασμός ἐστι <διανοίας ἔκστασις>, καθάπερ ἐξίστανταί τινες ὑπὸ τῶν ὑποθυμιωμένων <ἢ τὰ> ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὁρῶντες ἢ τυμπάνων ἢ αὐλῶν ἢ κυμβάλων ἀκούσαντες.

12. Hippocrates περὶ τροφῆς 14, t. 9 p. 103 Littré:—χυλοὶ φθείραντες καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος καὶ ἔξωθεν καὶ ἔνδοθεν αὐτόματοι καὶ οὐκ αὐτόματοι, ἡμῖν μὲν αὐτόματοι αἰτίῃ δ' οὐκ αὐτόματοι, αἰτίης δὲ τὰ μὲν δῆλα τὰ δ' ἄδηλα κτέ.

Although the reading here given is as old as Galen (v. t. 5 p. 393, and t. 15 p. 300 Kühn), we may be tolerably sure that Hippocrates himself wrote not αἰτίῃ and αἰτίης but in both cases ἐτεῇ—which is the regular Ionic equivalent of φύσει as the antithesis to νόμῳ or πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Galen elsewhere (t. 1 p. 417) shews himself quite familiar with the word.

13. Menander περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν 2. 1, Rhett. Gr. t. 3 p. 346 Spengel:—παράδοξα δέ [scil. ἐγκώμια], οἷον Ἀλκιδάμαντος τὸ τοῦ Θανάτου ἐγκώμιον, ἢ τὸ τῆς Πενίας ἢ τοῦ Πρωτέως τοῦ κυνός.

I give the text as it stands in Walz and Spengel (who rely mainly on two Laurentian MSS.), but every one must feel that there is something clumsy and unsatisfactory about it; one would naturally infer from it that Alcidamas wrote an ἐγκώμιον Πρωτέως τοῦ κυνός! In stating the theory of ἐγκώμια Menander divides them according to the nature of the subject-matter into (1) ἔνδοξα, (2) ἀμφίδοξα, and (3) παράδοξα[1]. Encomia of the Gods come under the first head:

[1] The existing text adds ἄδοξα to the list; the addition is to my mind—and Heeren takes the same view—an absurdity too great to be fathered on Menander. An ἄδοξον ἐγκώμιον is a contradiction in terms: if you wish to laud something ἄδοξον, you must by an effort of ingenuity make it out to be not really ἄδοξον—in which case the ἐγκώμιον becomes what Menander in the passage before us terms παράδοξον. When I read the explanatory clause, ἄδοξα δὲ τὰ περὶ δαιμόνων καὶ κακοῦ φανεροῦ, I cannot but think that the

under the second head he gives as instances the Panathenaic orations of Isocrates and Aristides, one instance being taken from early, the other from more recent literature. In dealing with the third class we should expect him to select his examples on the same principle, but if Spengel's text is right, this is not actually the case. When we revert, however, to the pre-Walzian text, that of the Aldine or of Heeren's edition, we find that the above passage once had a very different aspect:—

παράδοξα δέ, οἷον Ἀλκιδάμαντος τὸ τοῦ Θανάτου ἐγκώμιον, ἢ τὸ τῆς Πενίας Πρωτέως τοῦ κυνός.

This, as I have ascertained, is the reading also of the Paris MS. 1741, which is, I believe, older than the two Florentine MSS. followed by Walz and Spengel: Aristotelian scholars will remember that it is now-a-days recognized as the critical basis for our editions of the Rhetoric and Poetics; so that authority as well as internal probability seems to be on the side of the reading of the Aldine. If we keep the reading of the Aldine, we recover the name of a writing of the famous Peregrinus Proteus. We learn that he wrote a 'Praise of Poverty.' Menander would seem to regard it as a well-known book, and also as one of sufficient importance to be chosen from among recent works to be put in comparison with the famous 'Praise of Death' of Alcidamas.

14. Plato *de Rep.* 3, p. 411 B:—*ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίῃ ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.*

Though the words *καὶ λείβει* are recognized by Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* 51 (Rhett. Gr. t. 3 p. 274 Spengel), I am inclined to think *λείβει* a mere gloss on *τήκει*, the two words being almost synonymous in sense (comp. Hermogenes *περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος* 4, Rhett. Gr. t. 2 p. 428). The passage will read better if we cut it out as an emblema and suppose Plato to have written, *τήκει ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμόν.*

addition must have been worked in by a later hand, though I am aware that Plutarch's *τί βλαβερώτατον; δαίμων* (VII Sap. conviv. p. 153 A), might possibly be quoted as an argument against me.

15. Plato *de Rep.* 3, p. 411 D:—*πειθοῖ μὲν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρῆται, βίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς πάντα διαπράττεται.*

Here Baiter, following K. F. Hermann, brackets *διαπράττεται*, in lieu of which Madvig proposes *διατάττεται*—a reading actually found in one of Schneider's MSS. Prof. Chandler (Miscellaneous Emendations and Suggestions p. 6) suggests that, if any change is necessary, we should transpose and read *προσδιαπράττεται πάντα*. The real difficulty in fact is not so much in the verb as in the preposition. If we provisionally bracket the *πρός*, either as the addition of a scribe, or as representing some small word not affecting the general construction, we shall have as the result a form of expression precisely similar to that in Gorg. 451 D:—*ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων.*

16. Plato *de Rep.* 5, p. 473 A:—*τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκαζέ με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν, τοιαῦτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν.*

Read either, *γιγνόμεν'* AN *ἀποφαίνειν*, or (as a friend has suggested to me), *τῷ ἔργῳ* AN *γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν*. In favour of the second alternative I may remark that Stobaeus and also some of the MSS. of the *Republic* have *δὴ* instead of *δεῖν*, and that the difference between ΔH and AN is very slight indeed.

17. Plato *de Rep.* 6, p. 488 C:—*αὐτοὺς δ' αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ.*

For *αὐτῷ* we should perhaps read, *αὖ*.

18. Plato *de Rep.* 6, p. 492 C:—*ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν [ἂν] αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν κτέ;*

The *ἄν* after *ποίαν* has been very rightly excised by Baiter (following Cobet). The clause, however, which precedes requires the particle, as the symmetry of the sentence demands a future or the equivalent of a future in both cases. If Plato did not

write ἔξειν (as Demosthenes does in a parallel instance (p. 842), τίνα οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἕξειν;), the reason, I presume, was that ἕξειν would offend the ear, when ἀνθέξειν was so close to it in the context. But by the insertion of a single letter we get the equivalent of a future, if we read, τίν' ΑΝ οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν;

19. Plato *de Rep.* 6, p. 503 B:—ἦν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένα φύεται.

The parts were surely not διεσπασμένα but διεσπαρμένα—a distinction which we realize more easily when we reflect on the difference between διασπᾶν and διασπείρειν, though no doubt the distinction is not quite so clearly marked in the case of the perfect passive. But there are passages in Plato in which we find the perfect from διασπείρειν, and in which no one would wish to see the perfect of διασπᾶν substituted for it:—

Phaedr. 265 H:—εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα.

De Rep. 455 D:—ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζῴοιν.

Legg. 945 C:—οὓς...μίαν οὖσαν φύσιν διεσπαρμένην πολλαχοῦ, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορεύομεν.

A thing is said to be διεσπασμένον when its unity is lost through a more or less violent disruption—or, to use Aristotelian language, ταῦτα μάλιστα διασπᾶται, ἃ εἰς τοὐναντίον τε καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ἕλκεται καὶ κινεῖται (*Probl.* 5. 39, 885ª 8). The explanation in Hesychius, διασπάσαι· διασπαράξαι, διασχίσαι, gives, I think, a fair notion of the ordinary use of the word in Greek writers. On the other hand, the elements which go to form a composite whole may be said to pre-exist separately, διεσπαρμένα, before their union, but how can we say they pre-exist διεσπασμένα? In short there is a distinction between the two participles corresponding to that which we have in English between *separate* (adj.) and *separated* [compare Cobet *Nov. Lectt.* p. 412].

If what I have just said is true, there are probably not a few passages in Greek authors in which διέσπαΣται, διεσπάΣθαι, and

διεσπαΣμένος have usurped the place of διέσπαρται, διεσπάρθαι and διεσπαρμένος. I am inclined to think that this is the case in the passages in Aristotle's *De Gen. Anim.* in which he discusses the Empedoclean embryology. The theory of Syngenesis (I take the term on the authority of Lewes' *Aristotle*, p. 353), as maintained by Empedocles, Hippocrates and others, affirms the embryo to be the product of the union of male and female γονή: in order to explain the likeness of the offspring to both the parents, it seemed necessary to assume that both parents make the same sort of contribution to the physiological result. The elements of the body of the offspring accordingly were said to pre-exist partly in the γονὴ of the male and partly in that of the female; but before their μῖξις, it is clear that the elements must exist apart, and when thus existing apart they would in Greek phraseology be spoken of as διεσπαρμένα rather than as διεσπασμένα. I conjecture therefore that Empedocles must have written διέσπαρται in the fragment preserved (in a sadly mutilated form) by Aristotle (*De Gen. Anim.* 1. 41, 722^{b} 10 = v. 270 ed. Stein):

φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄρρενι καὶ θήλει οἷον σύμβολον ἐνεῖναι, ὅλον δ' ἀπ' οὐδετέρου ἀπιέναι, "ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις, ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός[1]."

The same correction has to be made more than once not only in the immediate context but also in the second discussion of the Empedoclean view, in the Fourth Book of the *De Gen. Anim.* (4. 9, 764^{b} 3). As far as I know, all trace of the word I wish to restore has disappeared from the MSS. of Aristotle, but the conspiracy of the scribes has not been equally successful in the case of the text of Galen. Galen too has a criticism of Empedocles: now one of his objections to the theory of Syngenesis is this, that if the parts of the offspring pre-exist separately in the two parents, we shall want a *tertium quid*, some formative principle, to account for the possibility of their union (περὶ σπέρματος 2. 3, t. 4 p. 617 Kühn):—ἄλλου τινὸς ἄρα τρίτου δεήσει τοῖς διεσπαρμένοις ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν σπερμάτων μέρεσι,

[1] The next line was perhaps something to this effect: ἡ δὲ γυναικείαισι γοναῖς ἕνι χωρὶς ἐοῦσα.

τοῦ συντάξοντος αὐτὰ καὶ διακοσμήσοντος. If Galen wrote this, it seems clear that he read διέσπαρται in the line of Empedocles; and I cannot believe that in other places in the same discussion he wrote διέσπαΣθαι (p. 616) διεσπαΣμένων (p. 616) or διεσπαΣμένα (p. 618) in his paraphrases of the language of the quotation.

20. Plato *de Rep.* 6, p. 503 E:—ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας, εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν, εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει.

The received explanation of the feminine δυνατὴ is, I imagine, to assume with Schneider that the subject present in Plato's mind was φύσις—a word which in Baiter's text is just 23 lines off, with all sorts of things in the interspace! I have more respect for Plato than his commentators seem to have, and prefer to think that he wrote not δυνατὴ ἔσται but δυνήσεται.

21. Plato *de Rep.* 6, p. 504 B:—τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἴη προσάψαι.

Read: ἐχομένας. Similarly in the passage in *Polit.* 271 E: ὅσα τῆς τοιαύτης ἐστὶ κατακοσμήσεως ἑπόμενα, we may perhaps be inclined to give Plato the benefit of the doubt, and believe the word as written by him to have been ἐχόμενα.

22. Plato *de Rep.* 6, p. 511 A:—εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην [scil. τὴν ψυχήν] αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

This is part of Plato's statement of his theory as to the nature of διάνοια and its objects, τὰ διανοητά, but the ingenuous youths for whose benefit the explanation is given in the dialogue must have been easily satisfied if they could accept the explanation as it stands without a protest against its obscurity. That διάνοια cannot dispense with the assistance of εἰκόνες, sensible figures and diagrams, is stated here and elsewhere with sufficient clearness: the present passage however has been supposed to imply that διάνοια requires in addition a second sort of εἰκόνες, here described as αὐτὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθέντα. Accordingly Schneider, and more recently Mr Henry Sidgwick (Journal of Philology 2, p. 96), think the

formula *τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθέντα* means literally, 'the things which are themselves copied by the things below them in the scale,' and is thus a description of *διανοητά*. If *διανοητὰ* are themselves *εἰκόνες* of something higher (*νοητὰ* proper, if I may use the expression), the mind in the stage of *διάνοια* may very well be said to deal with *two* kinds of *εἰκόνες*—which for the sake of brevity I may distinguish as *εἰκόνες αἰσθηταί*, and *εἰκόνες διανοηταί*. This explanation is not in itself un-Platonic (see esp. Rep. 7, p. 516 A, the Scholiast on 511 A, and Proclus in Euclid. Prol. 1, p. 10 Friedlein), but one may doubt whether it has any relation to the passage before us. Two objections may be urged against it. (1) If the words were to bear the interpretation put upon them, one would have expected Plato to prepare us in some way or other for so important a statement; whereas, if this refinement is really in the text, it is introduced without a word of warning—without a syllable in the context to suggest it. (2) The context on the other hand supports the older and more natural interpretation, viz. that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπεικασθέντα* denotes the sensible *εἰκόνες*. The sentence in which the formula occurs is a mere repetition or summary of what precedes; and we have in the sentence which immediately precedes this what I take to be an obvious equivalent of *αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπεικασθέντα*:—

αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσί τε καὶ γράφουσι.

So that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπεικασθέντα* = *αὐτὰ ἃ ἀπεικάζουσι*, and denotes the sensible copies, and not the (intelligible) originals—*τὸ ὁμοιωθέν*, and not *τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη*. The general sense of the passage seems to me to demand this (the old) interpretation, but we cannot get it out of the text as it now stands, which must therefore be amended before we can interpret it on the ordinary principles of philological probability. A very slight change however will give us the meaning which the logic of the passage necessitates. Let us for *ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω* read *ὑποκάτω*, and for *καὶ ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἐκεῖ* (or rather *κἀκεῖ*), so as to make the passage run thus:—

εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποκάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι κἀκεῖ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

In regard to *ὑποκάτω* I may refer to Madvig (Advers. 1 p. 27) who has a good deal to say about the corruption of the cognate word *περικάτω*. As soon as *ὑποκάτω* was turned into *ὑπὸ* ΤΩΝ *κάτω*, the further corruption of *καὶ ἐκεῖ* into *καὶ ἐκείνοις* was probably deemed an improvement: it was not seen that *ἐκεῖ*, coming after *ὑποκάτω*, meant 'in the lower sphere,' the region of sensible counterfeits in which the common man is said to live. A very similar instance of *κἀκεῖ* with a supplementary clause trailing after it is found in another place in the *Republic* (7, p. 532 B):—*ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτ' ἀδυναμία βλέπειν κτέ.* As I have been led to quote this place in the Seventh Book, I may as well say here that the reading *ἔτ' ἀδυναμία*, which the editors take from Naegelsbach who conjecturally restored it, is to be found in the paraphrase in Iamblichus *περὶ τῆς κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης* printed in Villoison's Anecdota t. 2 p. 196. Iamblichus reads *ἔτι ἀδυναμία*, which shows how the faulty reading *ἐΠ' ἀδυναμίᾳ* originated.

23. Plato *de Rep.* 10, p. 607 B:—*καὶ μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι καὶ ὁ τῶν διασοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν.*

The prevailing view among Editors is that we have here two quotations, the second beginning after *καὶ*. This is by no means obvious, but even if the view is true, it seems to me not impossible that Plato combined the two quotations into one. I suspect that *καὶ ὁ* is a mistake for *ὁ καὶ*, and that the original reading was, *ὁ καὶ τὸν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν*—*τὸν Δία* being governed by *κρατῶν* used perhaps in the sense which the verb has in Aeschylus *Choeph.* 958, *κρατεῖται τὸ θεῖον.* The reading of the Paris MS. is *τῶν δία σοφῶν.*

24. Porphyrius *de Abstin.* 2. 34, p. 104 Nauck:—*τοῖς δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκγόνοις, νοητοῖς δὲ θεοῖς ἤδη, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ὑμνῳδίαν προσθετέον.*

Porphyry is distinguishing between the honours due to the supreme deity and those due to his offspring—the mortal gods of Plato's Timaeus. Read, therefore, *θνητοῖς* for *νοητοῖς.*

25. Porphyrius *ad Marc.* 1, p. 193 Nauck:—*θυγατέρων μὲν πέντε, δυοῖν δ' ἀρρένων οὖσαν μητέρα, τῶν μὲν καὶ ἔτι νηπίων, τῶν δὲ ἤδη εἰς γάμου ἡλικίαν ἡβᾶν ἐφορμούντων.*

If, as Nauck thinks, *ἡβᾶν* is an intruder, how did it come to find its way into the text? On the alternative hypothesis that *ἡλικίαν* is the intruder we may by the change of an accent restore *ἐς γάμου ἥβαν*—which looks like the end of a line of some bucolic poet. A similar instance of the use of the substantive *ἥβη* I am unable to find, though Oppian has the verb in a sense approximating to that which we want here: *εἴαρι δὲ γλυκὺς οἶστρος ἀναγκαίης ἀφροδίτης Καὶ γάμοι ἡβώωσι* (Hal. 1. 474). *ἐφορμούντων*, at the end of the passage, seems an odd word to use when one would expect *ἐφορμώντων* or *ὁρμώντων*.

26. Strabo *Geogr.* 14. 19, p. 658 Cas.:—*καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς Νικίας ὁ καὶ τυραννήσας Κῴων, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ ἀκροασάμενος τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ καὶ κληρονομήσας ἐκεῖνον.*

This appears in an enumeration of the eminent natives of Cos. Aristo the Peripatetic is a well-known personage; but who is the Aristo whom it was possible to describe, as Strabo seems to do here, as 'the pupil and heir of the Peripatetic'? If we cannot know more about this Aristo, it might be as well to get rid of him altogether, which we can easily do by the insertion of a single letter, so as to read *ἈρίστωνοΣ ἀκροασάμενος*.

27. Timo Sillogr. ap. Diog. Laert. 2, 126 (ed. Cobet):—

λῆρον ἀναστήσας ὀφρυωμένος ἀφροσιβόμβαξ.

λῆρον is a conjecture, the MSS. having *λόγον*. I would suggest *ὄχλον*, or *λαόν*.

I. BYWATER.

NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES IN THE POLITICS.

I.

Pol. iv. iii.

The whole of Pol. bk. iv, ch. iii (or ch. 3 and ch. 4, §§ 1—15, 1289^{b} 27—1291^{b} 13) is considered by Susemihl ungenuine, and due either to one interpolator, or, because of the parallelism of the transition passage 1290^{b} 21 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους* κ.τ.λ.) to the transition passage 1291^{b} 14 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους* κ.τ.λ.) at the end of ch. iii, perhaps to two interpolators. In the latter case Susemihl would make the second interpolation begin at the first of these transitions (1290^{b} 21), and conjectures that the second interpolator, finding the first interpolation already in the text and supposing it referred to by the words in 1291^{b} 14, joined on to it the part which he had himself written by a transition (1290^{b} 21) imitated from 1291^{b} 14. This seems scarcely possible, for the whole of the first transition passage reads thus:

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον.

Thus it would be implied that the subject of the first (supposed) interpolation—the reason why there is a plurality of Constitutions (cf. 1289^{b} 27)—was done with, and that a new subject was to follow—the reason why there are more than have been mentioned (one might suppose democracy and oligarchy intended, which at the end of the first part of the first interpolation are said to form the usual division of Constitutions).

But instead of this the second (supposed) interpolation treats over again the main subject of the first, and more fully, ending with the same statement about the usual twofold division of Constitutions into democracy and oligarchy: and the writer of it therefore could hardly have joined it to the first interpolation by such an introduction.

A more probable account seems to be that two parallel versions have here been unskilfully put together, not intended by the author of either to stand in the same context.

The two parallel passages are 1289^{b} 27—1290^{a} 29 and 1290^{b} 21—1291^{b} 13.

Thus (i) 1289^{b} 27—8 = 1290^{b} 24 and 1290^{b} 38—9.

(ii) 1289^{b} 28—1290^{a} 3 corresponds to 1290^{b} 40—1291^{a} 10 and 1291^{a} 33—^{b} 1.

(iii) 1290^{a} 5—7 and 11—13 correspond to 1290^{b} 25—38.

(iv) 1290^{a} 13—16 corresponds to 1291^{b} 1—13 (esp. 8—13).

Susemihl says (Intr. p. 58, l. 6, edn. of 1879) that the interpolator of ch. iii (1289^{b} 27—1291^{b} 13) refers (1290^{a} 1 seqq.) to Pol. bk. VII, and therefore had the 'original' order of the books before him. The reference is found in one version only of the proposed resolution of ch. iii; the second version instead of the reference inserts a long passage similar to that part of bk. VII which the first version refers to. So far therefore it is by no means certain that the second version is older than the received order of the books.

The words however at the beginning of the second version, *ἀρχὴν τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον* (1290^{b} 23), may perhaps refer to bk. VII; but Susemihl thinks bk. IV, ch. iii is intended, i.e. the beginning of what seems the other parallel version in ch. iii.

A third parallel version seems to be found in ch. iv init. 1291^{b} 14—30.

The passage 1290^{a} 30—^{b} 20 which intervenes between the first two versions is obviously parallel to bk III, 1279^{b} 11 seqq.

There is room for the suspicion that the preceding part of the book, chs. i and ii, also contains three versions. The list of

contents in ch. i is repeated in the last part of ch. ii. The first part of ch. ii may be another independent list. For it announces the subjects thus, *λοιπὸν περὶ πολιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος*, 1289ª 35: and (1), democracy and oligarchy having been discussed, it is said (ch. vi or 8 init.) that two subjects are left (*λοιπίν*) *πολιτεία* and *τυραννίς*; (2) after the account of *πολιτεία* it is said that *τυραννίς* is left (*περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἣν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν* 1295ª 1, cf. *τελευταῖον* 1293ᵇ 25): while (3) after the chapter on *τυραννίς* follow other subjects peculiar to the lists in ch. i and the last part of ch. ii. The argument is not conclusive, and the unity of the text could be defended; so that the evidence for disunity might not be worth stating were it not for the more obvious triplicity in chs. iii and iv.

The double enumeration of the kinds of democracy and oligarchy in chs. iv—v (4—6), is also suspicious.

II.

Pol. III, x—xi.

Chs. x and xi (or chs. 15 and 16, 1285ᵇ 34 seqq. and 1287ª 1 seqq.) discuss the same subject, the *παμβασιλεία*. Out of a part of ch. x (15), 1286ª 26—ᵇ 3, and a part of ch. xi (16), 1287ᵇ 8—35, Susemihl forms two parallel versions, printing 1286ª 26—ᵇ 3 + 1287ᵇ 8—15 parallel to 1287ᵇ 16—35. The remaining parts of these chapters he tries to form into a continuous context by a number of rearrangements.

It may be however that the two chapters belong almost wholly to two parallel versions, and that instead of being combined in this way they should be still further resolved.

The beginning of ch. xi (16), 1287ª 1—8, is closely parallel to a passage near the beginning of ch. x (15) 1286ª 2—7, and a better case for parallel versions can be made out here than in the part selected by Susemihl.

The matter which follows these is in general of the same kind in both chapters for some distance, from 1286ª 7 to 1286ᵇ 3

in ch. x (15), and from 1287^a 8 to 1287^b 35 in ch. xi, though there are additions and differences of arrangement in the one context as compared with the other.

Thus (i) 1286^a 2—7 = 1287^a 1—8.

(ii) 1286^a 7—24 corresponds in subject to 1287^a 18—^{b} 8 + 1287^b 16—24.

Compare 1286^a 7—9 with 1287^a 18—19 and 1287^b 20—1
1286^a 11—16 with 1287^a 33—^{b} 5
1286^a 16—20 with 1287^a 28—32
1286^a 21—2 with 1287^b 23—4
1286^a 23—4 with 1287^b 17—18
1286^a 24 with 1287^b 17 and 19
1286^a 26 with 1287^b 15—16.

(iii) 1286^a 25—^{b} 3 corresponds in subject to 1287^b 24—35 and 1287^b 8—15. Of these passages, the third disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second; there is some ground therefore for placing it as Susemihl does.

From the above it would seem also that the first part of Susemihl's second column, 1287^b 16—26, with the exception of the first two lines, has its analogue not in his other column but higher up in ch. x, that is in the first column of the resolution of the text here proposed.

In ch. xi (16) the passage 1287^a 24—8 interrupts the argument of the context: it belongs to the same part of the subject as 1287^b 16—23, and may be read after *ἐστίν*, 1287^b 23: but if it belongs to this place it is hard to see how it could have been removed.

The repetition at the beginning of ch. x (or ch. 14 fin.) of the characteristics of the first four kinds of monarchy, before the introduction of the fifth, may indicate that the discussion of monarchy was double from the beginning: though the circumstance taken by itself would not count for much.

III.

Pol. v, i—iii.

Pol. v, i may be divided into three parts from 1301[a] 25 onwards, viz. 1301[a] 25—1301[b] 6, 1301[b] 6—1301[b] 25, 1301[b] 26—1302[a] 15. The third of these does not cohere with the second, but is an abrupt unexplained return to the subject of the first, which has been already wound up with the words *ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὗται καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεών εἰσιν*, 1301[b] 4—5. The first and third passages seem to be duplicates: both deduce in the same way political disturbances (and the existence of different forms of government) from the different interpretations which contending parties put upon a commonly accepted principle of right. Compare especially 1301[a] 26—7 with 1301[b] 35—6: 1301[a] 28—9 and 1301[a] 31—2 respectively with 1301[b] 37—8 and 1301[b] 38—9 together with 1301[b] 39—40.

Ch. ii, 1302[a] 16 seqq. returns again to the causes of political changes: *λεκτέον καθόλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν*, words which should be contrasted with the ending of the first passage, *ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ.* (quoted above). A wider classification of these *ἀρχαί* is given, and under the first head the main thought of the other two parallel passages is repeated in a shorter form. There is here then perhaps another rewriting, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book, and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of ch. ii and ch. iii.

The references in 1301[b] 36—7, 1302[a] 24, if genuine, may be to the third book of the Politics, like the reference in 1301[a] 28: thus there would be three parallel references to the third book of the Politics (III, 9 init., or its probable duplicate III, 12 init.), one in each of the supposed parallel passages.

IV.

Pol. VII i—iii and xii—xiii (=13—15).

Susemihl has remarked (Note 712) that the subjects of ch. i and chs. ii—iii are repeated by chs. xii (13) and xiii (14—15).

Possibly there is even a threefold treatment; for ch. xii (13) seems like a shorter duplicate of ch. xiii (14—15). In each the same question is proposed, What is happiness or the chief Good? (compare 1332^a 7 and 1333^a 15—16); and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost the same terms, to the subject of education (compare 1332^a 39—1332^b 11 with 1334^b 5—11 seqq.). The chief difference is that ch. xii (13, 1332^a 7—9) takes the definition of the Good in the general form given in Nic. Eth. I, vii (or Eud. Eth. II, 1), while ch. xiii. (14—15), like Nic. Eth. X, distinguishes between the life of moral virtue and the higher life of philosophic contemplation, the second discussion not being put as a continuation of the first. The division of Goods into *καλά* and *ἀναγκαῖα* is made independently in both chapters (xii and xiii), compare 1332^a 10 seqq. with 1333^a 32—^{b} 3 and 1334^a 16 seqq.: but in ch. xii there is no consciousness of what seems implied in ch. xiii (15), that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the *καλόν* as *θεωρία*.

The nature of the parallelism in the two transition-passages (1332^a 39—1332^b 11 and 1334^b 5—11, compare especially 1334^b 7—8 with 1332^b 8—11 and 1334^b 10—12 with 1332^b 5—8) confirms the order of the text in the first of them against Böcker's transposition of 1332^b 5—6 (for which see Susem. vol. i, p. 446, note 2), and makes Broughton's supposition (Susem. i, 462, note 2), that the second of them is an interpolation unlikely, especially if the other parallelisms of the two chapters be taken into account. Yet the beginning of the second passage—1334^b 6, *τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον*—may have been altered, unless the reference is to the Ethics.

In the version of ch. xii (13), the language which follows the words *φάμεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς* (1332^a 7), has more affinity for the Eudemian than the Nicomachean Ethics. Susemihl says (n. 876) of the distinction in 1332^a 10, that 'it is not in the Ethics (Nic.), but is put here by Aristotle—if he is the author—to avoid possible misunderstandings.' It occurs however in the Eudemian Ethics 1238^b 6. 1332^a 19 should be compared with the same Eudemian context, 1238^b 6—7; and

1332ª 22—3 with Eud. Eth. 1249ª 12. Compare also (though not so distinctive) the use of *χρῆσις* in the formula for the Good in 1332ª 9 with the repeated association of *χρῆσις* and *ἐνεργεία* throughout Eud. Eth. II, i (= N. Eth. I, vii, etc.)

V.

Pol. I, xiii, 1260ª 22, *καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης*. The reference being to one of Plato's dialogues, *ὁ Σωκράτης* would be expected. One MS (P^4 Susem.) has the article, but it has not been followed in the editions, though apparently right. The ordinary reading is accounted for by the last syllable of *ᾤετο*.

The article is similarly wanting in one other place, Pol. VIII, vii, 1342ᵇ 23, *διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο Σωκράτει*, though the reference is to the Republic (cf. 1342ª 32—3, *ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης*), but probably *τῷ* has been lost after *τοῦ το*.

Pol. IV, xiv, 1298ª 1,

δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἃς δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας καὶ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν.

For *ἐστὶν ἃς* should perhaps be read *ἐστὶ (τί)νας*: one *τι* may easily have dropped out.

J. COOK WILSON.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE OEDIPUS COLONEUS OF SOPHOCLES.

(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society.)

THE following paper is chiefly occupied with the elucidation of passages in the Oedipus Coloneus which have been obscured through inattention to the main argument of the play. I will begin with the passage that suggested it.

384. *τοὺς δὲ σοὺς ὅποι θεοὶ*
πόνους κατοικτιοῦσιν οὐκ ἔχω μαθεῖν.

The present reading is intolerable, whatever sense we assign to it, as Professor Madvig has seen. He conjectures, in the Adversaria, *καθορμιοῦσιν*, which is hardly near enough to the MSS. Besides, an examination of other places in the play where Oedipus speaks of his last resting-place suggests a different metaphor. The houseless, homeless wanderer finds at last in the territory of Athens the promised dwelling of which he has been so long in search.

Thus in vv. 87—93 *Φοίβῳ... | ὅς μοι τὰ πόλλ' ἐκεῖν' ὅτ' ἐξέχρη κακὰ, | ταύτην ἔλεξε παῦλαν ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ | ἐλθόντι χώραν τερμίαν... | ἐνταῦθα κάμψειν τὸν ταλαίπωρον βίον | κέρδη μὲν οἰκήσαντα τοῖς δεδεγμένοις | ἄτην δὲ τοῖς πέμψασιν οἵ μ' ἀπήλασαν.* Oedipus is to dwell in the land to work mischief to those who cast him out, and to be a source of advantage to those who received him. The plural *κέρδη* has the same force as in *παίγνια*, amores, &c. This natural sense is needlessly obscured by Madvig's conjecture *οἰκίσαντα*. Again in v. 626, 627 *οὔποτ' Οἰδίπουν ἐρεῖς | ἀχρεῖον οἰκητῆρα δέξασθαι τόπων.* So in 635, 636 *ἀγὼ σεβισθεὶς οὔποτ' ἐκβαλῶ χάριν τὴν τοῦδε χώρᾳ δ' ἔμπαλιν κατοικιῶ.* In fact the con-

trast between the knightly hospitality of the stranger Theseus and its reward and the very different conduct of Oedipus' own kinsmen and its retribution, is the very pivot of the play. The generous promise in the passage just quoted, *χώρᾳ δ' ἔμπαλιν (ἔμπολιν) κατοικιῶ*, is in marked opposition to the conduct of those who first drive the old man from their borders (*ἐκβάλλουσιν, ἐξελαύνουσιν*); and then, when forced by a divine necessity, grant him the privilege—the privilege of what?—of lying just outside their borders (v. 401 *θύρασι κειμένου*, 784 *οὐχ ἵν' ἐς δόμους ἄγῃς, ἀλλ' ὡς πάραυλον οἰκίσῃς*).

Hence in v. 631

> *τίς δῆτ' ἂν ἀνδρὸς εὐμένειαν ἐκβάλοι*
> *τοιοῦδε;*

the commentators are wrong in taking *ἐκβάλοι* as = 'waste, throw away:' it means 'drive from my bounds.'

So in Oedipus' speech 1348 sqq. in which he invokes upon his unnatural son a fate like the one in which he has involved his father. He has driven his father from his country, and from that country—for the curse is already working—he has been driven by his brother never to return. To begin with, the bitter antithesis of v. 1373 has been misunderstood:

> *τοίγαρ σ' ὁ δαίμων εἰσορᾷ μὲν οὔ τί πω*
> *ὡς αὐτίκ', εἴπερ οἵδε κινοῦνται λόχοι*
> *πρὸς ἄστυ Θήβης· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως πόλιν*
> *κείνην ἐρεῖ τις,*

'to the *streets* of Thebes: for I know one who shall never call it native city.' Oedipus says to his son 'You have driven me a homeless exile from my native city (v. 1357 *ἔθηκας ἄπολιν*), and with the same measure that you mete shall it be meted out to you. You shall never see your native town again.' Mr C. S. Palmer in a note on this passage has pointed out that *τὶς* is here used for the second personal pronoun, though he has failed to interpret the general sense[1]. This use is too well known to require much illustration. I may however refer to one place,

[1] I see that Professor L. Campbell in the second edition of his Sophocles which has only just come into my hands, probably taking a hint from Mr Palmer, interprets the passage as above.

at present corrupt, in which it should be restored. We should read in Aristophanes Lysistr. 657

εἰ δὲ λυπήσεις τί με,
τῷδε ταὐψήκτῳ πατάξω τῳ (for τῷ) κοθόρνῳ τὴν γνάθον.

'I'll strike somebody on the face with this untanned buskin.' The *ictus* falls on τῳ as in Ran. 708.

Again towards the end of the very same speech vv. 1389, 1390 we have the very curious expression

καὶ καλῶ τὸ Ταρτάρου
στυγνὸν πατρῷον ἔρεβος ὥς σ' ἀποικίσῃ.

Here ἀποικίσῃ 'settle you far from your fatherland' is to be understood in the same reference. 'You have driven me from my home, but I have found refuge and an abiding dwelling-place on the friendly soil of Athens; your brother has driven you too from home, but your new resting-place shall be the abhorred womb of death.'

Finally I think we may find the same keynote struck in the very beginning of the play vv. 25—27.

ΑΝ. ἀλλ' ὅστις ὁ τόπος ἢ μάθω μολοῦσά σοι;
ΟΙ. ναὶ, τέκνον, εἴπερ ἐστί γ' ἐξοικήσιμος.
ΑΝ. ἀλλ' ἐστὶ μὴν οἰκητός.

The antithesis of ἐξοικήσιμος)(οἰκητός which is thrown into the strongest relief by their close juxtaposition, will not permit us to suppose that their sense is the same. And the idea of Dindorf that ἐξ in ἐξοικήσιμος means 'completely' is opposed to the ordinary sense of the word and gives a meaning which can be only described as inane. It only remains then to take ἐξοικήσιμος in accordance with the common usage of ἐξοικέω 'to live out of a place or away from it,' i.e. 'to emigrate.' Oedipus, thinking of his weary wanderings and the divine promise that they should end at last, asks 'Is this a place where exiles can find a habitation?' to which Antigone, perhaps misunderstanding the question, returns 'Nay, it is inhabited already.' These two short speeches, properly interpreted, are seen to cohere with v. 39 where the stranger corrects the idea which underlies the action of the blind man and his guide, by saying the place is ἄθικτος οὐδ' οἰκητός. And perhaps it is not too subtle to suppose that

this peculiar turn of phrase was intended by Sophocles to be a foreshadowing and indication of the drama's main motive, which otherwise breaks unexpectedly and abruptly upon us in v. 45 with the flat declaration of Oedipus that he will not leave the holy ground. It will now be obvious what change I propose to make in v. 384. For *κατοικτιοῦσιν* I would read *κατοικιοῦσιν*, so that the sense will be 'I cannot tell where the gods will settle thee the toiling one.' The use of *ὅποι* of course does not require support; but one example from this very play is so apt that I cannot refrain from quoting it v. 23 *ἔχεις διδάσκειν δή μ' ὅποι καθέσταμεν;*

I take this opportunity of adding two suggestions on other lines of the play; and one on a fragment.

v. 30 *ἦ δεῦρο προσστείχοντα κἀξορμώμενον;*

This is explained, I believe, by all the commentators as a *hysteron proteron* 'going and starting,' a figure here ludicrously out of place. *ἐξορμώμενον* means 'hastening' as in Trach. 929 *ἐν ᾧ τὸ κεῖσε δεῦρό τ' ἐξορμώμεθα* 'while we hurry hither and thither.' Oedipus with the querulousness of a blind man wants to know, not only if the stranger is coming towards them, but if he is making good haste. This is on a piece with his words in v. 21 and Antigone's gentle protest, and with the pettishness of v. 25.

v. 153 *ἀλλ' οὐ μὰν ἔν γ' ἐμοὶ*
προσθήσεις τάσδ' ἀράς.

It is singular the editors can have put up with this so long. The middle is imperatively required both by the rules of Greek writing and Sophocles' own usage. Compare Antig. 40 *προσθέσθαι πλέον*, O. T. 1460 *προσθῇ μέριμναν*, and in this very play v. 404 *προσθέσθαι σε*. O. T. 820, which Professor Campbell quotes, is decisively against him *καὶ τάδ' οὔτις ἄλλος ἦν ἢ 'γὼ 'π' ἐμαυτῷ τάσδ' ἀρὰς ὁ προστιθείς*, as the *ἐπ' ἐμαυτῷ* makes all the difference[1]. Read therefore *προσθήσει* 'take to thyself,' which was changed through being mistaken for the active.

[1] In his last edition Professor Campbell supplies *τῷ ἡμετέρῳ δήμῳ*. By ellipses of this kind anything can be explained. But it must be observed that it is not easy to see how the action of a foreigner like Oedipus could bring *ἀράς* upon the deme of Colonus.

Fragm. 319. *ἀπῆξε πέμφιξιν οὐ πέλας φόρου.*

This is a passage from the lost play Κόλχοι, quoted by Galen 9. 385 (5. 454) in a philological discussion of the meaning to be assigned to *πεμφιγωδής* in a medical dictum of Hippocrates.

This interesting word, which Curtius Gr. Etym. p. 708 connects with *φυσάω*, seems to have meant originally either (A) 'something blowing' or (B) 'something blown out.' (A) gives the meaning *πνοή* 'blast,' which is assigned to it here by Galen. Under (B) we place the meanings 'blister,' 'bubble,' 'drop' of rain or blood, 'flash of light,' (so called from its evanescence); and then by a very curious metaphor *πέμφιξ ἡλίου* seems to mean the 'sun-bubble,' (unless indeed it is taken here also to be a 'flash').

The meaning assigned to *πέμφιξ* here by Galen is *πνοή* which agrees with the original meaning of the word from root *φυ* 'blow' Curt. Gr. Etym. *l. c.* A comparison of the other two passages quoted by Galen for this sense will shew that he uses *πνοή* with some latitude. In the fragment of the Salmoneus it refers to the blackening rush of the lightning, in the Prometheus Bound (rather Unbound) to the dark sweep of the storm. To either of these it may refer in this passage, or possibly to the scorching breath of the bulls of Colchis (as the play is the Κόλχοι) from whose nostrils issued fire and smoke. Hermann has suggested *ὡς ἱπνοῦ σελασφόρου*. *σελασφόρου* is very tempting, and, with the slight change of *υ* to *ν*, I propose to accept it. I propose also to keep *οὐ* and to find the lost substantive which agreed with *σελασφόρον* in *πέμφιξιν*, which I take to be for *πεμφιξ[ιξ]ιν*. *ἴξις* is a good word, used by Eurip. Troad. 396 for 'coming,' and by *Hippocrates* for 'movement' (*φορά*) and 'a straight course' (*εὐθυωρία*). So that the sense is 'the *πέμφιξ* sprang away on its dark path.'

J. P. POSTGATE.

OLD GERMAN GLOSSES FROM A BODLEIAN MANUSCRIPT.

The Manuscript which contains the following glosses is in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, marked Auct. F. 1. 16, and was written not later than the early part of the tenth century.

It contains the text of the Georgics of Virgil from 2. 120, Servius's Commentary on the Eclogues and Georgics, the text of the Aeneid, and Servius on the Aeneid. But between the commentary on the Georgics and the text of the Aeneid occur several pages of excerpts from Isidorus and other authors and the first sixty-four of the following glosses, the whole being arranged so as to form a brief commentary on all Virgil. This is followed by a heading *Incipiunt uaria glosemata* and the glosses 65 to 121. The rest of the glosses are either marginal or interlinear, and appear to be written by two different hands within a century of the date of the manuscript itself. It may be added that the glosses 1 to 121 were not first written by the scribe but copied from a book before him.

The history of the MS. before the seventeenth century is unknown. It was one of three lent by Bernard Rottendorph, a physician of Münster, to Nicholas Heinsius, who used it for his editions of Virgil, giving it the name *Rottendorphianus tertius*, but forgot to return it to its owner. In 1672, Francis Junius, author of the Etymologicum Anglicanum, then at the age of 83, saw and copied the more important of the textual glosses in Heinsius's house at Copenhagen. In 1678, Junius's transcript came into the Bodleian, and in 1697

the original MS.: but the connexion between them was unknown, and when a selection of the following glosses was printed in Nyerup's *Symbolæ ad Literaturam Teutonicam* (Hauniæ, 1787), it was from transcripts of Junius's transcripts that they were taken; and all the references to them in Graff's *Althochdeutscher Sprachschatz* are from this source.

At last, in 1877, the real history and significance of the long-lost MS. was discovered, and the whole of the glosses have been carefully transcribed for the present paper, an answer being thus supplied to the anxious query in Haupt's *Zeitschr. für Deutsches Alterthum*, Vol. xv. p. 103 (1872). This list will be reprinted in the second volume of Steinmayer and Sievers's *Althochdeutsche Glossen*, of which the first volume was published in 1877.

No.	Gloss on	
1	Ecl. 1. 56	Hibleis · herba est quam nos dicimus *aduch.*
2	59	Palumbes · columbę sunt · quas dicimus *menistuba.*
3	2. 36	Cicuta · herba est quam nos dicimus *scherning.*
4	50	Calta · *cle.*
5	3. 20	Carecta multitudo herbarum. In palustribus · quas dicimus *semithai.*
6	5. 39	Carduus · *thistilcarda.*
7	„	Paliurus · *hagan.*
8	7. 32	Coturno · calciamento uenatricio quod alii dicunt periscelidas · aut *hoson.*
9	50	Fuliginem · quod nos dicimus *ruot.*
10	8. 74	Licia · id est quod dicimus *harluf* · cum quo ligant mulieres.
11	Georg. 1. 75	Vicię · *Vuicchun.*
12	94	Rastrum · *recho.*
13	95	Crates · *egida.*
14	139	Visco · *hulis* [? bulis].
15	144	Cuneus · *vuecke.*
16	153	Lappe · *cledthe.*

No.	Gloss on	
17	Georg. 1. 162	graue robur · id est *grendil.*
18	164	Tribula · *flegil.*
19	,,	Trahę · *egida.*
20	165	[V]irgea preterea · id est *gart.*
21, 22	166	Crates · *hurth* · aut *egida.*
23	172	Binę aures · quę *riestra* dicimus.
24	173	Tilia · *linda.*
25	264	Vallos · sunt quos dicimus *phali.*
26	Georg. 2. 189	Filix · *farn.*
27	374	Vri · id est animal quod dictum est *urrint.*
28	389	Oscilla · *scocga.*
29	Georg. 3. 147	Asilo · *bremo.*
30	338	Achalantida id est auis · *nathagala.*
31	366	stiria id est *ihilla.*
32	543	Phocę id est animal marinum · quod nos dicimus *elah.*
33	Georg. 4. 63	Melisphilla · herba quam dicimus *biniuurt.*
34	131	Papauer · herba quam dicimus *maho.*
35	271	Amello · herba · *golthblomo.*
36	307	Tigna · *latta.*
37	Aen. 1. 123	Rimis · *nuoe* · in quibus tabulę in unum coniunguntur.
38	169	Vnco morsu · quem nos dicimus *chrampho.*
39	323	Lincis · id est *los* apud nos animal quod dicimus.
40	435	Fucos · *drenon* quod nos dicimus.
41	698	Sponda · lectum siue *beddipret.*
42	Aen. 2. 135	In ulua · hoc ~[in marg. is added "~ est"] in palustribus locis ubi crescit iuncus ac papyrus · et quod nos dicimus *suuerdollon.*
43	Aen. 3. 428	Delfinum · *mirisuuin.*
44	453	Dispendia · *ungifuori.*
45, 46	Aen. 4. 131	Lato uenabula ferro · id est *staph* · in se habentem latam hastam quam nos dicimus *euurspioz.*
47	Aen. 5. 177	Clauum · quod nos dicimus · *helta* · in summitate est.
48	208	Trudes · *furka.*
49	Aen. 6. 13	in tribus locis ubi tres uię in unum conueniunt · quę nos dicimus *giuuicge.*
50	205	Viscum · id est *bulis.*

No.	Gloss on	
51	Aen. 6. 209	Bratteatea · *blech.*
52	Aen. 7. 48	Picus · auis · *speth.*
53	378	Turbo · in modum factus globi rotundus · quem dicimus *doch* · buxum · inde erit factus turbo.
54	390	Thirsus · *stilherbę.*
55	417	Rugis · hoc dicimus nos *rumphusla.*
56	627	Aruina *mittigarne.*
57	Aen. 8. 278	Sciphus · parua *staupa.*
58	Aen. 9. 170	Pontis · scalis · aut quod rustici dicunt *clida.*
59	476	Radii · *rauua.*
60	Aen. 11. 64	Crates · *clida.*
61	862	Papilla · summitas mammę id est *uuarte.*
62	Aen. 12. 120	Verbena · herba quam dicimus *hanaf.*
63	413	Caulem comantem id est stipitem cum foliis · quam dicimus *stil.*
64	470	A temone · hoc est in anteriori parte plaustri ubi boues ligantur · apud nos *thessalia.*
		"FINIVNT GLOSÆ." "INCIPIVNT VARIA GLOSEMATA."
65		Callum caro et cutis indurata quod nos dicimus · *suuil.*
66		Flocci sunt quos nos in uestimentis thiudisce *uuuloo* dicimus.
67		Culcites · *bedd.*
68		Culcitum id est plumatium · *beddiuuidi.*
69		Cauteriola · *canteri.*
70		Toregma · *scaperede.*
71		Tornarius · *thresłsa* · [sic, manu ut uidetur prima].
72		Maialis · *barug.*
73		Murica · *snegil.*
74		Muscus · *grimo.*
75		Migale · *harmo* · Allec · alærencia · [?]
76		Gobio · *grimpo.*
77		Esox · *lahs.*
78		Lucius · *hacth.*
79		Capito · *alund.*
80		Timallus · *asco.*
81		Sardinia · *hering.*
82		Axedones id est humeruli · *lumisas.*

No.	Gloss on	
83		Scorellus · *amer.*
84		Terebra et teretrum · *nauuger.*
85		Crabro · *hornut.*
86		Ancipula · *fugulclouo.*
87		Andela · *brandereda.*
88, 89		Arula · *fiurpannę* uel *herd.*
90		Apiastrum · *biniuurt.*
91, 92		Æsculus · *boke* · uel *ec.* [*A* in *Æ* = *Æ* · mutatum est.]
93		Aestuaria · *flod* · uel bitalassum · ubi duo maria conueniunt.
94		Acinum · *hindbiri.*
95		Atramentarium · *blachorn.*
96		Atramentum · *blac.*
97		Fasciola · *uinning* · [? iunning]
98		Verriculum · *besmo.*
99		Villosa · *ruge.*
100		Villa · *lininhruge.*
101		Vadimonium · *borg.*
102		Bacinia · *beri.*
103		Botholicula · *stoppo.*
104		Bracium · *malt.*
105		Bracinarium · *brou̯hus* · [sic, manu ut uidetur prima].
106		Bouellium · *faled.*
107		Bradigābo · *feldhoppo.*
108		Balista · *stafslengrie.*
109		Brancia · *kian.*
110		Burdo · *uurenio.*
111		Cincindila · *uuocco.*
112		Cratus · *bollo* · [prima manu "gratus", rasura mutatum].
113		Cerasius · *kirsicbom.*
114		Cerasium · *biri.*
115		Clauatum · *giburdid.*
116		Arnoglossa · *uuigbrede.*
117		Plebeios psalmos id est seculares psalmos id est *uuinilieth.*
118		Reditus · *hembrung.*
119		Petulans · *uurenisc.*
120		Pastellus · *hunegapl.*
121		Pustula · *angseta.*

(N.B. Glosses 122—end are interlinear or marginal: those marked with an asterisk seem to be older than the rest.)

No.	Gloss on	
122 *a*	Georg. 2. 257	arbores *uuilnan* picee tantum [sic, quoad locum: "uuilnan" perobscurum est].
122 *b*		*ichas* taxique nocentes [sic, quoad locum].
123	365	acie : *uuihta.*
*124	Georg. 3. 25	aulaea : *umbihang.*
125	72	e *luue* dilectus dilectus [sic, quoad locum].
*126	82	Huic lineae e regione sunt extrema margine *hach*
*127		*inu* [*in* dubium est]
*128		*uua*
129	173	temo : *thisle.*
130		Aureus · *uuahsbl* — — — [uidetur "anc." sequi].
131		Gilbus badius · *falu* ·
132		Spadix · *dun* ·
133		Glaucus · *glasa* [forsitan una litera adiecta est].
134		Cadius · *blas* — [forsitan nil nisi " . " adiectum est].
135	180—192	Petilus · *fitilu* — — [forsitan "fitiluiz"
	[? asterisco sig-	uel "fitiluoz"].
136	nanda omnia]	Scutulatus · *appulgre.*
137		Guttatus · *sprutodi* [? sprurodi].
138		Mannus · *fiarscutig.*
139, 140		Mirteus · *dosan* uel *uuirebrun.*
141		Maurus · *alsuart.*
142		Iumenta · *mergeh.*
143		Toctonarii · *thrauåndi* [sic: ? Tottonarii].
144		Tottolarii · *Telderias* [? Toctolarii].
145	310	mammis : *geclerun* [? geelerun, geelcrun].
146	385	Lappae : *cliue.*
147	Georg. 4. 38	tenuia : *thunni.*
148	41	uisco : *mistile.*
149	141	tiliae : *lindian.*
150	168	fucos : *drenan.*
151	243	Stellio : *mol.*
152	244	fucus : *brana.*
153	245	crabro : *hornut.*
*154	395	phocas : *mirikoi.*
155	506	cymba : nauis parua alii *cuba* [? Latinum uerbum].

No.	Gloss on Servius on	
156	Ecl. 6. 78	upupam : *uuiduhoppe.*
157	„	hirundinem : *sualan.*
158	Ecl. 8. 74	stamen : *uuarp.*
159	„	Licium : *heuild.*
160	Georg. 1. 75	lupini : *ficbane.*
161	139	uisco : *mistile.*
162	178	glarea : id est arena · *grat.*
*163 *164	Georg. 2. 389	furcille : *gaflie* uel *furke.* [Haec uerba etiam in marg. reperiuntur, manu antiqua.]
165	Georg. 3. 82	uicinum : *uuasblanc* [contextus est :— "album quod pallori constat esse *uicinum*"].
	Gloss on	
*166	Aen. 1. 323	lyncis : *losses.*
*167	337	suras : *uuathan.*
168 *a*	427	portus : *cathoma.*
*168 *b*	435	fucos : *uaspe.*
169	711	Pallam : *hroc.*
170	Aen. 2. 16	abiete : *dœnnium* [? dænnuin].
171	55	foedare : *gihonen.*
172, 173	112	*mapuldrum* acernis acernis : *mapulder.* sic, quoad locum].
174	147	amicis : *friundlicun.*
175	229	merentem : *uuirthiganen.*
176 *a*	441	testudine : id est densitate armorum id est *schilduueri.*
176 *b*	492	ariete : *murlraca* [? murltaca].
177	Aen. 3. 16	socii : *isuese.*
178, 179	217, 218	*forths* effusio [sic quoad locum : sed fori. *gesseod* est tasse uerius "gesscod"]
180, 181	282	euasisse : *ouerrunnen habbien.*
182	286	Aere cauo clipeum : quia ex aere factum erat · *chuculan.* ["chuculan" quoad locum super "clipeum" est: et est uelut si "cauculan" uel "chuculan" uel "ehuculan" scriptum esset; corrector, ipse fortasse scriba, certe "huculan" scripsit, nisi mero casu paene euanuit τό "c".]
183	545	antennarum : *segelgerd.*

No.	Gloss on	
184	561	rudentem : vel rudente · circulo gubernaculi · id est · *stiruuith.*
185	649	corna : *curnilbom.*
186	671	aequare : *igrundian.*
187	688	introitum *imitthi* ostia saxo saxi [sic, quoad locum : ? imuthi].
188	Aen. 4. 19	pertaesum : odiosum *athrotan.*
189, 190	88	*undar* intermissa pinnę opera interrupta minaeque *numana* [sic, quoad locum : ? = undarnumana"].
191	131	uenabula : lanceę *euurspiat.*
192	139	fibula : fibula *spenule.*
193, 194	152	caprae : Capra · *reho* · nam crapra *get* dicitur.
195	167, 168	aether terrę signum · id est *erthbigunga* nimphae [sic, quoad locum].
196	239	talaria : *scridfoos* [? serid-, sorid-foos].
*197	245	tranat : *vulotad.*
198	250	mento : *chinne.*
199	490	ciet : *utihalad.*
200	534	procos : appetitores *druhtingas.*
*201	Aen. 5. 128	mergis : *dukiras.*
*202	205	murice : *duuansten.*
*203	230	pacisci ? teneant ? : — *rihingian* [Vna erat adiecta litera, "r" dubium est].
204	269	taeniis : tena · *nestila.*
205	306	leuato lucida : *gifuriuidemo.*
206	332	titubata : calcata *uuankonda.*
207	546	impubis : *unbarldharht* [? ex "unbarhharht" correctum].
208	566	primi : *uuassitiluot* [? uuasfitiluot].
209	578	Lustrauere : *umbiridun.*
210	630	hospes : *uuerd* ["e" fortasse dubium est].
211	710	fortuna : *missiburi.*
212	714	Pertaesum : odiosum sit *athrotan.*
213	719	incensus : *giscund.*
214	732	auernum sine uerno auerna per alta *uuunni* [sic, quoad locum].
215	735	Elysium : *sunnanueld.*
*216	745	acerra : cerra · uas turis · arcula turaria · id est *rocfat* [In "rocfat" "t" fortasse dubium est].
217	758	forum : *mahal.*
218	811	periurae : *forsuorenero.*

No.	Gloss on		
*219		852	adfixus : *tohlinandi.*
220	Aen. 6.	180	piceae : *fiuchtie* omnes arbores unde pix uenit [? fuichtie].
221		181	Fraxineae : *eschinę.*
222		205	uiscum : *mistil.*
223		214	robore : *rinda.*
224		420	offam : *muhful.*
*225			offam : *deuuin* [? cleuuin, deuiun].
226		682	recensebat : *talde.*
227, 228	Aen. 7.	109	adorea liba : *bradine diski.*
229		319	pronuba : *makerin.*
230		506	torre : *brande.*
*231		590	alga : *rietgras.*
*232		626	lucida tergunt · *uegadun* [sic, quoad locum].
233		627	Aruina : *midgarni.*
234		628	Signa : *gutfanan.*
235		690	pero : *striorling* [? streorling].
*236		796	picti : pictus *uehe.*
237	Aen. 8.	178	acerno : *mapuldrin.*
*238		276	? populus : *halebirie.*
239	Aen. 9.	87	picea : picea *uurie.*
240		134	iactant : *hromiat.*
241		222	statione : *uuardu.*
242		471	mouebant id est uidebant · *scuddun.*
*243		505	testudine : testudo *scelduuara.*
244		537	tabulas : *scindulan.*
245		608	rastris : *egithon.*
*246		616	manicas : *ermberg.*
247		629	petat : *stichit* ["s" fortasse dubium est].
248		701	pulmone : *lungandian.*
*249		705	falarica uenit : *stephstrengiere.*
250		723	fortuna : *missiburi.*
251		724	conuerso : *togidanemo.*
252	Aen. 10.	58	Dum : *iaunt.*
253		337	thoraca : *brungę.*
254		381	uelit (in "uellit" correctum) : a terra *losda.*
255		382	costis : *ribbun.*
256		390	gemini : *ituisan* [? "itiusan," uel = ".i. tuisan," sc. "id est tuisan"].
257 *a*		444	cesserunt : *rumdun.*
257 *b*		538	uitta : *xxxnding* [Vix dubium est quin scriba "uuunding" indicet].
258		542	gradine : quasi gradatim id est *stillo.*

No.	Gloss on	
259	649	pactos : *gimahlida.*
260	681	dedecus : turpitudinis *honithia.*
261	682	impellat *stachi* exigat ensem [sic, quoad locum].
262	711	erexit *struuide* inhorruit armos [sic, quoad locum : ? "striuude"].
263	735	Contulit : *angenbrahte.*
264	736	abiectum : *nithergiuuorpenen.*
265	744	Viderit : *gisehe* · et hoc uerbum ironia est.
266	795	Cedebat : retrahebat *thananfor.*
267	818	neuerat : *brordade.*
268	891	Bellatoris equi : *uuihherses.*
269	892	calcibus : *houun.*
270	893	effusum : *nithergiuuorpenen.*
271	901	nefas : *honithia.*
272	Aen. 11. 73	laeta : *uuillich.*
273	149	reposto : *nithergisettemo.*
274	320	plaga : *uuald.*
275	500	Desiluit : *umbette.*
276	524	quo : *thar.*
277	562	sonuere : *hullun.*
278	579	fundam : *slengiran.*
279	589	omine : *hele.*
280	599	fremit : *thrasida.*
281	607	ardescit : *gerode.*
282	616	tormento : ..... torqueo · *slingirun.*
283	663	lunatis agmina peltis : in modum lunę factus · *sinuuuellun.*
284	671	Suffuso reuolutus : *nitheriuallenemu* · [? "-eruiall-" : uulgo "Suffosso"].
285	688	Verba : *hrom.*
286	711	interrita : *ungimelademu.*
287	777	Pictus acu : *gibrordade.*
288	874	laxos : *unspannane.*
289	890	Arietat : *stiet.*
290	Aen. 12. 7	toros : toros · *crocon.*
291	91	candentem : *gloianden.*
292	163	radii : *gerdiun* [? gerduin].
293	171	admouit : adiunxit · *todeda.*
294	174	notant : *steppodun.*
295	215	lancibus : uasis · *baexuuegun* ["e" prius dubium est, "x" uix dubium : est uelut si quis scripsisset "baxuuegun" et in "baec-" uel "baex-uuegun" mutasset].

No.	Gloss on	
296	234	deuocet [in "deuouet" correctum] : *bifal.*
297	274	fibula : *hringa.*
298	300	Occupat : *slog.*
299, 300	305	prima : *in furistemo.*
301	357	extorquet : *utauuende.*
302	364	sternacis : id est sternentis *spurnandies.*
303	404	Sollicitat : *uuegida.*
304	412	Dictamnum : *uuiteuurt.*
*305	413	caulem : *stok.*
306	419	panaceam : herbam *rauuano* [? "riniuono," "reniuano"].
307	470	temone : *thisle.*
308	520	conducta : *ingimedodera.*
309	590	Discurrunt : *tiuarad.*
310	646	miserum : *unothi.*
311	696	spatiumque dedere *rumdun* [sic, quoad locum].
312	727	uergat : *nitheruuaga.*
313	775	sequi : *skietan.*
314	857	parthus : *ungar* [sc. Hungarius ?]
	Gloss on Servius on	
315	Aen. 2. 229	Expendisse : id est soluisse · *ungebdan.*
316, 317, 318	554	clunis : *isben* uel *ars belli* uel posterior pars omnis animalis.
319	Aen. 4. 548	Vrbanus : alter liber dicit urbane · *fronisco.*
320	Aen. 5. 269	taenis : *nestilun.*
321	Aen. 6. 704	Virgulta : *sumerladan.*

Dubious.

	Gloss on	
322	Georg. 3. 25	scena uidere *theathe* ut uersis [in marg. "quemadmodum"].
323	Aen. 5. 337	Euryalus : *fanfullistia.*
324	Aen. 10. 23	Quin intra : *netian.*

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N.B.—Numerals printed thus 234 are in the text, **234** and 234 are interlinear (or marginal)—in the older hand, in the more recent hand.

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F. MADAN.

1877.

TRACES OF DIFFERENT DIALECTS IN THE LANGUAGE OF HOMER.

THE article published by Mr Monro under this heading in the last number of the *Journal of Philology* seems to require a reply, more especially as the author is so impressed with the untenability of my position as to regret that a work "so well adapted otherwise" for general readers as Prof. Mahaffy's *History of Greek Literature,* should have given currency to what he regards as a mass of misstatements and erroneous reasoning. I hope to show as briefly as possible that the statements are not misstatements and that the reasoning is not erroneous.

I must begin by thanking Mr Monro for the clerical errors he has pointed out in the delinquent Appendix. Perhaps they will be excused when I say that the whole system of reference had to be changed while the Appendix was passing through the press, and that owing to my absence from England I was unable personally to superintend it. I must next draw attention to the fact that my primary purpose was not to determine whether Homer was an actual individual or a mere abstraction, whether he was the author of the whole of the Iliad and Odyssey, and whether he lived in the twelfth or the fifth century before our era, but to examine the age and character of the Epic dialect as we now have it. All I was concerned with showing was that the Homeric dialect is an artificial one, that it bears traces of having passed through several phases of existence, and that in its present form it is as late as the fifth century B. C. Professor Mahaffy, however, was perfectly right in assuming that I placed the date of "the first origin of the Iliad and Odyssey as complete poems at or near the opening

of the seventh century B.C." I certainly did so at the time I wrote the chapter, considering that the new Ionic forms found in Homer and Herodotus might be as old as that period, and that the Attic colouring which, in common with Aristarchus, Cobet and Paley, I find in Homer, was simply evidence that the poems had undergone a process of manipulation in Attica. Subsequent study and reflection, however, have brought me more and more over to Prof. Paley's view, and I find it increasingly difficult to believe that the Homeric dialect *in its present form* can claim a much greater antiquity than the Periklean era. Many of the forms which are usually regarded as archaic rather seem to me, to borrow a term from the art-critics, archaistic. Of course this does not prove anything as to the age of the original Iliad and Odyssey, or of the original Homer, whoever he may have been; if Mr Monro likes, he may still believe that Homer lived before the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus.

I will now take Mr Monro's objections and criticisms *seriatim*, dealing with each as briefly as possible. I cannot help remarking, however, that the general impression they produce upon me is that of a system of apologetics which I fancied had long since been discredited by critical science.

Mr Monro first objects to my use of the term "period." It is, however, consecrated by custom, and I do not see what other term I could have chosen to express my meaning. The Ionic genitives in *-ου* presuppose older genitives in *-οο*, and these again still older genitives in *-οιο*. If we follow Ahrens, all three forms are found in Homer. I am surely, therefore, justified in saying that Homer contains forms belonging to three different periods in the history of the Ionic dialect. Mr Monro says that "we cannot assume that all the forms which are similarly intermediate between two others belong to the same *chronological* period." But I never assumed anything of the kind; I was dealing with philology, not with history. It is sufficient to know that in the Homeric language we have relics of three different phases of growth of the Ionic dialect; those belonging to the first and third phases cannot be older than the earliest beginnings of Epic poetry or later than the

final redaction of the Iliad and Odyssey. So far as I can see, it matters little whether the relics of the second phase all belong to exactly the same chronological period or not. They must fall somewhere between the first and the second periods. Mr Monro asks what was the middle Ionic form of *νηός*, *νεός*? If an answer is necessary, we may say *νηός* itself, the older form which may or may not be preserved in Homer being *νηϝός*. I do not understand the point of Mr Monro's other question: "If *νηός* is old Ionic, and consequently archaic, how are we to explain the fact that it is very much commoner than *νεός*?" since according to my view the choice of equivalent words in later Epic poetry was determined partly by the exigencies of the metre, partly by an affectation of archaism.

We come next to the question of the relation of the language of Homer to that of Herodotus. Here as elsewhere, it must be understood, I have given but a few examples in support of my position out of the many which I have collected in my note-books, and as I have taken care not to select the most typical or convincing, but the first that came to hand, the examples are necessarily of unequal strength. At the outset Mr Monro seems to doubt whether he has not "strangely misunderstood" me. He certainly has done so. My point was not to prove that the New-Ionic parts of Homer are Herodotean, but that the language of Herodotus and of certain parts of the Homeric dialect belong to the same period in the history of Ionic speech. It was not necessary, therefore, to discuss whether *τιθεῖσι* and the other words arraigned by Mr Monro might possibly "date from the earliest periods of Ionic;" all I had to show was that they were employed by Herodotus, and were consequently in use in Ionic literature during what I have termed the New-Ionic period of the language. Their antiquity must be tested by other evidence, and when so tested, I venture to think, in spite of Mr Monro, fails to be substantiated in the majority of cases[1]. Except in the case of *τιθεῖσι*

[1] Thus the Attic *ἐσμέν* is an older form than the Ionic *εἰμέν*, and must therefore have been the form used in Old Ionic when the Attic and Ionic dialects first separated: the omission of the augment is distinctly the mark of a later time; *φύλακος* and *μάρτυροι* are the products of an analogy which

and its congeners, the Attic forms are older than the corresponding ones found in Homer and Herodotus, and must accordingly have been the forms used by Old Ionic when the Attic dialect branched off from it, while in some instances we meet with forms due to an analogy which seems first setting in during the age of Herodotus (as may be inferred from the small number of examples of it found in that author), or (as in the case of the augment) with marks of phonetic decay which are actually more numerous in the pages of Homer than in those of the historian of Halikarnassos. We must not forget that when the age of the Epic language is in question, we have no right to assume that forms found for the first time in Herodotus and the New Ionic inscriptions existed at a much

seems only just setting in during the age of Herodotus; the etymologically incorrect *ἤϊσαν* is probably late in spite of the Old Persian *-āisa;* and as the iteratives in *-σκον* are not found in Attic prose we may gather that they are subsequent to the separation of the Attic and Ionic dialects. In fact, the iterative Preterites are confined to the language of Homer (and his imitators), Herodotus and the later Epic writers. We know, therefore, that they characterised the New Ionic; we do not know that they existed in the Ionic dialect in any earlier stage of its career. Mr Monro is mistaken in saying that *χρῆν* is "probably not an instance of lost augment;" *χρῆ* no doubt was originally a substantive, but when an imperfect was formed from it the analogy of other augmented imperfects was necessarily followed. That Herodotus should omit the augment in a case of this kind is a strong proof that the omission of the augment is a mark of linguistic decay, characterising the New Ionic period of the Ionic dialect. It thus throws an important light on the omission of the augment in Homer, and I have accordingly referred to it. The loss of the aspirate in *μετάλμενος* and *ἐπάλμενος* is New Ionic; so therefore would its loss be in the Epic *ἆλτο*.

In his article on Homer in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* Mr Monro supports his assertion that the Homeric dialect is Old Ionic by the fact that many more weak (miscalled "strong") or second aorists, as compared with the number of sigmatic aorists, appear in Homer than in Attic prose. But he forgets that both aorists existed in the Parent-Aryan, and that there was no reason except custom and analogy why tenses should have continued to be formed on the one type more than on the other. As a matter of fact the weak aorist is the imperfect of the weak verbal stem, and several so-called second aorists in Homer are really imperfects. If there are more weak aorists in Homer than in Attic prose, all we are justified in inferring is that they suited the metre better than the sigmatic aorists, or seemed to have a greater flavour of antiquity about them. Some of them, like *κιχεῖν*, *ἔστυγον*, *ἐνένιπον* and *ἠνίαπον*, are certainly analogic formations.

earlier date, unless (1) they are also found in Attic, or (2) can be shewn to have belonged to the Parent-Aryan. We must also not forget that in a question of this kind three or four certain forms,—and Mr Monro admits that even the short list I have given contains as many,—are quite sufficient.

Mr Monro now endeavours to set aside my argument from the fact that whereas forms like the genitives in *-ευ* and *-ευς* are monosyllabic in Homer, they are written *-εο* in New Ionic inscriptions up to the beginning of the fourth century B.C. In this he has the support of German scholars, who finding in nine instances that *ευ* has been written *εο* in Ionic inscriptions infer that *εο* was pronounced as a diphthong. But the inference is obviously unjustifiable. *Εο could* not be pronounced diphthongally, and nine instances are not sufficient to upset a phonetic fact, more especially when we consider that they may either be the result of a misleading analogy, or indicate a disyllabic pronunciation of the ordinary *ευ* on the part of the engraver[1]. I do not find any German scholar venturing to assert that *Θεο-* in compounds was pronounced as a diphthong unless it was written *Θευ-*.

Mr Monro then suggests—at least, such I understand to be his meaning—that words like *βλώσκω, στυγεῖν, σκάζω, κροαίνω, ἀνεκήκιε* from the post-Homeric *κηκίς*, or the weak passive future *μιγήσεσθαι*, were derived by the Alexandrine poets from the language of the archaic period. I doubt whether he will find many comparative philologists to agree with him.

Passing over Mr Monro's supposition that Homer is older than the Dorian migration,—a supposition, however, which seems to me not only utterly untenable but also to make the whole history of Homeric poetry unintelligible[2],—I come to his treatment of the Æolisms in Homer. Here I would recommend a perusal of the careful work of Hinrichs *De Homericæ Elocutionis Vestigiis Æolicis*, where, by the way, Mr Monro

[1] The latter alternative is supported by *Σεοῆρον* for *Severum* (*Corp. Insc.* 3423).

[2] How would he explain Od. XIX. 177, where we find the Dorians divided into their three tribes and already established in Krete, which presupposes their previous occupation of the Peloponnesus and maritime extension?

will find an answer to his question as to the Æolic character of *κέν*. Mr Monro further asks why *ἄμμες*, *ὔμμες* may not be considered Old Ionic? I answer: (1) because this is phonetically impossible, and (2) because we know they were Æolic. As to Mr Monro's idea that honorary epithets like *ἀμύμων* or traditional proper names like *Θερσίτης* may have been introduced into Ionic poetry directly from the spoken Æolic dialects of the day, I can only say that it seems to me in the highest degree improbable. The poets of a pre-literary age are not likely to have gone for their honorary epithets to another dialect unless these epithets had already become fixed and stereotyped in their dialectic form. And the only conceivable way in which they could have become so fixed and stereotyped was by their having been coined and used in Æolic poetry. In a footnote Mr Monro quotes G. Meyer's *Griechische Grammatik;* but I do not think he has quite rightly understood the latter's meaning. Meyer does not intend to say that we do not know the phonetic peculiarities of the several Greek dialects and the forms which belong to each; a large part of his grammar is based on the opposite assumption; but that the relation of the dialects one to the other is still in great measure disputable. Even this assertion, however, is carefully guarded by the next sentence which Mr Monro does not quote.

I have included *σφίσι* in the list of Atticisms because Herodotus certainly uses *σφί* while the reading *σφίσι* in his text is not placed beyond doubt, and *ἔπεσον* because the parallel forms in Homer (*ἄξετε*, *οἶσε*, *ἶξον*, &c.) lead me to consider it to have been borrowed by Attic literature from the Epic dialect. *Θεά* is not supported by the genitive *θεάων*, since I regard the latter as archaistic, not archaic. G. Meyer, imagining *θεάων* to be archaic, holds that *θεά* was "derived from older non-Ionic poetry, while in Ionic *θεός* seems to have stood for both genders." We know, however, that the word was Attic. Mr Monro ignores altogether the Atticisms brought forward by Prof. Paley, the most striking of which I have quoted, and which, I am now convinced, Prof. Paley is right in regarding as evidences of the Periklean age.

I now come to the examples of false analogy. Mr Monro's question: "how do we know" that a form produced by false analogy "is the work of poets or rhapsodists, not of the people at large?" can only be answered by an examination of the false forms themselves. When they are modelled or supposed to be modelled after archaic words and forms which had disappeared from common use, or after corrupted or misunderstood words and forms preserved in poetry, we possess the criterion that is required. The instances I have chosen belong to the language of literature not of every-day life. Mr Monro's second question has been already anticipated on page 518 of my Appendix. I will now take his criticisms in detail.

(1) Our interpretation of *εἴκω* differs; I think mine the more natural. It certainly has the support of similar forms.

(2) *Πεφεύγοι* implies *πεφεύγω*, so I do not see the force of the objection.

(3) Benfey has long since shown that the so-called second aorist and the imperfect are originally the same. *Ἐπέφραδον* is as much the imperfect of *πεφράδω* as *ἔτυπτον* is of *τύπτω*. Why could the perfect *πέφραδα* not be formed?

(4) I was wrong in saying that the futures *ἰδήσω* and *τυχήσω* existed in Homer, and am duly penitent. But though *τυχήσω* does not exist, *ἐτύχησα* does, which has the same value as *τυχήσω* for the purposes of my argument.

(5) The "root" of *θήσω* is *θε-*, whereas the "root" of *ἐνισπήσω* is *σεπ* or rather *σπ*, not *σπε*.

Mr Monro goes on to blame me for fitting Wackernagel's "ingenious hypothesis" into my "general theory." But surely I may be allowed to use whatever grist comes to my mill. I was guilty, however, of writing a misleading sentence when I said that "the so-called diectasis...has been proved by Mangold and Wackernagel to be the result of an affected archaism." I meant, and ought to have said, that it has been proved by their researches to be so.

The criticisms in detail with which Mr Monro concludes his article are relegated to a footnote; I have therefore appended my replies to them in the same form[1].

[1] (1) I cannot admit Allen's explanation of the Lokrian ϝότι. G. Meyer says in his *Grammar* which Mr Monro quotes as an authority: "Das griechische Relativum lautet ὅς, ἁ, ὅ. Die beliebte Identificierung desselben mit dem ai. Relativum *yás, yâ, yát* scheitert an der einen Form ϝότι, die auf der lokrischen Inschrift von Oiantheia a 6 als Neutrum des Pronomens steht. Vergeblich hat Curtius die Bedeutung dieses ϝ abzuschwächen versucht."

(2) I am duly thankful to Mr Monro for pointing out this clerical blunder.

(3) By way of answer I would refer to Hinrichs: *De homericæ elocutionis Vestigiis Æolicis* pp. 62, 63.

(4) If πίσυρες is not Æolic, what is it? Its phonetic form proves that it is neither Ionic nor Doric, and at the same time justifies the usual opinion of scholars, which pronounces it to be Æolic. As Mr Monro himself says, "the nearest known form is the Lesbian πέσυρες," and Lesbian is the Æolic dialect nearest akin to the Æolic dialects spoken on the mainland opposite. The Lesbian form, however, is more archaic than the Homeric.

(5) We can explain the various reading ἐρηρέδατ' from ἐληλέδατ', but not ἐληλέδατ' from ἐρηρέδατ'. 'Ελληλέδατ' is further supported by ἐληλέατ', which, however, as Mr Monro well knows, is an inferior reading.

(6) Mr Monro does not say why Clemm "can hardly be right."

(7) Prof. Paley's explanation seems to me the only correct one. How does Mr Monro propose to get rid of the conjunction τ'?

(8) Buttmann's explanation will not stand.

(9) Phonology shows that πλέες can have no real connection with the comparative, as the sense and syntax of the passages in which it is found require. The only root to which the word can be referred is πλε- "to be full," the form originating in the supposed analogy of words like εὐρέες. Prof. Paley may perhaps be right in thinking that the New Ionic πλεῦν for πλέον gave rise to the false interpretation of πλέες, πλέες being to πλεῦν as εὐρέες to εὐρύν.

(10) I must maintain my correctness in stating that according to Curtius the *first* ε in the infinitives in -εειν is historically false. Ἰδεῖν for ἰδέ-εν is the correct form; the insertion of the *first* ε makes it incorrect.

(11) My explanation of ἐείσατο seems to me the less "violent" one. For reasons against that of Wackernagel see G. Meyer, *Griechische Grammatik* p. 193. I may add that there is quite a long list of words in Homer (ἔεδνα, ἐεισάμενος, ἐείκοσι &c.) in which an initial vowel, erroneously explained as "prothetic," has been introduced before the digamma through the influence of false analogy.

(12) I was thinking of words like κάθημαι, καθύπερθε, to which we may perhaps add words like δειδέχαται, δειδέχατο.

(13) A "fixed place" may still be "a choice of three or four" when the choice, as here, is further limited. What does Mr Monro mean by "considering the metrical form"?

(14) I gratefully accept Mr Monro's corrections. I had already noted them for a second edition of Prof. Mahaffy's work. But for obvious reasons I can-

Mr Monro's views of the Epic dialect seem to me to be influenced by a previous assumption of the antiquity of the Iliad and Odyssey, and he is therefore anxious to explain away whatever appears to militate against this assumption. I do not think I can be justly accused of being influenced by a counter hypothesis. My first investigations into the Homeric dialect were made with a full conviction of its great antiquity, and it is only little by little that I have been forced by what I believe to be overwhelming evidence into the position I now occupy. At the time I wrote the Appendix to Prof. Mahaffy's volume I still thought it possible to maintain that the Homeric language in its present form belonged in substance to the older phase of the Ionic dialect. I cannot do so any longer. The marks of conventionality and modernism are too numerous and interpenetrating to be ignored, and I cannot resist the cumulative force of the "Periklean" Atticisms which Prof. Paley has brought forward. Much, as I now see, that is usually termed archaic is rather archaistic, metrical necessity and the affectation of antiquity largely dominating the choice of words and forms[1]. Can anyone read Homer and Apollonius Rhodius together without prepossessions and prejudice, and then say that the language used in the two works is separated by a wide

not agree with what he remarks about *ζωστήρ*.

(15) The evidence is of course far too long to be given here; but it will be found in the works of the scholars who have laboured upon these Epics. In the case of the Nibelungen Lied and the Kalévala it is so notorious that I should have imagined it was well known even to Greek scholars. If the Edda is not an Epic, what in the world is it? The Kalévala seems to me to offer the closest possible analogy to the Iliad and Odyssey, especially to the latter, and I fancy the majority of its readers will be of my opinion.

[1] The Epic *αἶα* or *αἴη* may be quoted as an example of this. The attempt of Curtius to derive it from *γαῖα* must be rejected for phonetic reasons, and the less said about the roots *av*, *ai* and the like the better. The word always comes at the end of a verse, and therefore at once suggests the common phrase *πατρίδα γαῖαν* (and *πατρίδι γαίῃ*), which I believe formed the model for the new coinage *αἶα*, the *γ* being supposed to be the particle *γε* (*γ'*). Consequently *πατρίδος αἴης* was formed in imitation of *πατρίδα γαῖαν* and *πατρίδι γαίῃ*, and the archaic word, as it was imagined to be because never heard in living speech, was introduced into other passages where it suited the metre better than *γαῖα*. Hence we have *καθορώμενος αἶαν*, *ἐπικίδναται αἶαν*, *ἐπ' αἶαν*, and *ὑπὲρ αἴης*.

interval of time? Of course, we are told that Apollonius Rhodius was an "imitator," but how do we know that Homer was not one too? If we would rightly understand the Epic dialect I believe we must regard the language of Homer not as a form of Old Ionic or as a model for later writers, but *in its present form* as the last embodiment of an artificial dialect whose roots go back to the lost poems of ancient Æolis and which was nurtured and moulded by generation after generation of Ionic poets through long periods of time. In judging thus of the present text of Homer, however, I do not pretend to determine when the Iliad and Odyssey first took shape as independent poems or whether the Homer who composed them was one or many.

A. H. SAYCE.

ON SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THE PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY.

If we compare the teaching of the Phaedo concerning ψυχή with that of several other Platonic dialogues, two startling discrepancies seem to be manifest. Grote, in his chapter on the Phaedo[1], has with his accustomed clearness stated them as follows: 'In the Phaedon, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love of wisdom or knowledge exclusively: all that belongs to passion and appetite is put to account of the body: this is distinctly contrary to the Philebus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that desire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belong only to the soul....That controul, which in the Republic is exercised by the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the Phaedon exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over the body. In the Republic and Timaeus, the soul is a tripartite aggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Phaedon, Sokrates asserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his argument[2].'

Thus the difficulties are, (1) in the Phaedo desires, fears, &c. are attributed to body, while in the Philebus such

[1] Grote's Plato, vol. II p. 159 (2nd ed.).

[2] A third difficulty started by Grote, I conceive to be illusory: he says, 'Again in the Phaedon the soul is pronounced to be essentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in antithesis with the body, which is perpetually changing: while we read on the contrary in the Symposion that soul and body alike are in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the other ever continuing in the same condition.' But in the passage to which he refers (*Symp.* 207 D—208 B) there is no question of the essential nature of soul.

passions are expressly denied to body and attributed to soul; compare especially Phaedo 66 C, D with Philebus 35 C, D.

(2) In the Phaedo the human soul is uniform and incomposite; in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus it appears as threefold and composite; whence arises the often-discussed question: does the argument for immortality in the Phaedo apply to all the three parts of soul, or to the highest only?

Grote's summary method of dealing with the difficulty is characteristic. 'The difference which I have here noted,' he says, 'shows how Plato modified his doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul would have been found inconvenient where the argument required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as possible:' and more in the same strain.

To those who see in Plato's dialogues only a magnificent series of dissolving views this short cut to a solution may be altogether satisfactory; but if we believe that they compose an artistic and coherent whole—in which we may trace developement, but not contradiction—a *μακροτέρα περίοδος* must be followed. It may indeed seem rash to attempt the conciliation of discrepancies which so many eminent authorities besides Grote have failed to reconcile; yet, as Sokrates says, *τὰ λεγόμενα μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις πάνυ μαλθακοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρός.*

The way to the solution of the first problem clearly lies through the second, which we will accordingly take first.

It appears to me that some light may be thrown on the question by a closer examination of this very tripartite division of *ψυχή*; as a preliminary to which it may be well to note briefly how the case stands with regard to *ψυχὴ* in the Platonic dialogues, excluding the Republic and parts of the Timaeus and of the Phaedrus.

Ψυχὴ then is the principle of life which vivifies the entire universe, interpenetrating its whole mass from centre to circumference (*Tim.* 36 E); she is nature's upholder and sustainer (*Krat.* 400 A); having her motion of herself she is to all things that move the source and principle of motion (*Phaedr.* 245 C

cf. *Laws* 895 B—896 A); she is without birth or death, through all eternity existing (*Phaedr.* 245 D, E); she is the guardian of all that is soulless (246 B); she is divine, deathless, spiritual, uniform, indissoluble, self-identical, changeless (*Phaedo* 80 B); akin to the ideas and coeternal with them (79 D, 92 D); the only seat of reason (*Soph.* 249 A); the one cause and means of communion between the ideal and material worlds (*Phileb.* 28 C seq. where *νοῦς* is identified with the *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως*). The human soul is derived from the universal soul (*Phileb.* 30 A), differing only in the inferior purity of its substance (*Tim.* 41 D cf. *Phileb.* 29 B, C.); it possesses, as we gather from the Phaedo and Phaedrus, conscious and individual immortality; it is an indwelling essence distinct from the body but by some mysterious union informing and controlling it; it apprehends sensible objects by means of the bodily organs (*Theaet.* 184 D); and it alone, by virtue of its affinity with the ideas, has the power of contemplating pure being and absolute truth (*Phaedo* 66).

In all this we find that *ψυχή*, whether universal or particular, is treated as a substance, one and indivisible: and so it is everywhere in Plato, except in the passages I am coming to consider, the single principle of life, sensation, and thought. It is certainly not a little strange, if in three of the Platonic dialogues there exists a theory of *ψυχή* totally at variance with this conception; which is not one belonging to a particular period but is constantly occurring throughout the whole series of Plato's writings; and this strangeness is the more startling when we observe that in these three dialogues themselves the usual conception is also apparent.

It is in the celebrated allegory of the Phaedrus that we are first brought face to face with the difficulty. The individual soul, of god or man, is likened to a car driven by a charioteer and drawn by two steeds, one noble, spirited, and docile, the other lustful, vicious, and intractable. The meaning of this similitude, clear enough from the context, is fully explained in *Republic* 434—441, where we have the soul divided into a *λογιστικὸν* and an *ἄλογον εἶδος*, the *ἄλογον* being subdivided into *θυμοειδὲς* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. The soul thus appears com-

pounded of three distinct parts or kinds, rational, emotional, appetitive: in describing them Plato uses indifferently the words εἶδος, γένος, and μέρος—cf. *Republic* 435 C, 441 C, 444 B—but no expression of Plato's, I think, warrants Grote in speaking of three souls[1].

But if this is really so, what are the consequences? Let us turn to the Phaedo. At first the mutually complementary arguments of ἀνταπόδοσις and ἀνάμνησις seemed to carry conviction to us; yet presently we feel that even their combined persuasion has no charm potent enough to dispel our fear lest the soul that passes forth of the body on a stormy night be blown asunder and scattered like smoke on the blast: the child in us can only be soothed with the assurance that the soul is not compounded of parts, therefore into parts it cannot be resolved; that it shares the nature of the ideas and therefore shares their eternity. But now our soul that was incomposite and uniform and like to true being has turned out to be composite and triform and therefore as unlike true being as can well be conceived. The downfall of the argument is utter and ruinous; we are left hopelessly wondering whether all the parts survive the body, or one, or two; and if more than one, whether in union or apart; if the ἐπιθυμητικὸν survives, what does the soul's release from the body profit her? finally whether the argument that has betrayed us on so important a point be altogether faithless, and our soul die utterly with the body. It has been maintained that the Phaedo deals with the λογιστικὸν εἶδος alone; but there is not one word in the dialogue which countenances the supposition that Plato is using the term ψυχὴ in a more restricted sense than elsewhere; nor does he anywhere show an inclination to confine the title to the highest εἶδος. I cannot but regard this explanation as a forlorn hope. Apart also from the subject of immortality, we are laid

[1] Compare Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* I xiii 9, 10. οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. Here we may remark that Aristotle does not regard the distinction between ἄλογον and λόγον ἔχον as necessarily implying parts.

open to some inconvenient metaphysical questions: for instance, what is the essential difference between these parts of ψυχή? what the nature of their union? what the common principle by virtue of which they are all termed ψυχή[1]? I cannot believe that Plato intended to set his scholars adrift on such a sea of perplexity as this; still less, as Zeller[2] would have us suppose, that it is a question which Plato doubtless never definitely set before himself; which at least he has done nothing to answer.

But in one or other of these conclusions we must, I think, have acquiesced, had Plato never written the Timaeus. The account given in that dialogue still remains for consideration; and this, while at first sight it seems to plunge us even deeper in perplexity, really in my belief gives us the clue that shall guide us out of the maze. This passage (*Timaeus* 69 c seq.) has such an important bearing on the question that it may be well to translate some part of it in full.

'And the created gods following the creator's example, when they had received from him an immortal principle of soul, went on to frame about it a mortal body, and all this body they gave it to ride in: moreover they enclosed within the walls of the body another kind of soul, even that which is mortal, having in itself dire inevitable passions—first pleasure, the strongest allurement of evil, then pains that scare away good things; rashness also and fear, two thoughtless counsellors; wrath hard to assuage and hope that lightly leads astray—all these forcibly they mingled with reasonless sensation and love that ventures all things, and so they composed the mortal kind of soul. Wherefore, in awe of defiling the divine, but so far as needs must be, they lodge the mortal kind apart from the divine in another chamber of the body; and between the head and the breast they constructed an isthmus to sunder them, placing the neck in the midst that they might be separate. So in the breast and the chest, as it is called, they confined the mortal part of the soul. And seeing that one part of it was of higher, another of lower nature, they built a wall across the hollow of

[1] Compare Aristotle *de anima* I v 24—27; III ix.

[2] Gesch. d. gr. Phil. II i p. 717, 3rd ed.

the chest, as if they were marking off separate apartments for women and for men, setting the midriff as a partition between them. That part of the soul which shares courage and spirit, since it is warlike, they placed nearer the head between the midriff and the neck, that it might be within hearing of the reason and might aid it in forcibly restraining the tribe of lusts, whenever they would not willingly obey the signal and word of command issued from the citadel[1].'

I have translated so much verbatim, in order to bring out clearly the highly figurative character of the passage. In 70 D Plato describes the position of the *ἐπιθυμητικὸν* as follows: 'That portion of the soul which lusts after meat and drink and all things which because of the body's nature it needs, they placed between the midriff and the boundary at the navel, constructing in all this region as it were a manger for sustenance of the body; and herein they chained it like a wild beast, which nevertheless must be reared in union with the rest, if a mortal race were to be at all.'

Zeller, interpreting this passage literally (p. 715 seq.), asserts roundly that these three forces are not different forms of energy but actually different parts of the soul, to which Plato shall even assign separate positions in space. I believe that most of Plato's commentators, from Aristotle downwards, have got into trouble by failing to realise that the Timaeus is not only a profound philosophical speculation but also one of the most fanciful of fairy tales. Zeller, though he has elsewhere shown himself fully alive to this, has, I think, been here forgetful of it, and has thus failed to reach Plato's meaning. Moreover while he naturally feels that the passage, as he understands it, leads to grave difficulties (p. 717), he does not seem adequately to appreciate the irreconcilable inconsistencies it involves.

For to the difficulties before mentioned as attaching to the triform nature of *ψυχὴ* this passage adds two still more hopeless perplexities: (1) the three parts, as Zeller says, have distinct locations in specified regions of the body; all three

[1] Compare with this *Politicus* 309 C. *πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τὸ ἀειγενὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν μέρος θείῳ ξυναρμοσαμένη δεσμῷ, μετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖον τὸ ζωογενὲς αὐτῶν αὖθις ἀνθρωπίνοις.*

therefore, it would seem, have extension in space; yet Plato has again and again told us that soul is immaterial: (2) the two inferior parts are declared to be mortal. This does not seem to have given Plato's interpreters much anxiety, but surely a more startling statement could not proceed from his mouth; indeed in what possible sense of the two words Plato can use the combination *θνητὴ ψυχὴ* I am utterly at a loss to imagine. It is, if possible, a more absolute contradiction in terms than *πῦρ ψυχρὸν* or even *ἀρτία τριάς*. If *ψυχή*, that is vital principle, can die in any case, what becomes of the final argument in the Phaedo? what is the end of all Plato's endeavour to discover some stable and permanent object of knowledge? *σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται.* Again in the Phaedrus (245 D) it is positively asserted that all soul is immortal, *πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος*; and this only a few lines before the tripartite nature of the soul appears in full developement: that is to say Plato first affirms without limitation that all soul is immortal and immediately afterwards describes it as consisting of a mortal and immortal part united.

We are therefore driven to choose between the following suppositions: (1) Plato has directly contradicted himself on a point of the gravest importance; (2) the term *ψυχὴ* is used by him in different senses; (3) the expression *θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς* is to be explained so as to harmonise with Plato's other statements on the subject. The first must, I think, be dismissed without ceremony: it is surely incredible that the greatest and most careful of all original thinkers, on a point which he had so much at heart and on which he bestowed so much pains, has unconsciously fallen into so obvious and glaring an inconsistency. Secondly, if the *θνητὸν εἶδος be* a different substance or substances from the *ἀθάνατον*, what is this substance? a question which to ask is inevitable, to answer, I think, impossible. For what right has this mortal substance to share the name of *ψυχή*, whose essence is immortality? we have between spirit and matter a third substance, sharing, as it seems, the properties of matter—for it is extended and perishable—but classed under the same title as spirit. As the origin of emotions and appetites

it is a source of motion: either then its motion is of itself or from without: if of itself it cannot be mortal, for the self-moved is immortal; if from without, it cannot be *ψυχή*, for the essence of *ψυχὴ* is self-motion. We are thus forced to adopt the only remaining alternative; which amounts to this. It is not *ψυχὴ* which is mortal, but certain activities of *ψυχὴ* in certain relations which are terminable and determined by separation from matter; we must accept, in fact, the conclusion which Zeller rejects, that the three parts are not 'verschiedene Theile', but 'verschiedene Thätigkeitsformen', or modes of operation. To be more explicit: all soul, as such, is eternal and uniform, nor are there more kinds of soul than one. But soul when it enters into union with matter is forced more or less to operate through matter; and the names given to this combined action of soul and matter are *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία*. Therefore *θυμοειδὲς* and *ἐπιθυμητικὸν* are expressions for soul in certain material relations; and as the connexion of soul with body is terminable, *θυμοειδὲς* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, as such, are perishable. But this does not mean that the vital principle, which in its material connexion assumes these forms, is perishable, but only that the relation is temporary: *ψυχὴ* exists as *ψυχὴ* eternally; as *ἐπιθυμητικὸν* and *θυμοειδὲς* only so long as its connexion with matter continues.

This view will, I think, be found to agree entirely with Plato's whole teaching on the subject. It must be remembered that the two lower *εἴδη* of soul are found only in conjunction with matter. Even the gods, to whom all three parts are attributed, are corporeal: a god is *ἀθάνατόν τι ζῷον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχὴν ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνου ταῦτα ξυμπεφυκότα* (*Phaedr.* 246 D)[1]: only, as their bodies are more ethereal, their soul is more free to act independently; consequently in them reason is supreme. Similarly in the Phaedo, in proportion as the soul withdraws herself from communion with the body, pure reason predominates over the earthly and sensual appetites. All this is perfectly reasonable, if we conceive soul as a single essence, constrained in certain circumstances to work through

[1] Even in their case the connexion has no inherent permanence: its continuance depends upon the will of the creator (*Timaeus* 41 A).

matter; but surely Plato did not mean that soul, being when apart from body a uniform essence, on entrance into a material abode all at once annexes two inferior substances, being parts of itself and yet essentially different.

It is well also to bear in mind that although the three εἴδη are commonly spoken of as three coordinate parts of soul, the main division is really twofold, λογιστικὸν and ἄλογον as expressed in the Republic, ἀθάνατον and θνητὸν in the Timaeus; this is appropriately represented in the Phaedrus by the driver and pair of horses. This is important to notice; since, were the three divisions coordinate, the view I am here maintaining would involve serious difficulty. As it is, the distinction between θυμοειδὲς and ἐπιθυμητικὸν is simply a classification of the operations of soul through body.

The general physical application of this theory is perfectly simple. All living things derive their life from a single uniform principle, that is soul. In the gods, if such there be, soul possesses the highest state of freedom compatible with material existence: bodily affections they must have, since they are corporeal; but, owing to the predominance of spirit over matter, their affections are entirely controlled by the reason: in man, since soul is bound in a much closer union with matter, the power of reason is greatly diminished, while that of the passions is proportionately increased; still the philosopher, whose whole life is a 'study of death', can so far abstract his soul from its bodily connexion as to attain a considerable degree of intellectual freedom. In the lower animals, as we descend the scale, the implication of soul with matter becomes more and more complete, and in proportion as the reasoning power decreases the purely animal impulses predominate; till in plants all we find of life is a mere faculty of growth. But the reason of a god and the growth of a moss are alike operations of one and the same vital principle; in one case acting in almost complete independence of matter, in the other inextricably entangled with it.

The view that by θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς Plato means not a mortal kind of soul but a terminable mode of soul's existence is thus, I think, shown to be in harmony with his general

teaching and to release us from grave difficulties. And surely it cannot be argued that in this passage of the Timaeus—one of the most figurative passages of Plato's most allegorical dialogue—we are compelled to understand every phrase with verbal literalness. It would be as reasonable to maintain that Plato meant us to accept literally the account of soul's construction by the δημιουργός, involving its composition out of three elements and its beginning in time; both of which are directly contradictory of Plato's theory of soul.

It follows from what has been said that the question whether the reasoning in the Phaedo refers to all the parts of the soul or not is quite beside the mark. Plato has ignored the threefold division, not, as Grote says, because it would have been inconvenient, but because his argument is entirely unaffected by it. His demonstration applies of course to soul as such, not to particular relations of soul. The vital principle, of which the θυμοειδὲς and ἐπιθυμητικὸν are manifestations in conjunction with matter, exists eternally; but θυμοειδὲς and ἐπιθυμητικὸν themselves are merely temporary modes of its operation. The whole difficulty vanishes with the notion that Plato held the existence of more than one kind of soul.

If this solution of Grote's second difficulty be accepted, the explanation of the first is easy. In the Phaedo Plato is dealing with soul as such, with which bodily appetites, &c. have nothing to do: these belong to soul in its corporeal relation, and can only affect it through such relation. Consequently from this standpoint of the Phaedo Plato is perfectly justified in attributing such passions to body; because they arise from the union of soul with body. Any closer investigation of their nature would have been foreign to his purpose: and Plato always likes to do one thing at once. In the Philebus on the other hand we are specially concerned to examine scientifically into the nature of pleasures and desires; and they are accordingly attributed to soul. But the discrepancy is only apparent. In the Phaedo they are assigned to body, because they cannot affect soul except when it is in connexion with matter; in the Philebus to soul, because matter as such is insensate.

The latter statement is more exactly scientific, but it could not have been made in the Phaedo without raising irrelevant issues. In both the meaning is the same; that is, desires and passions are phenomena belonging to a conjunction of soul with body: inasmuch as the soul is the seat of these passions, they are properly assigned to soul; inasmuch as body is a necessary condition of their existence, they may be said to belong to body.

The easy explanation thus obtained of apparently so grave an inconsistency is, I think, another strong piece of evidence for the solution proposed of our former problem. Indeed, except on the supposition that soul, notwithstanding the figurative descriptions of it in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus, is a simple substance, I do not see how any psychological theory can be attributed to Plato, which he could conceivably have constructed. This view is also, I believe, not without important application to the theory of ideas; but that is far beyond the limits of the present inquiry.

I conclude with a brief summary of the preceding argument:—

The difficulties are two: (1) in the Phaedo *ἐπιθυμίαι* are attributed to body, in the Philebus to soul: (2) in the Phaedo soul is simple, in the Phaedrus, Republic, and Timaeus it is triform. I have endeavoured to solve both problems in the following way:

In Timaeus 69 C—72 D, we have a *θεῖον εἶδος* and a *θνητὸν εἶδος* of *ψυχή*: of which *θεῖον* = *λογιστικόν*, *θνητὸν* = *θυμοειδὲς* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Now *ψυχὴ* as such is *ἀθάνατον*; therefore the word *θνητὸν* can only refer to a particular relation of *ψυχὴ* and *σῶμα*, or operation of *ψυχὴ* through *σῶμα*. *Θυμοειδὲς* therefore and *ἐπιθυμητικὸν* are not different parts of *ψυχὴ* but only names for different modes of its action through *σῶμα*: thus *θυμοειδὲς* and *ἐπιθυμητικὸν* are *θνητά*, because, when the conjunction between *ψυχὴ* and *σῶμα* ceases, they cease also.

Thus, (1) the apparent discrepancy between the Phaedo and the Philebus is reconciled. In the one *ἐπιθυμίαι* are ascribed to *σῶμα*, because arising from the conjunction of

ψυχὴ and σῶμα; in the other they are more accurately ascribed to ψυχή, because they are an affection of ψυχὴ through σῶμα: (2) the argument of the Phaedo is entirely unaffected by the threefold division. All soul is simple, uniform, and indestructible; but in connexion with body it assumes certain phases which are temporary and only exist in relation to body. Thus though the ἐπιθυμητικὸν and θυμοειδὲς as such are not immortal, because they depend for their continuance upon body, which is mortal; yet the vital principle, which under such conditions assumes these forms, is immortal and continues to exist, though not necessarily in the same mode. For the modes in which vital force acts under temporary conditions are transitory, but the acting force itself is changeless and eternal.

R. D. ARCHER-HIND.

ON PLATO'S REPUBLIC VI 509 D sqq.

Mr H. Sidgwick's excellent article in the *Journal of Philology* II 96—103 is still, so far as I know, the best statement of the received interpretation of the last pages of *Republic* VI and of the difficulties which beset it. But his remarks are offered "with a view less to solve the difficulties of the passage, than to define them more clearly than has yet been done," and accordingly cannot be considered final. In the present paper (which would hardly have been written but for Mr Sidgwick's) I propose to review the passage together with its context and to offer some suggestions for its interpretation. On a future occasion I hope to comment upon the metaphysical portion of the *Philebus*, and to institute a comparison of the ontologies of the two dialogues such as Mr Sidgwick's concluding paragraph seems to invite.

§ 1 The Line.

In the pages preceding those which specially concern me Socrates has illustrated his theory of the supremacy of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, the origin of Being and of Knowledge, by comparing it to the sun, which in the visible world[1] is the origin of Becoming and of Light. He now 509 D proceeds at Glaucon's request to amplify and complete the similitude of the sun (*τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα*). Let us suppose, he says, the visible world

[1] That *ὁρατόν* is not to be confounded with *αἰσθητόν*, might perhaps be assumed; but as commentators have supposed the whole region of sense to be referred to, it may be well to note that at 507 C sqq. Plato has endeavoured to guard against this misconception. It is only in the case of sight, he there tells us, not in that of the other senses, that there is a *τρίτον* which will serve as an *εἰκών* of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*.

presided over by the sun and the intelligible world presided over by the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* to be respectively represented by the two segments of an unequally divided line, and let us further divide each of the two segments similarly to the whole line. The four segments thus obtained may be taken to represent, in respect of comparative clearness or truth,—

1 Images, i.e. (1) shadows and (2) reflections in water, &c.

2 Things by which images are cast, whether (1) products of art or (2) products of nature.

3 That which the soul studies (*a*) descending from hypotheses to a conclusion, (*b*) by the aid of visibles treated as images.

4 That which the soul studies (*a*) ascending from hypotheses to a principle which is not hypothetical, (*b*) by the aid not of images but of forms[1].

At this point I pause to comment. According to Mr Sidgwick, who assumes at the outset that "the universe is compared to a quadripartite line," "We have (omitting the fourth segment as of no metaphysical importance) three processes of apprehension carefully distinguished: and corresponding to the first and third two sets of objects, material things and *εἴδη*. We naturally expect therefore a set of objects intermediate between the two corresponding to the intermediate process." Just such an intermediate set of objects we have, thinks Mr Sidgwick with the commentators in general[2], in the *μαθηματικά* men-

[1] Until it is possible to arrive at a distinct conception of the two sorts of *νοητόν*, I shall sometimes for the sake of brevity speak of them as 'the inferior *νοητόν*' and 'the superior *νοητόν*' respectively, but I shall mean by these terms no more than 'the object of the inferior intellectual method' and 'the object of the superior intellectual method.'

[2] "Unter der *διάνοια* oder *ἐπιστήμη* versteht Plato (wie auch Brandis annimmt) ausschliesslich die mathematische Wissenschaft; er selbst sagt diess Rep. VI, 510 B f. 511, C f. ausdrücklich." Zeller *Gesch. d. gr. Ph.* II i 537. "Da Plato jedoch das Mathematische und zwar zunächst die Zahlen, wie wir sehen werden, für Wesenheiten hielt, die in der Mitte zwischen dem sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren und den Ideen, so hat er unter jenen sogenannten Wissenschaften oder Künsten doch wohl lediglich die mathema-

tioned by Aristotle *metaphysics* I 6 § 4, 987 b 14, though, as Mr Sidgwick himself acutely remarks, "the language" [of 510 D] "in no way supports this interpolation of intermediate objects." So far Mr Sidgwick. The obvious, and, I think, fatal, objection to this interpretation is that it leaves one of the four segments unexplained. By way of answer to this objection Professor Jowett suggests (1) that "Plato had been led by the love of analogy to make four terms instead of three," and (2) that "each lower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding"; in other words, that the proportionals are a, ar, ar^2, ar^3, so that when the superfluous a (the first segment) is omitted, it may still be true that ar is to ar^2 as ar^2 is to ar^3, i.e. that sensibles are to intermediates as intermediates are to ideas. But these inconsistent suggestions do not dispose of the objection: for (1) three proportionals would have satisfied Plato's love of proportion just as well as four; and (2) the proportionals are not, as Professor Jowett assumes, and apparently Mr Sidgwick also, a, ar, ar^2, ar^3, but, as Whewell has pointed out (*Philosophy of Discovery* p. 444) a, ar, ar, ar^2, so that when a is omitted, the three remaining terms do not give the relation supposed by Professor Jowett and Mr Sidgwick between sensibles, intermediates, and ideas. It would seem then that the introduction of the first segment is unmeaning, and worse than unmeaning, on the assumption that "the universe is compared to a quadripartite line"; and it may therefore be worth while to inquire whether this assumption is necessary or justifiable.

tischen verstanden und sie für die ausschliesslichen gehalten, bei denen das hypothetische Verfahren des vermittelnden Denkens zureichend." Brandis *Gesch. d. gr.-röm. Ph.* II i 272.

"Zusammenfassend schematisirt Plato Rep. 509 ff. und 533 f. in folgender Weise:

A. Objecte.

Νοητὸν γένος (οὐσία).		Ὁρατὸν γένος (γένεσις).	
Ἰδέαι.	Μαθηματικά.	Σώματα.	Εἰκόνες.

B. Erkenntnissweisen.

Νόησις.		Δόξα.	
Νοῦς (oder νόησις oder ἐπιστήμη).	Διάνοια.	Πίστις.	Εἰκασία."

Ueberweg *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Ph.* I 132.

Let us return to the preceding context. When at 506 E Glaucon challenges Socrates to give at all events a popular account of the *ἀγαθόν*, such as that which he has previously given of the virtues, Socrates professes his inability to do so, but declares himself willing to explain his notion of it by reference to its *ἔκγονος*, the sun, which (not in the whole sensible world but) in the visible world is *ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ*. Now it is plain that the sun is "of no metaphysical importance," except so far as it illustrates the Platonic Socrates's notion of the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*; and, as in what he says about the quadripartite line Socrates is amplifying and completing *τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα*, and indeed, when he resumes his discourse, is careful to repeat that the sun presides over the *ὁρατόν* just as the *ἀγαθόν* presides over the *νοητόν*, it would appear that *both* the lower segments, not one only, are devoid of "metaphysical importance," except so far as they help us to understand the relation between the two higher segments. We have then here what may be called (in imitation of Aristotle) an *εἰκὼν κατ' ἀναλογίαν*—'as images of things are to things imaged, so is the inferior *νοητόν* to the superior *νοητόν*,' the popular distinction between images of things and things imaged, *ὁμοιωθέν* and *ᾧ ὡμοιώθη* 510 B, being used to explain the metaphysical distinction between the respective objects of the inferior and the superior intellectual methods.

Now if the object of the inferior intellectual method is to the object of the superior intellectual method as an image or reflection of a thing is to the thing itself—in other words, if the inferior *νοητόν* may be regarded as an image or reflection of the superior *νοητόν*, it would seem that the objects of the two sorts of intellectual method are not distinct existences, but the same existences viewed in the one case indirectly and in the other case directly. Thus as soon as we discard the assumption that "the universe is compared to a quadripartite line," and recognize the purely illustrative character of the first and second proportionals,—for the four segments are only four proportionals geometrically expressed,—all reference to 'the intermediates' of the *metaphysics* (which differ from the ideas in that each of them is a *πολλά* and

not a ἕν[1]) disappears, and with it the inconsistency which Mr Sidgwick finds between "the symmetry of the theory" and "the language of the passage."

But what are the two objects related to one another as thing to image? That the superior object is the idea, is indicated at 510 B D 511 B, and is indeed generally acknowledged. What then is the inferior object, 'the image or reflection of the idea'? In the case of every group of particulars to which we give the same name, we assume the separate existence of an idea in which these particulars participate. This idea is the whole completed connotation of the name, as it would be understood by omniscience, hypostasized. Now the general notion is the connotation of the name as we imperfectly understand it, not hypostasized. For example, the idea of sulphur is, hypostasized, the whole sum of the properties, known and unknown, which are common to specimens of sulphur: the general notion of sulphur includes, not hypostasized, so many of these as are known to us. The general notion is therefore not the idea, nor a correct and complete representation of the idea, but an incorrect and incomplete representation of it. May we not assume, apart from any indications to be found in Plato's account of the methods of investigation, that by 'the image of the idea' he means the general notion[2]?

The view which I take of the significance of the several segments of the line finds, I think, some confirmation in the well known chapter of the *Phaedo* descriptive of the Platonic Socrates's aspirations and failures. Having in the course of his physical researches learnt to draw a distinction between 'cause' and 'condition,' the word 'cause' being properly used only in the sense of 'final cause,' Socrates was astonished to find that Anaxagoras, when he had arrived at the notion of an intelligent author of all things by whom chaos was reduced to order, did not complete his theory by providing an *ἀγαθόν*

[1] Hereafter I shall have something to say about 510 C—E, where the mathematical object, e.g. 'the reflection' of the *αὐτὸ τρίγωνον*, is recognized as *a part of* the inferior *νοητόν*.

[2] The *εἰκόνες* of 402 A are, I conceive, to be understood in the same sense. Of the *φαντάσματα ἐν ὕδασιν* of 516 A 532 B I shall have something to say presently.

which the intelligent author of all things should seek[1]. He had expected Anaxagoras, when he wished to assign the cause of anything, to show that 'it is best that the thing in question should be as it is,' the cause of each thing being τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον, and the cause of all things τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν. Anaxagoras however had done nothing of the sort, and Socrates had not succeeded in supplying the deficiency. He found himself therefore obliged to have recourse to another line of inquiry, though he had never abandoned his conviction that a really satisfactory theory of the universe must be teleological. Now in the passage above summarized, although the phraseology of the theory of ideas is carefully avoided, the supremacy of the ἀγαθόν is as distinctly asserted as anywhere in the *republic*[2]. In both places it is the origin both of Being and of Knowledge. The main doctrine of the two passages being thus the same, the resemblance of the next following sentences in the *Phaedo* to the sentences in the *republic* already considered can hardly be without significance. The investigation of things (ὄντα), we read at 99 D, having proved a failure, Socrates now proceeded to study their reality (τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν) in definitions (λόγοι), just as an astronomer, fearing to be blinded if he watches an eclipse of the sun directly, observes its image reflected in water. It will be seen that we have here an εἰκὼν κατ' ἀναλογίαν—as an image of the sun is to the sun, so are λόγοι to ὄντα—which εἰκών resembles the ἀναλογία in the

[1] It would seem that here at any rate the ἀγαθόν is not to be identified with νοῦς, of whose operations it is the οὗ ἕνεκα.

[2] Mr Sidgwick however, who takes no notice of the indications of doctrine contained in the criticism of Anaxagoras, is of a different opinion. "There" [sc. *Phaedo* c. XLIX], he says, "Plato's ontology is obviously in a different phase, as τὸ ἀγαθόν (here placed at the summit) is ranked indiscriminately with other εἴδη that Socrates supposes (ὑποτίθεται)." But as in the *republic*, in which dialogue its supremacy is admitted, the idea of good is repeatedly (476 A 484 D 507 B 531 C 538 E) ranked indiscriminately with other ideas, this can be no reason for denying its supremacy in the *Phaedo*. In fact, although as compared with other ideas the idea of good occupies a higher position, as compared with particulars it may be ranked with the rest. Compare *republic* VI 509 B, where the ἀγαθόν is placed ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, with VII 518 D 526 E, where it is spoken of as τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον and τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος.

sixth book of the *republic* and countenances the views above taken, both of the relation in which the first and second proportionals stand to the third and fourth, and of the significance of the third proportional[1].

§ 2 The Cave.

That 'the line' and 'the cave' are intimately connected, is obvious: indeed it is expressly asserted at 517 B, Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις. It will therefore be well to inquire whether the results so far obtained in regard to the line accord with the allegory which opens the seventh book.

If we tabulate the objects successively seen by the prisoners together with a conjectural interpretation of those objects, placing the imagery of the allegory on our left, and the signification on our right, we have (exclusive of details with which I am not now concerned)—

Within the Cave	δοξαστόν
Shadows of statuettes of things	= particulars as apprehended by the senses.
Statuettes of things	= particulars as they are (or become) in themselves.
Without the Cave	**νοητόν**
Reflections of things	= objects of the inferior intellectual method.
Things themselves	= objects of the superior intellectual method.

That 'shadows of statuettes of things' stand for 'particulars as apprehended by the senses,' and therefore that 'statuettes of things' stand for 'particulars as they are in themselves,' almost every reader[2] will take for granted: that 'reflections of things'

[1] It would appear that ὄντα generally, not ὄντως ὄντα as opposed to γιγνόμενα, are here contrasted with λόγοι. Hence I am careful not to *identify* the ἀναλογία of this passage with the ἀναλογία of the sixth book of the *republic*. The commentators with one accord assume that γιγνόμενα as opposed to ὄντως ὄντα are here contrasted with λόγοι. This limitation seems to me inconsistent with Socrates's narrative of his search for the ἀγαθόν as well as with the parallel passages.

[2] Professor Jowett however makes "the shadows" and "the images" [i.e. the statuettes which cast the shadows] "correspond—the first, to the realm of fancy and poetry,—the second, to the world of sense." This interpretation seems to be precluded by the description, 516 C—E, of the mental condition of the prisoner, when his gaze is turned for the first time from

are equivalent to the inferior *νοητόν* of the sixth book, cannot be doubted, since 'the contemplation of reflections of things in water' must stand for the *προπαιδεία*, which again includes the sciences or arts mentioned in 510 C and 511 C (cf. 533 D) as employing the inferior intellectual method: and that 'things themselves' stand for the superior *νοητόν*, is certain, since in both passages the highest object is expressly assigned to dialectic 511 C 534 D 536 C.

Let us now seek in this tabular statement of the allegory the four terms of the original *ἀναλογία*. If, as Mr Sidgwick assumes, "the universe is compared" [in 509 D sq.] "to a quadripartite line," the four segments should all be found on the right of the page, sensibles standing second: if however, as I have supposed, the first and second terms of the *ἀναλογία* merely illustrate the relation between the third and fourth terms, we shall expect the first and second terms to occupy the third and fourth places on the left of the page, the third and fourth terms as before occupying the third and fourth places on its right. Now on Mr Sidgwick's assumption the old difficulty meets us again—'the shadows of statuettes of things' are superfluous. On the other hand the requirements of my theory are perfectly satisfied, reflections (*τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα*) having been expressly mentioned at 510 A as a species of *εἰκόνες*, and the 'things themselves' (*αὐτά*) of the allegory being obviously capable of identification with the *ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτόν* of 510 A. Thus the *ἀναλογία* of the former passage,

'shadows of statuettes of things' to 'statuettes of things,' as it is not easy to see why the transition from "the realm of fancy and poetry" to "the world of sense" should occasion *ἀπορία*, nor why the former should seem 'more real' than the latter. On the other hand if the *περιαγωγή* or *περιστροφή* is the discovery, under the influence of such an *ἔλεγχος* as is applied to the young Theaetetus in the dialogue called by his name, that sensation is not objectively true, nothing could be more appropriate than the question *οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα*;

It is remarkable that Professor Jowett, who sees that "the reflections in water" of the seventh book are "the abstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences furnish the type," should have given in the sixth book an entirely different meaning to the third segment. That the two passages must not be inconsistently explained, seems to me certain.

as I understand it, gives us in a compendious form so much of the allegory of the seventh book as lies without the cave, together with its interpretation.

While however the scene within the cave is not represented in the *ἀναλογία* of the sixth book, this part of the allegory with its interpretation may be expressed in a similar *ἀναλογία*, namely, as images (in this case, shadows of statuettes) are to things (in this case, statuettes) so are particulars as apprehended by the senses to particulars as they are in themselves. Indeed we have been told at 510 A that *εἰκόνες* include *πρῶτον μὲν σκιὰς* (i.e. the shadows in the cave) *ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα* (i.e. the reflections outside the cave), and that to the second term of the *ἀναλογία* belong both *ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτόν* (i.e. *αὐτά* outside the cave) and *τὸ σκευαστὸν γένος* (i.e. the *ἀνδρίαντες κ.τ.λ.* in the cave); so that we are prepared for the double occurrence of the ratio $\frac{\text{images of things}}{\text{things imaged}}$, which, as the words 'images' and 'things' are of no "metaphysical importance," may be employed to illustrate the difference between the two sorts of sensible as well as that between the two sorts of intelligible[1].

Moreover as the ratio $\frac{\text{images of things}}{\text{things imaged}}$ is common to the *ἀναλογία* of the *νοητόν* given us in the sixth book and the *ἀναλογία* of the *δοξαστόν* which I have just constructed, we are now in a position to frame an *ἀναλογία* in which all four terms,

[1] That the ratio $\frac{\text{reflections of things}}{\text{things}}$ without the cave is equal to the ratio $\frac{\text{shadows of statuettes of things}}{\text{statuettes of things}}$ within the cave, seems to be intimated at 517 A, *Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον "πασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει.* "You must combine the whole of this image [of the cave] with our former statements [at the end of the sixth book], *paralleling* the visible region [outside the cave] with the prison-house [the inside of the cave], and the firelight in the prison-house with the sun." The ordinary rendering of *ἀφομοιοῦντα*, "comparing," "likening," as if *ἡ δι' ὄψεως φαινομένη ἕδρα* were the interpretation of *ἡ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἴκησις*, and *ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου δύναμις* the interpretation of *τὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς*, treats parts of the imagery as parts of the interpretation.

being derived from the interpretation of the allegory, shall be of "metaphysical importance." This third *ἀναλογία* will run thus: particulars as apprehended by the senses are to particulars as they are (or rather, as they become) in themselves, as the objects of the inferior intellectual method, i.e. *λόγοι*, are to the objects of the superior intellectual method, i.e. ideas.

Thus the original *ἀναλογία*, as I interpret it, though not coextensive with the allegory, is perfectly consistent with it. It is in fact its foundation, what is most important being set forth in advance in the sixth book and afterwards repeated with additions in the seventh. At the end of the sixth book we are told that the inferior *νοητόν* is an image of the superior *νοητόν*: at the beginning of the seventh we are told (1) that the inferior *νοητόν* is an image of the superior *νοητόν*, and (2) that the inferior *δοξαστόν* is an image of the superior *δοξαστόν*. It is then in the seventh book, not in the sixth, that we find a division of the universe, and this division is neither quadripartite nor tripartite, but bipartite[1], the two parts being *γιγνό-*

[1] At this point it may be asked—But where do we find a place in this scheme for the *μαθηματικά* mentioned by Aristotle, which are intermediate between *αἰσθητά* and *εἴδη*, differing from the *αἰσθητά* because unlike *αἰσθητά* they are eternal and immutable, and differing from the *εἶδος* which is single because they are plural? There is no place for these *μαθηματικά*. Plato, as I understand him, is here concerned, not with *μαθηματικά* as opposed to other *νοητά*, but with *μαθηματικά* as types of *νοητά*. Hence even if we suppose that when he wrote the *republic* Plato had learnt to distinguish in the case of *μαθηματικά* (in addition to the idea and the *λόγος* which are single) two sorts of *πολλά*, i.e. the triangles which the geometer sees and the triangles of which he thinks, the recognition of this distinction is in this place impossible because it is peculiar to *μαθηματικά*. But I cannot think that Plato would have taken *μαθηματικά* as types of *νοητά* in general, if when he wrote the passage before us this refinement had already suggested itself to him. In short, the passage in the *republic*, making no distinction between *μαθηματικά* and other *νοητά*, recognizes (to take a particular example) (1) the (single) idea of triangle as it is, 510 D, (2) the (single) general notion of triangle implied in the geometer's definition, (3) the plurality of particular triangles as they are, (4) the plurality of particular triangles as they are apprehended by sight. The *μαθηματικά* mentioned by Aristotle, i.e. the plurality of particular non-sensible triangles which particular sensible triangles suggest to the mind of the geometer, would have to be interpolated, if anywhere, between (2) and (3): but it is by no means clear that Plato entertained the two doctrines simultaneously.

μενα and ὄντως ὄντα, which stand second and fourth respectively in my third ἀναλογία, while its first and third terms are respectively the γιγνόμενα of the second term and the ὄντως ὄντα of the fourth, as they are respectively apprehended by us in αἰσθήσεις and λόγοι[1]. But though there are only two sorts of existence, the allegory of the cave, which has for its declared purpose the representation of our nature παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας, distinguishes four stages in the progress from ignorance to knowledge. First, the uneducated man takes his sensations for objective realities 515 B; next, he becomes aware of their subjectivity 515 D; thirdly, he studies the one and the many in the so-called sciences or arts which compose the προπαιδεία 525 A 533 D 536 D; and lastly, he will, it is hoped, attain to dialectic, which is a 'coping stone' to his former acquirements 533 C 534 E[2].

[1] "In logischem und ontologischem Betracht aber ist die Idee das Object des Begriffs. *Wie durch die Einzelvorstellung das Einzelobject erkannt wird, so wird durch den Begriff die Idee erkannt.* Die Idee ist nicht das den vielen einander gleichartigen Einzelobjecten innewohnende Wesen als solches, sondern das als in seiner Art vollkommen, unveränderlich, einheitlich und selbstständig oder an und für sich existirend vorgestellte Wesen der einander gleichartigen Einzelobjecte (die in den Umfang des Begriffs fallen, durch den eben diese Idee gedacht wird)." Ueberweg *Grundriss der Gesch. der Ph.* I 125. Apparently these words do not refer to the passage before us, as at p. 132 Ueberweg says expressly that the four objects recognized in *republic* 509 ff. 533 f. are ἰδέαι μαθηματικὰ σώματα εἰκόνες.

[2] In tabulating and discussing the imagery of the cave I have taken account only of 'shadows of statuettes of things,' 'statuettes of things,' 'reflections of things,' 'things themselves,' neglecting the subdivision of 'things' into 'things,' 'the moon and the stars seen at night,' and 'the sun.' All these stand for real existences or ideas. 'The sun' is plainly the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. 'The moon and stars' would seem to be the ideas of δίκαιον, καλόν, and perhaps all the ideas which in the *republic* bear indifferently abstract and general names. (Cf. *Parmenid.* 130 B.) (The phrase περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί 517 E, 'about particular rights as men conceive them or as they are,' implies that a place must be found in the allegory for the αὐτὸ δίκαιον at any rate; while the repeated mention of δίκαιον and καλόν in company with ἀγαθόν prepares us to find them placed second in the list.) 'Things' are the rest of the ideas, including ἄνθρωποι 516 A and ζῷά τε καὶ φυτά 532 A B. Plato is careful to say 534 E that the names which he gives to the παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα are not important. This is, I take it, an apology for a slight inconsistency in the use of them, 'conjecture' (εἰκασία) and 'belief' (πίστις) being assigned at 511 E to 'images' and 'things,' and

§ 3 The Two Methods.

Having thus shown or tried to show that the allegory of the cave agrees in all respects, as I conceive it should do, with the interpretation of 509 D E proposed in § 1 of this paper, I now resume the argument of the sixth book. To the two segments of the *νοητόν*, i.e. (according to my view) general notions and ideas, two methods of investigation are assigned. The one is adopted in the case of *τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις* 511 B, *ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης* 533 D; the other, the method which will presumably be adopted by the dialectician of the future, is scientific in a higher sense 534 C D. Plato's account of them is, briefly, as follows:—

(1) The arithmetician and the geometer start from hypotheses (e.g. odd and even, the geometrical figures, three kinds of angle),—which, not being justified by ascent to an *ἀρχή*, to the last retain their hypothetical character,—and thence descend by mutual agreement to the desired conclusions. Furthermore, to aid them in their investigation of *τὸ τετράγωνον αὐτό, ἡ διάμετρος αὐτή*, and the like, they employ models and diagrams which belong to the visible world, and are themselves imaged in shadows and reflections. Thus the objects of the arithmetician, the geometer, and the man of science in general are intelligibles, but intelligibles investigated by means of hypotheses, with the aid of visibles.

(2) The dialectician, like the mathematician, starts from hypotheses, but, unlike the mathematician, does not rest content with them. Hence, instead of immediately descending to

at 534 E (presumably) to 'the particular as it is apprehended by the senses' and 'the particular as it is' respectively. It will be seen that these terms are more appropriate in the latter use than in the former. If I am right in my explanation of the phrase 'reflections of *ἰδέαι*,' *διάνοια* is clearly the right word to describe the corresponding *πάθημα*: cf. *Theaetet.* 189 E, *sophist* 263 E.

conclusions, he uses his hypotheses as stepping-stones by which to ascend to the principle of all things. Having thus reached that which is not hypothetical in the ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, he is in a position to descend, without recurrence to sensibles, from idea to idea, and so to the conclusion sought.

Let us now examine the description here given of the former of the two methods, bearing in mind that, if my interpretation of 'the line' and 'the cave' is correct, this method, though here described with special reference to arithmetic and geometry, should be applicable whenever an idea is studied in its reflection, the corresponding λόγος, and that the characteristics here mentioned—(1) use of ὑποθέσεις which never cease to be hypothetical, and (2) dependence upon sensible images—should be characteristics, not of mathematical processes only, but generally of the processes by which λόγοι are investigated.

Let us in the first place endeavour to ascertain what Plato means when he says that 'mathematicians suppose (ὑποτίθενται) the odd and the even, the geometrical figures, three kinds of angle, &c., assuming them to be obvious to all and declining to give any account of them.' His meaning must be that the geometer starts from such propositions as 'There may be such a thing as length without breadth, henceforward called a line,' but does not show, or even attempt to show, that there is such a thing. If he could prove that there is such a thing, this which is now a ὑπόθεσις, i.e. an ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος, would become an ἀρχή proper. Now according to Plato there is in the ideal world an ὄντως ὄν answering to every abstraction. The geometer's definition is therefore hypothetical in the sense that it has not been shown to be a correct and complete account of the idea. Similarly, I conceive, every λόγος is a ὑπόθεσις so long as it has not been shown to be a correct and complete account of the appropriate idea. Whenever a λόγος can be shown to be a correct and complete account of the appropriate idea, it will be no longer an ὑπόθεσις, it will become an ἀρχή.

Next, what are 'the visibles used as images' of which the mathematician's models and diagrams are typical? They must

be, I think, the particulars or 'many', from which in virtue of their participation in the idea we derive that imperfect knowledge of the idea which is expressed in the λόγος. So long as the man of science has not got a firm footing in the world of ideas, he cannot get clear of the visibles from which the λόγος is obtained.

The inferior method then starts from λόγοι, which (1) are hypothetical in the sense that they have not been shown to be correct and complete accounts of ideas, and (2) for that reason are still dependent upon the particulars or 'many' from which they were originally derived. It is the method pursued by Socrates when he wishes to ascertain whether a certain person or a certain thing is just, and by Plato when he inquires whether the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher are identical. The appeal is in both cases to a λόγος, and the λόγος, though perhaps in the one case a more correct and complete account of the πολλά than in the other, is in neither case shown to be a correct and complete account of the ἕν[1]. Plato wants something more than this, and accordingly tries to devise a way of converting λόγοι which are ὑποθέσεις into λόγοι which are ἀρχαί,—λόγοι which being obtained through particulars are imperfect representations of ideas into λόγοι which are proved to be perfect representations of ideas,—so as to eliminate at once both the defects of the inferior method. He conceives that this may be done, if, instead of descending from a hypothetical or unproved λόγος to a conclusion, we ascend from one hypothetical or unproved λόγος to another, until at last, after repeated trials, the scale of hypothetical or unproved λόγοι converges and culminates in the ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, i.e. the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, from which the ideas derive

[1] It is worth while to note that in Xenophon's *memorabilia* IV 6 § 13 the word ὑπόθεσις is used for 'the general definition' of Socrates: ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον. Again in § 15 we have sentences which seem to be echoed in the *Phaedo* 100 D E 101 D 105 B: ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην [τὴν] ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου. τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχεν. ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὡς ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους.

their being. If in this way we can pass from unproved general notions, reflections of ideas, to the good, so that we may now say, not only that the good causes existences, i.e. ideas, to be what they are, but also that the good causes existences to be what we conceive them, we may infer, he thinks, that our λόγοι, hitherto provisional, are adequate representations of ὄντως ὄντα. Having thus bridged the gulf between the lower and the higher νοητόν, between λόγοι and εἴδη, by showing that certain λόγοι accurately represent εἴδη, we shall be able to descend in the line of the εἴδη without recurring to the 'many' particulars from which we originally started.

In other words, Plato conceives that, whenever we can draw up a scheme of ὑποθέσεις culminating in the ἀγαθόν, so as to show that the supposed system of ὄντως ὄντα is the best which intelligence working to an end could devise, we may be sure that our λόγοι, though originally derived from the inspection of particulars, are accurate representations of ideas. The moment we pass from ὑποθέσεις to the ἀγαθόν, our λόγοι will thereby receive the attestation which they have hitherto lacked and will be converted from ὑποθέσεις into ἀρχαί, whence we may descend to conclusions (τελευταί) as much more certain than the τελευταί of the geometer as certified ἀρχαί are more certain than uncertified ὑποθέσεις. The ἀγαθόν is therefore the source of all knowledge, just as the sun is the source of all vision 506 A 508 D sqq. Plato does not indeed pretend either to have drawn up the required scheme of existences, or to be able to explain the passage from ὑποθέσεις to the ἀγαθόν. It is not for him, but for the trained dialectician of the future, to explore the μακροτέρα περίοδος 504 A sqq. 506 E. To use the imagery of the cave, the Heraclitean Cratylus has released him from his bonds, turned him round, and convinced him that he has hitherto seen only the shadows of statuettes; further, Socrates has dragged him up the steep and rugged ascent, and taught him to study the reflections of men and things, of stars, and of the sun; but he has not learnt to regard with unreverted eye things themselves, the moon and the stars, and the sun in all its splendour. In short, he says of himself what Cowley said of Bacon:

"The barren Wilderness he past,
Did on the very Border stand
Of the blest promis'd Land,
And from the Mountain's Top of his exalted Wit,
Saw it himself, and shew'd us it.
But Life did never to one Man allow
Time to discover Worlds, and conquer too."

But, it may be asked, is not the view here taken of the method to be adopted in the investigation of ideas inconsistent with the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*, which in some other dialogues is prominent, and seems to be referred to in *republic* 621 A? If the sight of particulars reminds us of the idea which the soul has known in a previous existence, is not the idea directly apprehended? must not the superior method be accounted a superfluity? The inconsistency is, I think, only apparent. We may recollect the idea well enough to say that the particular falls short of it, and yet be unable to form an adequate notion of the idea recollected, just as (to use an image of Plato's) we may perceive that a portrait of Simmias is unsatisfactory without being able to paint a more perfect likeness or even to recal his features precisely and correctly. Thus the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις* leaves ample room for a theory of the investigation of the ideas recollected. In fact, *ἀνάμνησις* assures us that there are ideas to be known, an assumption which was made at the outset of the passage before us: but it does not give us correct and complete knowledge of ideas, still less does it assure us that we have obtained such knowledge.

At this point it is necessary to refer to the well-known passage of the *Phaedo* 100 A sq., though it is not without hesitation that I offer the following summary of it. Finding himself unsuccessful in the attempt to trace things to their cause, the good, the Platonic Socrates proceeded to deal with causes as he was in the habit of doing with other matters. His rule was to assume, i.e. to accept without proof, that *λόγος* which seemed to him most secure, and to account that true which agreed with it, that untrue which did not. On this principle he proposes in the present case to justify his belief in the indestructibility of the soul by showing that it is in accord with a *λόγος ἀσφαλής* which is no novelty. What in this case

is assumed without proof is apparently the correspondence of the idea in general to Socrates's conception of it. Now Socrates conceives things to be caused by participation in the idea. On the strength of this *ἀσφαλὴς λόγος* he proposes, when asked the cause of anything, to allege participation in an appropriate idea, neglecting altogether those inconsistent causes which are alleged by more ingenious thinkers. If however his original *ὑπόθεσις* is disputed, he will justify it by a higher assumption, and so proceed until he reaches *ἱκανόν τι*[1]. In conclusion he

[1] *τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐᾷς ἄν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν.* [*εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐᾷς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ.*] *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν.* 101 C—E. The sentence which I have bracketed seems to me in every way suspicious. That (1) *ἔχοιτο* cannot stand in the sense of 'oppugnare,' 'aggredi,' especially as *ἐχόμενος* has just been used (100 D 101 D) in its proper meaning, is remarked by Madvig, who would therefore read *ἔφοιτο*. But this conjecture leaves unanswered the further objection, that, as the text stands, (2) there is no antithesis (as there plainly should be) between *εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο* (or *ἔφοιτο*) and *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον*. Ast endeavours to meet both objections by reading *εἰ δέ τις ἄλλης ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο*, to which correction it may be objected that elsewhere throughout the passage Socrates persistently uses the word *ὑπόθεσις* only when he is speaking of his own provisional *ἀρχή*, and would hardly use a term so characteristic of his own doctrine in speaking of his opponent's more pretentious principle. Moreover (3) the injunction to consider *τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψασθαι εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ* finds no countenance in the summary statement *ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ* 100 A, and involves a violation of the precept *ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων* 101 E. Indeed it is not easy to say what is meant by 'the mutual agreement or disagreement of *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθέντα*,' a phrase which looks very like a perversion of the concluding words of the sentence quoted above from 100 A. The sentence seems to me to be the work of an interpolator, perhaps the same who in 72 D has added the words *καὶ ταῖς μέν γ' ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον*. (See Bonitz *Platonische Studien* p. 283.) It will be observed that in both places phrases which occur in the context are echoed in a false sense.

warns us not to confound the study of the *ἀρχή* with the investigation of its consequences.

As I read it, the whole of the passage summarized is concerned with the 'inferior method' of the *republic*. It has indeed been thought that the *ἱκανόν* of 101 D is the *ἀνυπόθετον* of *republic* 511 B, and therefore that the concluding sentences refer to the 'superior method.' It would seem however that a reference to the superior method, which at 99 C Socrates has renounced as beyond his powers, can find no place here, where he is describing his *δεύτερος πλοῦς*. It remains then to understand by the *ἱκανόν* any more general *ὑπόθεσις* which gains the assent of the opponent. Thus, while the passage in the *republic* treats of the use of the inferior method in *exposition*, the passage in the *Phaedo* (as the language throughout shows) deals with its application to *debate*, and accordingly provision is now made in case the *ὑπόθεσις* offered by the one disputant should not be approved by the other (*ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον*). In such a case we are to take some more general *ὑπόθεσις*, and so on, until we arrive at one which the opponent is willing to accept. As this *ὑπόθεσις*, not having been certified by the ascent from it to the *ἀγαθόν*, is no more an *ἀρχή* (in the strict sense of the word) than the *ὑπόθεσις* originally offered and refused, the reasoning which is based upon it is necessarily of the inferior kind.

In fine, the two methods of the *Phaedo*—that which Socrates has abandoned, not because he has lost his belief in it, but because he does not know how to apply it, and that which he adopts as the least unsatisfactory substitute—are respectively identical with the two methods described in the *republic*, the method of the dialectician and the method of the so-called man of science. In both dialogues the superior method is an unrealized aspiration; though it may perhaps be thought that the *republic* expresses a more hopeful mood than the *Phaedo*. Both dialogues are themselves examples of the inferior method, the *ὑπόθεσις* being the theory of ideas; but it would seem that, in accordance with the precept *ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροις ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν*, in the

republic the ὑπόθεσις itself is under discussion, while in the *Phaedo* Socrates traces τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων τι.

The passage in the *republic* upon which I have been commenting deserves, I think, more attention than it has received from recent commentators and historians, if only because it is unusually precise and dogmatic. But when Plato is precise and dogmatic, he generally contrives to introduce an element of obscurity into the exposition. In this instance the indirect description of the third segment is just such an element, made more perplexing for us by the apparent parallelism of *metaph.* 1 6 § 5. I venture to think however that, if we (1) understand the original *ἀναλογία*, not as a quadripartition of the universe, but as an εἰκὼν κατ' ἀναλογίαν in which the first and second terms are introduced only to explain the relation between the third and fourth, (2) equate the four segments, not with the whole imagery of the succeeding allegory, but with the imagery and the interpretation of the more important part of it, and (3) take the third segment to stand for those universals which were the foundation of the Socratic dialectic, we obtain a consistent interpretation both of 'the line' and of 'the cave.' Plato, as I read him, gives us here just what was wanted to complete the outlines of the theory of ideas, —a comparison between his own position and his master's. First, he shows that the theory of ideas is founded on the Socratic doctrine of universals, which is incorporated in it, not superseded. Secondly, he marks the deficiencies of the Socratic logic, and of all inquiry conducted on merely Socratic principles. Thirdly, while indicating a hope that the theory of ideas, teleologically interpreted, may one day become the basis of a new and powerful logic, he admits unreservedly that his own logic is not at present superior in kind to that of Socrates.

HENRY JACKSON.

AESCH. *AG.* 115–120.

οἰωνῶν βασιλεῦς βασιλεῦσι νεῶν, ὁ κελαινὸς, ὅ τ' ἐξόπιν ἀργᾷς,
φανέντες ἵκταρ μελάθρων, χερὸς ἐκ δοριπάλτου,
παμπρέπτοις ἐν ἕδραισιν,
βοσκόμενοι λαγίναν ἐρικύμονα φέρματι γένναν,
βλαβέντα λοισθίων δρόμων.

It appears from the commentaries that the concluding words of this citation are very difficult of interpretation. Hermann, indeed, would have us suppose that the λοίσθιος δρόμος of the unhappy hare "portended the capture of Troy just when it thought itself safe under the feigned retirement of the Grecian fleet."

δεινὰ μὲν οὖν δεινὰ τεράζει σοφὸς οἰωνοθέτας.

I am glad to see that upon this curious exposition Professor Paley, who cites it, observes a significant silence. The latest German commentary I have seen, that of Enger, is as far gone in another direction, enquiring by what interpretation or correction λοίσθιοι δρόμοι may be brought to signify the *birth* of the hare's offspring, of which they were hindered by the devouring of the mother—an enquiry hard to answer.

The word λοισθίων, in which all the difficulty lies, seems to have caused some misapprehension of the rest of the phrase. Professor Paley, in his translation of 1864, gives as the literal rendering "stopped from future courses," and Donaldson in the *New Cratylus*, § 454, "stopped from running any more races." Both these versions do some violence to the sense of λοίσθιος, in which respect Prof. Kennedy's "caught ere its closing race

was over" is more accurate. But apart from that, we may doubt whether any one, not pressed with the necessity of getting *last courses* into the context, would have translated *βλαβέντα δρόμων* 'stopped from running' instead of 'hindered in running.' *βλάπτειν*, as Eustathius says in the notice cited by Donaldson himself, is "properly *τὸ ἐμποδίζειν τὸν τρέχοντα, to hinder or impede a runner*," and so it should be turned in the two cases given from Sophokles, *El.* 696, and *Ant.* 455, *εἰ δέ τις θεῶν βλάπτοι, φύγοι τἂν χὠ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα*, though Donaldson, still haunted by the *λοισθίων* of the *Agamemnon*, writes *stop* in both of them, to the manifest detriment of the meaning. Nor is *βλαβέντα δρόμων* in this sense at all alien to the passage before us. The eagles' quarry was *hindered in running* by its pregnant condition, and as it was the cruelty of its capture under these circumstances which excited the anger of Artemis, this interpretation at once gives the line force and point, which it is difficult to find in the mere statement that when caught the hare could not run any more.

Even so however *λοισθίων* is a difficulty. An epithet thus inserted in a compact phrase like *βλαβέντα δρόμων* ought to be closely coherent with it in meaning. *Hindered in running* is sense, *hindered in last running* is scarcely sense. It is worth while therefore to ask whether *λοισθίων* is likely to be an error. No symbols are more frequently confused with others than those which compose the first syllable of *λοισθίων*—Λ with Δ, *οι* with *υ*. Each of these permutations is common enough to give a palæographic basis of *possibility* to the correction,

βλαβέντα δυσθόων δρόμων,

that is, literally, *hindered in its difficult running;* compare *θέω, θοός, δύσπλοος, δύσπνοος.*

A. W. VERRALL.

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THILO'S SERVIUS[1].

THE second volume of this work contains the Servian commentary on the fourth and fifth books of the Aeneid, with an elaborate preface in which the editor sets forth at length his views on the work, the manuscripts on which its text is based, its authorities, its date, and its general character. The appearance of this preface, while it makes the volume doubly welcome, also makes it possible for a reviewer to criticize the edition, for the first time, as a whole.

There are two recensions of the Servian commentary[2], one of which contains many more notes than the other. These notes are sometimes supplementary to those of the shorter version, sometimes repetitions of them, sometimes inconsistent with them. The fuller recension is generally known as the Servius of Daniel, from the fact that the different manuscripts in which it is contained were first used by Peter Daniel, who edited it from these manuscripts in 1600. An account of the

[1] Servi Grammatici qui feruntur in Vergilium commentarii. Recensuerunt Georgius Thilo et Hermannus Hagen. Vol. I. Fasc. II. Lipsiae, MDCCCLXXXI.

The essays on the ancient Vergilian critics and commentators prefixed to the fourth edition of Conington's commentary were published before the appearance of this volume.

[2] In this paper the supposed interpolations in Servius are enclosed in brackets.

manuscripts used by Daniel, all or nearly all of which are fortunately still in existence, is given both by Thilo and Thomas, of whose excellent essay on Servius I have spoken elsewhere. The two scholars are in substantial accord on all points but one. The additional notes on the first and second Aeneids are contained in a manuscript now at Cassel. A Fulda manuscript, containing additional notes on the same two books, was collated for Daniel by Scioppius. The readings of this codex as given by Daniel do not always coincide with those of the Cassel MS. Thomas, like Schubart before him, doubts whether the Fuldensis of Daniel is the same as the now surviving Cassellanus. Thilo maintains their identity in a very interesting and ingenious argument; but until Thomas (whom Thilo treats in this matter with scant courtesy) has replied to him, it cannot be said that the last word has been spoken on the subject.

The first question to be decided with regard to the Servian commentary affects the character of the fuller version. Is the fuller version the true Servius, while the vulgate (as with Thomas and Thilo we may call it) is an abridgment? Or is the vulgate the genuine Servius, while the additional notes are interpolations? And if interpolations, by whom and when were they added to the genuine commentary?

The view that the fuller recension represents the genuine commentary was maintained by Joseph Scaliger, and has been recently upheld, though in a different form, by Ribbeck. Masvic, on the other hand, and Ottfried Müller, contended for the non-Servian origin of the additional notes, and Thomas and Thilo agree with them.

In the essays prefixed to Conington's first volume (ed. 4) I ventured to express a doubt whether this latter view is correct; and a further examination of the evidence has led me to form the opinion that the additional notes have, on the whole, as good a right to bear the name of Servius as the vulgate. I doubt whether either recension of the Servian commentary can claim to come entirely from the hand of Servius, and to represent all that he had to say upon his author. But as Servius was celebrated as a very learned lecturer on Vergil, I suspect that the commentaries now bearing his name represent, in a

fuller and a shorter shape respectively, notes which were at various times given by him in his lectures, and which were edited without any serious attempt to present a properly homogeneous whole.

It used to be supposed that the additional notes were condemned absolutely by the words 'ut dixit Servius,' which were thought to occur in one of them on Eclogue 9. 1. But Thomas informs us in the supplement to his essay that these words are not really there. The only important piece of external evidence which could affect the question is therefore gone, and we are left entirely to considerations drawn from the character of the notes themselves.

The chief arguments relied upon by Thomas and Thilo as shewing that these additional notes did not form part of the original commentary of Servius, are, so far as I can ascertain, the following:

(1) The additional notes fall into two classes; one of which includes comments which are really supplementary to the vulgate, while the other consists of notes which, although they have been inserted in the text in such a way as to present a specious appearance of coherence with it, are really out of place, and interrupt the sequence of ideas. In many cases the addition is made with the aid of conjunctions such as *ergo, nam, enim, quod, quia* and the like, which on examination are found to be out of place. Thilo notices in particular that the word *sane* is used in an irrational way in the additional notes. In some passages again the additional note has had the effect of mutilating the text of the vulgate.

(2) The additional notes quote a great variety of opinions upon disputed points without deciding upon any one in particular, while the vulgate usually does so only to adopt one in preference to the others.

(3) The vulgate, when referring to an opinion previously expressed, or an observation previously made, always uses the words *ut supra diximus*, while the additional notes speak impersonally, *ut supra dictum est.*

(4) Where the manuscripts of the vulgate mention the names of Donatus and Urbanus, the manuscripts containing

the additional notes omit these names. This is however the case only with Donatus and Urbanus, not with Probus, Asper, or any other commentator mentioned in the vulgate.

(5) The compiler of the additional scholia assumes that the commentary on the Eclogues and Georgics preceded that on the Aeneid, while the vulgate assumes the reverse order. It may be observed by the way that the commentary of Aelius Donatus must have followed the same order as that observed in the additional scholia.

(6) In some cases the author of the additional scholia seems to have followed a different text from that followed by the author of the vulgate.

(7) The additional notes containing quotations from Sallust are probably to be attributed to Asper, others to Probus, others to Aelius Donatus. Many agree with Vergilian notes in Macrobius, but it cannot be shewn that they are borrowed from the Saturnalia.

(8) The character of the vulgate differs from that of the additional notes. The latter sometimes exhibit a deeper learning than the vulgate, while at the same time they are often expressed in worse Latin. The notes on grammar are inferior, but those on lexicography and interpretation, superior, to those of the vulgate; and the fables are given, in the additional notes, in a fuller form.

(9) The question must be answered whether scholars later than Servius, who seem to have known and used the Servian commentary, had the vulgate or the fuller version before them. Little can be made, in this connexion, of Cledonius, Pompeius, Priscian, the scholia on Lucan or on Statius: but the first writer among the *mythographi* and Isidore in his *Origines* evidently borrowed from the shorter Servius. In an immense number of passages, where there is a verbal correspondence between the notes of Isidore and those of Servius, Isidore repeats the note of the vulgate, though he might as easily, had he had the fuller version before him, have copied from it. In some cases however it appears as if the compiler of the fuller commentary had taken his notes from Isidore.

The conclusion which Thilo draws with regard to the com-

position of the additional scholia is this: that they were compiled by one writer, who had before him not only the writings from which extracts were made by Macrobius, but also the *Origines* of Isidore; that his date must therefore be later than that of Isidore (about 570—640), and that from some slight indications it may be inferred that he was a Christian.

Before passing on to the more important points involved in the discussion, I may remark that this last inference is based on the slightest possible evidence. Thilo appeals to two notes on A. 4 200 and 301, which he thinks (after Burmann) shew a Christian tone. The first is as follows: significat sine intermissione fieri sacrificia, ad quem (quae ?), excubare per diem et noctem necesse sit, ut dicimus quotidie in officio esse; non ergo apud quas dii excubant, sed quae diis excubantur. The second is this: *commotis excita sacris*: verbo antiquo usum tradunt; moveri enim sacra dicebantur, cum sollemnibus diebus aperiebantur templa instaurandi sacrificii causa; cuius rei Plautus in Pseudolo meminit, 'scis tu profecto, mea si commovissem sacra, quo pacto et quantas soleam turbas dare.' Hoc vulgo apertiones appellant.

I wish that Thilo had pointed out explicitly what mark of Christian authorship he finds in these notes. His other argument, that the compiler of the additional scholia often speaks of the customs of the Roman ritual as things of the past, need prove no more than that his notes were written after 382 A.D.

Let us now proceed to examine the arguments for the non-Servian origin of the additional scholia in the order in which (nearly following Thilo) I have stated them.

(1) There can be no doubt that many of these notes are repetitions of what has been said in the vulgate, and that many again interrupt and interfere with the coherence of the vulgate. So much is this the case that Thilo sometimes transposes them; a proceeding which, however tempting, is in my opinion questionable in a case of this kind. If we are to form an opinion on the character of a supposed interpolation, it is important that it should be exhibited to the eye of the reader, so far as possible, in the form in which the manuscripts present it. When these additional notes are embedded in the text of

the vulgate, to take them out of their place and print them separately is to assume the point which has to be proved, that they are essentially heterogeneous to their surrounding. Even where the sense of the vulgate is unquestionably interfered with by the interrupting matter, it would, in my opinion, have been safer to print the text as it appears in the manuscripts, relegating conjectural transpositions to a note, than to pursue, as Thilo has done, the opposite method. Indeed I have found two cases, and I dare say I might find more, in which I think it doubtful whether any transposition was required[1].

The phenomenon presented by these notes does not differ in kind from what meets us in the Terentian commentary which bears the name of Donatus. This work abounds in repetitions; a fact which may shew either that its author must have copied, or dictated to a class, identical notes from two or more older commentaries, or that the commentary is not the work of one scholar but of two, one of whom subsequently added, without any regard for symmetry, notes taken from a second work similar in character to the first. Or again, the same scholar may have given two or more sets of lectures, the notes of which partly coincided with and partly differed from each other, and the two sets of notes may have been carelessly embodied, side by side, in the commentary bearing his name.

[1] A. 1 52 Poetae quidem fingunt hunc regem esse ventorum [Hippotae sive Iovis sive Neptuni filium. Qui cum immineret bellum, quo Tyrrhenus, Lipari frater, Peloponnesum vastare proposuisset, missus ab Agamemnone, ut freta tueretur, pervenit ad Liparum, qui supra dictas insulas regebat imperio, factaque amicitia Cyanam filiam eius in matrimonium sumpsit et Strongulam insulam in qua maneret accepit. Varro autem dicit hunc insularum regem fuisse,] ex quarum nebulis et fumo, &c.

A. 1 145 *levat*, leves ac navigabiles facit, ut 'nostrumque leves quaecumque laborem.' [Alibi levat, laxat: ut 'atque arta levari Vincla iubet Priamus.' *Tridenti* autem pro tridente, dativum pro ablativo. *Aperit*, ideo quod harenarum congerie impediente praeclusae ad navigandum erant. Ceterum bis idem. Ergo inmisso in eas mari aptas ad navigandum facit. Sic Sallustius, 'sed ubi tempore anni mare classibus patefactum est.' *Temperat*, tranquillum facit. *Atque rotis summas*, &c. Bene non moratur in descriptione currus, ut citius liberetur Aeneas.] At in quinto ubi nullum periculum est, &c.

This is the order in the Cassel MS. I am not convinced that any change is necessary in either case.

The fuller version of Servius does not essentially differ in character, so far as its repetitions and inconsistencies go, from such scholia as those of Donatus on Terence. The vulgate of Servius is indeed on the whole a homogeneous work, which may fairly be supposed to come from one hand. Yet even the vulgate is not always consistent with itself, and sometimes gives us notes which bear the appearance of having been transcribed independently of each other and never harmonized[1]. Taken by themselves, these considerations point to the conclusion that though the fuller version of Servius cannot be called a homogeneous work, it has at least as good a right to bear the name of Servius as the Terentian commentary that of Donatus. And it must further be observed that, as I hope to shew in a moment, there are many cases in which the vulgate and the additional notes are absolutely homogeneous.

The second and third arguments are no doubt of importance as accentuating the facts already dwelt upon. It cannot be denied that there are slight differences of character between some of the additional notes and those of the vulgate.

(4) I am unable to see how this fact bears on the question of the Servian character of the additional notes. Where, in the vulgate, the names of Donatus and Urbanus are expressly mentioned, in the corresponding passages of the fuller version they are suppressed, and *alii*, or a similar word, is substituted for them. This shews that there were at least two recensions of that part of the commentary which is undoubtedly Servian, but what has it to do with the character of the supposed interpolations?

(5) This fact again proves no more than that there were two editions of the Servian commentary, one of which began with the Eclogues, and the other with the Aeneid. But there is some probability that this was the case with the vulgate as well. For in the Harleian manuscript of Servius, my account of which, written in 1878[2], has not come under Thilo's notice, the Servian memoir of Vergil is prefixed both to the com-

[1] See, for instance, p. 5, l. 9—12 in Thilo's edition; p. 51, l. 3 foll., compared with p. 76, l. 17 foll.

[2] In the preface to a pamphlet entitled 'Ancient Lives of Vergil.'

mentary on the Aeneid and (in a shorter form) to that on the Eclogues. I do not gather from Thilo's account of his manuscripts that this is the case with any other copy of the vulgate; but it shews that the commentary on the Eclogues was by some editors of Servius considered to be at least independent of that on the Aeneid.

With regard to (6) it must be admitted that the facts adduced by Thilo make in favour of separating the notes of the fuller version from those of the vulgate. The same may perhaps be said of (8), though it might be as reasonably inferred that so far as the notes on lexicography and interpretation go, the fuller version represents an older commentary than the vulgate. No conclusion that seriously affects the question can, so far as I see, be drawn from (7), for there can be no doubt that notes of Asper and Probus are embedded in the vulgate as well as in the additional scholia.

(9) I have not examined the passages which are alleged to have been borrowed from Servius by the first writer among the *mythographi*. But on the question of the relation between Isidore and Servius I am wholly unable to agree with Thilo. This point is of the utmost importance as bearing on the question both of the sources of the vulgate, and of the relation between the vulgate and the additional notes. Could it be shewn with certainty that Isidore copied from the vulgate of Servius, while he was ignorant of the fuller version, no doubt we should have a strong argument in favour of supposing the notes of the latter to be insertions by a later hand. But I think, and will endeavour to shew, that Isidore did not copy from the vulgate of Servius, but that the numerous coincidences between the vulgate and Isidore are due to community of sources, and also that a comparison between Isidore and the fuller Servius shews that many notes in the latter are absolutely homogeneous with the vulgate, and cannot, therefore, be supposed to be interpolations.

All considerations drawn from external evidence make strongly against the theory that Isidore borrowed from the vulgate of Servius. The *Origines* of Isidore is a work of reference arranged under heads on a perfectly intelligible system, and

bears the plainest marks of having been derived from a work or works of a similar kind. It is certain that Isidore had access to the Pratum of Suetonius, and nearly certain that he largely consulted it; and there is no proof that he did not know the great work of Verrius Flaccus. At least there is much in Isidore which must directly or indirectly have come from the latter. Now it is abundantly plain, and is allowed by Thilo, that the Pratum of Suetonius was much used by Servius. We shall therefore be prepared, *a priori*, to find that Suetonius was the common authority for many identical notes in Servius and Isidore. Why indeed should Isidore, with Suetonius or an abridgment of Suetonius before him, go out of his way to look for information in Servius? It would be like hunting for a needle in a bottle of hay. But we can safely leave *a priori* ground, and give instances of notes taken from Suetonius by Servius and Isidore alike.

Serv. Ecl. 3 8 *hirqui* autem sunt oculorum anguli, secundum Suetonium Tranquillum in Vitiis Corporalibus.

Isid. 12 1 14 *hircus* lascivum animal et petulcum...cuius oculi ob libidinem in transversum aspiciunt, unde et nomen traxit. Nam hirqui sunt oculorum anguli secundum Suetonium.

Serv. E. 3 105 *ulna* proprie est spatium in quantum utraque extenditur manus. Dicta ulna *ἀπὸ τῶν ὠλενῶν*, i.e. a brachiis, unde et λευκώλενος Ἥρη dicitur. Licet Suetonius unum cubitum velit esse tantummodo.

Isid. 11 1 64 *ulna* secundum quosdam utriusque manus extensio est, secundum alios cubitus, quod magis verum est, quia Graece *ὠλένη* cubitus dicitur.

Serv. A. 7 612 Suetonius in libro De Genere Vestium dicit tria esse genera trabearum. Unum dis sacratum, quod est tantum de purpura. Aliud regum, quod est purpureum; habet enim album aliquid. Tertium augurale, de purpura et cocco mixtum.

Isid. 19 24 8 *trabea* erat togae species ex purpura et cocco, qua operti Romanorum reges initio procedebant. Hanc primum Romulus adinvenisse dicitur, ad discretionem regii habitus.

Serv. A. 7 627 secundum Suetonium in libro De Vitiis Corporalibus *arvina* est durum pingue, quod est inter cutem et viscus.

Isid. 11 1 81 *arvina* pinguedo cuti adhaerens.

In these cases the reference in Servius proves the Suetonian origin of the note in Isidore, or makes it highly probable. Had Isidore been copying from Servius, why should he not have written out his notes in full and without any variation? But the very points in which the two writers differ shew in my opinion that Isidore is abridging the passages in Suetonius from which Servius is quoting more fully. In the case of the note on *hircus*, indeed, the explanation given by Servius of 'transversa tuentibus hircis' is quite different from that of Isidore.

Let us now consider some instances where there is a verbal coincidence between Isidore and the vulgate of Servius.

Servius A. 1 12 urbs dicta ab orbe, quod antiquae civitates in orbem fiebant, vel ab urvo, parte aratri, quo muri designabantur.

Isid. 15 2 3 urbs vocata ab orbe, quod antiquae civitates in orbem fiebant, vel ab urvo parte aratri, quo muri designabantur, unde est illud 'optavitque locum regno et concludere sulco.' Locus enim futurae civitatis sulco designabatur, id est aratro. Cato: 'qui urbem, inquit, novam condet, tauro et vacca aret, ubi araverit, murum faciat, ubi portam vult esse, aratrum sustollat et portet, et portam vocet.'

If Isidore is here borrowing his first words from Servius, it is natural to ask how it happens that he does not quote the line on which Servius is commenting, but a line which does not occur in Vergil at all; and secondly, what was Isidore's authority for the second part of his note, which is so closely connected with the first that it is natural to suppose that the whole comes from one source. Was Verrius Flaccus the ultimate authority? See Fest. 375 s.v. *urvat.*

Serv. ib. et eam deleverat Scipio Aemilianus. Quae autem nunc est postea a Romanis est condita.

Isid. 15 1 30 ex iis profecta Dido in litore Africae urbem condidit, et Karthadam nominavit, quod Phoenicia lingua exprimit; mox sermone verso Karthago est dicta: hanc Scipio delevit. Quae autem nunc est, postea a Romanis condita est. Karthago autem antea Byrsa, post Tyrus dicta est, deinde Karthago.

In this instance also the words common to Servius and Isidore occur in Isidore as an integral part of a longer note, and the supposition that they are taken from the passage in Servius is unnatural. Nor is there any other note in Servius from which they could be derived.

Much the same may be said of the following notes:

Serv. A. 1 43 *rates*, abusive naves: nam proprie rates sunt conexae invicem trabes.

Isid. 19 1 9 *rates* et primum et antiquissimum navigii genus e rudibus tignis asseribusque consertum, ad cuius similitudinem fabricatae naves ratariae dictae. Nunc iam rates abusive naves: nam proprie rates sunt conexae invicem trabes.

The ultimate authority for this note may have been Verrius Flaccus: see Fest. 273 s.v. *rates*, where much the same information is given.

Serv. A. 1 62 *foedere*, modo lege, alias pace, quae fit inter dimicantes. Foedus autem dictum vel a fetialibus, id est sacerdotibus per quos fiunt foedera, vel a porca foede, hoc est lapidibus occisa, ut ipse 'et caesa iungebant foedera porca.'

Isid. 18 1 11 *foedus* est pax quae fit inter dimicantes, vel a fide, vel a fetialibus, id est a sacerdotibus dictum. Per ipsos enim fiebant foedera sicut per saeculares bella. Alii foedera putant a porca foede et crudeliter occisa, cuius mors optabatur ei qui a pace resiluisset (?). Vergilius, 'et caesa iungebant foedera porca.'

Now this note of Isidore bears a much closer resemblance to a note, compounded partly of the vulgate and partly of a supposed interpolation, on A. 8 641, where the etymology from *fides* is given, and referred to Cicero. So far as it goes therefore, the note would go to prove that in this case the additional matter in the enlarged Servius is not an interpolation. As to the authority for the note, it may very well be Suetonius, whose name is mentioned by Isidore in its near neighbourhood, but ultimately it comes from Verrius Flaccus; Paul. 84 *foedus* appellatum ab eo quod in paciscendo foedere hostia necaretur. Vergilius: 'et caesa iungebant foedera porca.' Vel quia in foedere interponatur fides.

Serv. A. 1 178 *fessus* generale est: dicimus enim fessus

animo, [id est incertus consilii], ut 'ter fessus valle resedit,' et fessus corpore, quod magis est proprium, et fessus rerum a fortuna venientium, ut hoc loco. 8 232 *ter fessus valle resedit;* egens consilii. Sallustius; 'fessus in Pamphyliam se receptat.' Nam corpore *fatigatum* dicimus, animo vero *fessum;* quamvis haec saepe confundat auctoritas. Here again it seems that the additional note of the fuller version formed part of the original comment. Let us now compare Isid. 10 101, who adds something which is in neither note: *fessus* quasi *fissus*, nec iam integer salute; est autem generale. Dicimus enim fessus animo, ut 'ter fessus valle resedit,' et fessus corpore, quod magis est proprium, et fessus rerum a casu venientium. Fatigatus, quasi fato agitatus.

Serv. A. 1 215 *feras* dicimus aut quod omni corpore feruntur, aut quod naturali utuntur libertate et pro desiderio suo feruntur.

Isid. 12 2 2 *ferae* appellatae eo quod naturali utuntur libertate, et desiderio suo ferantur. Sunt autem liberae eorum voluntates, et huc atque illuc vagantur, et quo animus duxerit eo feruntur.

Here it is true that Isidore's comment corresponds in general drift with the vulgate, to which the fuller version adds a remark which is not in Isidore: still the wording of the two notes is so different that it is improbable that one was copied from the other. The additional note, sane veteres prope omnes quadrupedes feras dicebant, ut 'inque feri curvam conpagibus alvum Contorsit,' et 'armentalis equae mammis et lacte ferino,' should be compared with the Verona scholia on A. 7 489, and Nonius p. 307.

Serv. A. 4 7 nihil interest, utrum umbram an noctem dicat; nox enim umbra terrae est, ut supra (2 251) 'involvens umbra magna terramque polumque.'

Isid. 5 31 3 noctem autem fieri dicunt, aut quia longo itinere lassatur sol, et cum ad ultimum caeli spatium pervenit elanguescit, ac labefactus efflat suos ignes, aut quia eadem vi sub terras cogitur, qua super terras pertulit lumen, et sic umbra terrae noctem facit. Unde Vergilius 'ruit Oceano Nox' &c. Here surely the agreement between Servius and Isidore is of the slenderest.

Serv. A. 4 30 *sinus* dicimus orbes oculorum, id est palpebras, quae a palpitatione dictae sunt, nam semper moventur.

Isid. 11 1 39 *palpebrae* sunt sinus oculorum, a palpitatione dictae, quia semper moventur. Concurrunt enim invicem, ut adsiduo motu reficiant obtutum &c.

Here not only does Isidore add something which is not in Servius, but it is plain that the object of his note is different. He is defining *palpebra*, Servius is explaining *sinus*.

Serv. A. 4 130 *iubare exorto*, nato Lucifero: nam proprie iubar Lucifer dicitur, quod iubas lucis effundit; unde iam quicquid splendet iubar dicitur, ut argenti, gemmarum. Est autem Lucifer interdum Iovis; [nam et antiqui 'iubar' quasi 'iuvar' dicebant;] plerumque Veneris stella, unde Veneris dicta est, ut (8 590) 'quem Venus ante alios astrorum diligit ignes' [Alii iubar solem, alii splendorem siderum dicunt].

Isid. 3 70 18 Lucifer dictus eo quod inter omnia sidera plus lucem ferat; est autem unus e planetis. Hic proprie et iubar dicitur, eo quod iubas lucis effundat; sed et splendor solis ac lunae et stellarum *iubar* vocatur, quod in modum iubae radii ipsorum extendantur.

Isidore's note here combines observations which are to be found in the vulgate and the fuller commentary combined. There is no ground for supposing that he is borrowing from Servius, nor need we go far for the common source of the note. Paulus 104 clearly points to Verrius Flaccus: *iubar* stella quam Graeci appellant *φωσφόρον* vel *ἕσπερον*, hoc est Lucifer, quod splendor eius diffunditur in modum iubae leonis.

In all these cases, where the words of Isidore and Servius coincide, Thilo remarks 'excripsit Isidorus;' with what reason I leave readers to decide. As this is a case where the brick may be taken as a sample of the house, it is not necessary to quote any more instances. I will only observe that there are numberless passages where the correspondence between Isidore and Servius is only of a general kind, and where Thilo observes not 'exscripsit' but 'conferatur Isidorus.' In these passages, as far as I can see, the only hypothesis which can account for the correspondence is that of a community of sources. And if Isidore and Servius used the same sources in one large number

of instances, it is difficult to see why they should not have done so in another; or (to put the same thing from the other side) if Isidore copied from Servius in one set of instances, why he should have refrained from doing so in another.

Let us now examine the relation of Isidore, not to the vulgate, but to the fuller version of Servius.

Thilo himself allows that there is a considerable number of passages, of which he gives a list on p. xliv, in which Isidore appears to have copied scholia from the fuller version and neglected the notes of the vulgate on the same points: nor is he disinclined to concede that in this case a community of authorities is the cause of the correspondence. As there is here no difference of opinion between us I need not dwell further on this point. It is more important to consider in detail some passages in which the vulgate and the fuller version can be shewn, by a comparison with corresponding notes in Isidore, to be homogeneous.

The first which I will take is discussed by Thilo p. xli. Isid. 10 260 *sequester* dicitur qui certantibus medius intervenit, qui apud Graecos ὁ μέσος dicitur, apud quem pignora deponi solent. Quod vocabulum ab sequendo factum est, quod eius qui electus sit utraque pars fidem sequatur.

Serv. A. 11 133 *pace sequestra*; media; nam[que] sequester est [aut] medius inter duos altercantes, [aut] apud quem aliquid ad tempus seponitur, [dictum autem a sequendo, quod eius qui electus sit utraque pars fidem sequitur.] Pacem ergo sequestram indutias dicit, i.e., pacem temporalem et mediam inter bellum praeteritum et futurum.

I agree with Thilo that Isidore is not here borrowing from the fuller edition of Servius, but that both writers are taking from a common authority, whom I suspect to be not Lavinius Luscus *de verbis sordidis* (Gellius 20 11), but Verrius Flaccus: Festus 339 *sequester* is dicitur qui inter aliquos [qui certant medius], ut inter eos convenerit, [ita tenet depositum ali] quid, ut ei reddat &c. But the point on which stress should be laid is that the vulgate and the fuller edition of the Servian note are here homogeneous, and there can therefore be no question of interpolation. And so with the following instances (Thilo p. xlii).

Serv. A. 1 505 *testudine,* camera incurva, [id est fornicata] quae secundum eos qui scripserunt de ratione templorum ideo sic fit ut simulacro caeli imaginem reddat, quod constat esse convexum. [Quidam tradunt apud veteres omnia templa in modum testudinis facta, at vero sequenti aetate divinis simulacris positis, nihilominus in templis factas esse testudines, quod Varro ait, ut separatum esset, ubi metus esset, ubi religio administraretur. Bene ergo, cum de templo loqueretur, addidit ei testudinem. Idem Varro de lingua Latina ad Ciceronem, 'in aedibus locus patulus relinquebatur sub divo, qui si non erat relictus et contectus erat, appellabatur testudo.' Cicero in Bruto, 'commentatum in quadam testudine cum servis litteratis fuisse. Quidam testudinem locum in parte atrii volunt adversum venientibus.]

Isid. 15 8 8 gives an abridged version of the two notes combined, again shewing that in the common source from which both were drawn the two formed part of the same comment. *Testudo* est camera templi obliqua, nam in modum testudinis veteres templorum tecta faciebant, quae ideo sic fiebant ut caeli imaginem redderent, quod constat esse convexum. Alii testudinem volunt esse locum in parte atrii adversum venientibus. Compare Nonius 58: *testudines* sunt loca in aedificiis camerata, ad similitudinem aquatilium testudinum, quae duris tergoribus sunt et incurvis. Vergilius Aeneidos lib. I (505) 'in foribus divae, media testudine templi.' Sisenna Historiarum lib. IV. 'C. Titinius quidam...primo ante testudinem constitit,' &c.

Serv. A. 8 402 *liquido electro,* [aut liquefacto aut] puro; et secundum Plinium in Naturali Historia tria sunt electri genera, unum ex arboribus, quod sucinum dicitur. Aliud quod naturaliter invenitur, tertium quod fit de tribus partibus auri et una argenti; quas partes etiam si naturale resolvas invenies. Unde errant qui dicunt melius esse naturale. Electri autem natura probatur veneno, quo recepto et stridorem emittit, et varios ad similitudinem [arcus caelestis] reddit colores. [Et ad lumina in convivio clarius auro et argento lucet.]

Isid. 16 24 *electrum* vocatum, quod ad radium solis clarius

auro argentoque reluceat. Sol enim a poetis Elector vocatur. Defaecatius est enim hoc metallum omnibus metallis. Huius tria genera: unum quod ex pini arboribus fluit, quod sucinum dicitur, alterum metallum quod naturaliter invenitur et in pretio habetur, tertium quod fit de tribus partibus auri et argenti una. Quas partes etiam si naturale solvas invenies. Unde nihil interest natum an factum, utrumque enim eiusdem naturae est. Electrum quod naturale est eiusdem naturae est, ut in convivio et ad lumina clarius cunctis metallis fulgeat et venenum probet. Nam si eo infundas venenum, stridorem edit et colores varios in modum arcus caelestis emittit.

In this instance also it is clear that the vulgate and the fuller version together make up a homogeneous note, which is given in another and slightly different form by Isidore. Its source may either be Pliny, with whose words (37 31, 33 81) much of it coincides, or some later writer, such as Suetonius, quoting and enlarging Pliny's observations.

Serv. A. 1 119 *gaza* Persicus sermo est, et significat divitias, [unde Gaza urbs in Palaestina dicitur, quod in ea Cambyses rex Persarum cum Aegyptiis bellum inferret divitias suas condidit.] Isid. 15 1 16 Gazam oppidum Palaestinae condiderunt Evaei, in qua habitaverunt Cappadoces pristinis cultoribus interfectis. Vocata autem Gaza, eo quod ibi Cambyses rex Persarum thesauros suos posuit, cum bellum Aegyptiis intulisset, Persarum enim lingua thesaurus gaza nominatur.

Serv. A. 1 373 *annales:* inter historiam et annales hoc interest; historia est eorum temporum quae vel vidimus vel videre potuimus, dicta ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱστορεῖν, id est videre; annales vero sunt eorum temporum quae aetas nostra non novit; unde Livius ex annalibus et historia constat. Haec tamen confunduntur licenter, ut hoc loco pro historia inquit annales. [Ita autem annales conficiebantur: tabulam dealbatam quotannis pontifex maximus habuit, in qua praescriptis consulum nominibus et aliorum magistratuum digna memoratu notare consueverat domi militiaeque terra marique gesta per singulos dies. Cuius diligentiae annuos commentarios in octoginta libros veteres rettulerunt, eosque a pontificibus maximis a quibus

fiebant annales maximos appellarunt; unde quidam ideo dictum ab Aenea *annales* aiunt, quod et ipse religiosus sit et a poeta tum pontifex inducatur.]

Isid. 1 63 3 *annales* sunt res singulorum annorum. Quaecumque enim digna memoria domi militiaeque, mari ac terrae per annos in commentariis acta sunt, ab anniversariis gestis annales nominantur. Historia autem multorum annorum vel temporum est, cuius diligentia annui commentarii in libris delati sunt. Inter historiam autem et annales hoc interest, quod historia est eorum temporum quae vidimus, annales vero sunt eorum annorum quos aetas nostra non novit. Unde Sallustius ex historia, Eusebius et Hieronymus ex annalibus et historia constant.

The Servian note is here fuller than that of Isidore. The substance of the whole came, as Gellius (5 18) tells us, from Verrius Flaccus.

I could add many more similar instances; but enough has, I think, been quoted to shew that there are a considerable number of cases where a note in Isidore closely resembles one only to be found in the fuller version of Servius. The hypotheses at command for explaining this phenomenon are, so far as I can see, the following: either that Isidore borrowed from the fuller version of Servius, which must therefore be at least as old as the sixth century, or the beginning of the seventh; or that the interpolator borrowed from Isidore; or that these notes were taken by Isidore and the author (or authors) of the fuller Servian commentary from the same or similar sources. Thilo rejects the first hypothesis altogether, and seems inclined to lean in some cases to the second, in some to the third. But the second assumes that the author of the additional notes was later than Isidore, which is the very point in question; and I therefore am strongly inclined to adopt the third, which Thilo himself allows to be the most natural in some cases (p. xlv.). If in some cases, why not in all?

If, as I have endeavoured to shew, Isidore did not borrow from Servius, but used the same authorities, it follows that the matter common to both writers can claim a very respectable antiquity, and authority in proportion; while with regard to

those additional notes of Daniel's Servius which are shewn by a comparison with Isidore to be homogeneous with the vulgate, it is clear that they cannot be regarded as interpolations. Nor again is there any reason for suspecting the integrity of those which are really supplementary to the vulgate. With regard to those which are not homogeneous with the vulgate, which repeat it, or contradict it, I am unable to see that we are compelled to infer more than this, that they represent a different recension of the Servian commentary; but that they were not inserted in it until long after the time of Servius I see no grounds for believing. When we consider the general character of the fourth century commentaries on Roman authors, such as that of Donatus on Terence and of the Pseudo-Asconius on Cicero, when we reflect that their style and manner is in the main impersonal, that they bear the clearest marks of being compiled and abridged from the numerous works of earlier scholars, and that they present the same phenomena of repetitions and general looseness and carelessness in composition, we are justified in pausing before we deny to the fuller version of Servius its right to the name which it has so long borne. The additional notes are undoubtedly drawn from the same sources as those of the vulgate; they are often homogeneous with them, and their style, though later than that of the Verona scholia, is on the whole neither earlier nor later than that of Servius.

Thilo has said but little on the sources of the Servian commentary. He does not, in my opinion, at all succeed in shewing that Servius borrowed from Aelius Donatus. The memoir of Vergil which bears the name of the latter is generally attributed to Suetonius, and I have endeavoured to shew in my edition of this work that Servius extracted his shorter biography from the fuller work of the latter, and was thus able to add details which in the memoir by Donatus are omitted. Thilo mentions a number of passages in which notes in the Servian commentary correspond with notes of Donatus on Terence. But on examining these I find that in many cases the Servian note is fuller, and that it is not seldom possible to

point out an older form of the comment in Nonius, or Verrius Flaccus, or both. Nonius and Verrius, it may be observed, are hardly mentioned in Thilo's preface. Yet it is these two authors above all others who must, in my opinion, be more thoroughly studied than any others, if we would arrive at sound conclusions respecting the sources of the Latin commentaries of the fourth century.

HENRY NETTLESHIP.

PYRRHUS IN ITALY.

THE war waged in Italy by Pyrrhus of Epeiros against the Romans has always commanded attention, from the picturesque incidents interwoven with the story, from the character of the king, and of the Romans, Fabricius and Curius, and from a *false idea* of the importance of the struggle.

It was important; for it secured to Rome, as the representative of Italian unity as opposed to foreign intervention, the control of the whole Italian peninsula for the first time. The false importance given to the war has sprung from the consideration of it as a kind of *test action* between the Roman and Macedonian methods of fighting, between legionary and phalangite. It has been spoken of by one popular historian as if it first introduced the Italians, as a military people, to the notice of the Greeks and Macedonians.

Lord Macaulay, in his *Lays of Ancient Rome*, (*Prophecy of Capys, Introduction,*) uses the following strong expressions concerning it.

"That barbarian warriors, led by barbarian chiefs, should win a pitched battle against Greek valour guided by Greek science, seemed as incredible as it would now seem that the Burmese or Siamese should, in the open plain, put to flight an equal number of the best English troops." "The Tarentines were convinced that their countrymen were irresistible in war." ....."His (*i.e.* Pyrrhus') expedition to Italy was a turning point in the history of the world"....."The pilum and the broadsword had vanquished the Macedonian spear. The legion had broken the Macedonian phalanx."

This and similar language is sheer misrepresentation. The Tarentines must have been singularly unacquainted with their

own history, and with the history of their own times, if they believed their countrymen irresistible. Ever since the greatness of the Italiot cities began to decline, after the destruction of Sybaris in the sixth century B.C., the Italians had been constantly pressing upon the Greeks, curtailing their territory, and beating them in the field. In about 473 B.C. the Tarentines themselves had been overthrown by the Messapians in a pitched battle with heavy loss. The interference of the great despots of Syracuse, Dionysios the elder and Agathokles, had been invoked again and again in the struggles of the Greeks against each other, or against the Italians. Champions too had come over the Adriatic, from the mainland of Greece and Epeiros, and had fared but badly at the hands of the Italians. On the same day, it was said, as the battle of Chaironeia, in 338 B.C., Archidamos the Spartan had been defeated and slain by the Lucanians. Alexander of Molossos, a predecessor and cousin of Pyrrhus himself, an uncle of Alexander the Great, had since then waged war in Italy with doubtful success. He complained that he had *men* to fight against, as contrasted with the Asiatic foes of his great nephew; and by these men he was finally overthrown and killed, by Lucanians and Bruttii. Later still, twenty years only before the arrival of Pyrrhus, the success of Kleonymos the Spartan, on the same field, was at best doubtful. That the Greeks should finally be subdued by the Italians; that the strongest Italian power which had yet arisen should overthrow the most illustrious Greek adventurer who had yet come to Italy, this was precisely what a careful observer of past history would have predicted. What we call Rome, was a body of colonies, allies and subjects spread throughout central Italy, directed by the most uniformly capable aristocracy that the world has seen. That this coherent, persistent, patriotic power should overthrow the factious democracies of the Italiot cities, backed by a military adventurer however brilliant, assisted by disorganised and broken men like the Samnites and Lucanians however brave, was almost certain. The Roman victory was the natural consummation of a long series of events.

Neither is it correct to describe the contest as one between

rival systems of fighting. A portion of the legion was then armed with spears after the manner of the phalanx, though not with the extraordinarily long pikes of the Macedonians (Polyb. VI. 23). Nor were the troops of Pyrrhus merely a phalanx supported by cavalry. The great reason for the military superiority of the armies of Philip and Alexander had been the combination of other troops, peltasts especially, carefully armed and trained, with the phalanx. Their armies, and those of their successors, exhibited for the first time, among Greeks, a proper combination of all arms of the service. Infantry, cavalry, artillery[1], troops heavy and light were there. The Roman, that is the Italian[2], method of fighting, with swords in comparatively open order, must have been equally well known to the people of Tarentum and Epeiros. Certainly the scientific soldier Pyrrhus knew all about it. This is not conjecture. Polybios, comparing the Roman and Macedonian armies which fought at Kynoskephalai in 197 B.C., says: *Πυῤῥος γε μὴν οὐ μόνον ὅπλοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ δυνάμεσιν Ἰταλικαῖς συγκέχρηται, τιθεὶς ἐναλλὰξ σημαίαν καὶ σπείραν φαλαγγιτικὴν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγῶσιν*, Polyb. XVIII. 11. Italian allies, and among others Italian mercenaries, filled his line of battle, which exhibited alternately *manipuli*, armed with swords and javelins, and clumps of phalangite-spears.

Dr Arnold (*R. Hist.* c. 37) remarks that the account of Pyrrhus' first battle, Heraclea, is inconsistent with the supposition that his troops were mere phalangites. The two armies drove each other back alternately seven times. That the legions should drive back an unbroken phalanx is incredible; that a broken phalanx should have returned to the charge is well-nigh impossible. Yet Dr Arnold does not apply the passage of Polybios quoted above till he comes to the second battle, Asculum. As Polybios however speaks of battles, and lower down of victories, in the plural, as being gained by this formation, he must allude to both Heraclea and Asculum. At all events at Beneventum, where Pyrrhus was defeated, the bulk of

[1] See Arrian, *Anabasis* IV. 4, for Alexander's use of field artillery.

[2] The Samnites, and therefore the Lucanians too, were armed like the Romans. Liv. IX. 40. Sall. *Catil.* 52.

his army was Italian and mercenary. His Epeirot veterans had mostly perished, and his ranks were recruited from the mercenaries of Sicily and of Italy. The victory of M'. Curius was a victory over soldiers armed and equipped like his own, backed only by a reserve of *sarissae*, if indeed Pyrrhus had any phalangites armed in the Macedonian manner, left at all[1].

Moreover to rightly understand the course of the campaigns of Pyrrhus we must look beyond the fields of battle and beyond Italy. He crossed from Epeiros in the spring of 280 B.C., when his friend Ptolemy Keraunos was just established on the throne of Macedonia. Ptolemy supplied him with a portion of his army, perhaps with all his elephants and cavalry (Justin, XVII. 2), but the different accounts of his numbers are irreconcilable. After inflicting a severe defeat on the Romans at Heraclea, and after causing a general rising of the Samnites and Lucanians, he offered a peace, which could have been only a truce at the best, for Rome was not seriously crippled. In this peace we see no advantage for himself. The cause was as follows; in the same year, 280 B.C., the Gauls had invaded Macedonia, killed Ptolemy Keraunos, threatened Epeiros, and deprived Pyrrhus of all prospect of support from home or Macedonia.

Perhaps the defeat of the Gauls and their allies by the Romans in the decisive battle of Sentinum a few years before, and this invasion of Macedonia, give between them a more valuable criterion of the relative strength of Italy and Greece than the campaigns of Pyrrhus can.

However, the Romans refused peace. Some indecisive operations, and another doubtful victory near Asculum in 278 B.C., left Pyrrhus as far as ever from the position of conqueror or

[1] Macaulay's vigorous poetical opposition of sword and sarissa falls therefore to the ground:

"Hurrah! for the good weapons,
Which keep the War God's land;
Hurrah! for Rome's stout pilum,
In a stout Roman hand.
Hurrah! for the good broadsword,
Which through the thick array
Of levelled spears, and serried shields,
Hews deep its gory way."

The lines would I believe be more true of Kynoskephalai, or of Pydna, nay, even of the meeting of the Spanish and Swiss infantry at Ravenna (Machiavelli, *Art of War*, B. II. c. 3), than of Beneventum.

But see Plutarch's account of the battle, and above all Dionys. Halicar. XIX. 12, referred to below, for the composition of the army of Pyrrhus at Beneventum.

arbiter of Italy. Again he negotiated a truce, and this time successfully. Not that he now desired to return to Epeiros. The Gauls had retired from Macedonia, and had been defeated by the Aetolians in their incursion into Southern Greece. If we could trust an evidently untrustworthy and marvellous account of that invasion by Justin, we could place it in the winter of 279—8 B.C. But it anyhow probably occurred before the autumn of 278 B.C. when Pyrrhus left Italy. He had been there two years and four months since the spring of 280 B.C.

Now freed from anxiety about the Gauls, and finding Italy an unpromising field for adventure, he went to Sicily. His wife Lanassa was daughter of Agathokles the late tyrant of Syracuse, a man of talents and influence equal to his crimes. Lanassa had borne a son, Alexander, who might fairly hope to inherit his grandfather's position, if Pyrrhus could only expel the Carthaginians. But he failed, on this constant field of Greek military failure, where "barbarian warriors, led by barbarian chiefs," had often won pitched battles "over Greek valour, guided by Greek science."

He returned to Italy to support his former allies, to a task which his former partial success must have convinced him was now impossible. So only can we explain the readiness with which after the single defeat of Beneventum he retired from the contest. He might still have preserved the independence of Tarentum by staying. He had an army still; he brought upwards of 8000 men back to Epeiros, and left a garrison behind in Tarentum; but empire for himself was plainly hopeless, so he went. At Beneventum his forces had been Tarentines, armed no doubt as a phalanx, but more probably after the Greek than the Macedonian fashion[1]; Samnites, and mercenaries from Italy and Sicily, Italians too for the most part, retaining their national arms; with the remnants of his original force. Plutarch makes no mention of the special formation of the phalanx in the battle. Indeed no general in his senses,

[1] The Achaeans, for instance, after this, still kept up the old-fashioned phalanx with the shorter spear; and were only induced by Philopoemen to adopt the Macedonian arms.

much less Pyrrhus, would have attempted a surprise, by a night march, through woods and mountains, with troops principally armed with spears twenty-four feet long.

Nor does Dionysios of Halikarnassus (XIX. 12) mention the phalanx in connection with the battle. He calls the troops indeed ὁπλῖται with whom Pyrrhus attempted the surprise; but he talks of their being encumbered, not with spears, but θυρεοῖς, the oblong shields of the Italians, described by Polybios (VI. 23) as part of the equipment of the Roman ὁπλῖται, or legionaries. Pyrrhus was certainly here employing Italian weapons, probably Italian men, and these Dionysios tells us were his *best troops*. So much for "Greek valour guided by Greek science," as exemplified by the army of Pyrrhus.

Nor was the battle a decisive blow to Greek influence in Italy. The progressive events of two centuries had shewn that to be already doomed, so far as it was a political influence. The only question was, what Italian race should rule the Italiot Greeks. But Beneventum did confirm the authority of Rome, at the head of her Latin and Sabine confederacy and subjects, over the Oscans of southern and central Italy. These had stooped to use foreign aid; of the Gauls in the third Samnite war, of the Greeks in the present war; even as they welcomed Hannibal, and intrigued with Mithradates later. Rome, with a safer instinct, had in this very war refused to avail herself of useful Carthaginian succours to counteract the superiority of the Tarentine fleet; and she reaped the reward of a consistent national policy by becoming beyond dispute the head of Italy.

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BIOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.

"In 1802, simultaneously, and apparently independently, a German and two French naturalists proposed the word *Biologie* for the whole study of living matter. The idea was accepted, grew, and we in England have for some time past used the word *Biology*. Dr Field of Norwich had written to the Lecturer to point out, on philological grounds, that the word is a bad one, as βίος is applied only to human life, while ζωή is applied to other animal life. Although he suggests a new term, I think it too late to change our present one."

Prof. Huxley, *Lecture at South Kensington*, 1877.

"One of the most singular things that are shewn in that museum [of tools and weapons] is the wonderful tendency of the human mind, when it has once got into a groove, to stick there. The great object of scientific investigation is to run counter to that tendency."

Prof. Huxley, *Address at the British Association*, 1878.

Οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρὸς...ὄνομα θέσθαι ἐστίν, ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ.

Plat. Crat. p. 388 E.

"The study of living beings, irrespective of the exact nature and position of these, is the province of *Biology* (Gr. βίος, *life*; λόγος, *a discourse*). All living beings, however, may be divided into the two kingdoms of *animals* and *plants* .....in accordance with which division, Biology splits up into the kindred sciences of *Zoology* and *Botany*[1]."

It will be the object of this paper to show that the Greek word βίος has nothing in common with the subjects of either of these two kingdoms, with the sole exception of Man; and with him, not as a *living*, but as a *rational, social* and *accountable being*.

Βίος is thus defined by Aristotle: Βίος ἐστὶ λογικὴ ζωή. And so the grammarians, as Ammonius: "Βίος differs from

[1] *Introduction to the Study of Biology*, by H. Alleyne Nicholson, M.D., Edinburgh and London, 1872.

ζωή. Βίος is used of rational animals, that is, of men only; *ζωή* both of men and of irrational animals, and occasionally of plants (*ἤδη δέ ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ φυτῶν*). Whoever, therefore, uses *βίος* of beasts (*ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων*) *speaks improperly* (*ἀκυρολογεῖ*)[1]." In such apparent exceptions to this rule as we shall presently notice, it will always be found that there is no question of the *principle* of life, but only of some *adjunct* or *accident* of it.

The various shades of meaning of the word *βίος* may be thus arranged[2].

1. The *duration of human life* is so called. To this head belong the phrases *διάγειν, διατελεῖν, διέρχεσθαι τὸν βίον*; *διὰ βίου, per totam vitam*; *τὸν βίον κατέλυσεν, κατέστρεψεν, ἐτελεύτησεν, ἐξέλιπεν* etc.; *μακρόβιος, βραχύβιος, ὀλιγόβιος* (Job xiv. 1); *ἀποβιοῦν, vivendi finem facere*. Ὁ *βίος βραχὺς* (is the well-known aphorism of the Father of Medicine) *ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή*. In this sense, Πέρας ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῦ *βίου θάνατος*[3]; and one who is near that term may say with Cicero: *Mihi quidem βεβίωται*; *viderint juvenes*[4].

2. Life considered *in regard to the feelings*, with respect to

[1] Ammonius Περὶ ὁμοίων καὶ διαφόρων λέξεων, p. 30, ed. Valck. Archbishop Trench, in his *New Testament Synonyms*, p. 105, points out that the assertion of Ammonius, that *βίος* is never, except incorrectly, applied to beasts, is inconsistent with Aristotle's use of the word in *Hist. Anim.* i. 1, 15 [13] and ix. 8 [7], 1, "unless, indeed, he means to include Aristotle in his censure." But *ἀκυρολογίαι*, although reckoned amongst the *vitia orationis*, are only censurable when used harshly or extravagantly; in many cases, especially in poetry, they are beauties. Thus Virgil's "*Vir* gregis," and "Hunc ego si potui tantum *sperare* dolorem," and Thomson's "Softly shaking on the *dimpled* pool *Prelusive* drops," are instances of the judicious use of this figure. The Greek word *ὠρύεσθαι* is *properly* said of dogs and wolves; but this only gives greater significance to the Psalmist's (xxxvii. 8) *ὠρυόμην ἀπὸ στεναγμοῦ τῆς καρδίας μου*. And in the latter of the two places of Aristotle, he is comparing the habits (*τοὺς βίους*) of animals, in regard to skill and ingenuity, with those of the human race, instancing the manner in which the swallow builds its nest, mixing straw with the clay, etc.

[2] With our arrangement may be compared that of Tzetzes on Hesiod Op. et D. 689: *Βίος ἐξ σημαίνει· τὴν τέχνην, τὸν τρόπον, τὸν παρόντα κόσμον, τὸν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου χρόνον τῆς ζωῆς, τὴν περιουσίαν, καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν συντείνουσας τροφάς.*

[3] Demosth. Περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου, p. 258, 20.

[4] Cic. Epist. ad Att. xiv. 21.

happiness and misery (*εἰς εὐφροσύνας τε καὶ λύπας*[1]). In this view *βίος* may be *χαλεπός, ἐπίπονος, ὀδυνηρός, λυπηρός*; or, on the other hand, *εὐδαίμων, μακάριος, ἀπράγμων, ἀμέριμνος* etc. To this head also belongs the well-known phrase *βίος ἀβίωτος*, a life so wretched as to be *insupportable*. An ancient philosopher recommends *ὁδὸν μὲν τὴν λειοτάτην ἐκλέγεσθαι, βίον δὲ τὸν ἀλυπότατον*; but a better rule of life is that of Pythagoras, who said *ὅτι χρὴ βίον αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν ἄριστον· ἡδὺν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἡ συνήθεια ποιήσει*[2]. Animals, being endowed with feelings like ourselves, are not excluded from this use of the word *per ἀκυρολογίαν*. As we speak of *leading the life of a dog*, so the Greeks had a saying, *λαγὼ βίον ζῆν, to lead the life of a hare*, that is, in continual fear and trembling (*δεδιὼς καὶ τρέμων*)[3].

3. Life considered *in its moral aspect*, or in regard to the *conduct*, is emphatically called *βίος*. To this sense belong the epithets *σεμνός, κόσμιος, ἐνάρετος, σώφρων, χρηστός, ἐπιεικής*, and their opposites; and the synonyms *τρόπος, ἤθη, πρᾶξις* etc. In Christian writers *βίος*, even without an epithet, is often contrasted with *πίστις* or *δόγματα*; as St Chrysostom, in distinguishing between heretics and hypocrites, says: *Παρὰ γὰρ αἱρετικοῖς ἐστι πολλάκις καὶ βίον* (*good living*) *εὑρεῖν, παρὰ δὲ τούτοις οἷς εἶπον οὐδαμῶς*[4].

4. But in forming an estimate of moral worth, it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration the *circumstances* in which any one is placed, as well as his *conduct* under them. Both these were within the purview of the great Orator in his celebrated challenge to his rival: "Draw then the parallel between your life and mine (*τὰ σοὶ κἀμοὶ βεβιωμένα*), Aeschines. .....You were an usher, I a scholar; you were an initiator, I was initiated; you danced at the games, I presided over them; you were a clerk of the Assembly, I a member.....your measures were all in the enemy's favour, mine always in the

[1] Xenoph. Hiero 1. 2: *Πῇ διαφέρει ὁ τυραννικός τε καὶ ὁ ἰδιωτικὸς βίος εἰς εὐφροσύνας τε καὶ λύπας ἀνθρώποις.*

[2] Stob. Flor. T. 1. p. 17, ed. Gaisford.

[3] Demosth. ut ante, p. 314, 24.

[4] S. Chrysost. Opp. T. VII. p. 293 B, ed. Ben.

country's[1]." Hence the title of Plutarch's great work, ΒΙΟΙ ΠΑΡΑΛΛΗΛΟΙ; and the English word, legitimately formed from the Greek, *Biography.*

5. A man's *calling* or *profession* (*τέχνη, ἐπιτήδευμα*) is also indicated by this word, as *βίος θαλάττιος, γεωργικός, λῃστρικός, βουκολικός, κτηνοτρόφος, στρατιωτικός, φιλόσοφος* etc.; and by an easy transition, he is said *ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης, γεωργίας, λῃστείας* etc. *τὸν βίον ἔχειν, ποιεῖσθαι, πορίζεσθαι, to get his living.* To this head probably belongs one of the precepts (*ὑποθῆκαι*) of the Seven Sages, *Τῷ βίῳ μὴ μάχου, Do not quarrel with your bread and butter;* as well as a pithy saying of Metrodorus, preserved by Stobaeus in his collection *Περὶ φειδωλίας, Ἑτοιμάζονταί τινες διὰ βίου τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον*[2]. Every reader of the Greek Testament is familiar with this use of the word[3]. Hence (since animals must *live,* in this sense) arises another *ἀκυρολογία,* of which an instance is commonly quoted from Xenophon's description of spiders: *Αἱ φάλαγγες, ἀράχνια λεπτὰ ὑφηνάμεναι, θηρῶσι τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον*[4]. But a more notable example, and one of common occurrence, is the word *ἀμφίβιος, amphibious,* applied to such animals as pass their time and *get their living* in both elements; *quia non tantum terrestria, sed aquatilia quoque desiderant pabula*[5]. For a similar reason a smaller class of animals, as owls and bats, are called *νυκτίβιοι.*

6. Passing from individuals to communities, the diversities of the various tribes of the human race, in regard to *manners, customs, and modes of subsistence,* are properly styled *βίοι,* and distinguished by such epithets as *ἥμερος, ἄγριος, σκηνίτης, νομαδικός, θηριώδης* etc. Diodorus Siculus, one of the earliest cultivators of anthropological science, concludes his description of the races inhabiting the countries bordering on the Arabian Gulf with these words: "Now if any of my readers, by reason of the strange and marvellous character of the habits of life

[1] Demosth. ut ante, p. 315, 5 (Lord Brougham's Translation, p. 180).

[2] Stob. Flor. T. I. pp. 116, 341, ed. Gaisford.

[3] See Mark xii. 44, Luke viii. 43, xv. 12.

[4] Xenoph. Mem. Socr. III. 11, 6.

[5] Columella VIII. 13.

here recorded (*τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων βίων*) should disbelieve what has been narrated, let him only bear in mind the difference between the temperature of the air of Scythia, and of the country of the Troglodytes, and he will be no longer incredulous[1]." But even in civilized life, and in the same community, manners are continually changing; and in the increase of luxury and its attendant evils, a philosopher may sometimes wish to recall the old-fashioned and simple habits (*τὸν ἀρχαῖον καὶ ἀπαράσκευον βίον*) of ages long gone by.

7. Lastly, *human life* in its most comprehensive aspect, *genus humanum, the world,* is properly expressed by *ὁ βίος ὁ ἀνθρώπινος, ὁ κοινὸς βίος*, or simply *ὁ βίος*. Thus the great benefactors of the human race are described as *οἱ εὐεργετήσαντες μεγάλα τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον*[2]; and the greatest of them, Hercules, who is lauded by the Historian as having by his own labours humanized the world (*ἐξημερώσας τὴν οἰκουμένην*[3]), is represented as saying of himself and his exploits, *ὃς Διὸς μὲν υἱός εἰμι, τοσαῦτα δὲ πεπόνηκα* ΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΩΝ TON BION[4]. And to quote only one more instance, St Chrysostom, commenting on the text (1 Tim. vi. 1) "Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honour," observes that if this precept were neglected, the Greeks would have some reason to say that Christianity was introduced into the world for the subversion of all things (*ἐπὶ ἀνατροπῇ τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσενήνεκται*)[5]. Akin to this is the patristic use of *βίος* for *secular life*, as, *παρθένος ἀποταξαμένη τῷ βίῳ*; and *βιωτικοὶ ἄνθρωποι*, as opposed to the followers of a *religious* life.

The obvious result of the foregoing enquiry is to shew that the term *Biology*, recently imported into the scientific vocabulary, is a BLUNDER, illustrating the old saying, "A little learning is a dangerous thing." The inventor of it[6], being in want of a

[1] Diod. Sic. III. 32.

[2] Idem IV. 15.

[3] Idem IV. 8.

[4] Lucian Dial. Deor. XIII. 1 (coll. Vit. Auct. 8).

[5] S. Chrysost. Opp. T. XI. p. 774 A, ed. Ben.

[6] Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (born 1776, died 1837), in his work entitled, *Biologie, ou Philosophie de la nature vivante*, which appeared in 1802 and following years.

Greek word expressive of *life*, had recourse to his dictionary, which offered him a choice between two, *βίος* and *ζωή*. *Zoology*[1] being already in use, as a derivative from *ζῷον*, he was forced to take up with *Biology*, a well-sounding word, and not likely to be too closely scrutinized by the general scientific world. So it has proved. The philosophic mind, which, after all, is but human, has *got into a groove*, and seems likely to stick there, unless some helping hand is extended to it from without. Let us see what philology can do in this matter *constructively*, as well as *destructively*.

To attempt this with any prospect of success, two things seem to be required: first, to propose a substitute for the obnoxious term; and, secondly, to find another and a legitimate use for it.

1. The *vital principle* (*αὐτὸ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν*[2]) in Greek is neither *ζωὴ* nor *βίος*, but *τὸ ζωτικόν*. Thus the author of the Geoponics says that in the trying (*δοκιμασία*) of eggs care should be taken not to shake them, for fear of destroying the vital principle (*ἵνα μὴ διαφθαρῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ζωτικόν*)[3]. The term ZOTICOLOGY is not quite on a par with the similarly sounding word Toxicology, because *τοξικόν*, *poison*, though originally an adjective (*φάρμακον* being understood), has by use passed into a noun; whereas *τὸ ζωτικὸν* (like *τὸ ὁρατικόν*, *the visual faculty*, *τὸ ὀσφραντικόν*, *τὸ λογικόν* etc.) becomes a noun only by the help of the neuter article, which unfits it for entering into the construction of a compound term. Still, without appealing to such doubtful compositions as Neology from *νέος*, Hagiology from *ἅγιος*, Eschatology (!) from *ἔσχατος* (all three adjectives), we need go no further than the undeniably legitimate formation *ἀρχαιολογία Archaeology*, the science which deals with ancient things (*τὰ ἀρχαῖα*), as Zoticology is concerned about things endued with life (*τὰ ζωτικά*). But since it is always a matter of difficulty to obtain currency for a new term, however legitimately formed, it deserves to be considered

[1] There is not the same excuse for such monstrosities as *Bioplasm*, *Biogenesis*, etc., which might easily be changed into *Zooplasm*, etc. (from *ζωή*, not from *ζῷον*).

[2] Plato ap. Stob. Flor. T. I. p. 273, ed. Gaisford.

[3] Geopon. XIV. 7, 27.

whether the opposing claims of science and philology might not, in this particular case, be reconciled by the simple disuse of the objectionable word, without the adoption of any substitute for it. Is a term, which is merely a higher generalization of two subjects, usually studied distinctively, and represented in Universities by two or more separate chairs, absolutely necessary, or even highly convenient, for the promotion of scientific research? Would not the Biological section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science conduct its affairs as well under the title of the Zoological and Botanical section, as under its present more compact and euphonious, but decidedly unphilological, and, therefore, unscientific designation? I lately read that the late Arctic expedition had "supplied us with a great mass of additional knowledge, especially as regards the biology and physical geography of the newly discovered regions." A few years back, instead of *biology* the writer would have said the *Fauna and Flora* of those regions, with no loss of elegance, and with a decided advantage in point of linguistical propriety. If those who have occasion to use the word would only remember Prof. Huxley's candid acknowledgment that it is a "bad word," and only to be tolerated on the unphilosophical plea of "too late to mend," surely they would not grudge going a trifle out of their way, and by avoiding the use of the term themselves, help to bring about its gradual discredit and final extinction in the sense which it has hitherto borne.

2. But what shall we do with the discarded word? I answer: let the admirers of what is now periphrastically called *Social Science* assert its claim to be admitted amongst the *ologies;* and having regard to the wide use of *βίος*, as defined in this paper, let them consider whether the objects and uses of that branch of science, which they so zealously and laudably cultivate, may not be fairly represented by the term BIOLOGY.

"Social Science," says a former President of the Association for the Promotion of that science, "I take to be the acquisition of such knowledge as shall enable the human community by which the earth is inhabited to reach the highest level of moral and physical well-being, which is compatible with the original

conditions of their existence." And if I were promulgating a new science under the name of Biology, I should define its object to be, in the words of Polybius, *ἡ ἐπανόρθωσις τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου*[1], *the correction of human life*, a definition of which Lord Dufferin's account of Social Science is little more than an expansion. The task is an Herculean one, in both senses of that epithet; it is an arduous task, and it is the very one which (as we have seen) Hercules, in his generation, and according to the requirements of that early stage of society, set himself to perform, *ἐκκαθαίρειν τὸν βίον, to purify the world*, by ridding it, as the great Grecian hero of boars, lions and hydras, so the associated heroes of Adam Street, Adelphi, of the monstrous abuses, the Augean accumulation of social disorders and derangements, which stand between the human race and the "highest level of moral and physical well-being," which it is capable of attaining. But if the "club and lion's skin" should appear to belong to a state of civilization widely different from that with which modern professors have to deal, coming down a few ages, we meet with the honoured name of one whom the cultivators of Social Science would do well to adopt as the founder of their faith, and the model of a true social philosopher. SOCRATES, says his biographer, *πρῶτος περὶ* BIOΥ *διελέχθη*[2]. *Common life* was his lecture-room, his laboratory, his observatory. The subject of his researches was, as he himself avowed,

> *Ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται,*
> Whate'er of good or ill our homes enshrine[3].

Socrates, writes the great Roman philosopher, *primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque bonis et malis quaerere*[4]. If the papers hitherto read at the Social Science congresses should appear to have turned too much upon the smaller details (yet not small in their aggregate bearing upon human happiness) of sanitary requirements, mercantile laws, the treatment of lunacy and the statistics of crime, perhaps the assumption of a new name, at once more comprehen-

[1] Polyb. Histor. i. 35, 1.
[2] Diog. Laert. Vit. Socr. v.
[3] Hom. Od. Δ. 392.
[4] Cic. Tusc. v. 4.

sive and more elevated than the original designation, may have the effect of bringing out more conspicuously, and keeping more steadily in view, the great aims and landmarks of the Science of Life, and of reducing all its parts into harmonious proportion with each other and with the whole. At the congress of 1878, the President of the Art section (then for the first time admitted into the programme of the Association) thought it necessary to apologize for the intrusion, and to answer the question, "What has Fine Art to do with Social Science?" But if the enquiry had been, "What has Fine Art to do with Biology?" the respondent might have taken up a higher tone. He might have asked in return, What would human life be, stripped of all those elegances and refinements, which exercise a humanizing influence upon all classes of society, down to the very lowest; which contribute so largely to the employment of the idler, and the enjoyment of the busier, part of mankind? What but a *βίος ἀβίωτος*, destructive of the ends, and unworthy of the name, of life? The eloquent eulogium of Cicero upon one of the polite arts is equally applicable to them all: *Haec studia adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant; secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solatium praebent; delectant domi, non impediunt foris; pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur*[1]. Let the Biologist of the future take for his motto, *Humani nihil a me alienum puto.* Let the National Biological Association, if such should ever come into existence, write upon its banners (to wit, the title page of its annual volume of Transactions)

> Quicquid agunt homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas,
> Gaudia, discursus, nostri est farrago libelli[2].

[1] Cic. pro Archia poeta 7.

[2] Juven. Sat. 1. 85.

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Norwich, *August*, 1879.

HORATIANA.

Carm. II 2 1—4.

Nullus argento color est auaris
abdito terris, inimice lamnae
Crispe Sallusti, nisi temperato
splendeat usu.

ALIKE Lambinus' 'abditae' and Bentley's the only rational elucidation of the MS reading compel the words 'auaris terris' to mean the miser's coffers: now when Horace says carm. III 3 49 sq. 'aurum *inrepertum* et sic melius situm, *Cum terra celat*, spernere fortior Quam cogere humanos in *usus*' he is to be sure taking the other side as a poet may, but the parallel does seem to show that 'auaris terris' here must have its natural sense of the mine, 'in her own loins She hutcht the all-worshipt ore' as Comus says. And is not 'inimice lamnae, nisi temperato splendeat usu' or 'auaris abditae terris inimice lamnae' a most dark and helpless way of saying 'open-handed Sallust'? And then how 'inimice' and its train of dependants encumber and overbalance the sentence. If then as seems likely it is in 'inimice' the corruption lies, this is what I would suggest:

nullus argento color est auaris
abdito terris, *minimusque* lamnae,
Crispe Sallusti, nisi temperato
splendeat usu.

'Silver in the mine has no lustre at all, nay even when coined it has next to none, without it is burnished by changing hands.' This at least does away with the obscurity and redresses the

balance of the sentence. It is chiefly I suppose because Horace was at no period unread that the corruptions in his MSS seldom lie on the surface, they present a resemblance at least superficial to sense and metre: if 'minimusque' by two common errors became 'inimusce' the further change to 'inimice' was all but inevitable.

Carm. III 5 31—40.

Si pugnat extricata densis
cerua plagis, erit ille fortis
qui perfidis se credidit hostibus,
et Marte Poenos proteret altero
qui lora restrictis lacertis
sensit iners timuitque mortem.
hic unde uitam sumeret inscius
pacem duello miscuit. o pudor!
o magna Carthago probrosis
altior Italiae ruinis.

In this the reading of most MSS and well-nigh all editions Bentley justly finds fault with the lame climax 'timuitque mortem', and 'hic' used where the poet should and might have used 'ille': he might too have added, what sort of writer is Horace if 'mortem' and 'uitam' here have nothing to do with one another? But there is this deeper fault in the reading, that it makes Regulus lose the thread of his argument; for what is he debating? not what is done and cannot be undone, the surrender of the army, but its ransom, the matter in hand: his aim is to fence off the pernicies ueniens in aeuum, the flagitio additum damnum, the probrosae Italiae ruinae, and down to v. 36 he is speaking straight to the point; but here with a full stop at 'mortem' he loses his way and drifts off into mere exclamation about what is past mending and will remain the same whether he gains his cause or loses it.

But several good MSS, that of Queen's College Oxford among them, have 'aptius' for 'inscius', and very many more give it for a varia lectio: Bentley then accepting this, proposed 'timuitque mortem Hinc, unde uitam sumeret aptius, Pacem *et*

duello miscuit', comparing carm. III 11 38 'ne longus tibi somnus *unde* Non *times* detur'. This removes at once the faults of the passage and saves Horace's credit as a rhetorician: 'hinc' for 'hic' is the slightest of changes, carm. I 17 14 and 21 13 the MSS have 'hinc' where 'hic' must be right: but his insertion of 'et' has not much likelihood, as he himself tacitly acknowledges on IV 4 18.

But can 'pacem duello miscuit' in Horace mean 'confounded war with peace'? Horace who five times elsewhere uses 'duellum' uses it with a marked restriction, always of some single war, never of war in the abstract: the word's fancied connexion with 'duo' was maybe at the bottom of this: war as opposed to peace is 'bellum' carm. II 19 28 'idem *Pacis* eras mediusque *belli*' serm. II 2 111 'in *pace*, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea *bello*' 3 268 'in amore haec sunt mala, *bellum*, *Pax* rursum': if he wants to use 'duellum' thus he must use the plural epist. II 1 254 'tuisque Auspiciis totum confecta *duella* per orbem, Claustraque custodem *pacis* cohibentia Ianum'. I will suggest then that Horace here too was true to his custom and wrote 'pacem*que* *be*llo miscuit': 'u' and 'b' are in his MSS as in others much confused, carm. III 23 19 'mollibit' for 'molliuit', I 20 10 where Munro emends 'uides' for 'bides' or 'bibes', 25 20 Aldus' 'Euro' for 'Hebro' is probably right: 'be' then might well fall out after 'ue', and the senseless 'pacemquello' would be readily altered by the change of one letter to 'pacem duello'.

Carm. III 11 15—20.

> Cessit immanis tibi blandienti
> ianitor aulae
> Cerberus, quamuis furiale centum
> muniant angues caput eius atque
> spiritus taeter saniesque manet
> ore trilingui.

Perhaps neither 'eius' alone nor 'spiritus manet' alone would be intolerable, but surely the pair of them is more than man can stand: so at least thought Bentley Meineke and

Haupt. Haupt and Meineke however betake themselves to the coward's remedy of declaring the stanza spurious: Bentley perceiving that the alteration of 'eius atque' into a verb for 'spiritus' rids us at one stroke of both inconveniences proposes 'exeatque': he cites instances of 'spiritus exit' but candidly adds 'verum hic notandum est, quod in his locis *spiritus exit* de iis duntaxat dicatur, qui moribundi animam expirant. Quare ad euitandum Ambiguum, utinam Noster scripsisset potius *exeatque halitus teter*'. I propose then 'effluatque' a word which can well be applied to 'spiritus' or the like, Ovid met. VI 233 'ne qua leuis *effluat aura*', Cic. n. d. II 39 '*aer effluens* huc et illuc uentos efficit'. Of all errors 'i' for 'l' is perhaps the most frequent, 's' for 'f' by no means unusual, and if a copyist read or wrote 'essiu atque' then 'eius atque' was not far off.

Carm. III 26 1—8.

Vixi puellis nuper idoneus
et militaui non sine gloria:
nunc arma defunctumque bello
barbiton hic paries habebit,
laeuum marinae qui Veneris latus
custodit. hic hic ponite lucida
funalia et uectes et arcus
oppositis foribus minaces.

Of all weapons the one which doors and doorkeepers can best afford to laugh at is an 'arcus' in any known sense of the word: Bentley's 'securesque' however is not likely, no more is Keller's 'et ascias': indeed it surely is plain enough there is no keeping 'et': you can almost count up the available substantives on your fingers and see that none of them will do. But is it a substantive that is wanted? Theocritus cited by Bentley has πελέκεις καὶ λαμπάδες, and that Horace had this in his head is likely enough; but why then when Theocritus mentions only two sorts of 'arma' should he mention three? Surely hatchets alone or crowbars alone are all that is wanted in addition to the torches, and his 'uectes' do duty for Theocritus'

πελέκεις. Then as to the symmetry of the sentence: 'funalia' has an epithet to itself, and that 'uectes' should tally with it is at anyrate as likely as not. What I am trying to make out is that here we have a corruption such as Bentley detected in 'eius atque', that 'et arcus' represents a single word, probably then an imperative co-ordinate with 'ponite': can it be 'et uectes sacrate Oppositis foribus minaces'? 'sacrate' with the change of one letter is 'et arcus' written backwards: to be sure I know of no quite parallel corruption, but in Propertius (Baehrens) III 5 25 DV give 'integras' for 'et nigras' precisely reversing the first four letters.

Carm. IV 4 65—68.

Merses profundo, pulchrior euenit;
luctere, multa proruet integrum
cum laude uictorem, geretque
proelia coniugibus loquenda.

Many seem to have felt the strangeness of 'merses, euenit' followed by 'luctere, proruet geretque', yet 'exiet' is quite out of the question, and 'proruit' and 'geritque' are not very taking. And then the unexampled use of 'euenire'? The MSS vary between 'merses' 'mersus' and 'mersae': 'mersus' which has most authority is of course impossible and is attributed by Keller to the Mavortian recension: among those which have 'mersae' is Keller's liber archetypus F (= $\phi\psi$), one of the MSS which preserve for instance the genuine reading 'rumpit' carm. III 27 5. I think it then not unlikely Horace wrote 'mersae profundo pulchri*us* euenit', like 'male istis eueniat' etc.: a copyist misunderstanding the construction might readily write 'pulchrior', compare the corruption of 'ad uentum' to 'aduentus' carm. I 23 6. This at all events does away with both difficulties at once.

Carm. IV 12 5—8.

Nidum ponit Ityn flebiliter gemens
infelix auis et Cecropiae domus
aeternum obprobrium, quod male barbaras
regum est ulta libidines.

Bentley says 'ideo aeternum opprobrium *quod* sive *quia* male ulta est mariti libidines', that is he makes 'obprobrium' nominative, 'quod' = 'quia' and refers 'ulta est' to 'auis': all commentators seem to follow him in the main. You can hardly have demonstration on a point like this; but does not 'auis et obprobrium ponit nidum' make a strange hendiadys? one would rather expect 'obprobrium' to be placed in apposition. I should be inclined to take 'obprobrium' like 'Ityn' as governed by 'gemens', 'quod' = 'namely that', and refer 'ulta est' to Cecropia domus: 'Cecropiae domus' will then be the 'auis' and her sister: 'lamenting Itys, lamenting too her sister's infamy and her own, their dreadful revenge on Tereus'.

Epod. 1 7—14.

Utrumne iussi persequemur otium
non dulce, ni tecum simul,
an hunc laborem mente laturi, decet
qua ferre non molles uiros?
feremus et te uel per Alpium iuga
inhospitalem et Caucasum
uel occidentis usque ad ultimum sinum
forti sequemur pectore.

The great awkwardness of 'laturi' here = 'laturi sumus' has led Nauck to put a comma after 'laborem' and govern it by 'persequemur': this however only makes matters worse, as 'persequemur otium' means 'Shall I pursue my present stay-at-home life': now it is absurd to make Horace say 'Shall I continue to stay at home or continue to go to the wars'. Another objection, though perhaps not a serious one, I will mention, which applies alike to both interpretations: they make Horace ask a question of Maecenas to whom throughout this poem he is speaking, and then take the words out of Maecenas' mouth and give the answer in his own person. The punctuation I propose then is this,

utrumne iussi persequemur otium
non dulce, ni tecum simul,

an hunc laborem mente laturi, decet
qua ferre non molles uiros,
feremus, et te uel per Alpium iuga
inhospitalem et Caucasum
uel occidentis usque ad ultimum sinum
forti sequemur pectore?

He then makes Maecenas answer this question by a counter-question, 'roges, tuum labore quid iuuem meo Imbellis ac firmus parum', and everything runs smoothly. Perhaps it is not worth much that Porphyrion's lemma consists of these words thus written, 'an hunc laborem mente laturi decet qua ferre non molles uiros feremus'.

Epod. IX.

Quando repostum Caecubum ad festas dapes
uictore laetus Caesare
tecum sub alta (sic Ioui gratum) domo,
beate Maecenas, bibam
sonante mixtum tibiis carmen lyra,
hac Dorium, illis barbarum,
ut nuper, actus cum freto Neptunius
dux fugit ustis nauibus,
minatus urbi uincla quae detraxerat
seruis amicus perfidis?
Romanus eheu (posteri negabitis)
emancipatus feminae
fert uallum et arma miles et spadonibus
seruire rugosis potest,
interque signa turpe militaria
sol aspicit conopium.
ad hunc frementes uerterunt bis mille equos
Galli canentes Caesarem,
hostiliumque nauium portu latent
puppes sinistrorsum citae.
io Triumphe, tu moraris aureos
currus et intactas boues?
io Triumphe, nec Iugurthino parem

bello reportasti ducem,
neque, Africani cui super Carthaginem
uirtus sepulcrum condidit.
terra marique uictus hostis punico
lugubre mutauit sagum.
aut ille centum nobilem Cretam urbibus
uentis iturus non suis
exercitatas aut petit Syrtes noto
aut fertur incerto mari.
capaciores affer huc, puer, scyphos
et Chia uina aut Lesbia,
uel quod fluentem nauseam coerceat
metire nobis Caecubum.
curam metumque Caesaris rerum iuuat
dulci Lyaeo soluere.

I am constrained to cite this poem in full, though it now has but one critical difficulty, because I think I can contribute something to its elucidation as a whole. It takes some nerve to say it, but I am much deceived if all the commentators I have read are not strangely out in supposing it written after, not before the battle of Actium: I really think this only wants pointing out to be self-evident. Let us see: vv. 1—6 will square equally well with either view: they are generally taken to mean 'when shall we have a chance of carousing together over this victory of Caesar's': they may just as well mean 'when will Caesar win his victory and set us carousing'. On vv. 7—10 I will only say it seems to me unlikely he would care to say so much about Sex. Pompeius in the full blaze of Actium, but I lay no great stress on this. Vv. 11—16 the tense is generally taken to be historical, if I am right it will be present. Vv. 17—20 are important: the critical hitch in v. 17 need not delay us for the present: vv. 17, 18 seemingly refer to the defection of Amyntas and Deiotarus with their Galatians some time before the battle: what do vv. 19, 20 refer to? The older commentators say to Cleopatra's flight to Alexandria: if that is so, my theory of course crumbles away, and with it Horace's reputation for a decent style: to announce the defection of

2000 men out of 100,000, and then in the same breath, as an afterthought, that the world is lost and won! The lines refer then to some naval defection or mishap or mismanagement matching the desertion of the Galli on land: what 'sinistrorsum citae' means perhaps no one will ever know: Bentley suggests it may be some nautical technicality, and if so we need not be astonished at our ignorance, seeing that Cicero did not know the meaning of 'inhibere remis'. What sort of poet now is this who with the thunder of Actium in his ears can dwell on the desertion of a handful of barbarians, and mention the 'hostilium nauium puppes' without saying they are burnt to the water's edge? To proceed: I suppose it is vv. 21—32 that have thrown the commentators off the scent: I shall be surprised if any one familiar with the locutions of poetry finds a difficulty here, but if he does I will cite a parallel: 'The mother of Sisera looked out at a window, and cried through the lattice, Why is his chariot so long in coming? why tarry the wheels of his chariots?' Set that now against 'io Triumphe, tu moraris' cet., and with 'terra marique uictus' cet. compare 'Her wise ladies answered her, yea she returned answer to herself, Have they not sped? have they not divided the prey; to every man a damsel or two; to Sisera a prey of divers colours?' this interrogation being of course in Hebrew poetry tantamount to the strongest affirmation. Horace too returns answer to himself, and the answer is not correct in its details: if these lines are meant as a rejoicing over Actium, then what is the meaning of 'terra uictus'? there was no land-fighting at all, except a cavalry skirmish some days before the battle: a week or so after the battle Antonius' main army laid down its arms without a blow disgusted at the desertion of Canidius. Is that then what Horace means? but if so this poem must have been written full a fortnight after the battle, and that is incompatible with the ignorance vv. 29—32 about Antonius' flight. Truth to tell the poet is trying like the mother of Sisera to cheer himself with glowing anticipations, and finding this unavailing is driven to 'capaciores scyphos'. The last lines vv. 33—38 are generally supposed to inaugurate a carouse over the victory, though Horace takes pains to say that

they do nothing of the kind : 'curam metumque'! why, what anxiety, what fear could Horace have for the conqueror with the world at his feet? that Octavianus' difficulties were not over with Actium may be true as a matter of history, but was Horace the man to say so or this the time for saying it? 'Fluentem nauseam' alone should be enough to show that the poem was written in the breathless hush before the battle, when Italy and the world were in agonies of suspense, 'in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum Omnibus humanis esset terraque marique'.

I now come to the well-known crux in v. 17: 'ad hunc' has by far the most MS authority: perhaps an easy and satisfactory correction would be 'at nunc', which Horace as Munro has pointed out probably wrote 'ad nunc'. 'Frementes' must surely belong to 'equos' not 'Galli', see carm. IV 14 23 'frementem mittere equum': it is almost an epitheton sollemne. If there is anything in what I have been saying above, 'nunc' will seem quite necessary to mark the change from dark to the first streak of light.

A. E. HOUSMAN.

ON A PASSAGE IN THE RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM.

*** This paper was read at a meeting of the Oxford Philological Society, Nov. 19, 1880. Since then H. Jordan has published the suggestion 'quotannis' for 'quodam is' in the Hermes (May, 1881), p. 48; whether or not for the first time, I am not aware.

W. W. F.

IV. 54. 68. 'Breuitas est res ipsis tantummodo verbis necessariis expedita, hoc modo; Lemnum praeteriens cepit, inde Thasi praesidium reliquit, post urbem Lysimachiam sustulit, inde pulsus in Hellespontum statim potitur Abydo. Item: modo consul quodam is deinde primus erat ciuitatis. Tum proficiscitur in Asiam, deinde hostis est dictus, post imperator et populi Romani consul factus est'.

THE text here given is that of Kayser's separate edition of the Rhetorica (1854), which has not been improved upon by Baiter and Kayser in their joint edition (1860). Of the two examples of 'breuitas' given in the passage, the first is very corrupt, and attempts to restore it must necessarily be doubtful in the absence of any certainty as to the events referred to in it. The last three words, however (statim potitur Abydo), may be accepted as certain on the manuscriptal evidence, and may possibly supply a key, as I shall presently show, to the meaning of the rest of the example.

The second example, which is less corrupt and more important, has generally been considered as giving a terminus ex quo for ascertaining the date of the publication of the

Rhetorica[1]; a date which is incidentally of much weight in determining the relation between this work and the De Inventione of the youthful Cicero. The person whose public career it so succinctly sketches has been understood by the editors, though not universally by the copyists before them[2], to be L. Cornelius Sulla. The last words of the example have consequently been referred to his second consulship in B.C. 80, and no allusion to any event of a later date than this has as yet been discovered in the four books of the treatise.

If then this work was written or even published shortly after B.C. 80, we might expect to find in it at least occasional allusion to the stirring and crowded events of the years immediately preceding. Strange to say, the last event before that date which can be clearly shown to be alluded to, is the murder of Sulpicius in B.C. 88[3]: and though references are frequent to occurrences of the Gracchan and Marian periods, these eight years of terror and civil war are entirely passed over. It is of course perfectly possible that the author may have had a reason of his own for this at which we cannot now arrive; but there are two further difficulties, wanting as yet satisfactory solution, which have led me to suspect that the book has been post-dated by several years, and that the 'consul factus est' of the passage quoted above does not refer to Sulla or to B.C. 80, but to some other person, and to an earlier date.

The first of these difficulties can here be only briefly indicated. It is now generally believed, on what seems satisfactory evidence, that Cicero in writing his fragment de Inventione had the Rhetorica ad Herennium before him[4]; and on the supposition that the latter work was published in or after the year B.C. 80, the date of the former should be at earliest B.C. 78

[1] See the Preface to Kayser's edition, p. XI. Kayser is followed on this point by Teuffel, Rom. Lit. sec. 149, 2. Blass, Griech. Beredsamkeit, p. 121, and Prof. Wilkins, Introduction to Cic. de Or. p. 52.

[2] This is shown by the introduction of the word 'tribunus' into the text of one MS., as is explained below, and in the reading 'Africam' for 'Asiam,' which, though undoubtedly wrong, shows that the copyist was thinking of Marius.

[3] i. 15. 25; iv. 22. 31.

[4] Kayser Pref. XI; Spengel, Rhein. Mus. xviii. p. 495. Cp. Drumann, R. G. vol. v. p. 230.

or 77, *i.e.* at a time when Cicero was close upon thirty years old[1]. But Cicero himself, in a well-known passage in the De Oratore (I. 2. 5), writes of his earlier rhetorical work as composed 'pueris aut adolescentibus nobis'; and however loosely he may be expressing himself, it is at least surprising that he should describe himself as still so youthful at a time when he had already made his mark as an orator, and was on the point of entering on his public career as a magistrate[2]. Kayser has tried to get rid of this difficulty by supposing that the four books of the Rhetorica were not all published at once, and that Cicero may have had access to the first three before the publication of the fourth, which contains our passage with its alleged allusion to Sulla's consulship in B.C. 80. The guess is ingenious and far from unreasonable; but it becomes at once superfluous if it can be shown that the year 80 is wrongly assigned as a terminus ex quo for the date of the whole work.

The other difficulty simply consists in the fact that the second example of 'breuitas' in the passage quoted above cannot be tortured into yielding any allusion to Sulla or to the year B.C. 80 without severe treatment and a very imperfect result. If the reader will follow it closely with the aid of Kayser's critical apparatus and of an exact knowledge of the chronology of the period, I believe he will find, that the following propositions, taken together, will place it almost beyond a doubt that Sulla is *not* the person meant to be referred to:—

1. If Sulla be meant, the antithesis of the 'modo' and 'deinde' at the beginning of the example will be entirely lost: for the words 'modo consul' can only refer to Sulla's first consulship in B.C. 88, while 'deinde primus erat ciuitatis' must be forced to refer to his mastery of the situation at Rome *that same year*, after the death of Sulpicius and flight of Marius to Africa. He was consul during the whole of the year 88, and 'primus ciuitatis' during the latter half of it, and it can hardly be supposed that a careful writer, framing an

[1] He was born Jan. 3, B.C. 106, Drumann, p. 216 reff.

[2] Pro Quinctio, B.C. 81; Pro Rosc. Am. 80; election to quæstorship, 76.

example of 'breuitas' with great exactness, would point this relation of part to whole by using the words 'modo' and 'deinde.'

2. The first sentence of the example runs thus in the best MSS.: 'Modo consul quodam is deinde primus erat ciuitatis'. Now for the obviously corrupt reading 'quodam is' no correction has ever been suggested, so far as I am aware, on the supposition that Sulla is the person alluded to. A single MS (μ) of the best family has 'quondam tribunus', which was corrected by a later hand to 'quondam tribunus is'. Even if 'tribunus' were the true reading and not an obvious interpolation, it could not of course refer to Sulla, who never was or could have been tribune. But this reading is put entirely out of court by the awkwardness with which it breaks in on the contrast of the 'modo' and 'deinde'.

3. The next words are 'Tum proficiscitur in Asiam'. If Sulla be meant, they are curiously inexact for an author writing so near the event. Sulla went in B.C. 87, not to Asia but to Greece; he did not cross the Hellespont[1] till early in 84, and remained in Asia but a very short time. The words which follow ('deinde hostis est dictus') may on the other hand refer easily enough to the outlawry of Sulla by the Senate before his return from Asia—probably on his refusing to give up the command to Flaccus in B.C. 85.

4. In the concluding words of the example, if Sulla be meant, the word 'imperator' is meaningless, or at least needs a justification which it has not yet found. It is true that Sulla was technically 'imperator' from the day on which he left Rome in 87, till the day he resigned his Dictatorship in 79. But the word, if here used of Sulla, must be meant in some such special and extended sense as was afterwards given it by Augustus; and we have no evidence whatever that Sulla in this point anticipated the Empire[2]. Both Sulla and Cæsar

[1] Liv. Epit. 81 to 83: Fischer Zeittafeln, p. 184.

[2] In the inscription on the famous equestrian statue, which (according to Appian, B. C. I. 97) ran, 'Κορνηλίου Σύλλας ἡγέμονος εὐτυχοῦς', we must understand ἡγέμονος as translating 'Dictatoris' and not 'Imperatoris', since the latter would have been rendered αὐτοκράτωρ by a Greek writer. See Mommsen in Corp. Inscr. Lat. i. 163.

found the Dictatorship sufficient for their purposes, and studiously avoided the invention of titles of doubtful Republican orthodoxy.

5. The words 'populi Romani' which follow are not to be found in any MS, but were introduced by the Juntine editors in 1537 as a correction for 'populorum' which is given by all the MSS of the best family, as well as by a large majority of the others hitherto collated. It is plain that these editors forgot that they were dealing with an example of 'breuitas'—res tantummodo verbis necessariis expedita—, or they would have hesitated before inserting an emendation so flat and superfluous. On the other hand 'populorum' seems to have no possible meaning, if Sulla be the person alluded to; for 'populorum consul' is sheer nonsense, and if the 'et' be misplaced, 'imperator populorum' is almost equally so.

These considerations seem to me to put it beyond doubt that the author of the Rhetorica, who in this fourth book framed his own examples[1], never intended that Sulla should here be understood as alluded to. A still closer examination of the text and of the circumstances of the time will be found (if I am not mistaken) to clear up all these difficulties, and at the same time to elucidate the real meaning of the example. There is but one other person whose history it can possibly be meant to sketch, and it remains to be shown that the chief events in the life of Marius correspond with it in every particular. These were

1. Five consulships, in B.C. 107, 104, 103, 102 and 101, all of which, it should be carefully noted, were spent almost entirely in the field in Africa and Gaul.

2. Sixth consulship in B.C. 100, spent in Rome; where Marius, with the help of Saturninus and Glaucia, was omnipotent during the entire year, or at least until the death of Saturninus, which did not take place till December.

3. Departure for Asia in the year following, on the recall of Metellus. He remained in Asia for several years in a private capacity, and on his return served without distinction in the early campaigns of the Social War.

[1] iv. 4. 7; iv. 7. 10.

4. Struggle with Sulla for the Asiatic command in 88, ending in his flight to Africa and proclamation as a public enemy[1].

5. Return to Italy after the departure of Sulla for Asia in March 87; during the autumn of that year Marius and the other generals of the populares are at the head of Italian armies directed against Octavius and the Sullan government at Rome.

6. Seventh consulship in January 86, held only for a few days until his death.

I now present the example as I believe it should be read by the light of these well-known facts.

'Item: modo consul *quotannis*[2] deinde primus erat ciuitatis. Tum proficiscitur in Asiam, deinde hostis est dictus, post imperator populorum[3] et consul factus est'.

It will be found that the six landmarks in the public career of Marius are here indicated with as complete exactness as could be expected in an example specially framed to illustrate 'breuitas'; viz. 1. 'Modo consul quotannis' gives the succession of consulships from 104 to 101, 'ipsis tantummodo verbis necessariis'. 2. 'Deinde primus erat ciuitatis' gives the exact position of Marius in B.C. 100. 3. 'Tum proficiscitur in Asiam' gives the voluntary exile of Marius in B.C. 99. 4. 'Deinde hostis est dictus' gives his expulsion from Italy in 88, after which he was proclaimed 'hostis' by the Senate. His previous return from Asia and service in the Social War are not indicated, as neither could be called a turning-point in his fortunes.

[1] Appian B. C. i. 60.

[2] For the constant interchange of 'quot' and 'quod', see e.g. Corp. Inscr. Lat. vol. i. 1016; Festus p. 178 October equus.....immolatur quod) annis); Mr Munro on Hor. Od. ii. 3. 11, in number 18 of this Journal. By this correction the sentence seems to me to gain exactly that unusual and antithetical incisiveness which we should look for in an example specially framed to illustrate breuitas.

[3] I have here placed the 'et' after instead of before 'populorum'. At first the natural correction seemed to be 'post imperator et populorum *pro*consul factus est'; but the omission in that case of any allusion to the seventh consulship of Marius would imply that the book was completed before that event; and this, as I shall show, is very improbable.

5. 'Post imperator populorum' will be found to give with exactness the position of Marius in Italy on his return from Africa in the middle of 87[1]. He was furnished by the consul Cinna with the proconsulare imperium and the fasces, doubtless in order to give him, technically hostis as he still was, a definite position in the eyes of his soldiers. Secondly, the army he commanded, like those of Cinna, Carbo, and Sertorius at the same time, was composed beyond doubt of the Italian *populi* still in arms[2], together with large numbers of the new Italian cives who were discontented with the inferior position assigned them by the Senatorial government in a limited number of tribes. This campaign in fact, though commonly called the first Civil War, was in reality only a new phase of the Social or Marsic War; the new feature being that one party at Rome was now heading the Italians against the other. If we had the eighth and ninth decades of Livy, we should no doubt find, as we may guess from his Epitomist, that throughout the war the Italians were called 'populi Italici' or 'populi' only; and in an example of 'breuitas', framed by a person writing soon after the war, it would be perfectly natural to term a general at the head of an Italian army 'imperator populorum'. 6. 'Et consul factus est' refers of course to the election (or rather appointment) of Marius as consul for the seventh time after the occupation of Rome by the united armies in January 86.

If these arguments are well grounded, it will be apparent that in the seventh consulship and death of Marius, we have a more natural and more reliable terminus ex quo for the date of the Rhetorica, than the second consulship of Sulla. But if January 86 is the latest point of time that can with any certainty be considered as alluded to in the treatise, have we

[1] This is expressly stated by Plutarch (Marius 41) in a passage too explicit to be the result of a misapprehension, and possibly derived from Posidonius, who was in Italy a few months later, and had an interview with Marius on his death-bed (H. Peter, Quellen Plutarchs p. 103; Plut. Mar. 45). A parallel case of the illegal assumption of 'imperium' will be found in Sall. Catilina 36.

[2] Liv. Epit. 80. (Samnium). App. B. C. i. 67. (Etruria). Cp. Kiene, Bundesgenossenkrieg p. 298; Mommsen, R. H. (Eng. Tr.) iii. 317 foll.

any grounds for hazarding a conjecture as to the *exact* date of its appearance? I am inclined to think that the year in which the work was actually completed was 84, on the evidence of the other example of breuitas, which immediately precedes the one I have been discussing:

'Lemnum praeteriens cepit, inde Thasi praesidium reliquit, post urbem Lysimachiam sustulit, inde pulsus in Hellespontum statim potitur Abydo.'

Corrupt as these words are, they will help us, if 'Abydo' is the true reading; for comparing them with Appian (Mithrid. 56), we may guess that they refer to the movements of Lucullus and the fleet co-operating with Sulla early in 84[1]. If this be so, the precision of the writer in detailing the movements of the Roman admiral, together with the fact that the passage is almost at the very end of the work, suggest a probable completion and a possible publication very shortly after the news of these events reached Rome[2].

Whether or not this be the exact date, we are now in any case rid of our former difficulties. We no longer have an entire absence of allusion to any event in the eight years between the death of Sulpicius and the second consulship of Sulla. We are no longer surprised that Cicero should have written of the De Inventione as the work of a mere stripling, for if our reasoning is correct, it might well have been written when he was no more than five-and-twenty, and before he had come under public notice as the defender of either Quinctius or Roscius of Ameria. And lastly the conjecture of Kayser as to the delay in the publication of the fourth book of the Rhetorica may now be safely dispensed with.

I may add that it seems to me by no means impossible that the author of this work, who had made no secret in it of his

[1] Lucullus, according to Appian, seized Abydos in advance of Sulla, in order to secure the safe passage of the Hellespont for his chief.

[2] Kayser (notes, p. 310) sees in iv. 52. 66 (example of sermocinatio) an allusion to an outrage at Larinum adverted to by Cicero (pro Cluent. 8. 25), which must have occurred in 83, after Sulla's return to Italy. But this cannot be proved from a comparison of the two passages; for in the former no names are given, and in the latter no details.

sympathy with the cause of the populares and Italians[1], may have perished in the Sullan reign of terror which followed close on its publication. This would account in some degree for the mystery which has shrouded its authorship, and for the fact that we hear of no subsequent work by the same hand. It is at any rate quite fruitless to attempt to identify the author with any individual known to have been living at a later date, whether bearing the name of Cornificius or any other.

[1] See e.g. iv. 9. 13, 22. 31, 34. 46, 55. 68. The name of Herennius, to whom the book is dedicated, also suggests Italian and Marian associations. Plutarch Marius ch. 5.

W. WARDE FOWLER.

DISSIGNARE.

This word, which I hope to shew should be carefully distinguished from *designare*, is treated even by the most recent lexicographers (Lewis and Short, and Georges in his seventh edition), as an alternative form of that word. It is indeed agreed on all hands that *dissignator* is the right word, not *designator*, for the official who presided over funeral or other games: but I am not sure whether the verb *dissignare* has been set in its right connection with *dissignator* and *dissignatio*. I suppose that *dissignare* as implied in the words *dissignatio* and *dissignator* must mean literally to mark out or arrange in different directions, and so to order or dispose, while *designare* means to mark out in one direction, or to mark out in a single line, and so plan or design. *Dissignare* has sometimes, I think, been corrupted into *designare*, but I doubt whether the converse has taken place. Vitruvius constantly uses *designo* in its proper sense, and if Müller-Strübing's *apparatus criticus* may be trusted, the manuscripts do not give *dissignare* for *designare* in a single instance. Nor is there any confusion between the two words in the manuscripts of Vergil, who twice uses *designare* of marking out the walls of a city. Again, is *consul dissignatus* ever found for *consul designatus?* In two passages, however, of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* (1 § 26, 3 § 85) manuscripts of good character give *dissignari* and *dissignata* where *designari* might be defended. 1 26 Anaxagoras...primus omnium rerum descriptionem ac modum mentis infinitae vi ac ratione dissignari atque confici voluit. 3 85 Ut enim nec domus nec res publica ratione quadam ac disciplina dissignata videatur si &c. In both pas-

sages *designari* might perhaps stand, but *dissignari,* to be arranged or disposed, seems to give a better sense.

But in the following passages (some of which, from the Christian writers, I owe to Paucker) there can be little doubt that *dissignare* is the right reading: and it will be interesting to follow its various meanings.

Corpus Inscriptionum Rhenanarum no 161 (Brambach) NI DISSIGI[LS]ZNS NIVEVENS TISVOVIS. Brambach would read neu *discindatis* neu violetis opus: Georges quotes neu dissigilletis: why not neu *dissignetis?* do not unseal or tear open: comp. Augustine De Moribus Manicheorum 13 30, signaculi dissignator, he who tears off the seal. Metaphorically Augustine uses *dissignare* for to violate, outrage a custom: C. D. 15 16 2 qui (mos) cum...immoderationem continentiae coerceat, eum dissignari atque corrumpi merito esse nefarium iudicetur.

Manuscript evidence which is above suspicion also gives us *dissignare* and *dissignatio* in the sense (apparently) of tearing open or divulging unlawfully what ought to be kept sacred and secret, so to utter something wrong or unlawful. Plautus Most. 413 (Ritschl) according to B, though the editions give *designata:* quae dissignata sunt et facta nequiter: Apuleius M. 8 28 (so F) quasi contra fas sacrae religionis dissignaverit aliquid: Arnobius 1 63 nec reputandum putavit quid ille dissignasset, dummodo suis ostenderet se. 7 6 si quid animal caecum atque in nubibus semper ignorationis incedens dissignaverit, dixerit qui illorum minueretur auctoritas; (is *dixerit* a gloss?) 7 9 abolitionem dissignationibus comparari. And Porphyrio on Horace Epistles 1 5 16 says *dissignat,* aperit.

Whether this is the right interpretation of this passage may, however, be doubted. For Nonius p. 96, according, not to the editions, but to the excellent Harleian manuscript, of which my friend Mr J. H. Onions has just made a full collation, has the following note; *dissignare,* cum nota et ignominia aliquid facere. Terentius Adelphis (87) Illa quae ante facta sunt Omitto; modo quid dissignavit? where the Bembine has *designavit,* but the other good manuscripts *dissignavit,* and Donatus, according to the printed editions, says *designare* est rem novam facere in utramque partem...*designatores* dicti qui ludis fune-

bribus praesunt. But we know on the authority of very good inscriptions that these functionaries were called *dissignatores:* we need therefore feel no hesitation in reading *dissignarit* both in Terence (as Nonius would have us) and in the note of Donatus. Nor do I see any reason why we should not adopt the explanation given by Nonius and Donatus. From meaning to tear open, to treat with violence, *dissigno* with a cognate accusative neuter might readily come to mean to perform any startling or violent act, any act which upsets the existing order of things: and this is exactly the sense required in the often-quoted line of Horace, 'Of what miracle is not intoxication capable?' *Operta recludit, Spes iubet esse ratas, ad proelia trudit inertem, Sollicitis animis onus eximit, addocet artes.*

HENRY NETTLESHIP.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE BOOKS OF KINGS.

THE enquiries of Nöldeke[1], Wellhausen[2] and Krey[3] have established the artificial character of the Hebrew Chronology from the Exodus to the Return from the Captivity. There are 480 years from the Exodus to the founding of the temple, and 480 according to the list of Judaean kings from the founding of the temple in Solomon's fourth year to the Return. I note that the epoch-making year does not reckon as the close of the old but as the beginning of the new cycle. Thus B.C. 535, the year of the Return, is the first year of the new theocracy. Further it appears that where historical data failed the chronological intervals were filled in, as appears most distinctly in the period of the Judges, by numbers based on a generation of 40 years as the unit. The system as a whole is later than the Return, which is its fixed starting-point, and Wellhausen has shewn in his edition of Bleek's *Einleitung* that 1 Ki. vi. 1, the key verse of the system, is late and did not stand in the LXX. It thus becomes a point of great interest to determine which of the detailed dates, especially in the period of the kings, are traditional, which systematic.

Now in the earlier Judaean reigns the only dates other than those of accessions to the throne refer to the temple, its plundering by Shishak, the change of the system of temple revenues by Joash. These dates are not systematic, and doubtless are derived

[1] *Untersuchungen zur Kritik des Alten Testaments*, p. 173 sq.

[2] *Jahrbb. f. Deutsche Theol.*, 1875, p. 607 sq.; Bleek's *Einleitung*, 4th edition, p. 264 sq.; *Geschichte Israels*, p. 287.

[3] *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.* 1877, p. 404 sq.

from the temple records, from which we have several curious and valuable extracts in the books of Kings. They deserve therefore our special attention. The change in the revenue system is dated in the 23rd year of Joash. It was a very important change, tending towards the centralisation of the hierarchic system, by bringing funds that formerly belonged to the whole priestly guild under the immediate control of the high priest, and it continued in force in the days of Josiah. According to the present chronology this change took place in the 161st year from the founding of the temple. It marks the commencement of the second third of the cycle of 480 years. Again if we reckon 160 years from this epoch we come to the year of Hezekiah's death. The first year of Manasseh, whose reign is characterised as the decisive cause of Judah's rejection, begins the last third of the great cycle, the period of decline and captivity.

In the first third the details are filled in by the aid of the number 40, subject to the condition that 37 (= 40 − 3), the part of Solomon's reign after the temple was founded, and 22 (= 20 + 2) years of Joash are fixed data. This requires one period of 20 years, which is assigned to Jeroboam and Abijah, one of 41, which goes to Asa, and one of 40, which is the period of the influence of the house of Omri on Judah—Jehoshaphat to Athalia inclusive.

In the second period Hezekiah's reign was fixed at 29 years (30 − 1), by the fact that Sennacherib attacked Judah in his fourteenth year, and that fifteen years were added to his life after the sickness which occurred "in these days." Again Joash reigning a round 40, 18 years of his life (20 − 2) belonged to the new era. The other reigns had to supply a 2 and a 1 in the unit place, an 8 and a 3 for the tens. Accordingly Amaziah and Azariah give 81 years, Jotham and Ahaz 32.

In the third period the length of Zedekiah's reign (11 years) was known; for 2 Kings xxv. 8 is confirmed by Jer. xxxii. 1, 2 Kings xxiv. 12 and fixed by the synchronism of Nebuchadnezzar. The length of the captivity was also known to be fifty years (585—536 inclusive), for in Babylonia dates were carefully kept. Now 160 − 50 gives 110 years for the reigns from

Manasseh to Zedekiah inclusive. The length of Josiah's reign was also known to be 31 years from Jer. xxv. 1—3. On these data 11 was the natural factor by which to subdivide the reigns, and we find Manasseh $= 5 \times 11$, Amon and Josiah $= 3 \times 11$, Jehoiakim $= 11$. If the last clause of Jer. xxv. 1 is genuine, the 11 years of Jehoiakim are also confirmed by a synchronism of his fourth year with Nebuchadnezzar's first; but the clause is wanting in the Septuagint, as is also the name of Nebuchadnezzar at ver. 9 and xlvi. 26. According to Jer. xlvi. 2 the fourth year of Jehoiakim was the date of the battle of Carchemish when Nabopolasar was still alive. In any case the 55 years of Manasseh are suspicious. They have been challenged by Wellhausen on independent grounds.

The kingdom of Ephraim also lasted 240 years. Wellhausen and Krey reckon 242, and then correct the number by two years with the aid of the Jewish synchronisms. This process is arbitrary, since we know that these synchronisms are not part of the original chronology; it is also unnecessary, for the number of 242 is got by allowing a year for Zechariah and Shallum, who have no more right to be counted than Jehoahaz of Judah, who is not reckoned in Jer. xxv. The true sum is 241, and the epoch making year of Samaria's fall (the 9th of Hoshea) must be deducted, as in the case of the Judaean periods. The kingdom thus lasted 240 full years.

Now the first sure date, not an accession, supplied by the northern history, is the commencement of the great Syrian wars. There were two years' campaign under Ahab, then a year of rest; and in the following year, the third year from the foregoing campaign according to Hebrew reckoning, Ahab was killed. Four years of Ahab's reign belong to the Syrian wars. Now Ahab on the present chronology died in the 84th year from the division of the kingdom. The Syrian wars commence therefore in the 81st and open the second third of the whole 240 years of the kingdom. Again the 79th year of the Syrian wars is the last of Joash. Jeroboam II. succeeded and completed the deliverance begun by his predecessor (2 Kings xiv. 28 with xiii. 19). One year of Jeroboam is thus reckoned to the Syrian period, and his whole reign is 41 years. The last 80

years consist of 40 years of glory under Jeroboam and 40 of decadence to the year of Samaria's fall exclusive.

In this reckoning it is somewhat disturbing that one year of Jeroboam II. goes to the Syrian wars. This however is connected with a variation in the tradition. In 2 Kings xiii. Joash, but in 2 Kings xiv. Jeroboam, appears as the deliverer of Israel and the restorer of the lost territory on the Syrian frontier. To reconcile these statements it was necessary to take part of Jeroboam's reign into the Syrian period; but as three campaigns of Joash were recorded to have recovered the lost cities (xiii. 25) one was enough for his son.

The eighty years' period for the Syrian wars seems however to be older than this adjustment, and to belong to the cycle of prophetic narratives from which the fundamental date in Ahab's reign is derived. For it is noteworthy that Elisha dies just before the three campaigns of Joash. But in like manner Elijah first appears three years before the Syrian wars. The 80 years of war would thus on the present chronology correspond to a 79 years' ministry of these prophets. The discrepancy of one year between these periods appears to be connected with the variation in the tradition as to the close of the Syrian wars, and naturally suggests the conjecture that an earlier adjustment of the chronology gave Jeroboam only 40 years and assigned the odd year to an earlier king, so as to make the Syrian wars end with Joash's three campaigns. On this scheme we get an eighty years' period for Elijah and Elisha. It is not unlikely that this eighty years' prophetic period was the basis of the chronology, since all the numerical data apart from accessions belong to the prophetic cycle. If so it is also possible to explain as systematic the numbers given to the individual kings within the period. We have

Elijah under Ahab	7 years				War under Ahab 4
Ahaziah	2 [3]				
Joram	12	40	19 [20]	13+7=20 or	
Jehu	28				
Jehoahaz	17				
Elisha under Joash	13				Joash 16

But on the hypothesis one of these kings has to get the year

withdrawn from Jeroboam II. It belongs either to Ahaziah or to Jehoahaz. I apprehend that Ahaziah is the right person, for 3 and 7 are the usual numbers in the prophetic narratives (3 years and 7 years of famine, $42 = 6 \times 7$ children, 3 years' peace, &c.), and Joram has 3×4, Jehu 7×4 years. Ahaziah was afterwards reduced to the normal 2 of the short reigns in the finished scheme, and a year was given to Jeroboam II.

The construction of the first 80 years is so far on the same model that 22 years of Jeroboam I. + 18 of Ahab = 40 or half the entire period. But of course we cannot expect to find a uniform system carried out through all the details of the Chronology. The conclusion to which the present observations point is that the existing chronological scheme was obtained by setting down a small number of dates given in the old records as fixed points, and filling up the intervals by a system of interpolation in which 20 and 40 were the main units. But the details were necessarily subject to given determining conditions, for it was known in a general way that some kings had long reigns, and others short. We might have expected that it would also be thought necessary to preserve those synchronisms between kings of Judah and Israel, which were given for example by the deaths of Joram and Ahaziah in the revolution under Jehu. The fact that these synchronisms are not observed, and that the hand which finally added the detailed synchronisms of accessions in the North and South accomplished his work only by the highly arbitrary mode of calculation, which Wellhausen has explained in *Jahrbb. f. D. Theol.*, 1875, confirms the arguments adduced in this paper to shew that the main lines of the Northern and Southern Chronology were originally drawn from mutually independent data.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH.

ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN PASSAGES IN THE AGAMEMNON OF AESCHYLUS.

These remarks on the Agamemnon of Aeschylus are submitted in an honest desire to throw light into some of the dark corners of this greatest of ancient tragedies. They are made in the full knowledge of the fact—of which indeed only very superficial scholars can be ignorant at this day—that there are still many passages of the Agamemnon which no skill of scholars has ever been able to clear up, and which will probably always remain a battle-ground for critics.

There is one source of knowledge to which many will think it is no longer of any avail to turn for new light on Aeschylus: I mean the manuscripts. The list of these is easily given, so far as the Agamemnon is concerned. The Medicean with its two copies, all sadly mutilated and containing less than a quarter of the Agamemnon; the two Venetian fragments; the Florentine and the Farnese, the only two which contain the whole tragedy;—these are the whole. And it might reasonably be thought that the careful collations of the older scholars had exhausted the resources of these few manuscripts and left them (to use Bentley's expression) like "squeezed oranges." I will first give a few examples to show that this is not entirely correct. A short inspection of the Codex Venetus (616 in the Library of St Mark), containing Agam. 1—45 and 1095 to the end, showed that some gleanings yet remained in that fragment. In vs. 1196 this MS. reads plainly τὸ μὴ δέν^{αι}, i.e. τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. Although this reading is adopted in many modern editions,

it is always given as an emendation (see Paley's and Weil's notes). Hermann says: "Omnes [i.e. codices], τό μ' εἰδέναι... Apertum est aut deesse negationem, aut ineptum esse λόγῳ." Others, as Schneidewin, accept τό μ' εἰδέναι on the authority of the MSS., and explain or emend to avoid the inconsistency which Hermann points out. Again, in vs. 1127 many editors accept μελαγκέρῳ in the belief that this is the original reading of the Medicean, which now has μελαγκέρωι with ν written over the final ι. But the first reading of the MS. was clearly -ων, which was made -ωι by correction and was afterwards restored by a third hand. Recent editors doubt whether πορθεῖν or ποθεῖν is the reading of the Codex Florentinus in vs. 342 (see Hermann's and Paley's notes), and Hermann accepts ποθεῖν partly on the authority of his collation of that MS., saying "idque ex Flor. mihi enotatum est." But ποθεῖν is really found in no MS. at all, the Florentine (like all the others) having πορθεῖν beyond question. Hermann cites the Codex Florentinus as authority for the singular reading in vs. 345, θεοῖς δ' ἂν ἀμπλάκητος εἰ μόλοι, where I have copied the reading of this MS. (I think correctly) θεοῖς δ' ἀναμπλάκητος. I am at least confident that there is no breathing or other mark over the syllable αμ. I can hardly believe that Hermann's reading could ever have been adopted into any text had it not been for this supposed authority. Apart from the sense, ἄν (belonging to γένοιτο) would be in an absolutely anomalous position thus imbedded in the protasis, which could be defended by none of the ordinary examples of double or triple ἄν in long sentences, still less by the formula οὐκ οἶδα ἂν εἰ, as in Eurip. Med. 941, οὐκ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ πείσαιμι. Besides, the sense of the MSS. reading, θεοῖς δ' ἀναμπλάκητος εἰ μόλοι στρατός, *but (even) supposing the army to reach home without offending the Gods* (as suggested in vss. 338—342), seems best suited to the thought of the following lines, in which Clytemnestra darkly hints that a reckoning awaits the victors after their arrival at Argos, even though they may not incur new wrath of the Gods by sacrilegious plundering at Troy.

The passages which I have selected for discussion belong chiefly to the large class in which it seems to me that the

readings of the manuscripts have been needlessly called in question, and my object is therefore in great part a defence of the manuscript text. In many cases I fear that my attempt will seem both heretical and abortive to older students of Aeschylus, who have generally assumed that certain passages are corrupt, and to whom the emended text has in a measure become the vulgate.

1. Vss. 105—107. *ἔτι γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνείει πειθὼ μολπὰν, ἀλκὰν σύμφυτος αἰών.* Most recent editors read *μολπᾶν* depending on *πειθώ*, and *ἀλκᾷ* depending on *σύμφυτος*, omitting the comma. Hermann reads *ἀλκᾷ* and retains *μολπάν*, but he takes *ἀλκᾷ σύμφυτος αἰών* in the sense of *the time that the war has lasted*, and puts it in apposition with *πειθώ* to express *id quo niteretur ea fiducia*. Other interpretations may be found in Paley's and in Weil's notes. It seems to me that the emendations are far more difficult to explain than the reading of the MSS. as given above. In this reading it is hard to see what there is in either sense or construction to which almost all editors have taken exception. The asyndeton and the chiastic order both suit the sense, and we may translate as follows: "For still (i.e. after these many years of waiting) persuasion from the Gods inspires me with song; still even my old age (literally 'the time that has grown with me' for 'the time that I have lived') inspires me with strength (to sing)." The first clause was clearly so understood by the Medicean scholiast who says: *πείθει γάρ με ἡ παρὰ θεῶν πίστις μέλπειν καὶ λέγειν ὅτι εὖ πράξουσιν οἱ Ἀτρεῖδαι ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ σημείου.* The meaning of *σύμφυτος αἰών* (sc. *μοι*) and the construction of *ἀλκάν* with *καταπνείει* are indicated by the succeeding scholion: *ὁ γὰρ σύμφυτός μοι αἰὼν—ὅ ἐστι τὸ γῆρας—διὰ τὴν εἰς θεοὺς πειθὼ μολπήν μοι καὶ ἀλκὴν καταπνεῖ ὅ ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ γέρων εἰμὶ, ὅμως μέλψω τὰ γεγονότα· πέποιθα γὰρ ὅτι εἰς πέρας αὐτὰ ἄξουσιν οἱ θεοί.* The words *διὰ...πειθώ* here show a reading and interpretation of the first clause which we cannot reconcile with any possible form of the words *πειθὼ μολπάν*. Paley suggests that this scholiast may have read *πειθοῖ*, but his version would require also *καὶ ἀλκάν* or *ἀλκάν τε*. In the Medicean *πειθώ* and *μολπάν* have been changed by a later

hand to πειθῶ and μολπᾶν. Weil gives μολπᾶν as the reading of the first hand; but I feel confident that my own collation is correct here. Perhaps πειθῶ may confirm Paley's suspicion about πειθοῖ. The use of σύμφυτος αἰών (sc. μοι) in the sense of *the time* (or *age*) *which has grown with me* is well illustrated by Agam. 894: ἀμφί σοι πάθη ὁρῶσα πλείω τοῦ συνεύδοντος χρόνου, i.e. *more accidents than could have occurred during the time I was sleeping* (*the time sleeping with me* being used for *the time I was sleeping*). See also Eumen. 286: χρόνος καθαίρει πάντα γηράσκων ὁμοῦ. Hermann quotes also Soph. Oed. Col. 7: ὁ χρόνος ξυνὼν μακρός, and Oed. Tyr. 1082: οἱ συγγενεῖς μῆνες. It may be added that in the former clause ἔτι means *even now, after ten years' waiting for the fulfilment of the predictions*, referring to the omen of the two eagles and the hare, of which the chorus are about to sing, and the interpretation of it by Calchas; the faith of the chorus in the Gods and in the ultimate fulfilment of the predictions *still* remains unshaken. In the second clause ἔτι refers to the chorus *still* having strength afforded even by their old age, εἰ καὶ γέρων εἰμί. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the whole passage in question, ἔτι...αἰών, is a pure parenthesis, the following ὅπως...πέμπει being the development of the idea first expressed by ὅδιον κράτος, etc., in the leading clause.

2. Vss. 249—254. No passage in Aeschylus has been read and explained in a greater variety of ways than this. Between Hermann's τὸ προκλύειν δ' ἤλυσιν προχαιρέτω (τὸ μέλλον being joined with the preceding sentence) and Paley's τὸ μέλλον δ' ἐπεὶ οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν λύσις, προχαιρέτω, there is room for an infinite amount of conjecture and ingenuity. A few recent editors, Schneidewin, Weil, and Enger (1874), adopt a reading which is essentially that of the Farnese MS. in all except the last verse; but none, I believe, now venture to retain the reading of the best MSS. through the whole passage. As the text is so much in question, I give (from my own collation) the exact readings of the three principal MSS. in the first part of the passage. The following is the text of the Medicean (the words and *colon* within the brackets being added by a later hand in blacker ink):

Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν
ἐπιρρέπει
τὸ μέλλον[· τὸ δὲ προκλύειν]
ἐπιγένοιτ' ἂν κλύοις προχαιρέτω.

The Oxford fac-simile of this manuscript (ed. by Merkel, 1871) fails to mark the interpolation in τὸ δὲ προκλύειν, and no one (to my knowledge) has noticed that the colon after μέλλον is a part of the interpolation. Indeed, the total absence of punctuation in the Medicean is an important part of the record.

The Florentine MS. reads:

δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν,
ἐπιρρέπει τὸ μέλλον. τὸ δὲ προκλύειν, ἐπεὶ
γένοιτ' ἂν κλύοις, προχαιρέτω.

The reading of Ven. A (468), so far as it could be deciphered, seemed to agree with that of the Florentine, and it is so given by Hermann. In 1872 the words between προκλύειν and προχαιρέτω were no longer visible, even in the sunlight.

The reading of the Farnese MS. is as follows:

Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν
ἐπιρρέπει. τὸ μέλλον
ἐπεὶ γένοιτ' ἂν κλύοις; προχαιρέτω.

The words τὸ δὲ προκλύειν had evidently been introduced into the text before the Florentine and Venetian MSS. were copied, so that these latter have τὸ μέλλον joined with μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει, while τὸ προκλύειν takes its place as the object of κλύοις. But this construction of τὸ προκλύειν is as fatal to the sense as the introduction of τὸ δὲ προκλύειν into the text at all is to the metre, which is in perfect agreement with that of the strophe without these words. It is obvious that the only construction which the original copyist of the Medicean could have had in mind is that which the copyist of the Farnese MS. (probably Triclinius) adopted in his text, either by conjecture or from some purer source than the interpolated Medicean text. Of course, ἐπιγένοιτ' in the Medicean is only a slip of the pen or the ear for ἐπεὶ γένοιτ', and we thus have the construction τὸ

μέλλον ἐπεὶ γένοιτ' ἂν κλύοις, which requires only δ' after μέλλον to make both sense and metre complete. Davies objects to this reading on the ground that ἐπεὶ γένοιτ' ἄν is not a possible construction. But the construction is τὸ μέλλον κλύοις ἂν ἐπεὶ γένοιτο, *you can hear of the future when it comes*, the assimilating force of κλύοις (a force which is especially strong in poetry) causing what would otherwise be ἐπειδὰν γένηται to become ἐπεὶ γένοιτο. This is like τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλοι (Mimn. I. 2) and ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος ὅ τις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι (Odyss. I. 47), where assimilation alone makes the optatives more natural. Indeed, this example is a strong confirmation of the position on the whole subject of assimilation and its effect on moods which is maintained in the paper on "*Shall* and *Should* in Protasis[1]." There is the same difficulty in translating γένοιτο here in English that is felt in translating μέλοι or ῥέζοι, above; and for the same reason. The position of ἄν, where a comma *might* precede, is not objectionable so long as τὸ μέλλον, which is a part of the clause containing ἄν, precedes the particle, and ἐπεὶ γένοιτ' is only an inserted clause. See Arist. Pac. 137: ἀλλ', ὦ μέλ', ἄν μοι σιτίων διπλῶν ἔδει. The general principle that ἄν cannot be the first word in a clause, even after a comma, is subject to this limitation, not to speak of others.

The Medicean scholiast who wrote against vs. 249 τοῖς μὲν πεπονθόσιν ἡ δίκη δίδωσι τὸ μαθεῖν evidently had the original construction in mind. But the following note, δίκην γὰρ δόντες μανθάνουσι τὸ μέλλον, must come from some one who joined τὸ μέλλον with μαθεῖν in the text. When τὸ μέλλον is rightly taken with the following words, it will also be the natural subject of προχαιρέτω, which τὸ προκλύειν could hardly be.

In vs. 253 all MSS. and editions agree in ἴσον δὲ τῷ προστένειν. If the interpolated τὸ δὲ προκλύειν is left out of the text, τὸ προχαίρειν (sc. τὸ μέλλον) will be the subject; i.e. *for the future to be dismissed (bid farewell) before it comes is just as well* (ἴσον) *as lamenting it before it comes*, for it will surely come, whichever we do. When, however, τὸ δὲ προκλύειν was added, it was taken as subject here, and the meaning was sup-

[1] *Journal of Philology*, Vol. VIII. p. 33 sqq.

posed to be *hearing the future beforehand is equivalent to bewailing it beforehand,* on the ground that it must be full of sorrow. The later scholiast on this verse has this idea when he says: *ὁ γὰρ προγιγνώσκων τὸ μέλλον καὶ προστενάζει.* Indeed, it is highly probable that *τὸ δὲ προκλύειν* was first written in the margin as the subject (understood) of *ἴσον ἐστίν,* as it only adds confusion to all the other constructions.

A greater difficulty comes in the last line. Here there is little or no dissent among recent editors from the emendations of Wellauer and Hermann, *τορὸν γὰρ ἥξει σύνορθρον αὐγαῖς,* for *συνορθὸν αὐταῖς* (Med. and Ven.). For *συνορθόν* Flor. and Farn. have *σύναρθρον.* The words *σύνορθρον αὐγαῖς* are sometimes understood as referring to the actual rays of the morning sun (just about to rise), sometimes to the metaphorical sunlight which is expected to break upon the darkness of uncertainty in which the Argives at home have been living. The objections to *συνορθὸν αὐταῖς* are, first, that *συνορθός* does not elsewhere occur, and secondly and chiefly, that *αὐταῖς* cannot be referred to the distant *τέχναι* without great violence to the sense and still greater obscurity. But *συνορθός* (or perhaps *σύνορθος*), though a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον,* is no more so than *σύνορθρος,* and is, moreover, amply justified by the compounds *ἄνορθος, upright,* with the cognate verb *ἀνορθόω, set upright again,* and *ἔξορθος* with *ἐξορθόω.* We have the verb *συνορθόω* in Arrian (see Lexicon); and an adjective *συνορθός, coincident with,* would naturally be expected. Compare *συνόμιλος, σύμμετρος, σύνοξυς,* and other such compounds of *σύν.* A word thus analogically formed, and found in the Medicean MS. of Aeschylus, is not open to objection as a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον,* provided it suits the sense of the passage. (See also § 6, below.) We come now to *αὐταῖς,* which cannot be referred to anything nearer than *τέχναι* Κάλχαντος in vs. 248. But those terrible words *τέχναι δὲ Κάλχαντος οὐκ ἄκραντοι,* following the minute description of the preparations for the sacrifice of Iphigenia, and taking the place of an account of the sacrifice itself, suddenly bring before the mind the awful reality which faces the chorus as they think of the condition of things. These words give unity to the whole choral song, and show more

plainly than any exact language could have done that the Argive state now stands on the brink of a new gulf of horrors, which may well exceed all the ancient horrors of the house of Pelops. Let us trace the course of thought which runs through the whole chorus, that we may see more clearly the exact relation of the verse in question to the whole. The first stasimon and the lyric parodos (from vs. 104) form in subject a single ode.

The chorus first describe the omen which was seen as the Argives marched forth to Troy, two eagles devouring a pregnant hare. This Calchas interpreted as portending the capture and destruction of Troy by the Argives. But, with an ominous reserve, he fears *only* that some divine displeasure may cast a gloom over the bright prospect; for Artemis is watching with envious eyes her father's winged hounds, the two eagles, and the two sons of Atreus whom they represent, and she "loathes the eagles' banquet." And as Artemis, the friend of all the beasts of the field, is asking her father Zeus to fulfil what the prodigy portends, the bad as well as the good, so the prophet in turn prays Apollo to prevent his sister from detaining the Argive fleet by any contrary winds, which he fears she may do in her eagerness for "a new sacrifice, a lawless one, of which no man can partake, a kindred worker of strife, that fears not man." "For," Calchas adds with double significance at the close, "child-avenging wrath (i.e. the wrath that avenges a child's murder) abides firm, terrible, ever rising afresh, haunting (directing) the house, treacherous, ever remembering." To the Argive chieftains just setting forth for Troy this was terrible enough, as reminding them of the vengeance that still was due for the murder of the children of Thyestes; while to the chorus, who quote it after ten years, it has gained a new and more terrible meaning through the "new sacrifice" at Aulis. To the chorus, therefore, and to the audience—who know even more than the chorus—these last words of Calchas pronounce the doom of the guilty race. The vague forebodings of the prophet—his fear lest some divine power might possibly darken the prospect, lest Artemis might detain the fleet, lest this detention might in some way cause "a new sacrifice"—had all been

realized in the fullest sense; a child, the darling daughter of the King of Men, had been sacrificed to the father's ambition; and now nothing could save the race of Atreus from the double retribution of "child-avenging wrath." In this state of mind, with the hope of victory thus darkly clouded by the sure approach of retributive justice, the chorus again sing, in harmony with the words of the prophet, *αἴλινον, αἴλινον εἰπὲ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω* (vss. 104—159).

The chorus now invoke the aid of Zeus, the only power which can relieve them from the load of anxiety which oppresses them. Ouranos and Kronos, the elder divinities, are past and gone; but he who calls on the name of Zeus with willing heart shall gain perfect wisdom. But the law of Zeus makes wisdom the result of suffering; the "trickling of drops of torturing recollection before the heart in sleep" sobers men often in spite of themselves. And it is on the whole a gracious boon that this is so (vss. 160—183).

Then, by a sudden transition, the chorus describe the conflict in the mind of Agamemnon when he is told that his daughter's life is demanded by the army as a sacrifice to appease Artemis and still the opposing winds. He yields to the demand and to his own eagerness for victory. Then follows the graphic account of the preparations for the unnatural sacrifice, the maiden's prayers and cries to her father for help, the lifting of the victim "like a kid" upon the altar, her falling robes, the gags which checked her voice, and then her speechless appeal to the heroes whom she had often seen as her father's guests; Iphigenia lies upon the altar, ready for the sacrificial knife, "beautiful as a picture" (vss. 184—246). But here the chorus suddenly pause, and the last scene is left to be imagined. They say:

"*But what followed we saw not, and we tell it not. But* [we do say] *the prophetic arts of Calchas must bring fulfilment* (i.e. the vague horror of his predictions in vss. 147—155 must surely be realized). *But* [it is only by actual experience that we shall ever *know* what penalty is to be exacted for the sacrifice of Iphigenia, for] *Justice brings knowledge within the reach of those* [only] *who have suffered* (*πάθει μάθος*); *the*

future you can hear of when it comes; before that bid it farewell, and this is as well as to lament it beforehand; for [whatever we do] *it will come out clear and plain in full accord with these* (prophetic arts)."

It seems to me that no one can thus take a connected view of the whole song without feeling that the interpretation here given to the transmitted text of the last verses is not merely possible but highly appropriate. There is a special force in *αὐταῖς*, referring to the solemn words *τέχναι δὲ Κάλχαντος οὐκ ἄκραντοι* with emphasis at the end of a sentence which begins as parenthetical, but which thus leads the thought at the close back to the point from which it digressed. The gender of *αὐταῖς*, moreover, makes the reference to *τέχναι* much clearer in Greek than it can be made in English by our vague "them" or "these." Indeed, the ambiguity which *we* feel here can hardly be said to extend to the Greek.

The emended reading *σύνορθρον αὐγαῖς*, understood literally, *with the rays of the coming morning* (*orietur cum luce solis eventus*, Hermann), implying that the mystery is to be cleared up at sunrise, cannot give the correct meaning if *τὸ μέλλον* has been rightly explained above. For "the future" here includes not merely the question of the capture of Troy (which *was* to be decided at once), but also and chiefly the dreadful question of the doom impending over the race which had spread the Thyestean banquet and had sacrificed a royal princess on the altar of its ambition. This last question, as the chorus have said, can be decided only after the knowledge of the future has come through suffering; it is this knowledge that the chorus will bid farewell, for they have as yet no suspicion of the immediate doom which awaits Agamemnon on his return. The thought furthest from the minds of the chorus is that the coming dawn is to settle *this* terrible question. This interpretation is therefore opposed to the obvious sense of the preceding words. It is perhaps to avoid this that some recent editors understand the "rays of dawn" metaphorically, not of the morrow's sunrise, but of the future emerging from the darkness of futurity into the light of the present. In this view we have merely a strong expression for "the future will

come to light plain and clear." As this cannot be called impossible, two questions arise: first, whether this interpretation is better suited to the whole sense of the passage than the one proposed above, which adds the idea that the future which is to come out "clear" must accord with the prophecy of Calchas; secondly, whether, if this is preferred, it is so superior to the sense afforded by the manuscript reading that it must be purchased by introducing into the text two conjectures, one a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον*. I can hardly doubt what answer will be given to these questions by unbiassed scholars, especially by those who will reconsider their opinions from the beginning on a passage about which they have already made up their minds.

I have felt that the importance of these verses, which determine the final turn of thought in one of the grandest of lyric songs, and greatly affect the whole impression which the ode makes, is a sufficient justification of the space given to the discussion of them.

3. Vss. 931—943. These verses stand thus in the manuscripts (not to notice unessential variations):

ΚΛ. *καὶ μὴν τόδ' εἰπὲ μὴ παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοί.*
ΑΓ. *γνώμην μὲν ἴσθι μὴ διαφθεροῦντ' ἐμέ.*
ΚΛ. *ηὔξω θεοῖς δείσας ἂν ὧδ' ἔρδειν τάδε;*
ΑΓ. *εἴπερ τις, εἰδὼς γ' εὖ τόδ' ἐξεῖπον τέλος.*
ΚΛ. *τί δ' ἂν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τάδ' ἤνυσεν;* (935)
ΑΓ. *ἐν ποικίλοις ἂν κάρτα μοι βῆναι δοκεῖ.*
ΚΛ. *μή νυν τὸν ἀνθρώπειον αἰδεσθῇς ψόγον.*
ΑΓ. *φήμη γε μέντοι δημόθρους μέγα σθένει.*
ΚΛ. *ὁ δ' ἀφθόνητός γ' οὐκ ἐπίζηλος πέλει.*
ΑΓ. *οὔ τοι γυναικός ἐστιν ἱμείρειν μάχης.* (940)
ΚΛ. *τοῖς δ' ὀλβίοις γε καὶ τὸ νικᾶσθαι πρέπει.*
ΑΓ. *ἦ καὶ σὺ νίκην τήνδε δήριος τίεις;*
ΚΛ. *πιθοῦ· κράτος μέντοι πάρες γ' ἑκὼν ἐμοί.*

In the interpretation of these much-disputed verses, I differ from Paley, where he has expressed his opinion, chiefly in regard to vs. 933 (906 Paley); but it is impossible to discuss a single verse of a *στιχομυθία* by itself. In the speech just

finished, Agamemnon has expressed a decided repugnance to making himself a mark for divine vengeance, after his great victory, by walking into his palace upon a path spread with purple embroideries. He is well aware of his danger, already hinted at by the chorus: *τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ ἄσκοποι θεοί* (vs. 461), and *τὸ δ' ὑπερκότως εὖ κλύειν βαρύ* (v. 469); and his mind cannot be entirely free from anxious recollections of Aulis and Iphigenia. Clytemnestra, who is still more awake to the importance of the crisis, is determined that her husband's last act shall be one of defiance against the Gods. But it is a time for coaxing and for arguments (especially *ad hominem*), not for open quarrelling with her husband. She therefore says (vs. 931): "Now don't say you won't walk on the embroideries, and so go against my wishes." I think that *μή* stands after its verb merely to make *παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοί* more prominent and to show that the interference with her pet plan for the king's reception is what she has most at heart. The poet says *παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοί* (rather than *ἐμήν*) as he might have said, *παρὰ γνώμην ἐμοί ἐστιν, it is against my wishes* or *not to my mind*, opposed to *κατὰ γνώμην ἐμοί ἐστιν*. In this verse *γνώμην* means *wish, hope* (cf. Dem. Ol. I. § 16, p. 14: *ἄν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῇ*); but in the next verse (932) Agamemnon repeats the word with emphasis, giving it a slightly different turn by the change in expression. He says: "As to *γνώμη*, please understand that I shall not let my purpose (*γνώμην*) be weakened." This leaves Clytemnestra where she began; and she now tries a new style of argument, addressed to his sense of shame: "Could you possibly have vowed to the Gods in some time of fear that you would act thus?" The form of the question implies, with bitter sarcasm: "Surely *you*, Agamemnon, could never have had a moment of terror in which *you* could make such a vow!" Agamemnon has already (vs. 924) said that walking on embroideries is *ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἄνευ φόβου*. But he now replies with dignity and apparent firmness: "If ever a man declared a decision knowing perfectly what he was about, I have done it now." Hermann says of *τέλος* here: "Sic dictum ut sit pro decreto." This reply suits perfectly the meaning which I have given to the preceding

verse, and is not at all open to the objection which Professor Kennedy (*Journal of Philology*, VII. 13, p. 17) makes to Mr Paley's similar version, that it "is no reply to the previous words of Clytemnestra: it is a mere repetition of his refusal, '*No, I won't,*' in another form, rudely ignoring what his wife had said." Mr. Paley had omitted the interrogation-mark at the end of vs. 933 (906) and translated: "*You would have vowed to the gods to act thus in time of fear,* i.e. you are pursuing a course more like one in peril than a victor." But if we suppose Clytemnestra to have just suggested the possibility (or rather the impossibility) of Agamemnon's having been *frightened* into a vow that he would act with humility if he should ever capture Troy, the dignified reply of her husband is just what would be expected.

A third argument is now tried. Agamemnon is asked what Priam would have done if he had gained so glorious a victory; and he replies that Priam would undoubtedly have walked on embroideries. After he has been further asked to disregard human censure, and has replied that the voice of the people still has mighty power, Clytemnestra tells him that it is not desirable to escape the *φθόνος* of men, for "he who is unenvied is not an enviable man," i.e. he who escapes *φθόνος* is not the object of *ζῆλος* (is not *ζηλωτός*). It seems as if Agamemnon here decided that he was no match for his wife in "chopping logic," and that it would be better on the whole to make no more ungracious objection to her plan for his reception; and yet his scruples were by no means overcome, as appears in vss. 944—949, below. He shows his disposition to yield (as he had doubtless often yielded before) by saying: "It is not like a woman to be so eager for a fight as you are." The queen replies, now sure of her point: "It becomes the prosperous to submit even to defeat," i.e. they can afford to yield a point like this. Agamemnon rejoins, partly in scorn, but chiefly in jest: "Is *this* the kind of victory in a strife which *you* hold in honor?" i.e. the victory (*νίκη*) which consists not in *τὸ νικᾶν* but in *τὸ νικᾶσθαι*. He speaks as if *νίκη* could be the equivalent of both *τὸ νικᾶν* and *τὸ νικᾶσθαι*, as *τιμή* is of both *τὸ τιμᾶν* and *τὸ τιμᾶσθαι*, and asks his wife if she adopts

this principle for herself as well as for him. Professor Kennedy translates this verse: "Do you really care for victory in this dispute?" This requires a change of τήνδε to τῆσδε, which I cannot feel is necessary unless some objection can be urged against the interpretation given above. Nothing now remains for Clytemnestra but to ask that her husband's compliance may be not forced but willing.

I should thus translate the whole passage, following the reading of the MSS. (as given above):

CL. And now don't say this and disappoint my wish (γνώμην).

AG. My purpose (γνώμην) be sure I shall never weaken.

CL. Could you ever have vowed to the Gods in any time of fear that you would act as you now do?

AG. If ever a man declared a decision knowing well what he was about, I have done it now.

CL. But what do you think Priam would have done if he had accomplished what you have? (935)

AG. I am very sure *he* would have walked on embroideries.

CL. Now don't be afraid of the blame of men.

AG. Yet the voice of the people has mighty power.

CL. But the lot of the unenvied man is not enviable.

AG. It surely is not womanly to be (so) eager for a fight. (940)

CL. But it is becoming to the prosperous even to let a victory be gained over them.

AG. What! is *that* the kind of victory which *you* hold in honor (for yourself as well as for me)?

CL. Be persuaded (i.e. never mind which kind of victory it is): at all events let me prevail (here) by your consent.

4. Vss. 1025—1029:

εἰ δὲ μὴ τεταγμένα
μοῖρα μοῖραν ἐκ θεῶν
εἶργε μὴ πλέον φέρειν,
προφθάσασα καρδία
γλῶσσαν ἂν τάδ' ἐξέχει.

Every student of Aeschylus knows how unsatisfactory are all the widely divergent opinions of editors on these verses. Paley's translation — "But if the appointed law of fate did

not hinder fate from getting further assistance from the gods, my heart outstripping my tongue would pour out these feelings" — seems to give a literal sense of the words in a perfectly grammatical construction; and his note on the last two verses shows, I think, that Schutz's emendation *καρδίαν γλῶσσα* is not only unnecessary but injurious to the sense. But can we rest satisfied with this interpretation of the first three verses? I trust that *any* suggestion on so obscure a passage will appear better than none.

I think, first, we must certainly take *μοῖρα μοῖραν* in a reciprocal sense, like *ἄλλος ἄλλον*; and secondly, *πλέον φέρειν* must mean *bear away more than its due,* after the analogy of *πλέον ἔχειν, to have more than is due.* Πλέον *φέρεσθαι* is common in the sense *have an advantage* (cf. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 500: *πλέον ἢ ἐγὼ φέρεται*); and a similar use of the active *φέρω* is familiar, as in Soph. Oed. Col. 651: *οὐκ οὖν πέρα γ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἢ λόγῳ φέροις.* The meaning of the passage will then be: "But did not one fate appointed by the Gods (sometimes) hinder another (fate appointed by the Gods) from securing more than its due, my heart would outstrip my tongue and pour forth its present burden." This seems to point to a doctrine of "interference" between two lines of fate, by which either may be checked or balanced in a course which would, if unhindered, prove too destructive. The chorus would thus imply that this last desperate hope is all that they can still see to warrant them in hiding their feelings longer *ὑπὸ σκότῳ* (vs. 1030). In this song the gloomy forebodings of the chorus assume a more definite form. The earlier songs have hinted darkly at coming disaster; while the description of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, the allusions to the slaughter at Troy, and the fears of the consequences of human pride, all disclose grounds for the gravest apprehension. But these fears are all vague and general; now, however, after Agamemnon has entered his palace, timidly *πορφύρας πατῶν*, and Clytemnestra has assured him in bitter irony that she has at her command the whole Ocean to supply "purple" to the royal house, the chorus feel that a deed of blood is close at hand. They do not yet divine its nature, least of all do they suspect that Agamemnon was

walking to his death; but there is "murder in the air." The general tenor of their song is as follows:

"Why does this hovering phantom ever flit before my heart, and why can I not spurn it and restore confidence to my soul? I have seen the Argive host set sail for Troy; and now with my own eyes I have witnessed its return. But still my heart of its own impulse sings the Fury's lyreless dirge, and refuses to be encouraged by hope. And I know that this feeling within me is not all in vain, and that it points to some fulfilment of my forebodings; but yet I pray that my fears may prove groundless and without result.

"Great prosperity is ever insatiate to extend its limits, reckless of the close neighbourhood of calamity; and human fortune as it sails onward often strikes a hidden reef. Yet the sacrifice of part of the cargo to save the rest may keep the ship from sinking and the fortunes of the house from falling, and one plenteous harvest averts all danger of famine. But far otherwise is it when the life-blood of a man has once fallen to the earth; this no incantations can recall. Were this not so, Zeus had never stopped Aesculapius from raising the dead. My only hope is in the thought that one line of fate fixed by the Gods may sometimes interfere with another line of fate (also fixed by the Gods) and so hinder it from securing too much; were this not so,—had I not this desperate hope to encourage me,—my heart would outstrip my tongue and pour forth all its burden. But, as it is, I can only hide my grief in darkness, sore vexed, and with no hope of ever seeing order come out of this confusion, while my soul is burning within me."

The passage in question thus supplies an important link in the chain of thought, and gives the ground on which the chorus decide to suppress their feelings a little longer. The appearance of Cassandra now gives a sudden turn to the play, and the affrighted chorus are for the first time made aware of the real danger which awaits them.

It may be said that no such doctrine of the interference of two lines of fate as is here supposed can be found elsewhere in the Greek religion. Even if this is true, I contend that such a doctrine appears *here* by the only interpretation of the language

which is at once plain and consistent with the context. It cannot be too clearly understood that the ideas of fate which make the Μοῖραι the superiors of Zeus, and the King of the Gods merely a helpless agent in their hands, are not Aeschylean. The verses of the Prometheus (517, 518):

ΧΘ. *τούτων ἄρα Ζεύς ἐστιν ἀσθενέστερος;*
ΠΡ. *οὔκουν ἂν ἐκφύγοι γε τὴν πεπρωμένην.*

represent only the threats of a defiant rebel against the whole divine order of the world as this was established under Zeus; they refer moreover to a disaster which Zeus did avert by his own free-will. Greek orthodoxy—certainly the orthodoxy of Aeschylus—speaks plainly in the following verse (519), in which the chorus indignantly ask

τί γὰρ πέπρωται Ζηνὶ, πλὴν ἀεὶ κρατεῖν;

The doctrine of Prometheus probably represents a more ancient and gloomy view of inexorable necessity ruling both Gods and men, while the later view gave the government of the world to a wise and beneficent personal ruler, the director of other subordinate rulers, who had displaced a harsher dominion, and whose laws were made for the best good of mankind in general. These laws, however, the laws of nature, though beneficent on the whole, were inexorable and unyielding, often bringing misery upon the innocent children of a guilty race as the result of ancestral crime, but still by that very misery working out the great purpose of Zeus and making men wise through suffering. This stern, inexorable course of nature's laws, which all creeds must recognize, whatever they may choose to call it, seems to be the Fate of Aeschylus, the *μοῖρα τεταγμένα ἐκ θεῶν*. The Homeric *μοῖρα θεῶν* or *αἶσα Διός* stands in the same general relation to the more primitive government of the world by special interventions in which an earlier age believed. The frequent statues of *Ζεὺς μοιραγέτης* which Pausanias found in different parts of Greece show an absorption of an ancient idea of independent fate into the more advanced doctrine of the sovereignty of Zeus. (See Pausanias i. 40. 4; v. 15. 5; viii. 37. 1; x. 24. 4.) Now, if

this was the poet's view of fate, that it was the onward march of nature's laws, the universal laws of the Gods, how could he have failed to see that the workings of several such laws, i.e. several lines of fate, may—nay, must often—interfere with each other, like several mechanical forces, and produce a result which is different from any of them? In this view, the chorus simply express a last hope that the line of fate which seems to them to be leading directly to some new deed of blood may perchance be met and balanced by some other line of fate as yet unknown to them, so that the horrors which they see in prospect may be averted.

5. Vs. 1347: *ἀλλὰ κοινωσώμεθ' ἄν πως ἀσφαλῆ βουλεύματα.* This reading of the MSS. was emended by Porson to *κοινωσαίμεθ' ἂν πῶς* (interrogative). The emendation now generally adopted is that of Hermann *ἄν πως* (for *ἃ ἄν πως*). The latter is supported by two passages of Sophocles,—*ἀλλ' ἀναγκάσαι θεοὺς ἂν μὴ θέλωσιν οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δύναιτ' ἀνήρ*, Oed. Tyr. 281; and *φράσον τίς ἐστίν· ἂν λέγῃς δὲ μὴ φώνει μέγα*, Philoct. 574;—in both of which the sense makes *ἄν* for *ἃ ἄν* (= *ἐάν*) of the MSS. an almost certain correction. It is, however, quite as possible that *ἄν πως* in the MSS. is a mistake for *ἤν πως*, so that we should read *ἀλλὰ κοινωσώμεθ', ἤν πως ἀσφαλῆ βουλεύματα* (sc. *ᾖ*), *but let us take counsel, in case there shall prove to be any plans for safety*, i.e. *that we may adopt any plans for safety which there may be.* This is a case of the quite common absorption of the apodosis in the protasis, which sometimes gives *ἐάν* with the subjunctive the appearance of an indirect question. See Plat. Rep. II. 358 B: *ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ, hear me too, in case the same shall please you*, i.e. *that then we may adopt it.* Here the construction is obvious; but in Rep. IV. 434 A: *ἰδὲ δή, ἐάν σοι ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ξυνδοκῇ*, many think they see an indirect question, though they cannot tell us what the form of the direct question would be. The change of *ἤν* to *ἄν* (= *ἐάν*) in the MSS. here supposed is confirmed by three passages of Sophocles,—*ἤν φράσω*, Trach. 672; *ἤν...προσθῇ*, Frag. 323 (Nauck); *οὐδ' ἤν τὸν διδάσκαλον λάβῃ*, Frag. 736,—in all of which the MSS. have *ἄν*. The further question, whether all four passages together do not

furnish ground for an exception to the general doctrine that ἄν for ἐάν was *never* used by the tragedians, need not be discussed here. The meaning of the line with the reading ἤν πως agrees well with that of the preceding verse, *τοὔργον εἰργάσθαι δοκεῖ μοι βασιλέως οἰμώγματι.*

6. Vs. 1599: *ᾤμωξεν, ἀμπίπτει δ' ἀπὸ σφαγῆς ἐρῶν.* Here ἐρῶν is in most modern editions changed to ἐμῶν because ἐράω in the sense of *vomit* does not occur. But ἐρῶν seems amply defended by the compounds ἀπεράω, ἐξεράω, etc., and has rightly been restored (as I notice since reading this paper) by Weil. An instance of ἐξερῶν in this sense is found in Pherecrates (Pers. Frag. 2):

Ὦ μαλάχας μὲν ἐξερῶν, ἀναπνέων δ' ὑάκινθον.

W. W. GOODWIN.

July, 1877.

ON THE FRAGMENTS OF EURIPIDES.

I HAVE taken, as was natural, Nauck's edition of these Fragments (Lipsiae 1869) for the basis of the following remarks. His numbering and arrangement of them have been generally followed; by Dindorf for instance in his latest recension of the Scenic Poets. At the same time I have kept constantly in view the authors who have preserved these fragments for us, of whom Stobaeus is by far the most prolific and important. Editors appear to me to have sometimes unduly neglected the hints afforded by the theme which Stobaeus is illustrating in this or that fragment and thus to have missed the probable meaning.

58. Alexander.

ὦ παγκάκιστοι καὶ τὸ δοῦλον οὐ λόγῳ
ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ τῇ τύχῃ κεκτημένοι.

'vs. 2 *τῇ φύσει* Iacobsius' Nauck. In several fragments of this play slaves in name and by position are contrasted with them who are nominally free, but are slaves from baseness or self-indulgence. I would therefore suggest *τρυφῇ* for *τύχῃ*. Comp. fr. 55 *κακόν τι παίδευμ' ἦν ἄρ' εἰς εὐανδρίαν Ὁ πλοῦτος ἀνθρώποισιν αἵ τ' ἄγαν τρυφαί.*

106. Alope.

ὁρῶ μὲν ἀνδρῶν τόνδε γυμνάδα στόλον
στείχοντα θεωρὸν ἐκ τρόχων πεπαυμένον.

Ammonius quotes this passage to illustrate *τρόχος* = *δρόμος*. 'vs. 2 *στείχονθ' ἑῷον* Dindorfius; equidem suspicabar *ἀνδρῶν— στόλον Στείχονθ' ὁρῶμεν'* Nauck. I propose

ὁρῶ μὲν ἀνδρῶν τόνδε γυμνάδα στόλον
στείχοντ' ἀθύροντ', ἐκ τρόχων πεπαυμένον.

'I see this troop of gymnasts coming on, disporting themselves, now they have done with their racing'. I would suggest in Ion 52 *ἀμφιβωμίους τρόχους* 'Ηλᾶτ' *ἀθύρων* (or perhaps *τροχὰς*, for *τροχῇ* occurs, apparently with the same meaning, in a tragic iambic quoted by Hesychius s. v. *προσαυρίζουσα*), in place of *τροφὰς* which scarcely gives any sense.

149. Andromeda.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις εὐτυχὴς ἔφυ βροτῶν,
ὃν μὴ τὸ θεῖον ὡς τὰ πολλὰ συνθέλει.

' vs. 2 *τὰ πόλλ' ἐπωφελεῖ* Heimsoethius' Nauck. Perhaps *ὡς τὰ πόλλ' αὔξειν θέλει*: this first became *πολλὰ ξυνθέλει*. Comp. Med. 966 *κείνης ὁ δαίμων, κεῖνα νῦν αὔξει θεός, Νέα τυραννεῖ*. This however can scarcely be what Euripides wrote. Mr Verrall observes: '*κεῖνα* for *τὰ ἐκείνης* is a loose expression, and the whole phrase *κείνης—τυραννεῖ* somewhat incoherent... Nauck would strike out *κεῖνα—τυραννεῖ*'. I would suggest

καινῆς ὁ δαίμων, καινὰ νῦν αὔξει θεός,
νέα τυραινεῖ.

Comp. *καινῆς νύμφης* earlier in the play; and 76 *παλαιὰ καινῶν λείπεται κηδευμάτων*.

162. Antigone.

ἀνδρὸς δ' ἐρῶντος εἰς Κύπριν νεανίου
ἀφύλακτος ἡ τήρησις, κἂν γὰρ φαῦλος ᾖ
τἄλλ', εἰς ἔρωτας πᾶς ἀνὴρ σοφώτερος·
ἢν δ' ἂν προσῆται Κύπρις, ἥδιστον λαβεῖν.

This the Ms. reading is manifestly very corrupt. I will first write down the verses, corrected in sense and metre:

ἀνδρὸς δ' ὁρῶντος εἰς Κύπριν νεανίου
ἀφύλακτος ἡ πείρασις, ὡς κἂν φαῦλος ᾖ
τἄλλ', εἰς ἔρωτας πᾶς ἀνὴρ σοφώτερος·
ἢν δ' ἂν πρόσηται Κύπρις, ἥδιστον λαβεῖν.

vs. 1. *ὁρῶντος* 'pereleganter emendavit S. Musgravius' says Valckenaer (Diatr. p. 242); and this has naturally been adopted by the latest editors of Euripides and Stobaeus. In vs. 2 Nauck's *ὡς κἂν* for *κἂν γὰρ* simply and effectually corrects the metre. But

his proposed *ἄπρακτος ἡ φύλαξις* for the first part of the verse is surely rewriting. I conjecture *πείρασις* for *τήρησις*: when we recollect that in very early times, long before Stobaeus, *ει* and *ι* were indiscriminately interchanged, ΠΙΡ*ασις* might easily pass into ΤΗΡ*ησις*. The word I take in the sense in which Thucyd. VI 56 uses it, *τὸν δ' οὖν Ἁρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν πείρασιν*. His attempt at seduction is not guarded against, because love sharpens his faculties and enables him to carry out his schemes with greater skill. And now in v. 4 Musgrave's *ἦν* for *ἦν*, before unmeaning, becomes significant, as it refers to *πείρασις*. All editors have *προσῆται*, surely a non-existent word. Nauck says '*ἂν προσῆται* Κύπρις nondum emendata'; but I think *ἦν δ' ἂν πρόσηται* K. gives an excellent sense: 'But whatever form of seduction Cypris approves of and favours, it is most sweet to experience';—and thus it becomes irresistible. Comp. Electr. 622 *προσηκάμην τὸ ῥηθέν*, 'I quite approve what you say'. Cypris, as she wills, makes love prosperous or unprosperous.

167. Antigone.

ἡ γὰρ δόκησις πατράσι παῖδας εἰκέναι
τὰ πολλὰ ταύτῃ γίγνεται τέκνα πέρι.

The conjectures of Nauck, and of Meineke in his Stobaeus, strike me as violent and improbable. I propose

ἦν γὰρ δόκησις πατράσι παῖδας εἰκέναι·
τὰ πολλὰ ταύτῃ γίγνεται τέκν' ἐμφερῆ.

'Yes, there was an expectation that children are like their fathers'—and this expectation has produced the effect: 'it is in this way that for the most part children become like.'

230. Archelaus.

Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατὴρ
Νείλου λιπὼν κάλλιστον ἐκ γαίας ὕδωρ
* * * * * *
ἐλθὼν ἐς Ἄργος ᾤκισ' Ἰνάχου πόλιν.

'vs. 2 nondum emendatus' Nauck. *ἐκ χρείας* would suit the sense and the myth.

250. Archelaus.

οὐκ ἔστι πενίας ἱερὸν αἰσχίστης θεοῦ.
μισῶ γὰρ ὄντως οἵτινες φρονοῦσι μέν,
φρονοῦσι δ' οὐδενός γε χρημάτων ὕπερ.

'vs. 3 οὐδὲν χρημάτων ὑπέρτερον Pflugkius' Nauck: and Meineke actually adopts this conjecture in his Stobaeus. But the title of that chapter is Πενίας ψόγος, and many passages are given to shew that poverty at all hazards is to be avoided; not that riches can be too highly valued. I propose

φρονοῦσι δ' οὔ, δέον γε, χρημάτων ὕπερ.

'who are men of thought, but take no thought, tho' they ought to, for riches'.

264. Archelaus.

πάλαι σκοποῦμαι τὰς τύχας τῶν βροτῶν
ὡς εὖ μεταλλάσσουσιν· ὃς γὰρ ἂν σφαλῇ
εἰς ὀρθὸν ἔστη χὠ πρὶν εὐτυχῶν πίτνει.

'vs. 1 τὰς ἐφημέρων τύχας O. Hense. vs. 2 ὡς εὖ] ὅσον Herwerdenus, ὡς θεοὶ O. Hense' Nauck. The following has occurred to me

πάλαι σκοποῦμαι τὰς βροτῶν τύχας, ὅπως
ἀεὶ [or, εἰκῇ] μεταλλάσσουσιν.

286. Autolycus.

σχοινίνας γὰρ ἵπποισι φλοΐνας ἡνίας πλέκει.

'videtur tetrameter trochaicus restituendus esse' Nauck. The words suggest to me fragmentary senarii rather: such as

. . σχοινίνας γὰρ [ἄμπυκας]
ἵπποισι φλοΐνας θ' ἡνίας πλέκει . .

288. Bellerophon.

I cite the three last vss. of this fragment, as the first twelve present no difficulties.

οἶμαι δ' ἂν ὑμᾶς, εἴ τις ἀργὸς ὢν θεοῖς
εὔχοιτο καὶ μὴ χειρὶ συλλέγοι βίον,
τὰ θεῖα πυργοῦσιν αἱ κακαί τε συμφοραί.

'vs. 15 non expedio' Nauck. I would suggest

τἀχρεῖ' ὑπουργεῖν τῇ κάκῃ τ' ἀσύμφορα.

This would give a sense in accordance I think with the rest of the fragment. If c be written for ϵ, the letters in *υπουργειν* are then the same as those in *πυργουσιν*, and if it became *υπουργσιν*, such an impossible word might readily pass into *πυργουσιν*. Cobet, Collect. critica p. 217, says that there is a 'magna lacuna' before this verse. I do not think so; for the indefinite *τις* can surely designate any among the *ὑμᾶς*.

311. Bellerophon.

ἔπτησσ' ὑπείκων μᾶλλον ἢ μᾶλλον θέλοι.

'poetae verba mihi obscura' Nauck. Plutarch in two different works quotes this line to illustrate the truth that a man should not be too yielding and submissive to friends, as Pegasus was to Bellerophon. The following slight alteration would give I think a good sense:

ἔπτησσ' ὑπείκων μᾶλλον, ᾗ μᾶλλον θέλοι.

'Pegasus ever cowered and submitted the more, in whatever way Bellerophon wished him to do so'. With *ᾗ θέλοι* compare Soph. Ant. 440 *σὺ μὲν κομίζοις ἂν σεαυτὸν ᾗ θέλεις*: Electr. 1429 *ᾗ νοεῖς ἔπειγε νῦν.*

324. Danae.

ἔρως γὰρ ἀργὸν κἀπὶ τοῖς ἀργοῖς ἔφυ·
φιλεῖ κάτοπτρα καὶ κόμης ξανθίσματα,
φεύγει δὲ μόχθους. ἓν δέ μοι τεκμήριον·
οὐδεὶς προσαιτῶν βίοτον ἠράσθη βροτῶν,
ἐν τοῖς δ' ἔχουσιν ἡβητὴς πέφυχ' ὅδε.

'vs. 5 *ἡβητὴς* corruptum' Nauck. I have thought of

ἐν τοῖς δ' ἔχουσι δὴ βάτης πέφυχ' ὅδε.

Comp. Hesychius: *ἔβρος. τράγος βάτης*: id. *θόρος. βάτης ἀφροδισιαστής*: id. *βάτας. ὁ καταφερής. Ταραντῖνοι.*

406. Ino. vss. 2 and 3.

χρῆν γὰρ τὸν εὐτυχοῦνθ' ὅπως πλείστας ἔχειν
γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τροφὴ δόμοις παρῆν.

'vs. 3 εἴπερ ἐν δόμοις τροφὴ Pflugkius, an εἴπερ δώμασιν τροφὴ leg.?' Nauck. I would simply read εἴπερ καὶ τροφὴ δ. π. for καὶ is surely wanted.

414. Ino.

τοιάνδε χρὴ γυναικὶ πρόσπολον ἐᾶν,
ἥτις τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐ σιγήσεται,
τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ μισεῖ καὶ κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχει.

Nauck registers several quite useless conjectures; but does not mention in v. 1 Musgrave's almost certain correction, προσπολεῖν: comp. Troad. 264 τύμβῳ τέτακται προσπολεῖν Ἀχιλλέως: nor in v. 3 the quite certain correction of Dobree, ἐρεῖ for ἔχει: 'but hates what is base, and will tell you so to your face'. Comp. Aristoph. Ran. 625 ἵνα σοι κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς λέγω, referred to by Dobree: also Rhes. 421 καὶ μέμφομαί σοι καὶ λέγω κατ' ὄμμα σόν: Electr. 910 ἃ γ' εἰπεῖν ἤθελον κατ' ὄμμα σόν. For ἐρεῖ comp. fr. 416 ὅστις...τἀπὸ καρδίας ἐρεῖ. In frag. 613 we should perhaps read λόγους ἐρεῖς for ἔχεις.

457. Cresphontes.

ὠνητέραν δὲ τήνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμί σοι
πληγήν.

For ὠνητέραν is the reading of all known Mss., not ὁσιωτέραν which all editors follow Valckenaer in adopting: he says indeed vaguely 'e Mss.', but nothing is known of them. It appears from both Plutarch and Aristotle, that this verse, when spoken by Merope as she was on the point of stabbing her son, supposing him to be the murderer of that son, but discovering her error in time to save him, always caused a prodigious sensation among the spectators. I would suggest

ὄναιτ' ἄρ' ἦν δὴ τήνδ' ἐγὼ δίδωμί σοι
πλήγην.

'Good speed to this stroke which now I strike'.

514. Melanippe.

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως σκοπεῖν χρεὼν
τὴν εὐγένειαν· τοὺς γὰρ ἀνδρείους φύσιν
καὶ τοὺς δικαίους τῶν κενῶν δοξασμάτων,
κἂν ὦσι δούλων, εὐγενεστέρους λέγω.

'vs. 2 sq. τὰς γὰρ ἀνδρείας φύσεις καὶ τὰς δικαίας καὶ κενὰς Heimsoethius. vs. 4 εὐγενεστέρας Heimsoethius' Nauck. Eight words are thus altered, with no satisfactory result. I would simply read τῶν κενῷ δοξάσματι: the cause of the corruption is manifest. 'Them who are by nature brave and by nature just, even if the sons of slaves, I term more noble than they who are only so in empty opinion'. I have sometimes thought that to read τοὺς δικαίως τῶν κενῷ δοξάσματι would give a more pointed antithesis. But the two great civic virtues are courage which repels external, and justice which prevents internal dangers. The title of the chapter in Stobaeus which contains our fragment is περὶ εὐγενείας· ὅτι εὐγενεῖς οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῶντες κ.τ.λ., and several of the fragments dwell on the virtue of justice.

530. Meleager.

τὸ τ.. κράτιστον, κἂν γυνὴ κράτι.. ᾖ,
τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀρετή· τὸ δὲ ὄνομ' οὐ διαφέρει.

The passage appears in this mutilated shape in the sole Ms. of Orion. In vs. 1 τοι, and in 2 ἔστιν, are doubtless to be read with all the editors; and it is highly probable that the Ms. originally had κράτιστον, as Dindorf reads with Schneidewin. But this, as Meineke says, gives no sufficient sense. Nauck has γονῇ κακός τις ᾖ, γονῇ from Conington, the rest from Gomperz. I propose

τό τοι κράτιστον, κἂν γυναικόκτιστον ᾖ,
τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή· τὸ δ' ὄνομ' οὔ τι διαφέρει.

On the one hand Aristotle in his Poetics quotes from a Tragic poet σπείρων θεοκτίσταν φλόγα: on the other Aeschylus has γυναικογήρυτος: γυναικοδίδακτος also occurs. Conington and Meineke conjecture οὐ διαφθερεῖ. Our fragments shew that

the conduct of women, as might be expected, was much canvassed in this play.

538. Meleager.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν φῷ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ σκότος κακόν.

'verba τὸ δὲ—κακόν nondum sunt emendata' Nauck. Comparing Herc. Fur. 563 τοῦ κάτω σκότους, I should say that Valckenaer's τὸ δὲ κάτω σκότος κακόν was probably right. Dindorf asserts that the 'veteres' did not use τὸ σκότος. But other editors and the Mss. of Euripides have the neuter more than once. It is found in Thucydides also more than once, and is common in Plato. Its occurring in Pindar proves it not to be a late Attic invention. With reference to this neuter I would now discuss fragment

537. Meleager.

ἄτερπνον τὸ φῶς μοι τόδ' ὑπὸ γῆν δ' ᾅδου σκότος
οὐδ' εἰς ὄνειρον οὐδ' εἰς ἀνθρώπους μολεῖν
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν γεγῶσα τηλικήδ' ὅμως
ἀπέπτυσ' αὐτὸ κοὔποτ' εὔχομαι θανεῖν.

I have written down this fragment just as the Ms. gives it, with the exception of Valckenaer's τηλικήδ' ὅμως for τηλίκη δόμοις. Meineke calls it 'corruptissimum necdum probabiliter sanatum fragmentum'. But the αὐτὸ of v. 4 proves almost to demonstration that σκότος here is neuter and that Nauck and Dindorf are wrong in reading ὁ δ'—σκότος. Of course in v. 1 Gesner's τερπνὸν is rightly adopted by all editors. But I think it not improbable that it was preceded by the exclamation ἆ, which would explain the ἄτερπνον. This is how I would amend the first two vss.

ἆ. τερπνὸν τὸ φῶς μοι· τὸ δ' ὑπὸ γῆν ᾅδου σκότος
οὐδ' εἰς ὄνειρον ὑγιὲς ἀνθρώποις μολεῖν.

We find ἆ similarly 'extra metrum' in Herc. Fur. 629 and Bacchae 810.

554. Oedipus.

ἐκ τῶν ἀέλπτων ἡ χάρις μείζων βροτοῖς,
φανεῖσα μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ προσδοκώμενον.

'vs. 2 aut spurius aut corruptus' Nauck. Corrupt, surely not spurious. I suggest

σαίνουσα μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ προσδοκώμενον.

576. Oenomaus.

I quote the two first lines of this fragment.

ἔν ἐστι πάντων πρῶτον εἰδέναι τουτὶ
φέρειν τὰ συμπίπτοντα μὴ παλιγκότως.

'vs. 1 τουτί] τόδε B, suspicabar βροτῷ' Nauck. Of course τόδε of B is a mere attempt to correct the metre. I would read

ἔν ἐστι πάντων πρῶτον εἰδέναι, τό τοι
φέρειν τὰ συμπίπτοντα μὴ παλιγκότως.

τό τοι is in place in a general maxim: comp. fr. 530 τό τοι κράτιστον κ.τ.λ.

582. Palamedes.

τὰ τῆς γε λήθης φάρμακ' ὀρθώσας μόνος,
ἄφωνα καὶ φωνοῦντα συλλαβάς τε θεὶς
ἐξεῦρον ἀνθρώποισι γράμματ' εἰδέναι,
ὥστ' οὐ παρόντα ποντίας ὑπὲρ πλακὸς
τἀκεῖ κατ' οἴκους πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι καλῶς,
παισίν τ' ἀποθνήσκοντα χρημάτων μέτρον
γράψαντας εἰπεῖν, τὸν λαβόντα δ' εἰδέναι.
ἃ δ' εἰς ἔριν πίπτουσιν ἀνθρώποις κακὰ
δέλτος διαιρεῖ, κοὐκ ἐᾷ ψευδῆ λέγειν.

'v. 6 ἀποθνήσκοντα suspectum. v. 7 γράψαντα λείπειν Scaliger. vs. 8 κακὴν Heathius' Nauck. No word in the whole passage is more genuine than ἀποθνήσκοντα. I propose with some confidence

παισίν τ' ἀποθνήσκοντα χρημάτων μέτρον,
γράψανθ' ὅσ', εἰπεῖν.

'And at his death to tell his children the amount of his riches, having left in writing how much they are'. With ὅσα compare Soph. Aj. 118 ὁρᾷς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχύν, ὅση.

In v. 8 *κακὴν* may be the right correction of the corrupt *κακὰ*: I have thought of *καλὰ*, for which the context might readily suggest *κακὰ* to a careless scribe.

608. Peliades.

τὸ δ' ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς
τυραννίς, οὐχ εὕροις ἂν ἀθλιώτερον.
φίλους τε πορθεῖν καὶ κατακτανεῖν χρεών,
πλεῖστος φόβος πρόσεστι μὴ δράσωσί τι.

'vs. 1 *ἐσχάτως* scripserim. vs. 3 fort. *πόλεις τε π. καὶ φίλους κτανεῖν*. vs. 4 *πλεῖστος*] *ἐπεὶ* Pflugkius' Nauck. These changes are violent and yet insufficient; nor do other editors help us. I offer the following reconstruction of the passage:

τί δ', ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦθ' ὃ θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς,
τυραννίς; οὐχ εὕροις ἂν ἀθλιώτερον.
φίλους τ' ἀπωθεῖν, καὶ κατακτανεῖν χρεών,
πλεῖσθ' οἷς φόβος πρόσεστι μὴ δράσωσί τι.

With the beginning compare fr. 900, 7 *τί τοῦτο δὴ τὸ χρηστόν; οὐκ ἀρκεῖ κ.τ.λ.* Euripides is very fond of the word *ἀπωθεῖν*. The tyrant must drive away his friends, and put to death such of them as are most dangerous.

620. Peleus.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώποισι τοιοῦτο σκότος,
οὐ δῶμα γαίας κλειστόν, ἔνθα τὴν φύσιν
ὁ δυσγενὴς κρύψας ἂν εἴη σοφός.

Thus the Mss. We have then another instance of the neut. *σκότος*. Nauck, Meineke, Dindorf and others read *τοιοῦτος*: but the euphony is thereby somewhat impaired, fond as Euripides is said to be of *σ*. Elmsley indeed denies that *τοιοῦτο* is found in the tragic poets. But Hermann and other scholars do not follow him in this; and Aesch. Prom. 801 *τοιοῦτο μέν σοι τοῦτο* seems indisputable. If the tragedians use, as they sometimes do use, *ταυτό*, why proscribe the good Attic *τοιοῦτο*?

In vs. 2 Meineke, followed by Nauck and Dindorf, conjectures *χῶμα*. This suits *γαίας*: but then *κλῃστόν*? that surely

fits δῶμα, not χῶμα: Thuc. II 17, speaking of locked buildings, εἴ τι ἄλλο βεβαίως κλῃστὸν ἦν: Eurip. himself, Andr. 593, has ἄκλῃστα δώματα. The corruption therefore is in γαίας. I propose οὐ δῶμα τοίως κλῃστόν. Comp. Hesychius τοίως. ἰσχυρῶς. καλῶς. ἀκριβῶς: he means evidently οὕτως ἰσχυρῶς, which is illustrated by Thucydides' βεβαίως: and such an adverb, if not necessary to the sentence, at all events much improves it. It is evident that Hesychius, or his authorities, often have in view the Attic poets of the best time, and it is not improbable that the writer was thinking of our passage, if indeed τοίως was in it.

Hesychius again τώς. οὕτως. This Homeric word occurs four times in Aeschylus, twice in the dialogue; once in Sophocles in the dialogue. I would therefore suggest in the Medea, 909,

εἰκὸς γὰρ ὀργὰς θῆλυ ποιεῖσθαι γένος
γάμους παρεμπολῶντι τὼς ἄλλους πόσει:

τώς, δεικτικῶς, 'furtively dealing in other marriages as I am now doing'. Its use is very similar in Aesch. Sept. 618 ἢ ζῶντ' ἀτιμαστῆρα τώς σ' ἀνδρηλάτην φυγῇ τὸν αὐτὸν τόνδε τίσασθαι τρόπον. I should not think of rejecting ἀλλοίους merely because it is not found elsewhere in the Tragedians: Homer and Pindar prove it to be suited for poetry; Thucydides and Plato shew it to be good Attic. But I agree with Dindorf and Verrall that it has here no sense. When -τι τως had passed into -τος, ἀλλοίους might well have been written to make good the metre. The scholia are now a confused jumble; but they seem to shew traces of both ἄλλους and παρεμπολῶντι.

To return to our fragment: in v. 3 Sir G. C. Lewis may be right in proposing κρύψειεν ἂν κἂν ᾖ σοφός. But in another fragment of this chapter of Stobaeus folly is connected with δυσγένεια. See too what is said below on frag. 739. 'κρύψας ἂν ὀφθείη Enger, fortasse ἐκβαίη praeferendum' Nauck. Perhaps κρύψας ἂν εἶτ' εἴη σοφός.

652. Protesilaus.

πόλλ' ἐλπίδες ψεύδουσι καὶ ἄλογοι βροτούς.

Dindorf, followed by Nauck, *καὶ λόγοι.* Gaisford and Meineke *ψεύδουσιν ἄλογοι.* But *καὶ ἄλογοι* is certainly genuine, and the corruption lies in *ψεύδουσι.* I would read

πόλλ' ἐλπίδες ψύχουσι κἄλογοι βροτούς.

ψύχω in a fragment of Sophocles has the sense of 'cheer' 'refresh', like the compounds *ἀναψύχω, καταψύχω, παραψύχω.* Comp. too Athen. p. 503 c for the use in Aeschylus and Euripides of *ψυκτήρια* for *τοὺς ἀλσώδεις καὶ συσκίους τόπους...ἐν οἷς ἔστιν ἀναψῦξαι.*

664. Stheneboea.

ἄνευ τύχης γὰρ, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία,
πόνος μονωθεὶς οὐκέτ' ἀλγύνει βροτούς.

vs. 2 *οὐκέτ' ἀλδαίνει* Musgrave. Before I knew of this reading, I conjectured *ἀλδανεῖ*: 'Without luck, as the proverb goes, labour left to itself will no more make men plump'. This Homeric and Aeschylean word is in place in a proverb.

698. Telephus.

πτώχ' ἀμφίβλητα σώματος λαβὼν ῥάκη
ἀρκτήρια τύχης.

'vs. 2 *ἀλκτήρια* Bernhardy. *τύχης*] *ψύχους* Dobraeus' Nauck. But how with such readings would the verse proceed? I propose *αὐχμηρά τ' ἀτυχής.*

703. Telephus.

This fragment, which has been recovered from Olympiodorus' comment on Plato's Gorgias p. 521, is given as follows by Nauck, whose arrangement and explanation of the words are simply adopted by Dindorf:

οἶδ' ἄνδρα Μυσὸν Τήλεφον...
εἴτ' ἐστὶ Μυσὸς εἴτε κἄλλοθέν ποθεν,
[ἐκ τοῦ] προσώπου Τήλεφος γνωρίζεται.

Nauck has a right I think to say 'certum est quod v. 1 addidi *οἶδ' ἄνδρα* ex Ar. Ach. 430'. But he gets his last verse out of these words of Olympiodorus, *πῶς ὅτι ὁ Τήλεφος γνωρίζεται,* which are surely the writer's prose paraphrase of Euripides'

words. This reading of Nauck, who adds that *ξένος δ' ὅδε* at the end of v. 1 would complete the metre and the sense, seems to me to destroy all connexion between the beginning and end of the fragment, and to make Olympiodorus' comment unmeaning. To me it is clear that Telephus was in rags on the stage and for some time was not recognised. Some one says: 'I know (by fame) of Telephus a Mysian': [this man may be a Mysian or not]: and then

ἀλλ' εἴτε Μυσὸς εἴτε κἄλλοθέν ποθεν,
πῶς οὗτος ὡς ὢν Τήλεφος γνωρίζεται;

or something to the same purport.

739. Temenidae.

φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ φῦναι πατρὸς εὐγενοῦς ἄπο
ὅσην ἔχει φρόνησιν ἀξίωμά τε.
κἂν γὰρ πένης ὢν τυγχάνῃ, χρηστὸς γεγὼς
τιμὴν ἔχει τιν', ἀναμετρούμενος δέ πως
τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς γενναῖον ὠφελεῖ τρόπῳ.

'vs. 2 *ἔχει δόκησιν ἀξιώματος* Meinekius. *ἔχει τ' ὄνησιν* Schmidtius. vs. 5 *ὠφελεῖ τρόπῳ* verba corrupta' Nauck. '*ὠφελεῖ*] *οὐ φθερεῖ* Engerus' Dindorf. If *φρόνησιν* could bear the meaning of *φρόνημα*, 'high spirit', it might be in place; but no instance of this seems to be known. For Suppl. 216 is hardly a case in point. It was said above on fr. 620 that *τὸ μῶρον* was sometimes connected with *δυσγένεια*: see fr. 166 from the Antigone; and, what is more to the present point, comp. fr. 138 of the Adespota *τὴν εὐγένειαν, ἣν θέλῃς ἀνασκοπεῖν, Ἐν τοῖς καλῶς φρονοῦσιν εὑρήσεις βροτῶν.* But would the word at all harmonise with *ἀξίωμα*, and the rest of the fragment? If not, I would propose *φθόνησιν ἀξίωμά τε*, 'envy of the bad and esteem of the good'. *φθόνησις* occurs in Soph. Trach. 1212.

For the manifestly corrupt *ὠφελεῖ τρόπῳ* I have thought of *οὐ φιλεῖ ῥύπον*: 'Ever thinking of his father's nobility he loves not sordid ways'. *ῥύπος* is found in Homer, in Aristophanes and the Comic Fragments, in Plato, and once in the fragments of Aeschylus. Or *οὐ θέλει ῥυπᾶν* might be suggested:

Ion 1118 *ὁ θεὸς οὐ μιανθῆναι θέλων.* In Latin 'sordes' is very common in this sense: Horace 'O nec paternis obsoleta sordibus': Cicero 'splendetque per sese semper neque alienis umquam sordibus obsolescit [virtus]': 'non amat profusas epulas, sordes et inhumanitatem multo minus'.

773. Phaethon.

δεινόν γε, τοῖς πλουτοῦσι τοῦτο δ' ἔμφυτον,
σκαιοῖσιν εἶναι· τί ποτε τοῦδέ γ' αἴτιον;
ἆρ' ὄλβος αὐτοῖς ὅτι τυφλὰς συνηρετεῖ,
τυφλὰς ἔχουσι τὰς φρένας καὶ τῆς τύχης.

'vs. 4 tentabam *καὶ τῆς τέχνης* sc. *μαντικῆς.* Maehly *καὶ δυστυχεῖς*' Meineke. I offer

τυφλὰς ἔχουσι τὰς φρένας κοὐκ εὐστόχους.

But in v. 2 *τοῦδέ γ' αἴτιον* is Nauck's conjecture for *τοῦτο ταίτιον* of the best Mss.

781. Phaethon.

v. 50 of this long fragment is said to be thus represented in the Ms.

ἅπαντα ταῦτ' ἠθρησεκανπωτουσεχει.

Dindorf adopts Hermann's 'correction': *ταῦτ' αἴθρη|τ' ἀκάπνωτοί θ' ὁδοί.* It would certainly be nearer the Ms. and would I think agree with the context, if we read

ἅπαντα ταῦτ' ἤθρησ' ἔναντα πῶς ἔχει.

Comp. Soph. Ant. 1284 *ἔναντα προσβλέπω νεκρόν*: Euripides also uses *ἔναντα* in the Orestes; as well as the Homeric *ἄντα* in Alc. 898: *εἰσιδεῖν ἄντα.* This word I would introduce into Suppl. 322, where *ἀναβλέπει* can scarcely be genuine: *ὁρᾷς, ἄβουλος ὡς κεκερτομημένη,* Τοῖς *κερτομοῦσι γοργὸν ὡς ἄντα βλέπει* Σὴ *πατρίς*: 'Seest thou how thy country, when flouted for its reckless policy, grimly looks the flouters in the face?' This was written about the time of the peace of Nicias, when Athens was at the height of its power.

793 (vss. 4 and 5). Philoctetes.

ὅστις γὰρ αὐχεῖ θεῶν ἐπίστασθαι πέρι,
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οἶδεν, ἢ πείθει λέγων.

Nauck, followed by Dindorf, reads ἢ *πείθειν* λ.: 'quo locus vix persanatur' says Meineke. I propose *εἰ πείθει λέγων*. 'He may boast he knows all about the gods; but he knows not a whit the more for all that, if he persuades men he does by his words'. Perhaps we should read *οἶδε, κεἰ*.

794. Philoctetes.

λέξω δ' ἐγώ, κἄν μου διαφθείρας δοκῇ
λόγους ὑποστὰς αὐτὸς ἠδικηκέναι.
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ τἀμὰ μαθήσῃ κλύων,
ὁ δ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἐμφανιεῖ σοι λέγων.

This fragment ought to be compared with its context in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, ch. 19. There is I believe a corruption in every one of the 4 vss. This is proved by the metre of the last two, and by the sense in the first two. I will write down the passage as I propose to correct it:

λέξω δ' ἐγώ, κἄν μου διαφθεῖραι δοκῇ
λόγους, ὑφιστὰς αὐτὸς ἠδικηκέναι.
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ τἄμ' ἀναμαθήσῃ κλύων,
ὁ δ' αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἠμφάνιζέ σοι λέγων.

The figure *προκατάληψις* has place, when the *first* of the two speakers, conjecturing the charges which his adversary is likely to bring against him, and for himself, anticipates the other by giving his own version of these charges and so gaining the ear of his auditors. The *ἀντιπροκατάληψις* has place, when the *second* speaker retorts on the first by exposing the insufficiency of what he has said against him and in favour of himself: *σαφῶς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐξελέγξω αὐτὸν προκατέλαβέ μου τὸν λόγον καὶ προδιέβαλεν, ἵν' ὑμεῖς κ.τ.λ.* Anaximenes quotes these verses as an example of skilful *ἀντιπροκατάληψις*. 'I will speak, even tho' he seem to have spoilt my speech, by setting forth in his own way his own wrong-doing. But that won't do, for you shall hear from me over again my pleas; but he in his speech made it plain enough to you what a man he is';—so I need say no more of him.

The infin. *διαφθεῖραι* seems clearly called for. With *ὑφιστάς* comp. Soph. Aj. 1091 *γνώμας ὑποστήσας σοφούς*. For the

neut. *ὑποστάς* could only mean 'having agreed' 'promised to do something'; and not 'admitting doing it', which the context calls for. And that these two words might be easily interchanged, would appear from this: Hesychius says rightly: *ὑφιστάς. ὑποτιθείς.* Both Photius and Suidas, following him or his sources, have: *ὑφιστάς. ὑποστάς. ὑποτιθείς.* These late writers seem to have lost the feeling for the difference between the active and neuter parts of the verb. For *ἀναμαθήσῃ* comp. Hesych. *ἀναμάθω. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μάθω.* In v. 4 I write with some confidence *ἠμφάνιζε*, because I believe the fut. *ἐμφανιεῖ* to be a plain interpolation of a copyist who did not understand the past tense. Otherwise the old correction of Heath, *ἐμφανίζει σοι*, strikes me as better than various later conjectures. The conjectures recorded by Nauck and Dindorf seem to me very insufficient. The resolved foot which I have introduced into the third verse may be objected to in a play which was in the same trilogy as the Medea. But the word exactly suits the context; and even in the Medea we find verses like 375 *θήσω πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ' ἐμόν.*

801. Phoenix.

μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ τέκνα
δίδωσιν ὅστις οὐκέθ' ὡραῖος γαμεῖν·
δέσποινα γὰρ γέροντι νυμφίῳ γυνή.

Valckenaer's correction of this fragment, even as corrected by Porson, is very violent; so I think are Nauck's and Madvig's conjectures, as well as insufficient: the latter for instance makes *τέκνα* the vocative, and for *δίδωσιν* reads *ζύγωσις*. But even if Euripides could have used the latter word, it could scarcely have the sense of marriage absolutely; so that you would need *μοχθηρά*, the neut. predicate being here not in place. All three scholars too adopt *γαμεῖ* for the *γαμεῖν* of Mss. I correct the passage by altering one termination thus:

μοχθηρόν ἐστιν, ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ τέκνα
δίδωσιν ὅστις οὐκέθ' ὡραίῳ γαμεῖν.

The corruption is surely natural for a copyist not understanding the construction. This use of *ὅστις* is very idiomatic: fr. 362,

v. 1 *τὰς χάριτας ὅστις εὐγενῶς χαρίζεται,"Ηδιον ἐν βροτοῖσιν· οἳ δὲ δρῶσι μέν, Χρόνῳ δὲ δρῶσι, δρῶσι δυσγενέστερον*: (thus 'Heinrichius' completes v. 3; if however we read, as I should prefer to do, *δυσγενέστερον λέγω* with Meineke, or *τόδε*, or *δρῶσιν, ἔστι δυσγενέστερον*, or something of the sort, we then have a second example of the same idiom): Electr. 815 *ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κομποῦσι τοῖσι Θεσσάλοις Εἶναι τόδ', ὅστις ταῦρον ἁρταμεῖ καλῶς*: Fr. Trag. ap. Plut. Mor. p. 33 *τόδ' ἐστὶ τὸ ζηλωτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ὅτῳ Τόξον μερίμνης εἰς ὃ βούλεται πέσῃ*: Thuc. III 45 *ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας, ὅστις οἴεται κ.τ.λ.*: VI 14 *τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ*. Nor is there any tautology: 'It is a vexatious thing, for any one to offer his children to an old man for him to marry, when he is no longer of an age to marry'. He may be *ὡραῖος* for dying: comp. Alc. 516; Phoen. 968. The plur. *τέκνα* is I think idiomatic: Phoen. 966 *οὐδ' ἂν τὸν αὑτοῦ παῖδά τις δοίη κτανεῖν. Μή μ' εὐλογείτω τἀμά τις κτείνων τέκνα*, where one only is in question. There is a very similar example in Heracl. 410—414 of *τέκνα* thus used.

830. Phrixus.

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν,
τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί; πλὴν ὅμως βροτῶν
νοσοῦσιν οἱ βλέποντες, οἱ δ' ὀλωλότες
οὐδὲν νοσοῦσιν οὐδὲ κέκτηνται κακά.

'vs. 2 *πλὴν ὅμως* verba corrupta' Nauck. The sentence calls, not for a connecting particle, but for an adverb to sustain the parallelism. I would therefore suggest with some confidence *τλημόνως βροτῶν κ.τ.λ.* Hesych. *τλημόνως. ἐλεεινῶς*: Troad. 40 *τέθνηκε τλημόνως Πολυξένη.*

839. Chrysippus.

γνώμῃ σοφός μοι καὶ χέρ' ἀνδρείαν ἔχειν (or, *ἔχοι*)
δύσμορφος εἴην μᾶλλον ἢ καλὸς κακός.

Frag. 895 Choeroboscus quotes from Euripides *ἄφρων ἂν εἴην, εἰ τρέφοιν τὰ τῶν πέλας*, to illustrate the form *τρέφοιν*. If this form then *be* legitimate,

γνώμῃ σοφός τοι καὶ χέρ' ἀνδρείαν ἔχοιν·
δύσμορφος εἴην μᾶλλον ἢ καλὸς κακός

would give a satisfactory meaning and would explain the ἔχειν and ἔχοι of our authorities.

853. Incertarum.

δείξας γὰρ ἄστρων τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδὸν
δήμους τ' ἔσωσα καὶ τύραννος ἰζόμην.

'vs. 2 δήμους] δόμους Bergkius. θρόνους Heimsoethius'. Atreus is speaking of his astronomical discovery, recorded by Strabo and others, of the heavens moving in a contrary direction to the sun and stars; which discovery gained him popularity and made him king. I would therefore propose δήμους τ' ἔσηνα.

892. Incertarum.

ὤφειλε δῆθεν, εἴπερ ἔστ' ἐν οὐρανῷ
Ζεύς, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν δυστυχῆ καθεστάναι.

'vs. 2 μὴ τὸν ἐσθλὸν Heimsoethius'. Perhaps rather μὴ τὸν ἁγνὸν, or τοιοῦτον.

986. Incertarum.

Polyb. v 106 οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅπως ἀεί ποτε Πελοποννήσιοι...κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἦσαν 'αἰεὶ πρασίμοχθοί (or, πλησίμοχθοί) τινες καὶ οὔποτε ἥσυχοι δορί'. Perhaps

αἰεί τινες
ἀπληστόμοχθοι κοὔποθ' ἥσυχοι δορί.

Athenaeus twice quotes from Timon ἀπληστοίνους τ' ἀρυταίνας.

1028. Incertarum.

κρινεῖ τίς αὐτὸν πώποτ' ἀνθρώπων μέγαν,
ὃν ἐξαλείφει πρόφασις ἡ τυχοῦσ' ὅλον;

Thus without remark all the editors of Euripides and Stobaeus, among them Valckenaer, Gaisford, Meineke, Nauck and Dindorf. Yet surely the future with πώποτε is strange and unprecedented. A simple correction would be

κρινεῖ τις αὐτὸν πῶς ποτ' ἀνθρώπων μέγαν;

1030 (v. 4). Incertarum.

ἢ παισὶν αὐθένταισι κοινωνῇ δόμων.

For the unmeaning *παισὶν* I have thought of *ἢ ἄπαισιν αὐθένταισι κ. δ.*: 'He shares his house with childless murderers'; i.e. shelters them not from charity, but greed, to inherit their wealth.

1039. Incertarum.

νεανίας γὰρ ὅστις ὢν Ἄρη στυγῇ,
κόμη μόνον καὶ σάρκες, ἔργα δ' οὐδαμοῦ.
ὁρᾷς τὸν εὐτράπεζον ὡς ἡδὺς βίος,
ὅ τ' ὄλβος ἔξωθέν τίς ἐστι πραγμάτων,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔνεστι στέφανος οὐδ' εὐανδρία,
εἰ μή τι καὶ τολμῶσι κινδύνου μέτα.

'vs. 4 graviter corruptus' Nauck; and I have seen no specious correction of it. The *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔνεστι κ.τ.λ.* of v. 5, as well as v. 3, seems to shew that v. 4 pointed to the power of wealth over external things, tho' it has no inward virtue. I have thought of

ὅ τ' ὄλβος ἔξω σφήν τίς ἐστι πραγμάτων,

'Wealth is a wedge, or most effectual instrument, of things': it can remove external obstacles and procure external blessings, but can do nothing more. *σφήν* occurs in Aeschylus and Aristophanes: comp. too Aristot. Mech. 17 *διὰ τί τῷ σφηνὶ ὄντι μικρῷ μεγάλα βάρη διίσταται καὶ μεγέθη σωμάτων, καὶ θλῖψις ἰσχυρὰ γίγνεται*; *κ.τ.λ.* For the metaphor comp. Tertull. adv. Marc. I 21 hoc enim cuneo veritatis omnis extruditur haeresis.

1044. Incertarum.

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔξω λέκτρα αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχειν
δίκαιόν ἐστιν οἷσι συγγηράσομαι.

'locus nondum emendatus' Nauck. I suggest

ἔγωγ' ἀνέξω λέκτρ', ἃ γ' ὡς καλῶς ἔχειν
δίκαιόν ἐστιν οἷσι συγγηράσομαι.

οἷσι = *ἐπεὶ αὐτοῖς*. With v. 1 comp. Hecub. 121 *τῆς μαντοπόλου Βάκχης ἀνέχων Λέκτρ' Ἀγαμέμνων.*

1046. Incertarum.

μοχθοῦμεν ἄλλως θῆλυ φρουροῦντες γένος·
ἥτις γὰρ αὐτὴ μὴ πέφυκεν ἔνδον (or, ἔνδος)
τί δεῖ φυλάσσειν (or, δὴ φυλάσσει) κἀξαμαρτάνειν πλέον;

The end of v. 2 was evidently mutilated in the archetype: for the right meaning of v. 3 comp. fr. 112, from the Alope, § 17 in the same chapter of Stobaeus in which our fragment is preserved. I would suggest

ἥτις γὰρ αὐτὴ μὴ πέφυκε νοῦν ἔχειν,
τί δεῖ φυλάσσειν; ἐξαμαρτάνει πλέον.

1052. Incertarum.

τὸν σὸν δὲ παῖδα σωφρονοῦντ' ἐπίσταμαι
χρηστοῖς θ' ὁμιλοῦντ' εὐσεβεῖν τ' ἠσκηκότα.
πῶς οὖν ἂν ἐκ τοιοῦδε σώματος κακὸς
γένοιτ' ἄν; οὐδεὶς τοῦτό μ' ἂν πίθοι ποτέ.

'vs. 3 σώματος suspectum' Nauck. I read ἐκ τοιοῦδ' ἄσωτος ἢ κακὸς: ἄσωτος is the opposite of v. 1, κακὸς of v. 2.

1065. Incertarum.

ὦ γῆρας, οἵαν ἐλπίδ' ἡδονῆς ἔχεις,
καὶ πᾶς τις εἰς σὲ βούλετ' ἀνθρώπων μολεῖν·
λαβὼν δὲ πεῖραν μεταμέλειαν λαμβάνει,
ὡς οὐδὲν ἔστι χεῖρον ἐν θνητῷ γένει.

'vs. 2 ἕτοιμος ἀνθρώπων Elmsleius. βούλεται βροτῶν Meinekius. vs. 3 μεταμέλεια Meinekius' Nauck. I propose

καὶ πᾶς τις εἴς σ' ἕλοιτ' ἂν ἀνθρώπων μολεῖν·
λαβὼν δὲ πεῖραν μεταμέλειαν ἂν λάβοι.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

I. THE *PHILEBUS* AND ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS* I 6.

§ 1 *Does the theory of ideas appear in the* republic *in its final form?*

In a former paper[1] (*Journal of Philology* x 132) I proposed what I believe to be a new interpretation of the concluding pages of the sixth book of the *republic;* I compared this notable passage with another, not less difficult, in the *Phaedo,* which seems to me to represent the same phase of doctrinal development; and I tried to determine the dogmatic content of the two passages. In both places Plato, as I read him, contrasts the 'general notion,' i.e. the connotation of the name as we imperfectly understand it, not hypostasized, with the 'idea,' i.e. the whole completed connotation of the name, hypostasized: in both places he marks the insufficiency of any method which, like that of Socrates, whether in its original shape or as improved and supplemented by Plato himself, has nothing better than imperfect uncertified general notions for its ἀρχαί; in both places, but in the *Phaedo* with less confidence than in the *republic,* he aspires to a more perfect method, which should attain scientific truth by converting imperfect uncertified λόγοι into λόγοι proved to be the exact representations of ideas; finally, in both places, but in the *Phaedo* with especial emphasis, he declares his scheme of a higher logic to contain a fatal flaw.

[1] To my friend Mr R. D. Archer Hind I am indebted for much helpful and suggestive criticism both of this paper and of the paper here referred to.

Although however, not only in the *Phaedo*, but also in the *republic*,—the dialogue which is generally accounted the most perfect representation of the most characteristic phase of his doctrinal development,—Plato frankly acknowledges his failure to construct on the basis of the theory of ideas a logic of scientific discovery, in these same dialogues the theory itself is confidently maintained, and carefully formulated. In particular there are two passages, dogmatic in spirit and precise in expression, to which I would here invite the reader's attention. (1) "Wherever we find a plurality of particulars called by the same name," says the Socrates of the *republic*, "we assume a corresponding idea": *εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν.* X 596 A. Thus, *when the* republic *was written, Plato, building on Socratic foundations, assumed for every general name a corresponding idea*, and consequently recognized, with others, ideas of evil e.g. *κακόν ἄδικον*, of manufactured articles e.g. *κλίνη τράπεζα*, and of relations e.g. *διπλάσιον ἥμισυ*[1]. (2) "If any one alleges as the reason why anything is beautiful," says the Socrates of the *Phaedo*, "that it has a fine colour or a fine form or the like, regardless of such explanations, which only perplex me, with artless and I dare say foolish simplicity I hold fast the principle, that the

[1] In the *republic* ideas are explicitly recognized, not only of *ἀγαθόν* V 476 A, VI 493 C 505 A 507 B, VII 517 C 518 D 519 C 526 E 531 C 534 C 538 E 540 A, of *καλόν* or *κάλλος* V 476 BC 479 AE 480 A, VI 493 E 501 B 507 B, VII 531 C 538 D, of *δίκαιον* or *δικαιοσύνη* V 476 A 479 A 501 B, VII 517 E 538 E, X 612 B, of *σωφροσύνη ἀνδρεία ἐλευθεριότης μεγαλοπρέπεια* III 402 C, of *σῶφρον* VI 501 B, but also of *κακόν* and *ἄδικον* V 476 A, of *αἰσχρόν* V 475 E, of the *ἐναντία* of *σωφροσύνη ἀνδρεία ἐλευθεριότης μεγαλοπρέπεια* III 402 C, of *κλίνη* and *τράπεζα* X 596 B; while if we take note of implications, ideas of *διπλάσιον* and *ἥμισυ* V 479 B, of *μέγα* or *μέγεθος σμικρόν* or *σμικρότης κοῦφον βαρύ* V 479 B, VII 523 E 524 A, of *πάχος λεπτότης μαλακότης σμικρότης* VII 523 E, and of *μαθηματικά* VI 511 B, must be added to the list.

In the *Phaedo* 65 D, 74 A—78 E, 100 B—106 D there are ideas of *ἴσον μέγα* or *μεῖζον* or *μέγεθος ἔλαττον* or *σμικρότης πλῆθος ὅλον περιττόν* or *περιττότης ἄρτιον μονάς δυάς τριάς* or *τρία πεμπτάς ἀγαθόν καλόν δίκαιον ὅσιον μουσικόν θερμόν* or *θερμότης ψυχρόν* or *ψυχρότης ὑγίεια ἰσχύς νόσος πυρετός ζωή θάνατος ψυχή πῦρ χιών*. See especially 65 D *λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν.*

thing in question is made beautiful only by the presence, or the communion, or the intervention however styled and entitled, of the self-beautiful: mind, I don't insist upon the name, but I do insist upon the principle that it is the self-beautiful by which all beautiful things are made beautiful:" *ἀλλ' ἐάν τίς μοι λέγῃ δι' ὅ τι καλόν ἐστιν ὁτιοῦν, ἢ ὅτι χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά.* 100 c. Thus, *when the* Phaedo *was written, Plato held that the particular is what it is by reason of the presence of the idea.* In these two passages taken together we have, I conceive, a dogmatic and precise statement of views entertained by Plato at one period of his philosophical development in regard to those eternal, immutable, separate existences, which he postulated under the name of ideas and conceived to be the proper objects of knowledge.

Aristotle however in certain well-known passages of the *metaphysics* affords glimpses of a doctrine widely differing from that of the *republic.* He tells us (1) that Plato recognized ideas *ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει* only, to the exclusion of manufactured articles[1] and of relations[2]; (2) that he resolved both ideas and

[1] *metaph.* 1 9. 991 b 6 *καὶ πολλὰ γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶδη εἶναι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ τἆλλα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἵας καὶ τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν.*

[2] *metaph.* 1 9. 990 b 15 *ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν.* This passage has, I think, been misunderstood. Zeller in his *platonische Studien* p. 261 and Bonitz in his commentary (see below) suppose Aristotle to object that certain proofs—here spoken of as *ἀκριβέστεροι*, "quibus non solum commune quidpiam praeter singulas res esse demonstretur, sed idem esse exemplar, quod singulae res imitentur—" involve consequences which Plato had not foreseen, some of these proofs necessitating the recognition of ideas of relations, and others exposing him to the objection called the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*. They then proceed to accuse Aristotle of inaccuracy, inasmuch as (1) ideas of relations are recognized

particulars into two elements, *τὸ ἕν* and *τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν*, whereof the latter was the origin both of multiplicity and of evil; and (3) that his system as a whole bore a striking resemblance to that of the Pythagoreans. The editors and historians, taking for granted seemingly that in the *republic* the theory of ideas has assumed its final form, either reject Aristotle's testimony, or reconcile it with the *republic* by strained interpretations. They conjecture, for example, that Aristotle is mistaken when he makes Plato deny ideas of relations and of manufactured articles[1]; or that Aristotle is

in *republic* v 479 B and *Phaedo* 74 A sq., and (2) the objection called the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* is stated by Plato himself in the *Parmenides*. The very passages just now cited seem to me to suggest another interpretation. Aristotle, as I read him, says—'We find Plato in his more precise statements of doctrine (1) distinctly recognizing ideas of relations, which orthodox Platonism denies, and (2) urging against his own theory the objection called the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*. In other words, Plato himself by means of the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* dealt a fatal blow to the theory of ideas as it was conceived in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, and when he denied ideas of relations plainly admitted the position taken up in those dialogues to be untenable. Further criticism of that form of the doctrine in which an idea is assumed for every plurality of particulars called by the same name is therefore hardly necessary.' That the *republic*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Parmenides* are *οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων* in the sense which I have given to the phrase, seems to me incontestable.

To the remark made by Zeller *platonische Studien* p. 257 and by Bonitz *commentary* p. 112, that when Plato stated the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* in the *Parmenides*, he must have been convinced that he could meet it triumphantly, I cordially assent: but I infer, not that the objection was not valid against that form of the theory of ideas which is criticized in the *Parmenides*, but that, when Plato wrote that very important dialogue, he had in reserve a reformed doctrine, which was, or seemed to be, safe from attack on this side.

[1] "Die erstere Bemerkung erläutert Alexander (z. d. St.) in einer übrigens nicht sehr klaren Darstellung, an dem Begriff der Gleichheit. Um so auffallender wird dadurch aber die Behauptung, dass in der Ideenlehre keine Ideen der blossen Verhältnisse angenommen werden; denn Platon selbst wählt als Beispiel für die Darstellung jener Lehre nicht nur überhaupt solche Verhältnissbegriffe, sondern ausdrücklich den Begriff der Gleichheit. Und ebenso, wenn behauptet wird, von Kunstprodukten, wie ein Ring, ein Haus u. dgl., gebe es keine Ideen, so ist dagegen geltend zu machen, dass Platon nach Rep. x, 596 f. auch in den Werken der Kunst nur die Nachahmung an und für sich seyender Wesenheiten erkannte." Zeller *platonische Studien* p. 261. See however the *Ph. d. Griechen* II i 587, where Zeller accepts Aristotle's testimony, thinking apparently that Plato in his later years

mistaken when he makes Plato deny ideas of relations, and that, although he is right in saying that Plato did not recognize ideas of manufactured articles, this is not inconsistent with *republic* 596 B, the mention there of the 'idea of bed' not being serious[1]. When Aristotle says that Plato took the elements of the ideas to be the elements of all things, he is again accused of inaccuracy[2]. It is indeed admitted on the strength of Aristotle's testimony that at some period, probably towards the end of his life, Plato assimilated his doctrine to that of the Pythagoreans; but it is alleged that the theory of numbers was a mere "appendix" to the system[3], and that the Pythagorean development has left few, if any, traces upon Plato's writings[4]. Now, whereas in these criticisms it is plainly taken for granted that the doctrine referred to by Aristotle in *metaphysics* I 6 was substantially identical with the doctrine indicated in the *republic*, and that the two statements ought therefore to be consistent, I hope on some

arbitrarily modified the details of his teaching at a serious sacrifice of general consistency. I hope to show that these modifications of details were parts of a radical reconstruction of the system.

[1] "Mensae enim et sellae non videtur ideas ponere Plato, sed illo loco, ad vulgarem intellectum quam maxime adaptato (cf. x 597 c), haec exempla tantummodo adhibere ad illustranda diversa imitationis genera." Bonitz *commentary* p. 118.

[2] Zeller *platonische Studien* 248 ff. *Ph. d. Griechen* II i 628 ff. Bonitz *commentary* p. 94.

[3] "Eundem vero ideas ad numeros retulisse et idearum naturam per numeros expressisse, *ex ipsius libris non possumus colligere*, nedum pro certo affirmare..... Atque hanc de numeris doctrinam, *quae in ipsa Platonis philosophia vix alium quam appendicis locum potest obtinere*, ii ex discipulis Platonis, qui in philosophia magistri acquieverunt, tantopere adamaverunt, ut omissa, quod est Platonicae philosophiae caput, idearum doctrina in exquirenda numerorum illorum ratione prope unice elaborarent, unde intelligitur cur tantum operae iis refutandis Ar. tribuerit." Bonitz *commentary* pp. 539, 540.

[4] "die uns durch Aristoteles bekannte Umgestaltung der platonischen Lehre,...von der es in den Schriften des Philosophen an allen Spuren so sehr fehlt, dass wir sie später, als diese, zu setzen genöthigt sind." Zeller *Ph. d. Griechen* II i 462. "Diese Verbindung der Einheit und der Vielheit in den Ideen drückte Plato auch so aus, dass er die Ideen als Zahlen bezeichnete. Doch kann diese Darstellung erst seinen späteren Jahren angehört haben. In den platonischen Schriften findet sie sich noch nicht." 567. See also Brandis *Gesch. d. gr.-röm. Ph.* II 321.

future occasion to shew that Aristotle distinguishes the doctrine which we know through the *republic* from the doctrine which, when he was a member of the school, was considered orthodox[1], and therefore that it is not to be expected that the two statements should agree. For the present it is sufficient to note that in a summary of the speculations of his predecessors Aristotle attributes to Plato views which are certainly not those of the *republic*. It is possible, no doubt, that Aristotle has seriously misunderstood or misrepresented his master: but if evidence can be obtained from the writings of Plato himself, proving that after the composition of the *republic* he modified the theory of ideas in the direction indicated by Aristotle, it will at any rate be worth while to take the Aristotelian statement into account.

Now I cannot believe that, if Plato reconstituted his system, he wholly omitted to put his new views upon record; and accordingly I think I see in several dialogues, not only proofs that he was no longer content with the doctrine put forward in the *republic*, and signs that he had attempted a reconstruction, but also hints, and something more than hints, as to the leading principles of the revised ontology. It is in the *Parmenides*, I think, that Plato most loudly proclaims his rupture with his former self. In that important work he on the one hand criticizes the theory of ideas with a severity which

[1] It may be worth while to note a single instance. In *metaph.* XII 4, where Aristotle speaks of the theory of ideas in its original form before it was combined with the theory of numbers (*μηθὲν συνάπτοντας πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπέλαβον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι* 1078 b 10), he recognizes in it two elements—the Heraclitean flux and the Socratic definition—and no more: for the mention of the Pythagorean school in 1078 b 21 is clearly parenthetical. Observing that it was the separate existence of the idea which distinguished it from the Socratic universal, he proceeds to note, as a consequence of the parallelism of the two doctrines, that 'there were ideas of *all* general names:' *ὥστε συνέβαινεν αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ πάντων ἰδέας εἶναι τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων*. 1078 b 32. (That *σχεδόν* must be taken, not, as by Schwegler with *πάντων*, but with *τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ*, is obvious.) Thus, whatever Aristotle may have written elsewhere about a theory of ideas which in the case of some general names did not recognize corresponding ideas, he was quite aware that according to the original doctrine (as in the *republic*) every general name had its corresponding idea.

I cannot believe to be simulated, and on the other with all the air of earnest conviction insists that, except on the hypothesis of the existence of ideas, philosophy is impossible. At first sight the two positions appear to be hopelessly irreconcilable. It will be found however on examination that the doctrine criticized is precisely that form of the theory of ideas which is known to us in the *republic*, i.e. that form in which *εἶδός τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν*, and that, when Parmenides asserts, Socrates assenting, that philosophy is impossible except on the hypothesis of the existence of ideas, he does not postulate an idea in all cases in which several particulars bear the same name. Thus the two positions cease to be irreconcilable, if we suppose that, when the *Parmenides* was written, Plato had abandoned that form of the theory of ideas in which every general name was held to imply a corresponding idea, and was reconstituting his system on a new basis[1]. In fact the *Parmenides* seems to me to lead the way to the later doctrine just as the *Theaetetus* had led the way to the earlier doctrine, and is consequently from my point of view one of the most important of the Platonic dialogues. But partly because it is critical rather than expository, partly because it has been for centuries a battle-ground for controversialists, I find it convenient to defer the examination of the *Parmenides* until I have looked elsewhere for traces of the later theory of ideas.

In the hope then, both of proving that there was a time when Plato became dissatisfied with the doctrine of the *republic*, and of obtaining hints which may be combined with Aristotle's notice of orthodox Platonism as he knew it in the Academy, I now propose to examine the ontological part of the *Philebus*, reserving for future investigation other obvious sources of information.

[1] It will be seen that my hypothesis explains the peculiar position which Socrates occupies in the *Parmenides*. He acts as respondent because that form of the theory of ideas which bears the closest resemblance to the Socratic 'Begriffsphilosophie' is now under examination.

§ 2 *The significance of the* Philebus.

With a view to the better understanding of remarks hereafter to be made I subjoin an analysis of the opening pages of the *Philebus*, giving prominence to those portions of the argument which especially concern me, commenting in occasional footnotes upon certain minor difficulties, and now and then, when I find myself at variance with Badham, the latest and best editor[1] of the dialogue, justifying my dissent.

11 B Whereas Philebus has hitherto argued that pleasure —*χαίρειν ἡδονή τέρψις*—is for all creatures good, Socrates's contention being that, for all who are capable of it, wisdom—*φρονεῖν νοεῖν μεμνῆσθαι δόξα ὀρθή ἀληθεῖς λογισμοί*—is better than pleasure or any thing else,
D Protarchus, who now succeeds to Philebus's place in the discussion, undertakes to maintain that it is the *ἕξις* or *διάθεσις* of pleasure—against Socrates who holds that it is the *ἕξις* or *διάθεσις* of wisdom,—which makes human
E life happy. Should it however appear that there is a third *ἕξις* superior to both, it will be necessary to inquire further whether the *ἕξις* of pleasure or that of wisdom is the more nearly related to the third or victorious *ἕξις*, and therefore entitled to take precedence of its rival.

12 B Beginning with pleasure, Socrates remarks that pleasures are various; for it would be absurd to identify the pleasure of *ὁ ἀκολασταίνων* with that of *ὁ σωφρονῶν*, or
D the pleasure of *ὁ ἀνοηταίνων* with that of *ὁ φρονῶν*. Protarchus does not see how two pleasures, however different
E their sources, can be unlike another. In this way, replies Socrates. One figure may be unlike another figure, one colour may be unlike another colour, and similarly
13 A one pleasure may be unlike another pleasure. Perhaps, answers Protarchus: but what then? Why, rejoins

[1] I gladly take this opportunity of expressing my deep sense of the services which this excellent scholar has rendered to readers of the *Philebus* both in his careful revision of the text and in his acute commentary.

Socrates, you take for granted that all pleasures resem-
B ble one another in being good, whilst I hold that some
D are good, others bad: if we persist in thus withdrawing
our respective clients from examination, the discussion
14 B necessarily falls to the ground[1]. Both pleasure and wis-

[1] *φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.* Π. *Ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;* Σ. *Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ· κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ, εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἑνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;* 13 A B. Badham's revision of this passage seems to me to be founded on a misconception of the argument. "If Protarchus asserts," he says, "that they [i.e. pleasures] are all alike, and yet must confess that they are not alike good, he is bound to mention some *other* ground of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot be introduced as asking him for a proof that they are *ἀγαθά*, but as wanting to know, forasmuch as they do not agree in this respect, in what else they do agree. But the received text makes him say: 'You know they are not all good, and you are ready to admit that they are so far unlike; and yet you call them all good:' which is so absurd that I have changed *ὅμως* into *ὁμοίως*, and put *ἀγάθ' αὐτά* and *ἀγαθὸν εἶναι* in brackets." He further drops *πάντα* before *σὺ* and supplies *τε* before *ταῖς* and *ταῖς* before *ἀγαθαῖς*. In my opinion none of these changes are necessary, while several are positively destructive of the true sense. Protarchus has *not* acknowledged that "pleasures are not all good." On the contrary he has asserted at D that all pleasures, whatever their origin, are alike. Socrates having replied that, just as *χρώματα* and *σχήματα* though like may also be unlike, so pleasures though like may also be unlike, Protarchus signifies his assent by the word *Ἴσως*, but still does not see how Socrates's remark affects his inference that all pleasures in virtue of their likeness are good. 'Because,' returns Socrates, 'although you have admitted that pleasures have points of unlikeness as well as points of likeness, you take for granted that goodness is one of the points of likeness. Now as this is precisely what we deny, you ought to tell us what the characteristic is, common to those pleasures which I call good and those pleasures which I call bad, on the strength of which you attribute goodness to both my classes. Otherwise argument between us is impossible.'

So interpreted the passage is in perfect accord with the rest of the discussion begun at 12D and ended by common consent at 14 B. On the other hand Badham's interpretation assumes that Protarchus has already consciously surrendered the point for which we find him still contending at 13 B C.

The sentence *κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν κτλ* is then correct as it stands except so far as concerns the syntax of the last clause; where, inasmuch as Protarchus has already under pressure from Socrates admitted that pleasures are diverse (*Ἴσως* 13 A), instead of supplying *ἄν* before *ἀνόμοια* with Hermann and Badham, I would alter *προσαναγκάζοι* into *προσαναγκάζει*.

dom must be submitted to examination, if we would decide whether the one or the other or some third thing is the good. Protarchus assents, but plainly is not altogether satisfied.

C Socrates therefore proposes, before continuing the main argument, to inquire into the relations of the One and the Many, which others, besides Protarchus, find
D mysterious and paradoxical. You mean, I suppose, replies Protarchus, the union in the same person of different and even opposite qualities, as when the same person is said to be at once tall and short, heavy and light. No, I do not, retorts Socrates; nor yet the union in the same individual of a plurality of parts. These familiar paradoxes are now generally admitted to deserve no attention, to have no interest except for children, to present no real difficulty, nay to be serious hindrances to philosophical
E progress. No, the paradox of which I am thinking is
15 A not one of these. The One which is in my thoughts is not a *γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*, but the Unity which we see in Man, Ox, the Beautiful, the Good. These
B henads give rise to serious controversy: (1) Is each such monad really existent? (2) How is it that each such monad, though incapable of generation, of change, and of destruction, nevertheless appears in an indefinite plurality of *γιγνόμενα*, either (*a*) being itself divided into as many parts as there are *γιγνόμενα*, or (*b*) being reproduced as a whole in each *γιγνόμενον*, so that it exists,

In the last sentence of the *ῥῆσις* Thompson is, I am sure, right in substituting *ἑνορῶν* for *ἑνόν*: cf. 34 E *Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἑνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι*; *Meno* 72 C, *Hippias maior* 299 E, *Sophist* 247 D, *Hipparchus* 230 D. Badham rejects this conjecture (1) because his excision of *ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*, criticized above, makes it necessary to construe *τί ταὐτὸν ἑνὸν* with *προσαγορεύεις*, (2) because he "very much doubts whether a good Greek prose writer would say, *ἑνορῶ ἕν σοι τοῦτο*, without adding some participle." Cf. however Thucyd. 1 95 *ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον* (cited by Liddell and Scott) and *rivales* 133 D *Πότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἑνορᾷς κ τ λ.*

A few lines further 13 C, where *οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει* appears in the middle of a string of futures, I suspect that we should read *οὐδέν τι τρώσει*. For *οὐδέν τι*, see Stallbaum on *Phaedo* 65 E and Schaefer's Gregor. Corinth. Index s. v. *τίς* (referred to by Stallbaum).

not only in itself, but also simultaneously in a multitude
c of particulars? These are the questions which are really important: and accordingly we must now give them our best attention.

The verbal difficulties of the passage which begins *τό γε μήν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει* 14 A and ends *μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον* 15 C appear to have occupied the attention of the commentators to such an extent that they have neglected its substance. Yet, if I am not mistaken, it contains valuable information, both as to the relation in which the *Philebus* stands to several important dialogues, and as to the general purport of the succeeding argument. Socrates here recognizes identification of *ἕν* and *πολλά* in three distinct senses: (1) the identification of the One particular and its Many qualities, (2) the identification of the One particular and its Many parts, and (3) the identification of the One idea and its Many particulars. Of these three paradoxical identifications, Socrates authoritatively sets aside the first and the second, pronouncing the first to be 'stale,' 'by general admission unworthy of investigation,' 'childish,' 'trifling,' nay, 'a serious hindrance to thought,' and the second to be no better than the first. On the other hand he declares the third to be matter of grave controversy; for how can the One, if it is eternal and immutable, be distributed amongst an infinite number of particulars? and a fortiori, if it is separately existent, how can it exist at once by itself and in an infinite number of particulars? Now the same two identifications of *ἕν* and *πολλά* which are here accounted trivial and uninteresting, in the *republic* VII 523 A—526 B are made the bases of dialectical education. A rule is there provided for distinguishing those studies which will aid us in our progress towards *οὐσία* from those which will not do so. Any object of sensation which simultaneously produces inconsistent sensations needing to be reconciled by an effort of mind—for example, anything which is at once in different relations *μέγα* and *σμικρόν*, *κοῦφον* and *βαρύ*—is, we are told, *παρακλητικόν* or *ἐγερτικὸν τῆς νοήσεως*,

inasmuch as it obliges the soul to inquire—What are *τὸ μέγα* and *τὸ σμικρόν*, *τὸ κοῦφον* and *τὸ βαρύ*? Plainly this is the first identification of the One and the Many. Similarly the material counter of the practical arithmetician, being at the same time a unity and an infinitely divisible magnitude, obliges the soul to inquire—What is *τὸ ἕν*? and so stimulates *νόησις*[1]. Plainly this is the second identification of the One and the Many. Thus the very same paradoxes which in the *Philebus* are pronounced to be (*a*) *δεδημευμένα*, (*b*) *συγκεχωρημένα...μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι*, (*c*) *παιδαριώδη*, (*d*) *ῥᾴδια*, (*e*) *σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια*, are in the *republic* (*a*) dwelt upon, (*b*) as important studies, (*c*) to be pursued not only by children but also by men, (*d*) who must possess qualifications rarely found in combination, (*e*) as the only means by which they can attain truth. On the other hand the distribution of the idea amongst particulars, which in the *Philebus* 14 C is 'a trouble to all mankind,' is in the *republic* tacitly assumed as if Plato had never noticed that the third identification involved any difficulty whatsoever.

Similarly in the *Phaedo* 102 B—103 A the first identification is discussed—in regard to the tallness and the shortness simultaneously discoverable in Simmias—at a length for which Socrates thinks it necessary to make a sort of apology 102 D, whilst the simultaneous existence of *αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος* and *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος*, of the separately existent idea and the same idea distributed amongst its particulars—a case of the third identifi-

[1] *εἰ δ' ἀεί τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ περὶ [τὸ] αὐτὸ ὄψις· ἅμα γὰρ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.* 524 E. After this recommendation of the arithmetic of the accountant, who works with counters, Socrates proceeds to speak of the arithmetic of the mathematician, who uses, not counters, but abstract numbers, as likewise possessing the required tendency. (Sidgwick is mistaken when he says that the arithmetic of the multitude is not "recommended as a part of the propaedeutic of dialectic." *Journal of Philology* II 99, 100. The two sorts of arithmetic are both recommended, but on different grounds.)

cation of ἕν and πολλά—is assumed without a word of explanation[1].

In the *Philebus* then (and I may parenthetically remark, in the *Parmenides* also) Plato recognizes three cases of the identification of One and Many. We have (1) the division of One γιγνόμενον into Many qualities, (2) the division of One γιγνόμενον into Many parts, (3) the division of One ὄν into Many γιγνόμενα. Of these three cases the first and the second are set aside as trifling, uninstructive, and no longer interesting, whilst the third is declared to require serious consideration. Dropping the second, which both in the *republic* and in the *Philebus*, though distinctly recognized, occupies a subordinate position, we observe that the first and the third have important bearings upon Plato's theory of real existence. The fundamental principle of that theory as represented in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*—'Particulars are what they are by participation in

[1] If again we turn to *Meno* 73 c sqq., we remark at once a similarity and a dissimilarity to *Philebus* 12 d sqq. Meno's inability to regard virtue as a ἕν, and Protarchus's inability to regard pleasure as a πολλά, have a common origin, and Socrates in his answer to Meno takes the same sort of line, and employs the same examples (σχήματα and χρώματα), as in his answer to Protarchus. On the other hand there is nothing in the *Meno* to correspond to *Philebus* 14 b—15 b c. The ontological difficulty insisted upon in the latter has not in the former come to the surface.

It may be worth while to note in passing another instance of an echo with a difference. Having at the end of the passage above summarised 15 b c precisely stated the difficulty to be discussed, Socrates does not immediately address himself to his task, but first explains the method which he intends to pursue. 'There is no fairer method,' he says, 'than that which, despite my constant devotion to it, has often left me in the lurch.' This method is logic with its processes of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις, which are next copiously illustrated and in the subsequent inquiry carefully applied. The phrase which I have just paraphrased—οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο <ἢ> ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν. 16 b—echoes the words of the *Phaedrus* Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. 266 b, but with a significant addition. The method of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις is not superseded, but we are reminded that it is not infallible—a warning which seems specially appropriate when the theory with which it has hitherto been associated is undergoing a radical reform.

separately existent realities called ideas'—assumes both forms of the paradox: each γιγνόμενον partakes of many ὄντα, and each ὄν is distributed amongst many γιγνόμενα. In the *republic* and the *Phaedo* however, while the one form of the paradox—the γιγνόμενον's participation in many ὄντα—is persistently dwelt upon, the other form of the paradox—the distribution of each ὄν amongst many γιγνόμενα—passes without remark. When then we find that in the *Philebus* that form of the paradox which in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* was dwelt upon is, not ignored, but deliberately set aside, while that form of the paradox which in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* passed without remark becomes prominent, we are bound to suppose that the *Philebus* was written after the other two dialogues, and represents a later stage of doctrinal development.

And I think I see in the structure and the style of the *Philebus* evidence to confirm the theory that it belongs to a later period than the *republic* and the *Phaedo*. The dogmatic tone of the protagonist, the subordination of the dramatic interest, and the frequent occurrence of characteristic hyperbata, all point to this conclusion. Against this may be set Zeller's argument that "the very question which forms the theme of the *Philebus* is in the *republic* VI 505 B treated as a familiar one, the two views which in the *Philebus* are criticized at length being in the *republic* disposed of in a few sentences," *Ph. d. Gr.* II i 464, and Thompson's remark that the results of the long investigation of pleasure in the *Philebus* "seem to be taken for granted" in *Phaedrus* 251 E. For my own part, holding that in very many of the dialogues it is not the subject discussed by the interlocutors, but rather some side-issue arising from it, to which Plato attaches the greatest importance, I find no difficulty in supposing that he has here restated on a larger scale his views about the contemporary controversy, not so much because he was anxious to justify, or to supplement, what he had said about it in the *republic*, as because he thus secures an opportunity of marking the changes which had taken place in his metaphysical doctrine. Indeed I must confess that the ontology of the *Philebus* seems to me so certainly later than that of the *republic*, that, if there were (what I do not think

there is) clear proof that the main argument of the *Philebus* is earlier than the corresponding passage in the *republic*, I should not scruple to regard the ontological parts of the former dialogue as interpolations introduced by Plato himself subsequently to the composition of the latter.

Whether I am, or am not, right in thinking that Plato is here taking a new departure, it is at all events clear that he proposes for discussion a question of profound importance to the author of the theory of ideas, and the very precision and formality of the statement of the difficulty (15 B: see analysis, above) lead us to expect that some answer will be attempted. Further, as if to preclude all possible doubt, Plato makes Protarchus, on behalf of the company, distinctly suggest the investigation of the difficulty, and Socrates as distinctly accepts the challenge. Hence, when we find that Plato does not directly answer the question, we shall not, with Grote, assume that "he enjoins us to proceed as if no such difficulty existed," but shall rather suppose that he has deliberately preferred to answer it indirectly: for when Plato is obscure, he is so, I am convinced, intentionally, his aim being to compel the reader to think for himself.

§ 3 *The ontology of the* Philebus.

The question—'How is it that the separately existent monad or idea is reproduced in a multitude of particulars?' having been raised, and all present except Philebus having agreed that the discussion of it should not be deferred, Socrates addresses himself to his task.

15 D How shall we begin? he asks. Thus: the identification of the One and the Many, which is necessarily involved in the use of λόγοι, has been made by young
16 C people the basis of much fallacious argument. There is however a way by which we may avoid the confusion so occasioned. Assuming that all things which are said to exist are reducible to a One and a Many, and have two

D elements, Limit (*πέρας*) and Indefinity (*ἀπειρία*), in investigating anything we must first take a genus (*ἰδέα*), then divide it into two, three, or perhaps more, species, next divide each species into subspecies, repeating this process as often as necessary, and taking care not to attribute (numerical) indefinity to the multitude of species until all the species and subspecies have been
17 A enumerated. This is the method of the dialectician, as opposed to that of the eristic, who is not careful to
18 B mark the intermediate steps of the division. Similarly, when we have to begin with the indefinity of particulars, we must not pass from them to the genus until we have arranged them in subspecies and species.

D Philebus, who has already interrupted 18 A, now for the second time asks how this bears upon the matter under discussion, i.e. the rivalry of *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις*.
E Because, replies Socrates, *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις* are each of them a One. Hence, in order to decide which of them is to be preferred, we must first enumerate their kinds.
19 C That, says Protarchus after he has restated the question under discussion, will be your duty, Socrates;
20 A unless you know some other way of deciding the con-
B troversy. Here Socrates remembers to have heard it said that neither *ἡδονή* nor *φρόνησις*, but a third thing,
C is the *ἀγαθόν*: if this is acknowledged, it will no longer be necessary to enumerate the kinds of *ἡδονή* and
22 A *φρόνησις*. Now on being questioned Protarchus admits that the life of *ἡδονή* is inferior to the life of *ἡδονή* and
B *φρόνησις* combined; and similarly Socrates admits the inferiority of the life of *φρόνησις*, hinting however that the human *νοῦς*, whose claims have thus been disallowed on an appeal to experience, is not to be confounded with the true or divine *νοῦς*. Thus, for the present at any rate, if not finally, the original question falls to the ground. But though neither *ἡδονή* nor *φρόνησις* is
D entitled to the first place, it is possible that one of the two is more nearly related than the other to that, whatever it may be, which makes the mixed life

desirable and good: and accordingly Socrates continues
E to assert the superiority of *νοῦς* to *ἡδονή*, at the same time indicating his suspicion that even the third place is more than *ἡδονή* deserves.

23 B If however he is to maintain the claims of *νοῦς* to the second place, he requires other weapons besides
C those hitherto employed. Now the whole contents of the universe may be arranged under four heads—(1) *ἄπειρον* and (2) *πέρας*, which have been already mentioned 16 C as
D *ἀπειρία* and *πέρας*, (3) the two united, and (4) the cause
24 E of their union. The *ἄπειρον* includes *ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα*: for example, hotter and colder, dryer and wetter, more and less, quicker and slower, greater and smaller, all which forthwith cease to be, so soon as quantity and measure (*τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον*) establish themselves in the seat of the *μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον* by which
25 A the *τὰ ἄπειρα* are characterized 24 C. Next, to *πέρας* we assign *τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα* [sc. *τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον, τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα, τὸ λίαν*, κτλ], *τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἂν πρὸς*
E *ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον*. Thirdly, when the *πέρατος γέννα* or *πέρας ἔχοντα* are combined with the *ἀπείρου γέννα* or *ἄπειρα*, certain *γενέσεις* result[1];

[1] In the above summary I have been careful not to depend on the disputed passage 25 C—E Σ. *Πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἓν φύσεως.* Π. *Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;* Σ. *Ναί. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.* Π. *Ποίαν;* Σ. *Ἣν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει· τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκεινὴ γενήσεται.* Π. *Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;* Σ. *Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.* Π. *Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μιγνῦσι ταῦτα γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἑκάστων συμβαίνειν.* This passage as it stands abounds in difficulties. Take first the sentences *συμμίγνυ δέ γε—συνηγάγομεν*. Socrates having mentioned the *πέρατος γέννα*, and Protar-

26 A e.g. health, music, fine weather, beauty, strength, and
E a variety of excellences discoverable in the soul. Fourthly,

chus having asked 'What is that?' the reply is 'The γέννα which, whereas we ought to have collected the γέννα of the περατοειδές just as we had collected the γέννα of the ἄπειρον, we just now omitted to collect.' Neglecting for the moment the parenthetical part of Socrates's answer, we find that the words ἦν καὶ νῦν δὴ οὐ συνηγάγομεν contain a positive misstatement, the γέννα in question having been 'collected' in the phrase τὰ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα κτλ 25 A, just as the ἀπείρου γέννα was collected in the phrase ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα 24 E. Further, if we take account of the parenthesis, (2) the words τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς sc. γένναν seem a strange superfluity in an answer to the question 'What do you mean by the πέρατος γέννα?' and (3) while τὴν τοῦ πέρατος γένναν and τὸ περατοειδές are intelligible phrases, τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς γένναν has no authority elsewhere, and contains a hardly justifiable redundancy. Next, in the sentence which follows, (4) the words ταὐτὸν δράσει can scarcely mean "will do as well." Then, (5) though the word κἀκείνη, which clearly needs explanation, has intervened, Protarchus repeats his question about the πέρατος γέννα, and Socrates gives the answer which he might as well have given before. Finally (6) Protarchus's reply is strangely abrupt. Of these difficulties the last three disappear if, as I suggested in a paper read before the Cambridge Philological Society, October 18, 1877, the words ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει· τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανὴς κἀκείνη γενήσεται are placed after ἀπεργάζεται: but the other three remain untouched. It now seems to me necessary (1) to interchange Ἦν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν and Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τἀναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα, ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμόν, ἀπεργάζεται, (2) in the former place to bracket καθάπερ—περατοειδοῦς, and (3) to substitute συμμισγομένων for συναγομένων. We shall then get the following sense, 'S. Next you must combine with it [i.e. the ἀπείρου φύσις] the family of the limit. P. What is that? S. <The family of the equal and the double, that is to say, anything which puts an end to the mutual dissensions of the opposites (cf. 25 A), and by the introduction of number reduces them to symmetry and harmony.> But perhaps it will do the same thing now (i.e. the appearance of this γέννα will give symmetry and harmony to our exposition): by the union of these two families the third will be brought to light. P. What do you mean by the third family? and how is it to be brought to light? S. I mean the other family which we wrongly omitted to collect a little time ago. (Cf. 23 E, where the three γένη are mentioned, but only two, πέρας and ἄπειρον, are taken in hand.) P. I understand. You mean, apparently, that if we add these (i.e. the πέρατος γέννα), certain generations are the result.' Badham anticipates me so far as to declare transposition necessary, and (with other alterations) to place τούτων—γενήσεται after ἀπεργάζεται. He is clearly wrong in giving to συναγομένων the meaning of συμμιχ-

to these three kinds—of which the first and second are constituent elements (*ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται*), while the third includes the results of their union (*τὰ γιγνόμενα*)—we
27 B must now add the *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως καὶ γενέσεως*. This is *νοῦς* or *φρόνησις*, which, as others have already seen, orders and governs the universe, as well as the individual.

C The table of the four *γένη* being now complete, we return to the main argument. As intelligence in the abstract is akin to the *αἰτία*, while pleasure in the abstract, with its correlative pain, belongs to the *ἄπειρον*, we may safely assume intelligence in the abstract to be superior to pleasure in the abstract. But in order that we may adjudicate upon the claims of *νοῦς* actualized, and *ἡδονή* actualized, to stand next to that third thing which is admitted to be the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*, the two claimants must be studied in their species.

31 B—55 C Pleasures are classified as (1) false, (2) true, the latter class being subdivided into (*a*) *ἐπιστήμαις ἑπόμεναι*, (*b*) *αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπόμεναι*.

θέντων 26 B: but I think that in this respect the text should be brought into conformity with his interpretation. Vahlen thinks that all that is necessary is to add *εἰ* after *δράσει*, and to remove the colon after the latter word: but his interpretation depends upon a misconception of the words *συνηγάγομεν*, *συναγαγεῖν*, *συναγομένων*; for, whereas he takes *συνάγειν* in the two former cases to mean 'enumerate instances,' and in the third to mean 'unite' (*συμμιγνύναι*), it is quite clear from 23 E, 25 A, that *συνάγειν* here means to 'collect under a definition,' in which sense the *πέρατος γένναι* as well as the *ἀπείρου γένναι* (but not the *μικτόν*) has been already collected.

That marginal notes and references have in several cases been incorporated in the text of the *Philebus*, seems to me certain (see, for example, 30 A, where the words *τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ* should, I think, be bracketed): and it is easy to see that, when once transposition had occurred, a diligent annotator would be very likely to try his hand upon a misplaced sentence. For playful applications of a theory under examination to the circumstances of the dialogue, such as that which I think I see in *ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν δράσει*, compare *πορρωτέρω δέ ἐστι τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.* 22 E. *ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δή, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;* *Ἀπιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι.* *Phaedo* 73 B. *οὕτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνᾴσεται;* *Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας.* *Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνῳδός.* *Phaedo* 92 C.

55 C—59 D Arts and sciences are classified as (1) inexact, (2) exact.

59 D—64 A We are now in a position to ask which of the arts and sciences and which of the pleasures are to be mixed in order that we may obtain that combination of intelligence and pleasure which constitutes the happy life. All arts and sciences, it is answered, but only those pleasures which are true and those which are necessary, the need of intelligence being unreservedly admitted by pleasure, whilst intelligence resents the introduction of those pleasures which are false and intense.

64 A—E The ingredients having been determined, we have next to ascertain what it is which makes this mixed life desirable and good, in order that we may then, as proposed 22 D, inquire which of the two ingredients is the more nearly related to it. It is obvious that, if it is to be harmonious and real, the combination must possess *μέτρον* or *μετριότης*, *ξυμμετρία* or *κάλλος*, and *ἀλήθεια*.

65 A—66 A Let us now take these three conditions, into which the *ἀγαθόν* of the mixed life has been resolved, one by one, and consider whether *νοῦς* or *ἡδονή* is the more closely related to each of them. It will be found that *νοῦς* is nearer akin than *ἡδονή* to each of the three —to *ἀλήθεια*, to *μέτρον* or *μετριότης*, and to *ξυμμετρία* or *κάλλος*: and as the excellence of the combination depends upon these three things, we must account *νοῦς* victorious over *ἡδονή*.

66 A—67 C Finally, it is concluded that the conditions of perfect union and the ingredients of which the mixed life consists may be placed in the following order of merit

1. *μέτρον, μέτριον, καίριον.*
2. *σύμμετρον, καλόν, τέλεον, ἱκανόν.*
3. *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις*, which represent *ἀλήθεια.*
4. *ἐπιστῆμαι, τέχναι, δόξαι ὀρθαί.*
5. *ἡδοναὶ καθαραὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς—*
   (*a*) *ἐπιστήμαις* [? *καὶ ἀρεταῖς* 63 E] *ἑπόμεναι*
   (*b*) *αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπόμεναι.*
6. [? *ἡδοναὶ ἀναγκαῖαι.*]

If the conversation imagined in the *Philebus* had ever taken place, and one of the interlocutors had afterwards been asked to say what the character of the conversation had been, he would have answered, and would have rightly answered, that the subject of the discussion was ethical, but that incidentally something had been said about a metaphysical difficulty in regard to the theory of ideas. If Plato had been asked what the subject of the dialogue was, he would no doubt have answered "I leave that to your own penetration"; but I am very much mistaken, if to himself, in his heart of hearts, the metaphysical element of the treatise was not vastly more important than the ethical. The very pains which have been taken to obscure the fact, serve to rouse my suspicions. In the passage of which I have now to speak, 15 C—31 A, where the two threads are strangely interlaced, the continuity of the metaphysical thread, though never really broken, is never insisted upon; and partly in consequence of this deliberate reticence, partly in consequence of the reappearance of the ethical theme, Grote and others have supposed that the inquiry into the difficulty stated at 15 B loses itself in the mazes of the subsequent discussion. The statement of the metaphysical difficulty is however so precise, and the opening of the investigation is so formal, that we may be very sure that a solution of the problem, if not explicitly offered, is at any rate implicitly contained in the succeeding pages.

Now in the passage about genus, species, and particulars—*ἕν, πολλά,* and *ἄπειρα πλήθει,* 15 D—18 D, there is, if we except the words *πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων* 16 C, nothing which might not be found in an account of the earlier theory of ideas. There is in it moreover nothing which could possibly be regarded as an attempt to meet the difficulty raised at 15 B in regard to the distribution of the idea among its particulars. It is in fact, as is shown by Socrates's meditative questions *πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται, πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἆρ' ἐνθένδε;* 15 D, a mere preface to the promised explanation. When we find then that under pressure from Philebus 18 AD, Socrates, as soon as he has completed his account of the processes of

συναγωγή and διαίρεσις, recurs to the main question and settles it without making any use of these processes, we should, I think, infer, not that the attempt to explain the relations of the idea and its particulars has been abandoned, but only that it has been postponed, the contribution to the main argument serving the purpose of separating the logical doctrine with which we are familiar from the metaphysical novelties now to be presented to us. It is then only what was to be expected when the conversation takes a turn which brings the metaphysical thread again uppermost, its continuity being marked by means of a direct reference (Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων τὸ δὲ πέρας; 23 C) to the statement—made incidentally at an early stage of the inquiry and not referred to in the interval—that every thing which is said to exist, not only is resolvable into a One and a Many, but also has in itself Limit and Indefinity (ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων 16 C). Hence we enter upon the passage which begins Βαβαὶ ἆρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου πάνυ τι νῦν. 23 B, expecting to find in it a resolution of the difficulty proposed for consideration in 15 B; and as we have seen that the difficulty now considered so serious was not felt to be a difficulty at the time when the *republic* and the *Phaedo* were written, we shall not be altogether surprised if the resolution of the difficulty is effected by a reconstitution of the earlier doctrine. Perhaps we may further conjecture, on the strength of the sentence καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς, ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον, οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά. 23 B, that the reconstitution will involve additions to the original theory. In this way we are brought face to face with the question raised by Sidgwick, *Journal of Philology* II 103,—How is the ontology of the *Philebus* related to that of the *republic?* but, whereas he and others start with the assumptions that the *Philebus* is earlier than the *republic*, and presents substantially the same doctrine, I hold the *Philebus* to be the later of the two dialogues, and expect to find that in the interval the doctrine has been added to, and perhaps otherwise modified.

What then is the ontological doctrine of the *Philebus*? According to the *Philebus* πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντί may be arranged under four heads, as follows:

(1) ἀπειρία 'indefinity', or ἄπειρον 'the indefinite',—which regarded as a πολλά becomes ἄπειρα 'indefinites'—includes everything which exhibits τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον, τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα, τὸ λίαν, κτλ: for example, θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον, ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον, πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον, θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον, μεῖζον καὶ σμικρότερον, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη (so long as they have not been actualized by the introduction of a πέρας ἔχον[1]);

(2) πέρας 'limitation', or πέρας ἔχον 'limit', 'limitant',—which regarded as a πολλά becomes πέρας ἔχοντα 'limits', 'limitants',—includes everything which exhibits τούτων [sc. τοῦ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον κτλ] τὰ ἐναντία, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, everything which by the introduction of numbers reduces the divergent ἄπειρα to symmetry and concord;

(3) μικτόν or κοινόν includes τὸ τούτων [sc. ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος] ἔκγονον ἅπαν, all μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν, all ἄπειρα when bound fast by the πέρας: for example, ὑγίεια, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, μουσική, ἁρμονία[2], ὧραι, the μικτὸς βίος, ἡδοναί actualized, whether ἀληθεῖς or ψευδεῖς, whether good or bad;

[1] Here I may notice an apparent inconsistency which has perplexed some of the editors. In 27 E ἡδονή is assigned by Philebus to the ἄπειρον, on the ground that any limitation of it would prejudice its claim to be regarded as πανάγαθον. Socrates demurs to the reason alleged; but, as is clear from 31 A, is otherwise content with Philebus's decision. The same view is taken in 41 D. In 31 C however ἡδονή is assigned to the μικτόν or κοινόν. "These two statements" says Jowett "are unreconciled." The two statements are however perfectly consistent: for the ἡδονή mentioned in 27 E 31 A 41 D is one member of the δυάς, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, not as yet actualized by the introduction of a πέρας ἔχον—in the language of 31 A, ἡδονὴ αὐτή—and is therefore rightly assigned to the ἄπειρον; whilst the ἡδονή of 31 C is ἡδονή actualized—ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένη—and therefore belongs to the μικτόν. The same confusion might have arisen in regard to θερμόν ψυχρόν κτλ, if Plato had not, in order to guard against it, where he means θερμόν καὶ ψυχρόν not actualized, used the comparatives θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον, or as in 26 A added the explanatory words ἄπειρα ὄντα.

[2] Σ. Ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἡ τούτων ὀρθὴ κοινωνία τὴν ὑγιείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

(4) The *αἰτία τῆς μίξεως*, which by combining *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* produces *γένεσις*, is *νοῦς*, the lord of heaven and earth, which orders and directs the universe, just as the human *νοῦς* orders and directs the individual.

Π. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Σ. Ἐν δὲ ὀξεῖ καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἆρ' οὐ ταὐτὰ ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα ἅμα πέρας τε ἀπειργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο; Π. Κάλλιστά γε. Σ. Καὶ μὴν ἔν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγενόμενα τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο. Π. Τί μήν; Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὥραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμιχθέντων; Π. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Σ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ ξύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὖτη κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, ὦ καλὲ Φίληβε, πέρας οὖτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἐχόντων ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῂς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. 25 E. Badham is no doubt right in his acute conjecture that the words *μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν* in the sixth line of this extract should be followed by *τε* and some word signifying a genus of which *μουσική* is a species, but I feel no confidence in his suggestion that *τελεώτατα* (which seems to me an appropriate adjunct) is a corruption of *τε λειότητα*. There is a distinct reference to the passage before us in 31 C Σ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν. Π. Ὃ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο; But, whereas Protarchus's citation in 31 C has all the appearance of being exact, and certainly ought to be exact as regards *ἁρμονία*, seeing that the word, having been incidentally introduced, gives Socrates his cue, in 25 E sqq. *ἁρμονία* is not mentioned. May I suggest that the requirements of both passages would be satisfied if we were to read in 26 A *καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασάν θ' ἁρμονίαν τελεώτατα ξυνεστήσατο*? This conjecture is not as tempting as Badham's ingenious *τε λειότητα*: but it is conceivable that a scribe who had before him ΞΥΜΠΑCΑΝΤΕΑΡΜΟΝΙΑΝΤΕΛΕΩΤΑΤΑ might drop a couple of words in consequence of the recurrence of the letters ΑΝΤΕ. It is worth while to note that Olympiodorus mentions *ὑγίεια*, *ἁρμονία*, *στοιχείων τάξις*, and *ὡρῶν περίοδος* as the *παραδείγματα* here adduced.

The editors have not been able to agree about the goddess mentioned towards the end of the extract. It seems to me that we have a clue in 63 E *καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς, ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ*, where *ὑγίεια* and *ἀρετή* are together conceived as one goddess. So in the passage before us, *ὑγίεια* in the body (with *κάλλος* and *ἰσχύς*, cf. Aristot. *topics* 116 b 18) and *μουσική* in the soul (with *πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα*, i.e. the virtues) are together conceived as one goddess, whom, if pressed for a name, I should call *ἁρμονία*. Plainly Plato here pythagorizes: cf. Diog. Laert. VIII 33 *τήν τ' ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἅπαν καὶ τὸν θεόν· διὸ καὶ καθ' ἁρμονίαν συνεστάναι τὰ ὅλα*. The whole passage recals *Symposium* 185 E—188 D, where (as here) *ὑγίεια* and *μουσική* are the two most prominent manifestations of *ἁρμονία*.

Further of these four γένη, the first and second are together spoken of as ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα and as τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτίᾳ, the third as τὰ γιγνόμενα and as τὸ ποιούμενον, and the fourth as τὸ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν and as τὸ ποιοῦν. Finally, we must not forget the important phrase ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἔχοντων, which shows that the processes of συναγωγή and διαίρεσις find a place in the new system as well as in that of the *republic* and the *Phaedo*.

Now the exposition summarized above, though for the most part precise and even perspicuous, is in one point difficult and perplexing. The πέρας ἔχον appears to perform a double function. On the one hand it converts non-existence into existence: on the other hand it converts what is bad into what is good. But if the function of the πέρας ἔχον is to convert what is bad into what is good, so that one πέρας ἔχον in conjunction with one ἄπειρον produces ὑγίεια, and another πέρας ἔχον in conjunction with another ἄπειρον produces μουσική, how is what is bad produced, for example, 'disease', 'discord'? If 'disease' and 'discord' belong to the μικτόν, how do their elements differ from the elements of 'health' and 'music'? If they do not belong to the μικτόν, in what part of the system are they to find a place? It would seem however that the latter supposition may be immediately rejected, bad pleasures, as well as good ones, being unhesitatingly assigned to the μικτόν. We have then to ask ourselves—Under what circumstances does the union of πέρας ἔχον and ἄπειρον produce what is good? Under what circumstances does it produce what is bad?

Experience seems to shew that with Plato a gap in an exposition does not necessarily mean a lacuna in the system. The gap may have been intentionally left to be filled up by the student. In such cases however Plato usually affords one or

Philebus is appealed to, not "because *his* goddess was in question," but because here, as in 27 E (q. v.), where Philebus is again brought into the conversation, the width of the difference between him and Socrates is insisted upon. Whilst Socrates regards πέρας as the αἰτία τοῦ εὖ, Philebus regards it as the αἰτία τοῦ κακῶς.

two pregnant hints. Now in 24 C, *τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον* having been taken as the characteristic of the *ἄπειρον*, the *ἐναντία* of *τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον* are *τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον*, where *τὸ μέτριον* is plainly not identical with *τὸ ποσόν*. Next, taking Plato's example, the *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον*, i.e. temperature not yet actualized by the introduction of a limitant, let us observe what will be the effect of introducing first *μέτριον*, secondly *ποσόν* generally. The effect of introducing the particular *ποσόν* called *μέτριον* into *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον* or *θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ἄπειρα ὄντα*—i.e. temperature not actualized, regarded as extending in opposite directions from a point of indifference—is to produce in actuality an equable temperature which is neither *θερμόν* nor *ψυχρόν*. But when any other *ποσόν* is introduced into *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον*, the effect is to produce in actuality a temperature diverging more or less either on the side of *θερμότερον* or on that of *ψυχρότερον* from the equable temperature of the point of indifference. In fact, while the union of *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον* with any *ποσόν* whatever produces an actual temperature of some sort,—it may be, *χειμών* or *πνῖγος*,—there is one *ποσόν* which produces an actual temperature which is neither *θερμόν* nor *ψυχρόν*, namely *ὥρα*, and inasmuch as this is the one point in the infinitely extended line which is fixed, all the other actual temperatures must be measured from it. Thus the one *μικτόν* produced by the union of *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον* with the particular *ποσόν* called *μέτριον* stands in marked contrast to the many *μικτά* produced by the union of *θερμότερον καὶ ψυχρότερον* with other *ποσά*: *it* is the one fixed standard, and therefore capable of being known; *they* are the many deviations from the standard, and, inasmuch as, however nearly they may approximate to the standard, they can never attain to fixity, are consequently incapable of being known: *it*, as the standard, is perfect; *they*, as deviations from the standard, are necessarily imperfect, though the more nearly any *ποσόν* approximates to the *μέτριον*, the more nearly the *μικτόν*, which results from its union with the *ἄπειρον*, approaches perfection. The apparently distinct functions of the *πέρας ἔχον* are then in reality one: for perfection and existence are identical, and the further anything is from perfec-

tion, the further it is from existence. Thus when τὸ μέτριον, i.e. the appropriate ποσόν, is added to a given ἄπειρον, perfection and existence are the results. When a ποσόν more or less approximating to the appropriate ποσόν is added, the result approximates correspondingly to perfection and to existence. When a ποσόν is added which is remote from the appropriate ποσόν, the result is correspondingly remote from perfection and from existence. For example, perfect health and perfect music are produced by the union in either case of the appropriate ποσόν with the ἄπειρον in question: imperfect health and imperfect music are produced by the union in either case of a ποσόν, more or less approximating to the appropriate ποσόν, with the ἄπειρον in question: disease and discord are produced by the union in either case of a ποσόν, remote from the appropriate ποσόν, with the ἄπειρον in question; for even disease and discord must have something of order or goodness in them, or they could not be existent[1]. It would seem then that in the case of

[1] With the above should be compared *politicus* 283 B—287 A. The passage being too long to be quoted, I append a summary, in which I have endeavoured as far as may be to preserve the turns and expressions of the original: 'The art of measurement includes two parts, (1) that which deals with τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σμικρόν in their relation to one another, and (2) that which deals with τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σμικρόν in their relation to τὸ μέτριον, and so is concerned with the bare existence of becoming (τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν). If we ignore the existence and the measurement of τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σμικρόν in their relation to τὸ μέτριον, we shall forthwith work the destruction of the arts: for the arts regard excess or defect of τὸ μέτριον, not as non-existent, but as an existence detrimental to their operations, and guarding against it accordingly, in so far as they secure μέτρον, make all things good and beautiful. As surely then as there are arts, so surely τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σμικρόν must be measured, not merely in relation to one another, but also in relation to τὸ μέτριον: if there is a μέτριον, there are arts; if there are arts, there is a μέτριον; if either is not, neither is the other. Hence to the one part of the art of measurement we assign all those arts which measure number, length, depth, width, and speed in relation to their opposites, and to the other all those arts which measure them in relation to μέτριον πρέπον καιρόν δέον and generally everything which migrates from the extremes to the middle point. It is of the last-named part of the art that many of the κομψοί are thinking, when they say that the art of measurement is concerned with all things which become, though from want of familiarity with the processes of dialectic they have confounded the two parts.'

It will be immediately seen that this passage presumes the theory which

a given ἄπειρον we must carefully distinguish the μέτριον or appropriate ποσόν from all the other ποσά which may be united with it[1]: and that, where the combination is imperfect,

I have elicited from the *Philebus*, precisely that part of the theory which in the *Philebus* was left obscure being here emphasized, whilst what in the *Philebus* was expressly stated is here barely indicated. There are further some points of detail which seem to deserve a passing notice: (1) when Aristotle says *metaph.* 1 9 § 3 *κατά τε γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴδη ἔσται πάντων ὅσων ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι*, he may very well be thinking of that part of the passage before us which is summed up in the words *ὡς ἄρα ἠγητέον ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι καὶ μεῖζόν τι ἅμα καὶ ἔλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν.* 284 D. Plato here from the existence of arts and sciences argues the existence of a *μέτριον*, which (as we have seen in the *Philebus*) combines with the *ἄπειρον* to produce the fixed type or idea. Aristotle replies that in that case there should be fixed types or ideas of *τεχνητά*, whereas in the later development of the system—with which we are now concerned—in the case of *οἰκία δακτύλιος* κτλ fixed types or ideas are not recognized: (2) when Plato quotes certain *κομψοί*—generally admitted to be the Pythagoreans—who say that *μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα*, and reinterprets the dictum in the light of what has been said about approximations to a standard, he must surely mean that, whereas the Pythagoreans say that 'things are *ἀριθμοί*,' he holds that 'the degree of the thing's approximation to the standard is determined by *ἀριθμός*.' Now this is exactly what Aristotle says in his comparison of the Pythagorean and Platonic systems; *τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγὴ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν· οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον. metaph.* 1 6 § 7: (3) in view of the last words of the foregoing quotation from the *metaphysics*, it is almost startling to find Plato 285 A in like manner attributing the Pythagoreans' misinterpretation (as it seems to him) of their own principle to their want of familiarity with the processes of dialectic.

[1] The distinction between the *μέτριον* or appropriate *ποσόν* and other *ποσά* differing from the appropriate *ποσόν*, appears to be indicated in the precedence expressly assigned to *ἴσον* and *ἰσότητα* in 25 A *Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο;*

The latter part of this sentence seems to imply that the *ποσά* are quantities measured by reference to the *μέτριον* as unit. If so, it may well be asked—(1) Are we then to assume that the *ποσά* of things are in all cases exact multiples of the associated *μέτριον*? (2) Granted that this sort of measurement is applicable to that which is in excess of the *μέτριον*, how is it to be applied to that which is in defect of it? In fact the numerical expression of divergence from the type involves serious difficulties, of which Aristotle was well aware.

while it is some ποσόν other than the appropriate ποσόν which makes the μικτόν in question what it is, the perfect μικτόν, which results from the union of the appropriate ποσόν with the ἄπειρον in question, may be regarded as a type to which the imperfect μικτόν approximates[1].

[1] It may perhaps be asked—Does the new explanation of the ontology of the *Philebus* throw any light upon the fanciful order of merit which concludes the dialogue? I think it does. In order to establish the claims of the human νοῦς actualized against those of ἡδονή actualized, Socrates proposes to show that νοῦς is more nearly related than ἡδονή to that which makes the mixed life desirable and good. What then is that which makes the mixed life good for human beings? We can no longer say,—as we used to do,—that it is participation in the good: indeed in the *republic* itself no attempt was made in this way 'to hunt the good with one idea' μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι 64 E. It is possible however that we may be more successful if we take account of the new theory, that it is τὸ μέτριον which makes a thing good—περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ἀΐδιον ἠρῆσθαι φύσιν. Now, that our μικτὸς βίος may be the ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, firstly, its ingredients (which have been found to be ἐπιστῆμαι and certain ἡδοναί) must be good, i.e. they must severally exhibit μετριότης; secondly, they must be mixed in proper proportions, i.e. the mixture must exhibit ξυμμετρία; and thirdly, the result must be a reality, and consequently there must be νοῦς to act as αἰτία τῆς μίξεως καὶ γενέσεως. Having thus ascertained what conditions are necessary that the μικτὸς βίος may be (*a*) a good combination (*b*) of properly constituted ingredients, (*c*) actualized, namely μετριότης ξυμμετρία ἀλήθεια, we are in a position (1) to decide the contest between νοῦς and ἡδονή by comparing them with each of the three requisites in turn, (2) to draw up an order of merit. This order of merit will be—

1. μέτριον, which, in union with (α) ἐπιστήμη ἄπειρος οὖσα, and (β) ἡδονὴ ἄπειρος οὖσα, produces (α) ἐπιστήμη, and (β) ἡδονή, properly constituted.
2. ξύμμετρον, which determines the proportion in which the ἐπιστῆμαι and the selected ἡδοναί shall be mixed.
3. νοῦς which effects the two unions, and their subsequent mixture or combination.
4. ἐπιστῆμαι actualized.
5. selected ἡδοναί actualized.

In fact μέτριον and ξύμμετρον, the representatives of πέρας, stand first and second; the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως comes next; then come the μικτά which are here to be combined in a single κρᾶσις. To complete Plato's list, the remaining ἡδοναί and the two ἄπειρα, ἐπιστήμη and ἡδονή not actualized, might be added. That the four γένη should reappear here, is very clearly indicated at 27 D. The difficulty of the passage as a whole is perhaps in some measure due to the fact that we are here examining a μῖξις of two μικτά.

That the νοῦς which stands third is the ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς seems clear, since at 22 C (q. v.), where Socrates abandons the claim made to the first place by the ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, he reserves the claim of the θεῖος νοῦς for further consideration. Indeed, it is plainly stated

The μικτόν then includes two orders of existence which we shall do well to discriminate: (*a*) certain fixed types which result each from the union of the appropriate ποσόν with the ἄπειρον in question; for example, health, music, harmony, equable temperature, beauty, strength, virtue; (*b*) any thing which results from the union of a ποσόν, more or less approximating to the appropriate ποσόν, with the ἄπειρον in question, and consequently approaches more or less to the one fixed type.

So far I have endeavoured to develope the doctrine of the *Philebus* without reference to the theory of ideas. But we must not forget that the purpose of the exposition is the resolution of an objection which may be raised against that theory, and that the objection is apparently to be met by means of modifications and additions. Our next step then should be to throw the new system into a shape in which it may be compared with the old one. And with a view to this we must plainly begin by asking ourselves—In what part of the new system are the ideas to be found? Of the three answers which have been given to this question, none seems to me satisfactory. When Brandis *Gesch. d. gr.-röm. Ph.* II i 332 and Susemihl *genetische Entwickelung d. pl. Ph.* II 13 identify the ideas with the πέρας ἔχοντα, the remark immediately suggests itself, that in that case the difficulty raised in 15 B is not removed—the idea still exists at once by itself, apart, and distributed amongst a multitude of particulars. Zeller's theory *plat. Stud.* p. 251 and *Ph. d. Griechen* II i 577, that the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως represents the ideas, is open to the same objection, to say nothing of the difficulty of reconciling the hypothesis with Plato's statements about the αἰτία. When Schaarschmidt (as I learn from Zeller) asserts that the ideas do not appear in this passage and infers the νοθεία of the dialogue, I can only say that, though I am satisfied that the ideas are not to be found either in the ἄπειρον, or in the πέρας ἔχον, or in the αἰτία, I cannot accept his assertion until I have looked for them in the μικτόν.

33 B, that pleasure, being the concomitant of a γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, affects the gods as little as pain itself: their life is, in fact, a life of serene contemplation. (Hence Badham can hardly be right when, in the sentence τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ 22 C, he brackets πω.)

Now the idea as we knew it in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*—existing at once separately and in a multitude of particulars—is certainly not to be found in the μικτόν. We have seen however that there are in it (*a*) certain fixed types resulting each from the union of the appropriate ποσόν with the ἄπειρον in question, and (*b*) side by side with each type a divergent multitude, resulting each from the union of a ποσόν, more or less approximating to the ποσόν of the type, with the ἄπειρον in question. The fixed types are then just what the Ones spoken of at 15 B were supposed to be—μονάδες τινὲς ἀληθῶς οὖσαι, whilst the relation of the fixed type to the μικτά congregated about it presents no difficulty such as that which the relation of the idea to its participant particulars, as originally conceived, was found necessarily to involve. May we not conclude that Plato meets the difficulty formulated at 15 B by modifying his conception of the idea, and that the fixed types which we have discovered in the μικτόν are the reconstituted ideas[1]? If so, the idea is still eternal, immutable; it is still perfect, separately existent; it is still the proper object of knowledge. It is too, in a stricter sense than ever before, a One: for, whereas according to the earlier theory it was either divided or multiplied amongst particulars, its unity is now never sacrificed. But (1) its relations to the particular have undergone a complete transformation. Whereas in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* a particular is what it is by reason of the presence of the idea, so that the idea is its cause, in the *Philebus* both the idea and the particular come into being through the conjunction of two elements, an indefinite matter and a limitant quantity. The indefinite matter is the same for the idea and for the particular. The limitant quantity of the particular differs from, but at the same time more or less approximates to, the limitant quantity of the idea; and the more nearly the limitant quantity of the particular approximates to the limitant quantity of the idea, the more closely the particu-

[1] I have heard the Master of Trinity—from whom in common with many Cambridge men of my generation I derived my first genuine interest in Plato—use the word 'types' in speaking of the ideas as they appear in the *Philebus*, but I do not know whether in other respects his interpretation of the dialogue agrees with my own.

lar resembles the idea. Thus the relation of the particular to the idea is now no more than resemblance to a type, the causal function of the idea as conceived in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* having been transferred to the two elements into which the particular, in common with the idea itself, has been analyzed. Further (2) whereas in the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, Plato, in the attempt to convert the Socratic logic of practical morality into an ontology, has made himself the slave of general names, and has assumed, wherever he found a general name, the existence of an idea, the new conception of the idea as a fixed type, to which particulars approximate, implies an immediate depopulation of the world of real existences. Certainly all general names which connote divergence from types will cease to have equivalent ideas—e.g. *κακόν αἰσχρόν ἄδικον ἀκόλαστον θερμόν ψυχρόν ἡδονή λύπη*; and it will not surprise us if we are further told that *τὰ πρός τι* and *τὰ τεχνητά* have also been struck off the list[1].

In fact, the doctrine briefly but precisely declared in the passages quoted at the outset from the *republic* 596 A and the *Phaedo* 100 C, has now been superseded by a doctrine which finds expression, as brief, but also, I think, as precise, in two mutually complementary passages, the one from the *Parmenides* 132 C, the other from the *Philebus* 27 B: (1) *ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα.* (2) *Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τέταρτον λέγων ἆρα μὴ πλημμελοίην ἄν τι*; Π. *Καὶ πῶς*; Whether the new theory is still incomplete, and needs to be supplemented by the identification of an ultimate *πέρας* with the *ἀγαθόν* of the *republic* and of an ultimate *ἄπειρον* with the *χώρα* of the *Timaeus*, is a question which I leave to be considered on another occasion.

[1] Cf. Aristot. *Metaph.* 1 9. 990 b 15, 991 b 6, quoted above p. 255.

§ 4 *The Aristotelian summary of the later theory of ideas.*

In this attempt to recover Plato's later doctrine, I have thus far depended solely upon the *Philebus*, my reference to the *politicus*, p. 279, being purely illustrative and supplementary. I now propose to start afresh from Aristotle's summary of the Platonic ontology *metaph.* I 6. If I can shew (1) that this vexed passage is consistent with itself, and (2) that the doctrine described in it is in all respects that of the *Philebus*, I may, I think, at any rate claim to have made out a prima facie case.

The principal points insisted upon in this important chapter (part of which I shall presently transcribe) are the following:

§ 1 Though in the main Plato's system agrees with that of the Pythagoreans, there are certain dogmas which he does not share with them.

§ 2 These distinguishing features of Plato's teaching are (1) the doctrine, derived from the Heraclitean Cratylus, of the flux of *αἰσθητά* which consequently are not the objects of knowledge, and (2) the theory of ideas existing apart from the sensibles which from them derive

§ 3 their being, which theory was based upon the Socratic doctrine of ethical universals.

We come now to those parts of Platonism which have analogues in Pythagoreanism. First, the Platonic theory of the relation of particulars to the idea (*μέθεξις*) differs only in name from the Pythagorean theory of the re-

§ 4 lation of things to the number (*μίμησις*), and the one theory is just as incomplete as the other.

§ 5 Next, Plato distinguishes three sorts of existence, *αἰσθητά*, *μαθηματικά*, *εἴδη*, and, as ideas are causes of particulars, conceives the elements of the ideas to be the elements of all things—*τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν* being the *ὕλη*, and *τὸ ἕν* being the *οὐσία*, as it is by *μέθεξις* in *τὸ ἕν* that

§ 6 the ideas are derived from *τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν*. Now

in this part of his system Plato agrees with the Pythagoreans in making τὸ ἕν an οὐσία, and in taking ἀριθμοί to be αἴτιοι τῆς οὐσίας to particulars: he differs from them however, when he makes the ἄπειρον a duality, and calls it τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, when he makes ἀριθμοί distinct from things, and when he assigns to μαθηματικά an intermediate position between αἰσθητά and εἴδη.

§ 7 Of the doctrines which distinguish Platonism from Pythagoreanism, two—that of the separate existence of τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί and that of the ideas—were due to Plato's logical studies, while the resolution of the ἄπειρον into a duality was devised in the hope of tracing to the material cause the plurality of particulars.

§ 8 This last device is however a failure, as familiar analogies seem to shew that plurality originates in form rather than in matter.

§ 9 Such is Plato's theory of causes: it is however plain that he recognizes two causes only, a τί ἐστιν and a

§ 10 material cause, the ideas being αἴτια τοῦ τί ἐστι to particulars, and the ἕν an αἴτιον τοῦ τί ἐστι to the ideas, while the material cause both of ideas and of particulars is a duality, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν.

In the two elements he sees the origin of good and of evil respectively, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras did.

For fuller statements of the difficulties which have been found in this passage and of the attempts which have been made to elude them, I must refer the reader to Bonitz's commentary *ad loc.* and Zeller's *platonische Studien* and *Ph. d. Griechen.* It will be sufficient here to say that the commentators and historians, assuming the ἀριθμοί mentioned in §§ 6, 7 to be identical with the ideas, agree in asking—How can the same indefinite which in conjunction with the idea produces particulars, in conjunction with the one produce the idea? and again — What does Aristotle mean by identifying the one, the formal cause of the idea, with the idea, the

formal cause of the particular? They seem further to agree in supposing by way of explanation that the one and the indefinite which produce the idea are not identical with, but only analogous to, the one (i.e. the idea) and the indefinite which produce the particular. They differ however as to the exact import of Aristotle's testimony; some of them by a strained interpretation of his words reading into his assertions their own explanation; while others, seeing that, if words have any meaning, he distinctly and deliberately makes Plato identify the elements of the ideas with the elements of all things, are driven to the supposition that the pupil "has not quite rightly apprehended his master's meaning,"—"er habe Plato's Meinung, so weit es sich um die vorliegende Frage handelt, nicht ganz richtig aufgefasst,"—a supposition, I may remark, which is insufficient, if for no other reason, because it does not explain Aristotle's failure to perceive that he is attributing to Plato irreconcilable contradictions. Is there then no other explanation?

It is possible that the reader will be startled when I say that in this summary of orthodox Platonism the *ἀριθμοί* which are formal causes of particulars are not the ideas. It is true that in § 3 Aristotle represents the relation of the particular to the *ἀριθμός* in the Pythagorean system as identical with the relation of the particular to the idea in the Platonic; and that in §§ 6, 7 he recognizes *τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς* as parts of the Platonic apparatus; but it by no means follows, because the Platonic idea is equivalent to the Pythagorean *ἀριθμός*, that the Platonic *ἀριθμός* is identical with the Platonic idea. It is also true that at the end of § 5 *ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς*, commentators from Alexander Aphrodisiensis downwards have assumed *τοὺς ἀριθμούς* to be identified with *τὰ εἴδη*; but neither Bonitz's view, that *τοὺς ἀριθμούς* is an apposition, nor Zeller's suggestion, that *τὰ εἴδη* is subject, *τοὺς ἀριθμούς* predicate, *platonische Studien* p. 236, carries conviction. Thinking then that Zeller has taken a step in the right direction when in his *Ph. d. Griechen* II i. 628 he expunges *τὰ εἴδη*, I propose provisionally to retain *τὰ εἴδη*, expunging *τοὺς ἀριθμούς*, for which words I shall be able to

find a place in the immediate neighbourhood. It is true too that § 9 seems to favour the assumption of the commentators and historians, but as in this § Aristotle is by his own admission, not recording Plato's doctrines, but commenting upon them, I think myself entitled to defer the consideration of it until I have examined the rest of the passage.

Aristotle is however so far from assuming the identity of the *ἀριθμοί* with the ideas, that in § 7 he seems to distinguish *τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς* from them. Now *τὸ ἕν* is expressly declared §§ 5, 6 to be the *οὐσία*, i.e. the formal element of the ideas, and in the second sentence of § 6, *οἱ ἀριθμοί* are as expressly declared to be *αἴτιοι τῆς οὐσίας*, i.e. the formal elements of particulars. Would it not seem then that, when Aristotle says that Plato conceived the elements of the ideas to be the elements of all things, he understands by the formal element *τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί*, *τὸ ἕν* being the formal element of the ideas, and *οἱ ἀριθμοί* the formal elements of particulars? It appears to me that §§ 5, 6 might very well bear this meaning as they stand: remembering however that we have already expunged the words *τοὺς ἀριθμούς*, which at the end of § 5 are superfluous and ungrammatical, I venture to place them, first prefixing a *καί*, after *ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν*. The sequence of thought in §§ 5—7 will now be as follows:

'Plato conceived the elements of the ideas to be the elements of things, the material element being *τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν*, the formal element *τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί*: more precisely, the ideas come into being from *τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν* by *μέθεξις* in *τὸ ἕν*, which with Plato as with the Pythagoreans is an *οὐσία*; while *οἱ ἀριθμοί* are formal causes of particulars, another point in which Plato and the Pythagoreans agree: Plato differs from the Pythagoreans however in making the indefinite a duality (*τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν*), in separating the *ἀριθμοί* from sensibles, and in assigning to the *μαθηματικά* an intermediate position. Here the separation of *τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί* from things, and the introduction of the ideas, are the results of Plato's logical studies.'

It will be seen that, so far, a consistent sense has been obtained, and that the doctrine here attributed to Plato is

exactly that which has been found in the *Philebus*. In fact (1) as in the *Philebus* τό τε μέτριον καὶ τὸ ποσόν are formal elements of all things, τὸ μέτριον being the formal element of ideas and τὰ ποσά formal elements of particulars, so here τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί are formal elements of all things, τὸ ἕν being the formal element of ideas and οἱ ἀριθμοί the formal elements of particulars: (2) as in the *Philebus* an ἄπειρον called τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, so here an ἄπειρον called τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, is the material cause at once of ideas and of particulars: (3) in precisely the same sense in which in the *Philebus* both sections of the μικτόν are reduced to the same ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται, all things are here reduced to the same στοιχεῖα: (4) as in the *Philebus* the particular stands to the idea in the same relation in which a copy stands to its model,—the resemblance of the one to the other being caused by the approximation of the ποσόν of the one to the μέτριον of the other,—so here § 3 the μέθεξις of the particular in the idea would seem to be in reality μίμησις: (5) as in the *Philebus* τό τε μέτριον καὶ τὸ ποσόν and τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, so here § 10 τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί and τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, are respectively the origin of good and the origin of evil.

Thus five principal dogmas—of which not one is consistent with the theory of ideas as it is stated in the *republic*—are common to orthodox Platonism as described by Aristotle and to the doctrine adumbrated in the *Philebus*. The terminology is not indeed precisely the same, but this will not surprise us, as Plato would naturally avoid in a written exposition the technicalities of the school, while Aristotle would as naturally preserve them. In other respects the agreement is exact.

Two paragraphs however still remain to be explained. The first begins § 7 with the words τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος ἐκμαγείου—and ends with § 8. Here it is immediately obvious that the words τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων are full of difficulty, and that until they have been explained the meaning of the whole sentence must remain to some extent uncertain. According to Bonitz (after Alexander) Aristotle says—'Plato's reason for making the material

cause, in name rather than in fact, a duality ("quod infinitam materiae naturam, verbo quidem magis quam re ac notione duplicem fecit"), was, that numbers, i.e. mathematical numbers, with the exception either of primes or of odd numbers, are generated by the help of the number two' ("quia numeri quorum ad naturam vel similitudinem ideas suas redegerat, magnam partem dyadis ope progignuntur, exceptis nimirum numeris vel indivisibilibus vel omnino imparibus"). In other words, Bonitz supposes Aristotle to say that, when Plato came to name his *ἄπειρον*, he preferred the dual title *μέγα καὶ μικρόν*, because *some* mathematical numbers are generated by the number two. How Bonitz connects the sentence in question with § 8 is not clear. Further, in regard to the *πρῶτοι ἀριθμοί* here excepted, no agreement has been arrived at. Bonitz hesitates between primes and odd numbers generally: Trendelenburg *de ideis et numeris* p. 79, Zeller *platonische Studien* p. 255, and Schwegler *ad loc.* suppose the ideal numbers to be intended: Brandis *Gesch. d. gr.-röm. Ph.* II 313 takes them to be those ideal numbers which are odd. That these interpretations are anything but certain seems to be admitted even by their authors. Does the new conception of the theory as a whole throw any light upon these incidental sentences?

We have seen in the *Philebus* that each *ἄπειρον* is a duality in the sense that it extends in opposite directions from a point of indifference. It is further plain that in § 8, which clearly should be read in conjunction with the sentence now under examination, Aristotle refers to the plurality of particulars. Hence if the MSS had exhibited a hiatus where the troublesome words *τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων* now occur, no one would have scrupled to paraphrase the passage as follows: 'Plato's reason for making his material element a duality [i.e. for making it extend in opposite directions from a point of indifference] was, that this hypothesis made it easy to suppose the generation from it of <a plurality of particulars>. Familiar analogies seem however to shew that the origin of plurality should be looked for, not as Plato supposes in matter, but rather in form: for example, one table only can be produced from one piece of matter, whilst the joiner, who impresses form upon the matter

in question, makes several tables; and in like manner the analogy which Plato himself has used (*καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρί, τὸ δ' ὅθεν πατρί, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ, Timaeus* 50 D) may be effectively turned against him.' The sense thus obtained being unexceptionable, the question now suggests itself—Is it possible that *τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων* means 'the multitude of particulars'? Here Aristotle comes to our assistance. We read in the *physics* 219 b 6 *ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ* [*τὸ*] *ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν*: whence it would appear that there is nothing to prevent us from using the word *ἀριθμοί* on the one hand in the sense of *οἷς ἀριθμοῦμεν* to denote the *ποσά* of the *Philebus* apart from any *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*, and on the other hand in the sense of *τὰ ἀριθμητά* to denote the *ποσά* of the *Philebus* taken in conjunction with some *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*. In this latter sense however, the idea, being a combination of *τὸ μέτριον* or *τὸ ἕν* with *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον* or *τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν*, is itself an *ἀριθμός*, here called *πρῶτος* to distinguish it from the *ἀριθμοί* or *ἀριθμητά* before mentioned. (In fact the *πρῶτος ἀριθμός* of Aristotle is the *ἑνάς* of *Philebus* 15 A.) Thus by *τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων* Aristotle means *ἀριθμητά* arising from the union of a *μέγα καὶ μικρόν* with *ἀριθμοί* or *οἷς ἀριθμοῦμεν* as opposed to *ἀριθμητά* arising from the union of a *μέγα καὶ μικρόν* with the *ἕν*. It will be seen that the explanation here given of the double sense in which the word *ἀριθμός* is used, applies to a considerable group of passages, which might otherwise have been thought fatal to my interpretation of the phrase *τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί*.

It remains to say a word or two about § 9, where Aristotle from his own point of view briefly comments upon the system which he has been describing. Here he certainly assigns to the idea the same position in relation to the particular which the *ἕν* holds in relation to the idea. That there is in this place some confusion, inasmuch as throughout the rest of the chapter, while the *ἕν* is the formal cause of the idea, the idea is, not the formal cause, but the type of the particular, cannot, I think, be denied. This confusion may be due to the

hasty and careless expression of Aristotle's dislike of a theory which seemed to assign the function of his own εἶδος in part to an inherent formal cause, in part to an external type. It is possible again that Plato himself did something to create the confusion, if, as perhaps may be inferred from Aristotle's statements in § 3 and § 5, he used the word μέθεξις—which had formed a part of the terminology of the earlier system—to express at once the relation of the particular to the idea and the relation of the idea to the ἕν. Or again it may be that, though in dealing with the particular Plato discriminated the cause, i.e. the ἀριθμός or ποσόν, from the type, i.e. the idea, in dealing with the idea, he assigned to the ἕν both functions. However this may be, I can see nothing here to lead us to doubt the general accuracy of the precise statements of the rest of the chapter, confirmed as they are by the evidence of one of Plato's most elaborate dialogues.

By way of conclusion to this section I append the text of the latter part of the chapter upon which I have been commenting, together with a translation.

τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει <τῶν
§ 4 εἰδῶν>, τοὔνομα μεταβαλών· τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἥτις ἂν εἴη [τῶν εἰδῶν] ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν. | ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀίδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ
§ 5 ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον. | ἐπεὶ δ' αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, τἀκείνων στοι-

The only novelty in this doctrine of participation was the term employed: for whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato changes the term, and says, by participation in ideas: § 4 but what this participation or imitation was to be, both Plato and the Pythagoreans left an open question. | Furthermore Plato asserts the existence of mathematicals, distinct from sensibles and from ideas, and intermediate between them, differing from sensibles inasmuch as they [sc. the mathematicals] are eternal and immovable, and from ideas inasmuch as of each mathematical there are many similar instances, whilst the idea is in each case one alone. | § 5 Now

χεῖα πάντων ᾠήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα. ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν <καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς>. ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη εἶναι

§ 6 [τοὺς ἀριθμούς]· τὸ μέντοι γε ἓν οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἕτερόν γέ τι ὂν λέγεσθαι ἕν, παραπλησίως τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἔλεγε· καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας ὡσαύτως ἐκείνοις. | τὸ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς ἑνὸς δυάδα ποιῆσαι, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τοῦτ' ἴδιον. καὶ ἔτι ὁ μὲν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὺς εἶναί φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ

§ 7 μεταξὺ τούτων οὐ τιθέασιν. | τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγὴ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν· οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον. τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος ἐκμαγείου.

§ 8 καίτοι συμβαίνει γ' ἐναντίως· οὐ γὰρ εὔλογον οὕτως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πολλὰ ποιοῦσιν, τὸ δ'

since the ideas are causes of all besides, Plato conceived that the elements of ideas are the elements of all existences. Thus in his system the great and the small are material causes, and the one and the numbers are formal causes. From the great and the small the ideas are developed by participation in the one: § 6 where indeed he resembled the Pythagoreans in making the one an existence and not a mere predicate of something else which exists. He also resembled them in his further doctrine, that the numbers are the causes of the existence of all things other than ideas. | But the substitution of a duality for the indefinite taken as a unity, and the resolution of the indefinite into a great and a small, are peculiarities of Plato's. Again, whereas he makes the numbers distinct from sensibles, they say that numbers are the things themselves: and [whereas he does,] they do not, assign to mathematicals a position intermediate between higher and lower existences. | § 7 The separation of the one and the numbers from things, as opposed to the Pythagorean doctrine, [which identifies them,] and the introduction of ideas, had their origin in Plato's logical speculations, his predecessors not having cultivated dialectic. His reason for making the other [i.e. the material] element a duality, was, that [on that hypothesis] the numbers other than the first [i.e. particulars] were naturally generated from it, as from a lump of wax. § 8 Facts are however against him —the theory is untenable: for,

εἶδος ἅπαξ γεννᾷ μόνον· φαίνεται δ' ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης μία τράπεζα, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐπιφέρων εἷς ὢν πολλὰς ποιεῖ. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ μιᾶς πληροῦται ὀχείας, τὸ δ' ἄρρεν πολλὰ πληροῖ. καίτοι ταῦτα μιμήματα τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκείνων ἐστίν. | Πλάτων μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων οὕτω διώρισεν· φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαιν ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἐστιν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν. καὶ τίς ἡ ὕλη ἡ ὑποκειμένη, καθ' ἧς τὰ εἴδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ δ' ἓν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι λέγεται, ὅτι αὕτη δυάς ἐστι, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν, ὥσπερ <ἔ>φαμεν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἐπιζητῆσαί τινας φιλοσόφων, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν[1].

§ 9

§ 10

whereas his school derives multitude from matter, supposing the form to generate once for all, we find that one table is produced from one piece of matter, whilst the one person who impresses the form makes many tables. So it is likewise with the sexes: the female is impregnated by a single congress, while the male impregnates repeatedly. Now the relation of the carpenter to the piece of wood, and the relation of the male to the female, are similar to that of form to matter. [Whence it would appear that Plato is not justified in assuming matter to be the origin of multitude.] | § 9 Such was Plato's decision of the points at issue. Enough has been said to shew that he employs two causes only, a formal cause and a material cause, the ideas being formal causes of all other existences, and the one a formal cause of the ideas. It is also clear what the material substratum is, to which the ideas are attributed in the case of sensibles, and the one in the case of ideas: it is a duality, the great and the small. Further, he assigned to the two elements respectively the origin of good and the origin of evil, like certain earlier philosophers whose speculations we have already noticed,—I mean Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

[1] In printing the above extract I have made three alterations of the text, which need a word of explanation: (1) I have tried to shew above p. 287 that though the word *ἀριθμός* occurs in both systems, the Platonic equivalent of the Pythagorean *ἀριθμός* is not *ἀριθμός* but *εἶδος*. Hence in § 3 we must, at any rate in thought, supply after Πλάτων δὲ *μεθέξει* the words *τῶν εἰδῶν*, while in § 4 the words *τῶν εἰδῶν*, though appropriate to *τὴν μέθεξιν*, are not appropriate to *τὴν μίμησιν*. In view of the double inaccuracy I have ventured on a transposition, though, had the inaccuracy been single, I should have thought little of it: (2) In § 5, for reasons explained

§ 5 *Concluding remarks.*

It will now be possible to frame a provisional theory of Plato's doctrinal development.

I. Starting from the philosophical scepticism which he had learnt from the Heraclitean Cratylus, Plato seems for a time, like his master Socrates, to have found employment for his intellectual energies in the construction of general notions (λόγοι, ὑποθέσεις), within the domain of ethics. That these general notions are not knowledge in the strict sense of the word, Plato was quite aware: but this in no wise troubled him, as in this stage, like Socrates, he held knowledge properly so called to be unattainable.

II. Overcome by the craving for knowledge properly so called, he cast about for some method of extracting it from the Socratic general notions. In order to this it was necessary (1) to assume that each general notion represented not only what is common to a multitude of particulars, but also, in an imperfect way, an eternal and immutable existence, separate from particulars, and (2) to devise a method of converting the imperfect representation of the eternal and immutable existence into a perfect representation of it. The theory of ideas as we see it in the *republic* and the *Phaedo* is the assumption above named dogmatically expanded into the following propositions: (*a*) wherever we find a plurality of particulars called by the same name, there is, separate from them, an eternal and immutable existence, which we call

above p. 288, I have added *καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς* after *ὡς δ' οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν*, and bracketed *τοὺς ἀριθμούς* after *τὰ εἴδη εἶναι*: (3) The last sentence of the extract—*ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν κτλ*—appears to contain a direct reference to 3 § 17. 984 b 18 and 4 § 3. 985 a 5 (cited by Bonitz): I have therefore written *ἔφαμεν* for *φαμέν*. Further I have throughout 'spaced' the *Platonic* technicalities in order to distinguish the Pythagorean *ἀριθμοί* §§ 3, 6 from the Platonic *ἀριθμοί*, *ἕν* in the ordinary sense of the word §§ 4, 6 from the Platonic *ἕν*, and *εἶδος* in its Aristotelian sense of 'form' § 8 from the Platonic *εἴδη*.

an idea; (*b*) each particular is what it is by reason of the presence in it of the idea which bears the same name. In the *republic* and the *Phaedo* Plato further propounds a scheme for the requisite conversion of that imperfect representation of the idea which the general notion affords into that perfect representation of it which would constitute knowledge properly so called: but he frankly confesses that there is in the scheme a gap which he has not succeeded in bridging. In this stage then Plato tries to attain knowledge properly so called through ideas, but sees as clearly as any of his critics that the attempt is unsuccessful. Indeed the theory of ideas, which was to be the basis of the higher logic, is itself open to serious objections: (*a*) if we are to postulate an idea wherever we find a plurality of particulars called by the same name, the argument commonly called the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος may always be urged against us, and (*β*) it is impossible to understand how the idea can be distributed amongst particulars without sacrificing its unity and its separate existence.

III. In order to meet these objections urged against the theory of ideas, Plato in the *Philebus* (and elsewhere) amends his doctrine. Whilst he still postulates eternal, immutable existences, separate from particulars, he withdraws the assertions (*a*) that, wherever a plurality of particulars is called by the same name, there is an idea to correspond, (*b*) that the particular is what it is by reason of the presence in it of the idea which bears the same name. He now regards each idea as an eternal, immutable type in nature, produced by the union of an appropriate quantity (ἕν) with a given matter (μέγα καὶ μικρόν), and the allied particulars as divergences from the type, produced by the union of a quantity (ἀριθμός), differing more or less from the appropriate quantity, with the matter in question. Thus the idea is now a παράδειγμα, the particular, in virtue of the approximation of its ἀριθμός to the ἕν of the idea, being a ὁμοίωμα. In this way Plato provides himself with eternal, immutable existences παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά to be the objects of knowledge. In the *Philebus* he makes no attempt to explain how the knowledge of them is to be obtained: but I hope

hereafter to show that, whereas in the period of the *republic* and the *Phaedo* it was proposed to pass through ontology to the sciences, in the period of the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* it is proposed to pass through the sciences to ontology. It is possible that the statement of the theory of ideas which is contained in the *Philebus* was afterwards modified or supplemented, but its exact agreement with Aristotle's summary in *metaph.* I 6 would seem to show that it continued to the last to be in the main a correct account of the Platonic ontology.

The time has not come for attempting to criticize the theory which has been unearthed, or to trace the consequences of the discovery, if such it is. But even in this early stage of the inquiry it is easy to see, that, if the later theory of ideas was what I have supposed it, Aristotle's attack upon Plato assumes a new aspect, in so far as, form and matter being already provided for the particular in the shape of *ἀριθμός* and *μέγα καὶ μικρόν*, the paradeigmatic idea with the associated doctrine of *μέθεξις* or *μίμησις* is from the Aristotelian point of view a mere excrescence. It is easy to see too, that, if, as I conceive, the later theory is represented in certain of the Platonic writings, we shall obtain an important criterion for the determination of the order in which they succeeded one another. Again, it may perhaps be found that the study of the later dialogues from this novel point of view throws new light upon the teaching of Plato's Pythagorean contemporaries, as well as upon that of his academic and neoplatonic successors. On some of these subjects I hope to say something hereafter, but my first task must be to complete the examination of the original authorities.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to interpret and to apply two passages, the one in the *Philebus*, the other in the *metaphysics*. The special novelty of my interpretation of the former consists in the discrimination of the *μέτριον* and the *ποσόν* and the assignation of the ideas to the *μικτόν*. The special novelty of my interpretation of the latter consists in the recognition of *τὸ ἓν καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί* as the formal element of all things, *ἕν* being the formal element of the idea and *ἀριθμός* the

formal element of the particular. In the course of the inquiry four important propositions have emerged, (1) that internal evidence proves the *Philebus* to have been written after the *republic* and the *Phaedo*, (2) that in the first-named dialogue a new and improved theory of ideas is traced out, (3) that *metaph.* I 6 contains a consistent account of orthodox Platonism, (4) that the doctrine ascribed to Plato in *metaph.* I 6 is precisely the doctrine of the *Philebus*.

As I have found myself throughout in antagonism to two great scholars whose names are honoured wherever Plato is studied, it seems fitting that the last words of this paper should express the admiring gratitude which I feel towards Eduard Zeller and Hermann Bonitz. If, as I am bold enough to imagine, I have added something to their results, it is their writings which have enabled me to do so. In any case *οὐκ ἐρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμεθα.*

HENRY JACKSON.

12 *Dec.* 1881.

THE SIMILE OF THE TREACHEROUS HOUND IN THE AGAMEMNON.

νεῶν τ' ἔπαρχος Ἰλίου τ' ἀναστάτης
οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
λέξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνους δίκην
ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ.

Æsch. *Ag.* 1227—1230.

A WELL-KNOWN scholar, who recently revived not without profit the discussion of the δίκαι ξυμβόλαιαι, observed that the reappearance of the subject would probably raise a smile. In inviting the student of Æschylus to yet another consideration of the μισητὴ κυών I certainly feel the same hesitation, and am therefore encouraged to the same perseverance.

In the most recent edition[1] of the *Agamemnon* (A. Sidgwick, 1881) the simile is abandoned to the obelus; the following is the editor's note—

"1228 'Knows not what things the tongue of the vile she-hound, with long-drawn smiling welcome...shall accomplish by evil fate.' This is the best sense that can be made out of the text as it stands; but οἷα is a clumsy and unlikely accusative for οἷων, and φαιδρόνους is a very strange adjective, and the use of adj. for adv. is harsh with ἐκτείνασα: and we can scarcely resist the conviction that the text is corrupt. On the whole Madvig's alteration (following Tyrwhitt) is the most probable and is certainly highly ingenious; he reads:

οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
λείξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρὸν οὖς, δίκην
Ἄτης λαθραίου, δήξεται κακῇ τύχῃ

[1] Written in October, 1881.

...'knows not what a tongue of the vile she-hound has licked (his hand) and stretched out a joyful ear, and now like a stealthy curse shall bite him by evil chance.' The violent stretches of language, making the tongue (instead of the dog) stretch out a joyful ear and bite, are hardly too strong for Æschylus. Still they are strong, and *δήξεται* for *τεύξεται* is a considerable alteration; so I have not ventured to put the conjecture into the text."

Most readers will share Mr Sidgwick's objection to the MSS version, and approve his discretion in refusing admission to that of Madvig. For myself, indeed, I cannot, with the utmost deference to the author of the correction, give to it even such a qualified approval as Mr Sidgwick gives. The only acceptable thing in it is the *λείξασα* of Tyrwhitt, which indicates the true point of the comparison, namely, that the glozing welcome of Klytemnestra is a preparation for her treacherous stab, as a dog will lick the confiding hand which it purposes to bite. I am little disposed to quarrel with anyone on the shades by which boldness in language is discriminated from absurdity, but I think it should be proved by some similar instances that Æschylus could possibly describe a tongue as putting out an ear and biting. It is no defence that *γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνός* may stand for *κυὼν μισητὴ γλῶσσαν ἔχουσα* or the like. Of course it may in proper places; but poetry cannot be constructed or analysed like a term in an algebraical equation. To say

> narratur et prisci Catonis
> saepe mero caluisse virtus,

though it was Cato and not his virtue that *warmed*, is sense and poetry, because the phrase *virtus calet* suggests no visible image at all, and consequently cannot suggest an absurd one. But *γλῶσσα ἐκτείνασα φαιδρὸν οὖς δήξεται* does suggest a visible image, and that image is ridiculous. Still there is scarcely a limit to the vagaries of the imagination, and if the rules of critical evidence seemed to shew that Æschylus made a dog's tongue bite, we could only sigh and acquiesce. But this gem of metaphor is scarcely worth purchasing at the expense of such an alteration as *τεύξεται* for *δήξεται*. Nay, even *φαιδρὸν οὖς*, the charming

simplicity of which has lulled the suspicions of criticism, might not have been so effective against Agamemnon. I cannot pretend to an intimate acquaintance with dogs, but according to my small experience the canine manner of making friendly overtures is not at all happily described by 'stretching out a joyful ear,' whether this means (for it is not determined) 'pricking the ear' or 'laying it back.' The amicable lick is familiar to everybody, and it is often accompanied by rubbing the head against the hand saluted, but the ear—I put this merely as an enquiry—though the chief organ for expressing excitement, attention, etc., is in the coaxing mood merely passive, and the position of it would depend on the breed of the dog [1].

But while I go with Mr Sidgwick in rejecting this, the best of the attempts to make sense out of 1229, I think that the verse should not be given over until it has at least been considered from an entirely different point of view. If we take the lines as they stand in the MSS [2],

οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς
1229 λέξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρονους δίκην
ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ

and consider *ab integro* how we are to find there the meaning which Madvig justly expects, we ought surely to make our first essay upon the assumption that 1230 forms a sentence grammatically continuous. A malicious dog, he wishes Æschylus

[1] Prof. Kennedy (see recently published *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, p. 172) has given a guarded approval to the reading φαιδρὸν οὖς. He has stated most of the objections to it with a vigour which leaves nothing to be desired, but he regards as "all but decisive" on the other side the occurrence of φαιδροῖς ὠσὶν in a parody of tragedy by Aristophanes *Pax* 154-6. I cannot but think that Prof. Kennedy greatly overestimates the weight of this fact. It certainly proves (if proof be required) that *to prick a joyful ear* (φαιδρὸν οὖς) is an expression proper to the poetical style. It might even support the conjecture that the words actually occurred in some tragedy, though it does not prove even as much as that, for it is not to be assumed that Aristophanes could not invent a quasi-tragic phrase without an actual model. For connecting the parody with this passage of the *Agamemnon* there seems to be no reason whatever.

[2] The difference between καὶ κτείνασα and Canter's κἀκτείνασα is not worth notice.

to say, by licking the hand under the pretence of affection will obtain the opportunity to wound it. But this is just what 1230 does say, whether we read

ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ,

will accomplish by an evil chance of treacherous hurt, or

ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακὴν τύχην,

will find an evil chance of treacherous hurt[1]. If this were so, the participial clause must of course begin and end with 1229. And whatever difficulties may ultimately await us in bringing the whole into conformity with this hypothesis, if once it occurs as possible, I think we shall soon discover small but conspiring indications in its favour. In the first place, not only is it easy to take ἄτης λαθραίου with τύχῃ, but it is difficult to explain it satisfactorily in any other way. According to the usual punctuation, δίκην ἄτης λαθραίου, the actions of a treacherous dog are illustrated by those of Ἄτη. If our attention had not been turned elsewhere, it would probably have been noticed before[2], how oddly the relation of copy and original are thus inverted. When a quality or immaterial thing such as ἄτη is personified, actions may of course be attributed to it, and the most natural way of making the conception real and vivid is to compare the action supposed to that of some material agent which may serve as a type of it. But to reverse the process is unreasonable, not to say silly. Our only way of imagining what a treacherous ἄτη would do is to figure to ourselves what a treacherous human being or treacherous animal would do. What purpose, then, can be served by saying

[1] The case of οἷα appears to me, as it has appeared to Prof. Kennedy and others, quite defensible. It is rather cognate than object to τεύξεται, *what success it shall have;* οἷων τεύξεται would mean *what will befall it,* a different thing. Moreover, even a slightly irregular accusative would be, as Prof. Kennedy says, not surprising in such a position. It has also been suggested (Prof. Paley) that τεύξεται is the future not of τυγχάνω but of τεύχω and is equivalent to ποιήσεται. Although we should expect τεύξει, the middle is not impossible; but it is difficult to dissociate τεύξεται from τύχῃ.

[2] Prof. Kennedy does observe in passing how "strange" is the "parenthetic simile."

that the behaviour of a dog or a woman is like that of Ἄτη or an ἄτη? Let us consider a parallel case in English. When the Elizabethan poet writes how

> pity, like a naked new-born babe,
> Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubim, horsed
> Upon the sightless couriers of the air,
> Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye,

the figure, though bold or even (some might think) exaggerated, has a plain function, giving to the abstract notion of pity the energy and force of a visible presentation. But when the poetaster in 'The Chough and Crow,' encouraged possibly by this very passage of Shakspeare, tells us that

> The hushed wind wails with feeble moan,
> Like infant Charity,

the thing in spite of the most pathetic and quavering prolongations remains hopelessly ineffective; obviously because the moaning of infant Charity, a purely imaginary sound, presents itself to the mind so much less distinctly than the wail of the wind itself, that the image *loses* in force by the comparison. And really the "licking" and "ear-stretching" of a "treacherous curse" (or "secret plague," or whatever you please) is very little better. Moreover, if such a comparison was to be made, the very last word to express it would be δίκην. This curious archaism, which signified properly 'after *the wont of* so-and-so,' is elsewhere reserved to the most picturesque similes only, and was clearly in Æschylus' day a highly artificial phrase, the unusual application of which would have been instantly felt and reprehended. In modern imitations of the Attic dramatists this δίκην is treated as an arbitrary variety for ὥσπερ, but this is not so in the originals. Sophokles and Euripides have but one example between them, which we shall notice more particularly below; Æschylus, for reasons not difficult to see, is extremely fond of the phrase; but the reader will perhaps be a little surprised at the following list of his comparisons—*a crow, an ox, a swan, a swallow, a dog, a hare, a fawn, a kid, a wave, fire, water, the moon, the Gorgons, a diver, a messenger, a charioteer, a gardener, sailors, a child, a bride, a man speaking a foreign tongue, dreams.* The limits of this class are visible

upon inspection. All these things are things which have a motion or habit of some kind, a 'way', in fact, of their own, which way is called their *δίκη*. The case of *Ag.* 980, whatever view may be taken of it, is peculiar,

> *μαντιπολεῖ δ' ἀκέλευστος ἄμισθος ἀοιδά·*
> *οὐδ' ἀποπτύσαι δίκαν*
> *δυσκρίτων ὀνειράτων*
> *θάρσος εὐπιθὲς ἴζει φρενὸς φίλον θρόνον.*

Neither the object nor the manner of this comparison are like the supposed *δίκην ἄτης λαθραίου*, and it does not therefore concern us here, but *δίκαν ὀνειράτων* is certainly unusual, and there is something to be said for the editors who reject it (see Karsten, Dindorf 1869, and others). Beyond Æschylus, there is I believe but one tragic example, *πολεμίων δίκην* in Eur. *Hek.* 1162, to which for its own sake I should like to devote a word or two. Fresh from the vigorous similes of Æschylus, his

> *βοὸς δίκην πρὸς βωμὸν εὐτόλμως πατεῖς,*

or his

> *ὄνειδος ἔτυψεν δίκαν διφρηλάτου*
> *ὑπὸ φρενός,*

the mind can scarcely fail to be displeased by the shadowy vagueness of *πολεμίων δίκην*, and to wonder why Euripides should have gone out of his way to pick up so poor a phrase. At least this was my own impression, and it was certainly not weakened when on turning to the passage, I read—Polymnestor is describing the assault of the Trojan women—

> *κἆτ' ἐκ γαληνῶν πῶς δοκεῖς προσφθεγμάτων*
> *εὐθὺς λαβοῦσαι φάσγαν' ἐκ πέπλων ποθὲν*
> *κεντοῦσι παῖδας, αἱ δὲ πολεμίων δίκην*
> *ξυναρπάσασαι τὰς ἐμὰς εἶχον χέρας*
> *καὶ κῶλα.*

We scarcely need the poet to tell us that to hold a man down by main force while your comrades murder his children is the act of an enemy, and if Euripides did wish to state the fact, the commonest vocabulary would have been adequate to his purpose. The adoption of *δίκην* should signify some unusually

bold and Æschylean image, some graphic touch from nature such as the father of tragedy delights in. Perhaps we can even recover it—

αἱ δὲ πολυπόδων[1] δίκην
ξυναρπάσασαι τὰς ἐμὰς εἶχον χέρας
καὶ κῶλα—

they clung to my limbs like devil-fish.

With any reading, therefore, the common punctuation of

λέξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνους, δίκην
ἄτης λαθραίου

is objectionable in point of sense; and this objection applies to Madvig's reading no less. But the correction φαιδρὸν οὖς raises another objection on the ground of rhythm. I appeal with some confidence to any one who has tuned his ear by the sound of Æschylean verse, to say whether he is pleased with

φαιδρὸν οὖς, δίκην

for the close of an iambic senarius. A pause, even the slightest, before the final foot is contrary to the principle of the metre and extremely rare. It occurs indeed with this very word δίκην in *Ag.* 297

ὑπερθοροῦσα πέδιον Ἀσωποῦ, δίκην
φαιδρᾶς σελήνης,

but it is plain—I speak of my own sensations—that the ill effect of the break is very much increased when it follows immediately upon a heavy and emphatic monosyllable. I do not of course mean to say that any line could be suspected merely on this ground, but when we are endeavouring to fix the exact place of an admitted corruption, we should best begin by presuming the rhythm normal; and this, corroborating our other evidence, will incline us to place the division before ἄτης λαθραίου and seek a construction for δίκην in the line where it stands.

This, then, is the new point of view of which I spoke. It

[1] Or πουλύπων if this form of the word is to be restored in tragedy. See Lexicon s. v.

remains to take the corrupt line 1229 and see whether, on this hypothesis, we can make anything of it.

λέξασα (or λείξασα) κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνους δίκην.

Now there is only one word in this clause which does not offer hope of a reasonable sense, and that is δίκην. Mr Sidgwick indeed remarks that 'φαιδρόνους is a very strange adjective,' but the objection, unless it be confined to the construction of the word in this particular context, seems groundless. The transference of φαιδρός from the *glad* expression to the *glad* feeling which the expression is supposed to indicate is quite natural; we have parallel forms in ὑψηλόνους (Plato, *Phædr.* 270 A), ὑγρόνους *of weak virtue* (mentioned by Pollux 6. 126 in a list of epithets applicable to the κίναιδος), and probably others. It is likely that such formations were unusual in Attic prose, impossible they can scarcely have been in a dialect to which, εὔνους and κακόνους were familiar; and it might even be argued from the context that neither ὑψηλόνους nor its companion τελεσιουργός are of Plato's own mint; but for poetry φαιδρόνους is perfectly good. But δίκην of course cannot be right if the line is continuous. And to a reader accustomed to the habits of copyists, no word could appear more promising as a lurking-place for corruption. It is an extremely common word and has a wide range of meanings, with a corresponding capacity for appearing to give a sense when it really does not. In fact it is just the sort of word which the half-learned scribe is apt to fabricate. The next thing, then, will be to consider what letters were likely to be mistaken for ΔΙΚΗΝ, a question admitting of a brief and positive answer. ΔΙΚΗΝ in Æschylus may represent four different groups of letters, of which two have no meaning, or none which can apply to the present passage. But let us try λιχην—

οὐκ οἶδεν οἷα γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνὸς,
λείξασα κἀκτείνασα φαιδρόνουν λιχὴν,
ἄτης λαθραίου τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ,

he knows not what the tongue of the abominable hound, proffering the lick of gladness, shall accomplish by an evil chance of treacherous hurt. The accusative λιχὴν is to be taken both with λείξασα

and with *ἐκτείνασα*. Thus the language of the metaphor becomes perfectly natural and consistent: the tongue does not bite, but by offering to lick the hand in token of friendly welcome, it gains an opportunity for the bite. *ἐκτείνασα* is modelled upon *ἐκτείνειν χεῖρα to put out* or *proffer* the hand by way of greeting, and it is this word which, if my suggestion is right, was probably the cause of all the mischief. Kassandra's words are pointed more especially to the long and elaborate speech with which Klytemnestra receives Agamemnon upon his arrival 855—913, of which the king says (915)

ἀπουσίᾳ μὲν εἶπας εἰκότως ἐμῇ·
μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας.

It was therefore very natural to connect the *ἐκτείνασα* of one passage with this *ἐξέτεινας*, though in reality it has not any resemblance, or, except perhaps in a sort of allusive way, any reference to it. Thus *ἐκτείνασα* in fact produced the false substitution of *λέξασα* for *λείξασα* which it has served to conceal. The experience of any student of textual degeneration will supply him with examples of this species of error by false reference, as it might be called. Thus aided and prepared, the descent of ΛΙΧΗΝ to ΔΙΚΗΝ, already sure, would be precipitated, and *φαιδρόνουν* must wander, as forsaken adjectives will and do, to the only remaining support.

I should like to add a few words on the reading *κακὴν... τύχην*. Palæographically, it is almost an indifferent alternative for *κακῇ...τύχῃ*, the confusion of these terminations being incessant. And though, as the dative will pass, we should of course not change it, I am not sure that the accusative is not better, and possibly right. The adverbial *οἷα how*, for the common *ὡς*, is illustrated by the analogy of *ὁποῖα* and *ὁμοῖα*, both of them Attic; *οἷα* itself occurs as an adverb in Homer. and there is no reason for denying it to Æschylus. Upon *τεύξεται τύχην* it is to be observed that *τύχη* in its common use is 'cognate' to the intransitive *τυγχάνω to happen, befall*, rather than to the transitive *to find* or *get*, though the two meanings are very near and sometimes cross. But it is a characteristic of poetical styles, particularly of archaic poetry, to use words according to their

etymological and, so to speak, native force, and not according to the narrower limitations which for the sake of clearness are imposed upon them in prose. It is one of the many ways of attaining that remoteness from vulgar associations, which is in some degree necessary to diction intended for dignified purposes. The Greek tragedians themselves furnish examples much more remarkable than this exceptional treatment of τύχη. For instance, λαβή in the Greek of all periods signifies either *a handle* or *a grip* and in the latter sense is a technical term of the wrestling ground. But notwithstanding this, Æschylus can fall back upon its etymological relation to λαμβάνω, like that of τύχη to τυγχάνω, and boldly writes (*Supp.* 935)

> τὸ νεῖκος δ' οὐκ ἐν ἀργύρου λαβῇ
> ἔλυσεν,

making λαβή a poetical equivalent for the prosaic λῆψις. So again the various uses of πάλλειν are for the purposes of ordinary speech strictly parted among the different substantives derived from the same stem; to πάλλειν κλήρους corresponds πάλος *a lot*, from πάλλεται κέαρ we have παλμός *a throb*, while πάλλειν τὸν μαχόμενον *to swing* or *dash down an adversary*, a use which, though it must have been once in vogue, had before the literary epoch been expelled almost to the last trace from the verb, took by way of compensation the exclusive possession of the substantive πάλη *wrestling*. Neither πάλη nor its derivative παλαίειν have any other sense in prose, or normally in poetry either. Yet the language remains conscious, so to speak, that πάλη is, after all, merely πάλος in an older form and can upon occasion remember it, as we see when Euripides writes (*Herakl.* 158)

> ἦν δ' ἐς λόγους τε καὶ τὰ τῶνδ' οἰκτίσματα
> βλέψας πεπανθῇς, ἐς πάλην καθίσταται
> δορὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα.

It is obvious that this πάλη δορός (for the common μάχη δορός) is intended to recall the cognate verb in its most familiar application πάλλειν δόρυ, which does not appear to have formed any substantive in common use, nor are πάλος and its associations of *arbitrament* and *decision* out of view. This blurring of

the hard lines drawn for practical purposes between kindred forms of speech is, in fact, the essential condition of poetry and its chief linguistic difference from prose. One more example out of many I will mention because it is peculiarly striking. *κόπος ache* is connected in form with *κόπτειν to bruise*, but the etymology has left no impression upon its ordinary meaning. The word itself is almost confined to poetry, but its congeners classical and post-classical *κοπιάω, κοπιαρός, κοπάζω, κοπόω* etc. have all the same notion as *κόπος* itself, *fatigue* or *weariness*. *To strike a coin* was *κόπτειν νόμισμα*, the stamp not *κόπος* but *κόμμα*, *to beat the breasts* in mourning was *κόπτειν στέρνα*, the act not *κόπος* but *κομμός*. It is quite improbable that *κόπος* was ever heard among Athenians in any but the one proper sense. Yet it was observed by Seidler and is generally agreed that in Eur. *Suppl.* 789

τάδε σοι δίδομεν
πλήγματα κρατὸς στέρνων τε †κτύπους†

the poet must have trusted the ears and intellects of his audience so far as to write

πλήγματα κρατὸς στέρνων τε κόπους.

It is a bold stroke, though, and Athens one would think must have contained critics dull enough or keen enough to ask what 'breast-aches' might be. It is possible also that the true correction is

πλήγματα κρατὸς στέρνων τε τύπους,

but if so the example is equally to the purpose, for *τύπος*, like *κόπος*, was differentiated for prose purposes by the different sense of *a mark* or *stamp*. Xenophon has it once as an equivalent (unless indeed it is an error) for *κτύπος* (Eq. 11, 12). I prefer *κόπους*, however, in the *Supplices*, because *κόπτεσθαι* was the regular Attic word for the gesture of mourning, not *τύπτεσθαι*, and an exceptional use of this kind would naturally follow some perfectly familiar analogy.

In the presence of these facts, and many more of the same kind, there is no reason for surprise at any use of *τύχη* which is justified by its relation to *τυγχάνω*. There are, as I have

pointed out elsewhere (note to Eur. *Med.* 198), other passages in which τύχη in the common sense of *chance* would give a poor effect, and the word is certainly coloured by the associations of τυγχάνω *to hit*, so as to suggest, if not to mean, *a stroke*, notably Eur. *H. F.* 1393

πάντες ἐξολώλαμεν
Ἥρας μιᾷ πληγέντες ἄθλιοι τύχῃ.

In the Æschylean example, the actual presence of the verb in a grammatical connexion implying similarity of meaning would make the substantive perfectly clear, and the whole would resemble more closely than ever the αἰνεῖς...κακὸν αἶνον from 1481—2 of the same play, which Prof. Kennedy quotes in illustration of it.

If the reader, satisfied in other respects with my interpretation, is disturbed by the absence of λιχή from the Lexicon, I would suggest to him the following reflexions. (1) Is it seriously to be supposed that the Greek language was incapable of expressing *a lick?* (2) If the word for *a lick*, was not λιχή or λοιχή, one or both (cf. πλοκή, τύχη, πτυχή, στοιβή, στιβή, λοιβή, στίχος, στίχες, etc. etc.)—what was it?

A. W. VERRALL.

Note.—Having had occasion to refer to Mr Sidgwick's edition, I should like to express my thanks for his courteous and appreciative remarks (Appendix) upon a former paper of mine in the 9th volume of this Journal. I think his criticisms partly right and partly wrong, and hope soon to have an opportunity of discussing them further.

Φαμὲν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἁπλῶς τὸ καλῶς. οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρετῆς μέν εἰσιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν· αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν· αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἁπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος αἵρεσις ἐστίν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις τοὐναντίον, κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις.

Happiness, we are here told, consists in *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία*; but in order that *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία* may constitute happiness, it must be *τελεία ἁπλῶς*, not *τελεία ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*. By way of explaining the distinction, it is added that *τἀναγκαῖα* are *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τέλεια, τὸ καλῶς* being *ἁπλῶς τέλειον*. For example, *αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις*, though virtuous, are *ἀναγκαῖαι*, and exhibit *τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως*; while *αἱ δίκαιαι πράξεις αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας* are *ἁπλῶς κάλλισται*. In the sequel something is said about *χρήσεις* which are *ἁπλῶς σπουδαῖαι καὶ καλαί*.

As the phrases *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἁπλῶς* confessedly need explanation, while the words *ἀναγκαῖα, καλῶς* are ambiguous, we naturally look to the example in the hope that it will give us some assistance. Here however a new difficulty meets us. If we take the phrase *αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας* in its obvious sense, it seems strange that 'acts done with a view to, or in the expectation of, honours and rewards,' should be contrasted with 'the infliction of just vengeance and punishment.' If again with Susemihl we take the phrase in question to mean "diejenige Ausübung der Gerechtigkeit, welche Anderen Ehrenauszeichnungen zutheilt oder Wohlstand verschafft," it seems strange that acts of distributive justice should

be accounted so decidedly superior to acts of corrective justice, while it may be doubted whether the phrase *ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας* can bear the meaning given to it. It is to be remarked further that in any case the epithet *δίκαιαι* is superfluous, as *τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις* are alone under consideration.

Now in *Nic. Eth.* III 8 §§ 1—5 and X 9 §§ 4, 9, 10, acts done *δι' ἀνάγκην, διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας*, are unfavourably contrasted with acts done *ὅτι καλόν, διὰ τὰς τιμάς*: see especially III 8 § 5 *δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.* X 9 § 4 *οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν* [sc. *οἱ πολλοί*] *αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας.* § 9 *οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ.* May we not infer that in the passage before us, where *ταναγκαῖα* are contrasted with *τὰ καλῶς, αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας πράξεις* being the second member of the second pair of correlatives, (1) *ταναγκαῖα* means, not *ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ* (Berlin Index 797 a 43), but *τὰ δι' ἀνάγκην*, and (2) *αἱ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ κολάσεις* should be substituted for *αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις*?

In this way we obtain an excellent sense: just acts which have for their motive *ἀνάγκη* in the shape of vengeance and punishment are distinguished from just acts which have for their motive *τὸ καλόν* in the shape of honour and reward, the former being accounted *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τέλειαι*, perfect in a qualified way, the latter *ἁπλῶς τέλειαι*, perfect without such limitation: it is in acts, not of the former, but of the latter sort—in other words, it is in acts not of *obligatory*, but of *optional*, morality—that happiness is to be found[1].

HENRY JACKSON.

[1] Accepting Postgate's interpretation of the phrase *κακοῦ τινος αἵρεσις* (*Notes on the Politics of Aristotle*, p. 13), I read the sentence in which it occurs as a justification of the superiority assigned to *αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας πράξεις*: 'for, whereas virtuous action enforced by punishment is good only by comparison with vicious action, virtuous acts done in the hope of honour and reward produce positive good, and so are good absolutely.'

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